Russell's second paradox: a dialectical analysis of 'On denoting' by Boukema, H.P.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The version of the following full text has not yet been defined or was untraceable and may
differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/81995
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-08 and may be subject to
change.
Russell’s Second Paradox
Copyright ©  2010 by Harm  Boukema
Design by Roel Elbers, designGenerator
W atercolour entitled  “Denoting Colours” by Harm  Boukema
Printed and bound by Ipskamp Drukkers, Enschede
ISBN: 978-90-9025356-5
Russell’s Second Paradox
A  Dialectical Analysis of ‘On Denoting’
Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Filosofie
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Radboud U niversiteit N ijm egen 
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortm ann, 
volgens besluit van het college van decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 1 juli 2010 
om 15.30 uur precies
door
Harm  Pieter Boukema 
geboren op 23 juni 1945 
te Delft
Promotores:
prof. dr. G öran B. Sundholm  (U niversiteit Leiden) 
prof. dr. C hristoph H . Lüthy
Manuscriptcommissie:
prof. dr. Rob A . van der Sandt
prof. dr. W illem R. de Jong (Vrije U niversiteit Am sterdam ) 
dr. Graham  P. Stevens (University of M anchester)
Russell’s Second Paradox
A  Dialectical Analysis of ‘On Denoting’
A n  academic essay in Philosophy
Doctoral Thesis
To obtain the degree of doctor 
from Radboud U niversity Nijm egen 
on the authority of the Rector Magnificus, prof. dr. S.C.J.J. Kortm ann, 
according to the decision of the Council of Deans 
to be defended in public on  Thursday, July 1st 2010 
at 3.30 hours p.m.
by
Harm  Pieter Boukema 
Born on  23 June 1945 
in Delft
Supervisors:
Professor G öran B. Sundholm  (Leiden University) 
Professor C hristoph H . Lüthy
Doctoral Thesis Com mittee:
Professor Rob A . van der Sandt
Professor W illem  R. de Jong (Free U niversity Am sterdam ) 
Dr. Graham  P. Stevens (University of M anchester)
In memory of Jan H ollak

But the greatest m en who have been philosophers have felt the need both  
of science and of mysticism: the attem pt to harmonize the two was what 
made their life, and what always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make 
philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing th an  either science or religion.
Bertrand Russell
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In the following list of abbreviations the unusual ones are marked by scare
quotes.
“A E A ” “A ny Entity A rgum ent”, i.e., possible version of the ‘Gray’s
Elegy A rgum ent’ as applied to the most im portant of all 
denoting concepts, namely “any entity”.
“A M A ” “A ny M an A rgum ent”, i.e., the same argument as applied to 
Russell’s very first example: “any m an”.
GEA “Gray’s Elegy A rgum ent”, i.e., the argument put forward in “O n
D enoting”, paragraph 18-25.
“KFA” “King of France A rgum ent”, i.e., the argument put forward
against M einong and Frege in “O n  D enoting”, paragraph 9-13 
and 17.
OD “O n  D enoting”. See bibliography Russell, B. (1905d).
A  copy of the original version is attached. T he paragraphs 
are numbered. This num bering is used in order to refer to the 
text. According to the convention introduced by Blackburn &  
Code (1978), the GEA’s paragraphs are marked as A , up to and 
including H.
OF “O n  Fundam entals”. See bibliography Russell, B. (1905c).
POM  “T he Principles of M athem atics”. See bibliography
Russell, B. (1903a).
ToD Theory of Descriptions.
Connection behind the abbreviations
T he article On Denoting (OD ) was published in O ctober 1905. It is famous, 
because in it, Russell presented, for the first time, an im portant and beloved 
theory, later called the Theory of Descriptions (ToD). In O D  the th en  nameless 
theory appears as a second view on  denoting. T he classical text in which 
Russell’s first view, his theory of denoting concepts, can be found is: The 
Principles of Mathematics (PO M ). It appeared two years earlier, in 1903.
Both the old and the new theory can be divided into two parts: the part 
concerning indefinite descriptions, or “ambiguously denoting phrases”, such 
as “all m en”, “every m an”, “any m an”, “some m an” or “a m an”, and the part 
concerning definite descriptions or “unambiguously denoting phrases”, such as 
“the m an who discovered tha t the planet Jupiter has m oons”.
In the old theory, most a tten tion  is paid to the former part, especially to 
denoting phrases containing the word “any”. T he denoting concept “any 
entity” is assumed to be more fundam ental th an  the no tion  of the variable.
In the ToD, however, most a tten tion  is paid to the latter part. T he only two 
critical arguments contained in O D  are concerned w ith the explanation of 
phrases containing the.
T he most famous and eye-catching argument in O D  is the argument starting 
w ith the discussion of propositions in whose verbal expression a vacuous 
denoting phrase like “the present King of France” occurs. T h at is why I have 
called it the King of France Argument (KFA). In it, the views of M einong and 
Frege, being two possible variants of the old theory, are subjected to criticism. 
O n  account of Russell’s later autobiographical remarks, it has been generally 
supposed tha t the KFA reveals the genesis of the ToD.
OD  also contains another argument against the old theory of denoting. It 
does no t regard the M einongian issue of non-being, but the question of how 
the m eaning of an unambiguously denoting phrase can occur as subject of a 
proposition. T he most striking example discussed in this rather obscure part 
of OD is: “the first line of Gray’s Elegy”. T h at is why this argument is usually 
called the Gray’s Elegy Argument (GEA). T he present thesis is mainly focussed 
on  the exegesis of the GEA.
In 1980 Russell’s m anuscript, entitled  On Fundamentals (OF), was dug up. It 
was w ritten in the summer of 1905, some m onths before Russell composed and 
published OD. N oth ing  corresponding to the KFA can be found in OF. But 
it actually contains a passage similar to the GEA. However, tha t passage also 
significantly differs from the GEA on account of its being no t only concerned 
w ith definite, but w ith indefinite descriptions as well. Russell starts with 
considering the phrase “any m an”. T h at is why I have called the argument in
XVI
XVII
OF the Any Man Argument (A M A ).
In the course of tha t passage Russell makes a shift from “any m an” towards 
unambiguously denoting phrases like “the centre of mass of the Solar System”. 
Afterwards, the ToD is conceived as the result of an attem pt to avoid the 
problem w ith respect to such phrases. T he same procedure is also applied to 
indefinite descriptions like “every m an”, “any m an”, or “some m an”. But in the 
ToD the variable happens to play a pivotal role. Therefore, as long as no new 
theory of the variable is available, the viability of the ToD is thw arted by what 
I have called the Any Entity Argument (AEA).

Introduction
0 .1  H istory of philosophy: an academic creed
Philosophy is m uch less harmless th an  m ight be supposed from a conventional 
academic point of view. It is no t just a ping-pong game w ith ingenious 
arguments. Its aim is neither to provide shelter to those who do n o t dare to 
th ink  for themselves, nor to provide professional researchers w ith material. 
Philosophy is an art, the art of original, passionate, personal, critical, 
unconventional and consistent thinking. G reat things have been and certainly 
will be accomplished in it by great, inspired and inspiring spirits.
A t least partly, the academic discipline called ‘history of philosophy’ has to do 
w ith them . If these great thinkers were impeccable saints, their works would 
be Holy Scriptures. In  dealing w ith them , the historian of philosophy would 
be in the rather hum ble position of a scribe or m ullah. But however great the 
great philosophers may be, they actually happen to contradict each other.
This, I think, is the hardest and most elem entary m atter of fact the historian of 
philosophy is faced with.
How is this fact to be construed? A ccording to me, the right answer is, 
th a t although great philosophers contradict each other, in so far as they are great 
and inspired, they cannot contradict, but only complement each other. This view is 
general in the sense th a t it does no t bear on  the specific subject m atter of this 
book, but only on its being an essay in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, 
it is no t general as far as it is a very specific, unorthodox view on  history of 
philosophy in general. I quite fully realize tha t my colleagues will no t generally 
accept it. T hat is why, before going into more detail, I want to discuss it as a 
kind of introduction to my introduction. In  doing so, I do n o t claim to prove it 
or to change the m ind of my readers, but only to clarify, by means of a personal 
confession, the uncom m on nature of the attem pt made in this study.
My statem ent is no t m eant to reduce in any way the num ber of 
philosophers who deserve to be called great. To tha t extent, the use of the 
somewhat scholastic phrase “in so far” could be misleading. For the attitude 
assumed by N eo-Thom ists may be seen as an uninhibited  and clear-cut 
example of what I am opposed to. They supposed the really great philosophers 
to belong to a more or less well-defined trend or tradition w ithin the history 
of W estern thought: the philosophia perennis, as they used to call it. According 
to them , only its exponents are inspired by the Holy Spirit; all o ther so-called 
great philosophers are either uninspired or inspired by another, wicked or even 
Diabolic Spirit.
1
2O f course, N eo-Thom ists hardly exist anymore, but a subdued version of 
their attitude is still to be found among contem porary philosophical birds of 
different feathers. In our age of industrialization and financial m anagem ent of 
academic research, as a historian of philosophy too, you have to specialize. So 
you choose to become a scholar in the philosophy of A , or may be of A  and B, 
provided B is no t too far away from A. Your choice is prom pted by admiration. 
Tacitly you assume A  to be greater and of more im portance th an  o ther so- 
called great philosophers. However, this does no t prevent you from respectfully 
tolerating colleagues who happen to have chosen a patron who, in your eyes, is 
somewhat less admirable. For it is no t your job to criticize them .
In this ‘academic’ view, no t a single word is m entioned about the Holy 
Spirit or about the ideal of combining exegesis w ith criticism. In so far, the 
N eo-Thom ist outlook seems to be superseded. But in my opinion, there 
actually is a hidden kinship. It exists in the tacit assumption tha t criticism in 
name of the Holy Spirit leads to fundamentalism  and inevitably jeopardizes 
the academic ideal of open-mindedness and tolerance.1 T he view I advocate is 
opposed to this presupposition. It may be stated as follows.
T he dignity and importance of the academic discipline called history of 
philosophy cannot be upheld in ignoring the greatness of great philosophers. 
As soon as you really try to understand a famous M aster of Thought, paying 
due atten tion  to the historical context, he will appear greater and more 
interesting th an  you supposed him  to be. This is one of the things I really 
believe to have experienced myself several times. But I also believe to have 
experienced something else, namely th a t what you really have learned 
from one great philosopher, no o ther one can ever take away from you. If 
there existed a super-human Being w ith complete acquaintance and loving 
understanding of the deepest aspirations of all great philosophers, such a Being 
would be able to subject each of them  to the sharpest, i.e. the most disarming 
criticism. It would respectfully acknowledge all personal differences. A nd 
yet, provided its message were accepted, it would take away all controversy 
and discord. For the highest ideal of criticism is: to reject w hatever is false 
and nothing more; and equally: to accept w hatever is true and nothing more. 
Indeed, b lunt criticism spreads discord, but it does so because it fails to be 
critical enough.
It is often supposed tha t if there is something like philosophical inspiration 
at all, it must be confined to unverifiable ‘visions’ or ‘intuitions’ beyond 
any possible criticism. For criticism is deemed to be a purely hum an affair. 
According to my view however, the ideal of criticism is just as divine and
1 Cf. Boukema, H.P. (2006).
3holy as inspiration. In fact, the two are inseparable. For uninspired criticism is 
worthless and uncritical inspiration impossible. In this connection, it may be 
helpful to recall Spinoza’s saying th a t w hat is true is indicative of itself and of 
what is false (verum est index sui et falsi). N othing but tru th  itself can help to 
distinguish it self from falsity. For falsity, and especially deep-rooted falsity, is 
no t only, as Scholastics used to say, a privation of truth, it also is its simulation.
It belongs to the business of illusions to confuse themselves w ith truth. In so 
far as you live in an illusion, you are no t aware of it and in so far as you become 
aware of it, you are getting out of it.
Consequently, it does no t make sense to conceive being enlightened 
as a kind of degree you can get after having passed an exam. T he clear-cut 
distinction betw een enlightened and unenlightened people is far too hum an 
to be of any importance to the Holy Spirit. For it does no t take the slightest 
no tion  of such divisions. Having no opponents, save the illusions it gently 
makes aware of, it does no t give license to rest on  your laurels. Q uite the 
contrary, the more enlightened you are, the more you are aware of your 
growing susceptibility of further enlightenm ent. Philosophy, therefore, is to be 
conceived as an ongoing process, an inspired and inspiring struggle w ith bad 
philosophy. In a world w ithout fundam ental illusions, philosophers would be 
just as idle as barbers in a world w ithout hair growth.2
T he fire of any great philosophy, I believe, is lighted by a personal 
experience of an  impersonal opposition, namely the one between some wide­
spread and deep-rooted assumption tha t goes w ithout saying and cannot stand 
up to the light of day, on  the one hand, and the specific tru th  tha t has to be 
faced in order to get rid of tha t assumption, on  the o ther hand. This particular 
opposition constitutes the philosopher’s orientation. Each great th inker has his 
own stumbling block and his own aspiration. In this respect, each differs from 
others. But being in conflict w ith each other cannot be due to this variety. For 
in principle any orientation is just as inspired and just as holy as any other. 
C ritical spirits cannot be in conflict w ith each other unless they are in conflict 
w ith themselves. A nd  they cannot be in conflict w ith themselves unless their 
self-criticism is capable of improvement.
T hat is why I believe th a t the most challenging task of the historian of 
philosophy is: to understand the greatness of great philosophers and to reveal it 
through immanent criticism, i.e. a criticism as much as possible in accordance with 
their highest aspirations. O f course, such a criticism will be contestable and 
capable of further im provem ent. However its aim is no t to finish philosophical 
discussions, but to demolish the barriers tha t lim it their scope and thw art their 
intensity.
2 Cf. Boukema, H.P. (1993).
40.2 Substantial background of Russell’s development
In the present study the above-sketched union  of the historical w ith the 
critical approach is applied to an  im portant and glorious turning point in the 
philosophical developm ent of Bertrand Russell, nam ely the one marked by 
the rise of the Theory of Descriptions (ToD), put forward in the famous article 
On Denoting (OD ) in 1905. This m ilestone may be and has been approached 
from a lot of different perspectives. In this enquiry I shall focus on  something 
specific: the opposition betw een the ToD’s glory and its o ther side, the problem 
tha t triggered it. Gradually, more and more atten tion  has been paid to that 
curious problem. Equally, a lot of a tten tion  has been paid to the curious fact 
tha t the later Russell ignored it. But, as far as I can see, un til now no a tten tion  
has been paid to the possible historical m eaning of Russell’s forgetfulness.
According to the view I advocate, this forgetfulness is ideological. The 
problem behind the ToD is more im portant th an  generally supposed, even 
more im portant th an  Russell was prepared to admit. It is more serious th an  the 
ToD and has seriously challenged its viability. In “forgetting” it, Russell turned 
away from the substantial background of his own philosophy; indeed, he 
turned further away from it. For as I shall explain below (0.3), according to my 
critical assessment, Russell’s forgetfulness does not have any m eaning in itself. 
It is to be construed as a com pletion of a larger process. His m ain philosophical 
virtue, the capacity to discover and face unsuspected problems, is closely knit 
w ith his m ain vice: heroically overemphasizing their external character.
From the very start Russell distinguished him self by making an attem pt to 
be, as a philosopher, open-m inded towards the sciences. More th an  a lot of 
great thinkers he displayed the ability to change his mind, to detect problems 
in his own views and to construct new theories.
Am ong the sciences Russell was concerned w ith in the course of his 
long-lasting philosophical developm ent, one played an exceptional role. It 
happened to be the m ain science tha t had co-existed w ith W estern philosophy 
from Thales onwards: mathematics. Before turning to philosophy, Russell 
had studied it for some years. A lthough he was very m uch disappointed by 
m athem atics as taught in Cambridge at th a t time, the young philosopher 
rem ained involved in it for m any years.
5Very soon he devised, w ithin the conceptual framework of the then  
prevailing neo-Hegelianism , his own rather ambitious philosophical 
programme.3 According to it, the task of theoretical philosophy is no t to add 
new m aterial to w hat the sciences are able to provide, but to put it into 
perspective. Each science only deals w ith a part or aspect of reality w ithout 
being able to fathom  its own limitations. Philosophy has to guard the W hole. 
This task cannot be accomplished, unless the a priori principles of each science 
are laid bare as fairly as possible. T hat is the K antian elem ent in Russell’s 
approach. Afterwards, and th a t is the Hegelian elem ent, the supposed self­
sufficiency of these principles is to be disproved by means of an “inevitable 
dialectical contradiction”, i.e., a contradiction tha t can only be solved at the 
level of a higher, less “abstract” science.
Here the Hegelian, hierarchical distinction between more or less “abstract” 
and more or less “concrete” appears to be of pivotal im portance. For the young 
Russell supposed m athem atics to be the most abstract of all sciences. It is 
concerned w ith discrete and continuous quantity. A nd  quantity is farthest 
away from full, differentiated reality. T he no tion  of quantity provides “a 
conception of diversity w ithout any diversity of conception”. A ccording to 
his own programme, Russell had to treat the sciences in order, i.e., starting at 
the lowest level. Now, supposing m athem atics to be the lowest of all sciences, 
he was forced, in spite of his already m entioned disappointm ent, to remain 
concerned w ith it in starting to elaborate his philosophical programme. In that 
connection he wrote, on  occasion of a course provided by James W ard, a book 
on Kant and non-Euclidean geometry, entitled An Essay on the Foundation of 
Geometry (1897).4
In this book and in o ther writings on the same subject, Russell made loosely 
use of the traditional, but rather un-H egelian no tion  of substance. He used it as 
a foil in order to explain why, in his opinion, geometrical space is “abstract”. 
Points, lines and all o ther elem ents in it do no t have any other being but 
being related to o ther equally purely relative elements. Everything is relative 
and therefore the relations cannot be real either. W ithout “thinghood” or 
“substances” relations cannot be real. Concrete relations are supported by
3 See Russell, B. (1896a) and Russell, B. (1967), p.125.
4 For early essays written in the context of Ward’s course, see Russell, B. 
(1895). See also: Griffin, N. (2003b).
6-  and based on intrinsic properties of their bearers. But geometrical space is 
space in abstraction, w ithout anything real in it. 5
In 1898, Russell got by accident involved in the study of Leibniz, i.e., of a 
philosopher in whose logical and metaphysical system the A ristotelian no tion  
of substance is of central im portance. Leibniz purports to elaborate it more 
consistently th an  Aristotle and his scholastic followers had ever dared to do. 
He advocated a metaphysics of absolute individualism. W hatever seems to 
be shared by m any individuals is relegated to the Divine U nderstanding. It 
is supposed to be only ideal, n o t real. There cannot be anything real between 
substances, nor anything in w hich they are. Universals, space and time are 
only ideal. T he same applies to relations and even to plurality, for only together 
many substances are many.
This confrontation has caused in Russell the most im portant philosophical 
change he ever lived through: his so-called revolt into pluralism.6 From Leibniz 
he learned to abandon his former belief in “inevitable contradictions”. But 
he also learned tha t the no tion  of substance is incom patible w ith the reality 
of all kinds of beings, among them  relations and plurality. Russell, who never 
had called in question their reality, concluded tha t is has become necessary “to 
base metaphysics on  some notion  other th an  tha t of substance”.7 In this way he 
developed a new kind of unrestricted realism, based on the no tion  of
5 See Russell, B. (1897), §196: pp.186-187, also Russell, B. (1896b), p.286.
I disagree with the opinion of Griffin, N. (2003b): 87 that the idealist Russell, “like 
Bradley rejected relations”. Like almost all traditional philosophers who make use 
of the notion of substance, the idealist Russell believed both in real plurality and 
real relations. His complaint about the “abstract” character of geometrical space 
presupposes this belief. See e.g. Russell (1896b): 286. There he says: “... we have 
a space which cannot stand by itself, a thing all relations, without any kernel of 
‘thinghood’ to which the relations can be attached. This forces us to attempt a 
resolution of the contradiction by abandoning the purely geometrical standpoint.”. 
In my opinion, thanks to Leibniz, Russell realized, that real relations and real plu­
rality are incompatible with the notion of substance. That is why he banished the 
notion of substance in order to consistently accept real plurality and real relations. 
His “revolt into pluralism” is a change from inconsistent, half-hearted pluralism 
towards radical and consistent pluralism. It equally could be described as a “revolt 
into ‘relationalism’ ”, i.e. a change from inconsistent, half-hearted acceptance of 
relations towards the radical doctrine of external relations. Leibniz is honoured 
on account of his being, at least as far as relations are concerned, more consistent 
than a lot of other philosophers. And after the confrontation with Leibniz, Bradley 
and Spinoza are honoured on account of their being, at least as far as plurality is 
concerned, more consistent than Leibniz.
6 See Russell, B. (1959), Chapter 5.
7 Russell, B. (1900) §71, p.126.
7the proposition and on the reduction of being-in to occurring in a proposition. 
W hatever has being, can occur as subject of a proposition. W hether it is a 
person, a mountain, a river, a point, a relation, a property, a collection or a 
proposition, it always deserves to be called an entity. A n  entity is whatever is 
such, that something is true or false about it.
This revolution marked the beginning of an “intellectual honeymoon”.8 
Russell, who never had called himself an idealist, now used this word in order 
to describe what he was opposed to. A s far as I can see, it is quite important 
in this connection to realize that this so-called idealism is usually not called 
“ idealism” but rather “conceptualism”. Russell was not primarily concerned 
with the reality of material, sensible things, but with the reality of universals, 
relations, space, time and plurality. Both traditional Aristotelian logic and 
traditional metaphysics are thereby challenged. They belong together. Russell’s 
revolt has much more to do with the so-called philosophia perennis than with 
Hegel’s semi-Platonic idealism. In this way he can be appreciated as proponent 
of a general revolt extending the one initiated by Copernicus, Galileo and 
Newton against Aristotle’s authority in the field of philosophy.9
Leibniz was a mathematical genius who transgressed the limits of the 
traditional view in cautiously accepting actual infinite plurality. For this, 
Bolzano and Cantor have honoured him. But this side of Leibniz did not have 
any impact on Russell at all. His traditional view of mathematics as the science 
of quantity essentially remains untouched, as appears for example from Russell 
(1900), §63, p.115, where he turns out to be a more scholastic philosopher 
than Leibniz! For he says: “But infinite number is self-contradictory; and 
we cannot be content with the assertion that there is an infinite number of 
monads.”
That is why the self-criticism occasioned by his study of Leibniz asked 
for further completion, which was offered by a number of mathematicians 
such as Weierstrass, Dedekind, Cantor, Peano and Whitehead. They raised 
Russell’s conviction that nineteenth-century mathematicians had achieved 
what neither he nor any other professional philosopher until then had 
accomplished: liberating mathematics from the fetters of bad traditional 
philosophy. The queen and servant of the sciences is not any longer to be 
construed as the lowest of all, nor as concerned with quantity, but as the most 
universal of all, essentially one with modern universal logic. Now, Russell
8 Russell, B. (1944), p.13.
9 Russell and Whitehead must have been aware of this correspondence. The 
title of their Principia Mathematica is evidently borrowed from Newton’s Principia 
Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis.
8wanted to prove this, making use of his own brand new logic and metaphysics. 
In this way, during and after his great revolt against idealism, he continued 
to be concerned with mathematics, but with much more enthusiasm and 
much greater philosophical modesty. In other words, as a philosopher of 
mathematics, he moved from a continental attitude towards an “analytical” 
one.10
Among those who awakened Russell from his dogmatic slumber and 
raised his Platonic love of mathematics, one, namely Cantor, succeeded 
in challenging him to a duel. W hat was at stake in it? Cantor had made 
him aware of the dogmatic character of the Aristotelian axiom of finitude. 
According to it, any actual definite number must be finite because an 
infinite plurality cannot be but indefinite and potential. Cantor laid bare the 
inconsistency of this view, pointing out that the number of all finite numbers 
is itself both definite, at least in a certain sense, and not finite. This part of the 
new philosophy of the infinite, perfectly well fitted into Russell’s realism and 
even enhanced it.
But Cantor also purported to have proven something else, namely that 
the finite or infinite number of elements of any set or ‘collection’ S is always 
definitely smaller than the number of the elements of the set consisting of all 
the subsets of S. This theorem is at variance with Russell’s unrestricted realism. 
It also seems to contradict the radical rejection, initiated by Cantor himself, of 
the axiom of finitude. Therefore, Russell objects as follows:
There is a greatest of all infinite numbers, which is the number of things 
altogether, of every sort and kind. It is obvious that there cannot be a 
greater number than this, because, if everything has been taken, there is 
nothing left to add. Cantor has a proof that there is no greatest number, 
and if this proof were valid, the contradictions of infinity would reappear 
in a sublimated form. But in this one point, the master has been guilty of a 
very subtle fallacy, which I hope to explain in some future work.11
In his attempt, made in June 1901, to elaborate this objection, Russell hit on 
a particular set, allowed in his own ontology, namely the set of all sets that 
are not a member of themselves. The question whether this set is or is not a 
member of itself, constitutes the very first version of the paradox.12 Soon, it 
appeared to be just one member of a whole family of ‘contradictions’.
10 The great enthusiasm of this turn is nicely expressed in Russell, B. (1901).
11 Russell, B. (1901), p.69.
12 See POM §§344-350.
9Among all the problems Russell once discovered in his own theories, no 
one ever had such an impact on him as this one. Later he said, that he “felt 
about the contradictions much as an earnest Catholic must feel about wicked 
Popes”.13 It took him about a decade to conceive and develop, in cooperation 
with W hitehead, his solution: the Ramified Theory of Types put forward in 
Principia. Russell and W hitehead never supposed this rather complicated 
theory to be final. W hat is more, it did not satisfy Russell emotionally. He 
said: “The solution of the contradictions ( . . . )  seemed to be only possible by 
adopting theories which might be true, but were not beautiful.”14 Eventually 
this dissatisfaction contributed to Russell’s loss of his former Platonic love of 
mathematics.
Among all the theories Russell ever conceived and adopted, one has played 
an exceptional role, namely the above-mentioned Theory o f Descriptions. 
Russell was very fond of this theory and remained faithful to it until the end 
of his life. According to his own account, it was the first ray of hope in the 
darkness caused by the paradox. For it paved the way of the reduction of his 
former unrestricted realism. A s such it made the Theory o f Types possible, 
but it was deemed to be more fundamental. The ToD’s appeal is due to its 
allowing unrestricted freedom of speech without unrestricted “ontological 
commitment”.15 We can do as if we speak about the present King of France 
and say that he does not exist without actually speaking about him. For 
“the present King of France” is a definite description. A nd according to the 
ToD descriptions are not names. Even if there is something answering the 
description, we do not by means of the description speak about it. In fact we 
speak about something else, may be about predicates or about whatever is real. 
A s seen from this perspective, the rise of the ToD constitutes the third major 
turning point in Russell’s development. It may, of course, also be construed 
as the second salutary change: the Glorious Revolution, the mitigating 
counterpart of the unmitigated revolt into realism.
Where did this new theory come from? How did it emerge? OD does not 
inform its readers about this question. Nevertheless, in his autobiographical 
accounts Russell has suggested, that he was led to the ToD by the “desire to 
avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being”.16
However, in 1980, the then unpublished manuscript O n Fundamentals
13 Russell, B. (1959), p.157.
14 Ibid.
15 This expression has been introduced by Quine, W.V. (1948).
16 Russell, B. (1944), p.13. In Chapter II this saying will be extensively 
discussed.
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(OF) was dug up. It unambiguously proves that the ToD has been conceived 
on occasion of a quite different kind of problem, namely the same problem as 
the one discussed in a very difficult and obscure passage of OD. The most eye­
catching example occurring in it is the phrase “the first line of Gray’s Elegy”. 
That is why it usually is called the “Gray’s Elegy Argument” (G EA ). It is not 
concerned with vacuous descriptions like “the present King of France”, but 
with the question how the supposed meaning or content of a description can 
be made the subject of a proposition. A s the other side of Russell’s most famous 
and glorious theory, it constitutes the centre of the present enquiry.
0.3 Critical import and approach
My main contention is that the problem discussed in the G EA  is much more 
important and interesting than usually supposed. It deserves to be called 
‘Russell’s second paradox’. According to me, he forgot about it because he was 
a little bit too anxious to solve his famous “first” paradox. In this way he has 
wronged his own remarkable capacity to lay bare problems in his own theories. 
The problem from which the ToD actually originated is in my opinion more 
important and more serious than the ToD itself. In this way I try to save the 
regressive and problem-detecting Russell from the progressive, theory-minded 
one. I do so in order to pave the way towards a new, rather unorthodox 
approach of both paradoxes.
According to the view I advocate, the nature of both paradoxes is rooted 
in the manner Russell turned away from his continental background. He 
failed to realize that his criticism of idealism was both too severe and too soft. 
In this way he made his own philosophy appear much less substantial than it 
actually is. Together with Leibniz’s in-esse he rejected being-in in general. In 
this way Russell adopted the “axiom of external relations” . Relations can only 
be real in being outside their bearers. This view is based on the assumption, 
shared by all extremists, that there is nothing soft about extremism. Russell 
never realized that his criticism was at the same time too severe and too 
lenient. Such a union of opposite vices seems to be contradictory and therefore 
impossible. Nevertheless it is possible. For Russell uncritically adopted the 
idealist assumption that being-in cannot be conceived otherwise than in a 
hierarchical, oppressive way: as a one-sided link between inferior beings and 
their genuine superiors. The essence of the metaphysical idealism Russell 
was opposed to consists in the distinction between more and less genuine 
being and the assumption that the latter cannot be without or outside the 
former. Being-in completes their dependence. In the Aristotelian version of
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“idealism”, accidents are supposed to have no other being than being in the 
substance they belong to.17 A nd as such, universals are supposed to have no 
other being than being abstracted from reality by really thinking substances.
Russell rejects being-in in order to get rid of the oppressive hierarchy. But 
in my opinion he could have rejected more, namely the very assumption that 
being-in must be oppressive. A nd he could have rejected less, namely only 
the oppressive version of being-in. Then the reciprocal, non-hierarchical form 
of being-in, the unio mystica as illustrated by Swedenborgh’s down-to earth 
example of the wind in the sails and the sails in the wind would have been allowed. 
Indeed, the externalist logic of Russell’s “ intellectual honeymoon” lies on 
the borderline of mysticism. That is why it deserves to be honoured as a very 
interesting and fascinating thought experiment.
Similarly, Russell’s criticism of Hegelian dialectics is both too extreme and 
not radical enough. For he uncritically borrowed from Hegel the assumption 
that dialectics is essentially allied with “inevitable contradictions” . Inspired by 
Leibniz Russell wanted to philosophize consistently.18 Therefore, he dropped 
his former belief in “inevitable contradictions”. A nd with it, he abandoned 
dialectics in general. A  consistent logical analysis, he assumed, must be 
undialectical. In this way he not only rejected the hierarchical side
17 Platonism and Aristotelianism are the two archetypal forms of idealism. They 
both are based on the distinction between more and less genuine beings and on the 
notion of being-in. The latter is used for preventing the less genuine beings from 
independence. But it is used in opposite directions. According to Platonic ideal­
ism the superior beings (forms) are in the lower, sensible things. According to the 
Aristotelian inversion, Platonic forms exemplified by sensible things are only in 
the latter. They are conceived as substances, i.e. as more genuine beings having in 
them the less real accidents or forms. These two archetypes may be and have been 
combined in all kinds of different ways. In the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas,
for example, besides his evident Aristotelianism, a lot of Platonic participation 
is involved. The same holds of Leibniz’s metaphysical system. Russell is opposed 
to both forms of idealism, but primarily to the Aristotelian one. He failed to see 
both the Platonic Leibniz and the Platonic Hegel. As perceived from his perspec­
tive, Hegel is just as much a philosopher of substance as Bradley and Spinoza. See 
the quotation from My Philosophical Development in 22.2 below. Evidently, Russell 
never read Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in whose Preface the famous statement 
is put forward that “the true is not to be conceived as substance, but equally well as 
subject.” Hegel, G.W.F. (1807), p.xx (my translation).
18 Nowhere, as far as I know, does Russell discuss this change. The author of 
The Philosophy of Leibniz simply presents himself as champion of consistency! More­
over, he honours Leibniz on account of his having been more consistent than many 
other philosophers who made use of the notion of substance and he criticizes him 
on account of his having been not consistent enough.
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of dialectics, but its other side as well, namely the principle of oppositions. 
W hat seems to be contradictory need not be contradictory. A nd what is 
logically possible need not be evidently possible. For logic is universal and super­
human. It by far surpasses our narrow-minded expectations. In short, Russell 
fails to distinguish critically what I suppose to be the good and the bad side of 
Hegelian dialectics. He simply deemed dialectics to be bad and undialectical 
analysis the only possible way of sound analysis. In this way he ignored the 
universal logical importance of oppositions.
Indeed, Russell did so in a very specific and instructive way. But in 
my opinion, as such, the tenet that oppositions are not of any logical 
importance is not specifically Russellian at all. It is shared, as far as I can 
see, by all twentieth-century philosophers. For in virtue of the logical law 
of contraposition it can be applied in two opposite ways. Either oppositions 
and being-in are supposed to be real and therefore somehow outside the 
realm of logic and science,19 or logic is supposed to be universal and therefore 
oppositions and being-in are deemed to be subjective, unreal or even 
impossible. The former alternative is adopted by continental philosophers, the 
latter by adherents of the analytical movement.
I am opposed to what they share. O f course, I am not opposed to being 
involved in oppositions. But I am involved in being opposed to being involved 
in oppositions without attributing any logical importance to being-in or 
oppositions. That is why I have called my analysis “dialectical” . I hope to show 
that it is not less analytical than the form of analysis promoted by Russell.
The main division of this thesis is based on the Cartesian principle that it 
is advisable to start with what is most easy and evident, not with what seems 
to be most urgent or fascinating. Applied to the GEA , this rule results in 
postponing its exegesis. For in spite of their disagreements, all commentators 
share the opinion that the text is very difficult indeed.
That is why, in the first part of this book, I start with exploring its 
surroundings. In chapter I it is argued that these surroundings contain a lot 
of neglected evidence in favour of the view that the problem discussed in the 
G EA  must be of great importance. There must be something behind Russell’s 
later forgetfulness. In chapter II a sideway trip is made towards the question 
how much truth is contained in the official story promoted by Russell himself. 
Because Meinong plays an important role in it, the question is discussed in
19 Husserl was an anti-psychologist in the field of logic, maybe partly inspired by 
Frege. But as soon as Husserl rediscovers and elaborates the notion of intentionality 
as an irreducible two-sidedness, he supposes it to be an enigma more fundamental 
than logic.
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how far Russell ever adopted a Meinongian or quasi-Meinongian view.
The second part provides what is postponed in the first one: an exegesis of 
the G EA  and an explanation of the nature of the “rather curious difficulties” 
discussed in it. Chapter III is devoted to its genesis, chapter IV to the G EA  
itself and chapter V  to its follow-up. The second part as a whole may also be 
construed as an attempt to discuss the role played by Frege. For I advocate 
the view that in this connection, i.e., on the road towards the problem, in 
its exposition in OD and on the road from the problem towards the ToD’s 
final adoption, Frege has been of much more importance to Russell than is 
generally supposed. Therefore, his eclipse from the official story and from 
later expositions of the ToD, is equally of greater importance than is generally 
supposed. In the concluding section Frege is taken into account in order to 
clarify the forgotten kinship between Russell’s paradox and the problem on 
whose occasion the ToD has been conceived.

PART ONE
Surrounding the Gray’s Elegy 
Argument
Chapter I
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Towards a Re-Evaluation 
of On Denoting20
In his writings, Bertrand Russell exhibited three sorts of qualities rarely united 
in one philosopher: firstly the open-mindedness needed to detect unsuspected 
problems involved in his own assumptions, secondly the ingenuity to invent 
and try out new theories in order to cope with those problems, and lastly 
the willingness to communicate his findings, however sophisticated and 
complicated they might be, to as many fellow creatures as possible, expounding 
them in an accessible and popularized fashion. Both Russell himself and those 
who have assessed his philosophy, be it in admiration or in disdain, are prone 
to overlook that the possible drawbacks of the latter two virtues are liable to 
overshadow the importance of the first.21
In the reception of OD, both the inclination to overrate the importance 
of the possible merits or demerits of the ToD contained in it and the 
counteractive attempt to pay attention to the problems behind that theory, 
especially the one discussed in the GEA, have played an important role. No 
doubt, the latter pursuit has considerably widened the scholarly perspective on 
OD.
But -and that is my main contention -because of its reactive character, it 
has not been radical enough. The method I shall use to advocate this view is 
based on the principle that for antagonisms the converse of Berkeley’s famous 
slogan concerning ideas holds: their esse is non percipi. Paying attention to 
oppositions is of psychological, historical and logical importance. It leads to a 
somewhat uncommon critical evaluation of OD which, more than the usual 
ones, is in accordance with its underlying structure, its spirit and the historical 
facts related to it.
Usually it is assumed that there is only one way of evaluating the GEA: 
going straightforwardly into its content. According to the approach I advocate, 
there is also a second, less travelled road which deserves to be trodden first: 
going around it. In the following exposition, I shall confine myself to the latter, 
postponing the detailed exegesis of the G EA  to chapter IV. I shall start this
20 This chapter is a slightly revised version of Boukema, H.P. (2005).
21 Cf. Griffin, N. (1993).
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roundabout by considering the history of O D ’s reception as far as the G EA  
is concerned. In the second section I shall go into OD itself, exploring the 
immediate textual and historical surroundings of the GEA.
1 Not paying attention to OD itself
1.1 O D’s reception, first period
The above-mentioned theory-minded attitude comes pre-eminently and 
conspicuously to the fore in the way OD has been evaluated during the era of 
its glory, the period before the Second World War. It was hailed as the very 
first, maybe somewhat stubborn, but at any rate memorable official appearance 
of a marvellous theory, the ToD, which has elsewhere been expounded in a 
more comfortable way. The reasons why analytic philosophers such as Russell 
himself, the young Wittgenstein, Ramsey and Quine welcomed it as a great 
achievement are probably as divergent as their respective points of view. But 
the very fact that it could be used in such a variety of ways probably reveals 
one of its most remarkable features. To a considerable extent it seems to meet 
Leibniz’s conception of divine perfection: much by means of little.22 Being 
mainly concerned with a very limited subject matter, the meaning of “the”, it 
is capable of achieving great things.
A s seen from Russell’s own perspective (see Russell, B. (1959), Ch. 7), the 
greatest merit of the ToD seems to be that its main principle, the translation 
of sentences containing certain name-like expressions into sentences not 
containing them, enabled him to refine his former, rather tentative Theory 
of Types in such a way as to avoid the paradox that had afflicted him for 
many years. So, OD seems to mark the second great step forward, the 
decisive liberating move which had to be made after the sweet “intellectual 
honeymoon” following the sweeping “revolt into pluralism” had been spoiled 
by the discovery of the contradiction (see 0.2).
O f course, reverence was paid not only to the ToD itself and to its various 
possible applications, but just as much to the critical arguments it is based on. 
Although Russell, both in OD and in later expositions, put forward different 
arguments in favour of the ToD, one of them, the argument against Meinong 
(and Frege) concerning denoting phrases such as “the present King of France” 
was generally supposed to be the most striking and conclusive one. For the
22 Leibniz, G.W. (1684), section V, pp.430-431. It is quite remarkable, that Rus 
sell, in his book on Leibniz, does not pay any attention to this original and uncon­
ventional conception of perfection.
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sake of convenience I shall call it the King of France Argument (KFA)
During its heydays there was hardly any interest in the ToD’s historical 
background. Nevertheless, on different occasions, Russell made some casual 
remarks on its genesis. The very same consideration that appeared to be the 
most convincing one also happened to have led him to the ToD: “the desire to 
avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being” (Russell, B. (1944), p. 13).23
1.2 Second period
Shortly after the Second World War, a considerable change in the intellectual 
climate takes place. Philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon world begin to realize 
that they belong to one great movement whose emergence is largely due to 
German speaking pioneers. The influence of the later W ittgenstein is growing, 
ordinary language philosophy is flourishing and some works of Frege, who, in 
his construal of definite descriptions had taken a stand much closer to ordinary 
language than the Russell of OD, are translated into English. In short, the 
happy years of O D ’s uncontested fame are gone. A  new era of ideological strife 
is heralded by Strawson (1950).
Although this controversy is mainly concerned with the ToD, 
unintentionally OD itself gets more involved in it. Seven years before 
Strawson’s attack, Church (1943), making an attempt to comprehensively 
safeguard Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, not only pays 
attention to Russell’s KFA, but also to the GEA , which until then had not 
played any role at all. Somewhat later Carnap (1947) joins Church in his 
devastating criticism. Then Butler (1954) adds two new elements to the 
discussion: he tries to mitigate the attack of his predecessors in suggesting that 
the G EA  could make some sense if construed as aimed at Russell’s own former 
theory of meaning and denotation. It is enormously different from Frege’s 
doctrine both in character and in quality, although the two are treated as “very 
nearly the same” in OD. Both points have had a considerable impact on the 
subsequent quarrels. Geach (1958) joined Butler in giving the reader of OD 
the advice to “ ignore Russell’s use of Frege’s name”. Cassin (1970) made an 
attempt to mitigate the tacit criticism implied in Geach’s advice, suggesting 
that the G EA  does not even purport to be a criticism of Frege, but only of 
Russell’s own former view.
In 1970 a new revisionist trend emerges, initiated by Ayer (1971) and more
23 In chapter II the role played by Meinong will much more extensively be 
discussed than in the present chapter.
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thoroughly propounded by Hochberg (1976) and Blackburn &  Code (1978). 
They all try to safeguard Russell’s ToD from those humiliations, however 
mitigated they might be, in construing the G EA  as a sound criticism of both 
Russell’s former theory and Frege’s.24
1.3 Third period
Just as the beginning of the second period of O D ’s reception corresponds to 
a turning point in the general development of analytic philosophy, its self­
conscious formation out of scattered materials, so does its end. About 1980, 
when philosophers of science are turning to the history of science, a growing 
number of analytic philosophers feel the need to approach the movement they 
belong to historically. It is, I presume, not accidental that at that very moment 
Russell’s manuscripts were dug up, among them On Fundamentals (OF), which 
appeared to contain a lot of valuable and surprising information about the true 
origin of the ToD. It now appears that this theory did not, as Russell himself 
seems to suggest, emerge from his criticism of Meinong, but from the problem 
discussed in GEA . Furthermore, in the part of OF corresponding to the GEA, 
no mention is made of Meinong or Frege; Russell appears to be exclusively 
concerned with his own former theory of denoting.25
Coffa (1980) first signalled these findings and others like Cartwright 
(1987), Hylton (1990) and Rodriguez-Consuegra (1992) have followed him. 
W hat is their conclusion like? First of all, that the revisionist view is out of 
date, and that, from now on, an attempt has to be made to understand OD and 
the G EA  on the basis of its true Russellian origin. Secondly, that
24 The survey is very schematic indeed. I have deliberately simplified the 
developments in order to highlight significant trends. The members of one and the 
same movement are in fact much less united than might be supposed. For example, 
Blackburn & Code (1978) did not take notice of Hochberg (1976), although their 
approach and results are very similar. Others, like Searle (1957), continued the 
tradition of Church and Carnap in ignoring Russell’s own former theory of denot­
ing concepts, whose importance had been tightly emphasized by Butler (1954). 
Finally, some commentators take a somewhat exceptional stand. Among them is 
Dummett (1973), who rightly observes (at least in my opinion) that the GEA bears 
on Frege’s notion of indirect sense and reference (see below chapter III). According 
to Dummett Russell is confused but has nevertheless taken notice of a real problem 
in Frege’s theory. However, according to him, it can easily be solved by means of a 
correction in Frege’s fashion.
25 This assumption will be challenged in the second part. See especially 
section 8.
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Russell’s official story about the genesis of the ToD is a myth. W hoever wants 
to understand OD has to rely on what precedes it, not on Russell’s later 
comments.
In short, both the dazzling, somewhat too youthful and innocent 
enthusiasm of the first era and the stormy, more or less suppressed animosity of 
the second one, are replaced by a more quiet and sober- minded atmosphere 
inspired by the maxim that it is better to understand a philosopher against his 
own background than against that of the victories he supposed himself to have 
gained over others.
1.4 Perceiving the main opposition
The general upshot of the history of O D ’s assessment seems to be rather 
salutary. It does not consist in simply turning towards or away from Russell, 
but rather in turning away from the self-forgetful older one in order to save 
the forgotten younger one from oblivion Thus the main and final opposition 
dominating this development affects the direction of view. Russell’s own 
official, forward-looking perspective, OD as memorably containing a theory 
whose rendered services promise future victories, is replaced by an unofficial 
retrospective view: OD as reflecting its author’s previous wrestling with 
himself.
Just like other opposites, these have, as such, something in common: they 
are contrary forms of looking away from OD in order to find its real essence 
elsewhere. A s soon as this common reductionist element is recognized as 
such, the question whether it is worth following this path is answered as a 
matter of course. It goes without saying that paying attention to OD itself 
deserves preference. This, of course, does not mean that looking at its sources 
and its follow-up are to be put under a taboo. On the contrary, its charming, 
adolescent character cannot be revealed unless it is compared both with OF 
and with later expositions of the ToD. But, and that is the crucial point, if we 
want to know the extent to which OD does or does not agree with those other 
writings, one and only one reliable crown witness is to be consulted: OD itself.
However trivial and obvious this maxim may seem to be, it points in a 
new direction, one opposed to the two mutually opposed variants of the 
reductionist approach. OD is to be situated where it evidently belongs: halfway 
between the forgotten and the forgetful Russell. Both extremes are reflected in 
OD and both deserve attention, just as well as their opposition does.
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1.5 The riddle of Russell’s forgetfulness
Suppose the official story about the genesis of the ToD had been told not by 
Russell himself, but instead by some uninformed outsider. In that case, we 
would perhaps be entitled to turn our back to it. But in fact the protagonist 
himself has told the story! How could we ever entertain the slightest hope of 
understanding the intrigue of O D ’s history, unless we are prepared to dwell on 
Russell’s words and investigate what lies behind them? We shall have to ask, 
firstly, what possible grain of truth is contained in them and in how far they are 
deceptive.
A nd if the story, at least to some extent, appears to be misleading, we shall 
have to ask a second question, namely: How is it possible that the very person 
who happened to be more acquainted with the true genesis of the ToD than 
any one else in the whole world, has led us astray? Did Russell suffer from a 
memory defect? There are, as far as I can see, no indications to justify such 
an assumption. Did he deliberately play false? If so, what could possibly have 
been the underlying motive for such a fraud? A nd if his deceptive behaviour 
flows from self-deception (which might be the most plausible hypothesis), 
then the same question must be asked. For in whatever way self-deception is 
construed, in Freudian or Sartrean fashion, it needs some hidden incentive. So, 
Russell must have had some ‘reason’ to banish the real origin or at least some 
of its features, from his conscience, in overemphasizing the importance of his 
being dissatisfied with “Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being” and in not 
mentioning the problem occurring in OF at all. But what could this ‘reason’ 
possibly be? Is there anything shameful about the actual conception and birth 
of the ToD?
1.6 Assumptions underlying the neglect of the riddle
A ll these questions concerning Russell’s forgetfulness are quite obvious. 
Nevertheless, Russell scholars have not raised them. How is that possible? If 
the above account of the main antagonism dominating the reception of OD 
is right, this fact is not as surprising as might at first sight be supposed. It is 
a natural outcome of the reactive turn of mind which consists in focussing 
on the forgotten Russell instead of the forgetful one. Indeed, his being an 
unreliable witness is established as a curious, maybe somewhat embarrassing 
fact. But the opportunity of focussing on its very curiousness and of asking for 
an explanation has been either overlooked or deemed to be useless.
Why so? Evidently because Russell’s later account of what led him to the
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ToD, is supposed to be just a wrong answer to an unambiguous multiple-choice 
question, whose correct solution has been determined beforehand. There 
seems to be no reason either to be fascinated by Russell’s story or to examine 
it any further. Forgiving and forgetting such an evident flaw, preferably with a 
kind smile, in order to turn to Russell’s forgotten better self seems the best way 
to cope with it.
Those who anxiously rely on the testimony of OF, do not, of course, 
suppose the G EA  to be the only critical argument in OD. They are prepared 
to admit the occurrence of other arguments as well, such as the KFA and the 
one based on the principle of acquaintance.26 So, there are at least two or three 
candidates qualifying for being nominated as the one that actually led Russell 
to the ToD. They do so in virtue of something they are supposed to have 
in common: purporting to undermine the old view of denoting, they are all 
trailblazers and somehow supporters of one and the same new theory. One and 
only one of them can and does have the additional quality of being the leader 
of this team, just as one and only one among all those men who ever walked 
on the moon, can be the first one who ever did so.
This conceptual scheme is based on the following assumptions:
a) There is one and only one ‘leader’ because there is one and only 
one way of being a  ‘leader’ . The past tense of the verb “lead” used in 
Russell’s notorious saying that he was led to the ToD by his “desire 
to avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being”, is supposed 
to be susceptible to one and only one interpretation: He wanted 
to make us believe that the said desire made him conceive his new 
theory. A nd that, of course, is precisely what the manuscript OF has 
revealed to be false.
b) The two or three critical arguments that possibly could have led him 
to the ToD, are deemed to have, all of them, the same logical import. 
In other words, the quality of being the leader, which actually does 
make a difference, must, according to this view, presuppose equality 
of legal status. Although their actual strength and validity may be 
assessed differently, all candidates purport to do the same thing.
c) W hat they actually purport to do may be construed in only two 
possible ways: either as merely undermining the old view on 
denoting and thus making room for the new one, or as both making 
room for it and supporting it. Consequently, the relation to the ToD 
is supposed to be at any rate positive.
26 I shall leave aside the latter one.
23
There is one and only one way of testing the possible validity of these 
assumptions: paying attention to OD itself. In the subsequent discussion, I 
shall try to show that actually doing so leads to the conclusion that they are all 
mere dogmas whose persistency is only due to the habit, established by Russell 
himself, of seeking O D ’s essence beyond it.
2 Paying attention to OD itself
2.1 O D’s puzzling structure
Let us start with the question concerning the way in which the KFA occurs in 
OD. In the third paragraph Russell gives the following survey of the course of 
his argument:
I shall begin by stating the theory I intend to advocate; I shall then 
discuss the theories of Frege and Meinong, showing why neither of 
them satisfies me; then I shall give the grounds in favour of my theory; 
and finally I shall briefly indicate the philosophical consequences of my 
theory.
From these words, an uninstructed and unsuspicious reader inevitably gets 
the impression that the second part of OD will be devoted to criticism of 
theories about denoting put forward by others. Furthermore, such a reader will 
expect the purpose of criticism to be merely destructive. For all arguments in 
favour of the new theory seem to be relegated to the third part.
On closer scrutiny, however, this impression seems to be rather misleading. 
In the footnote linked to this passage, Russell refers to his own former theory 
of denoting, expounded in The Principles o f Mathematics (POM ), Ch V, saying: 
“The theory there advocated is very nearly the same as Frege’s, and quite 
different from the theory to be advocated in what follows.” From this we may 
infer that in the second section of OD, Russell not only wants to criticize the 
views of others, but his own former theory as well, which, in being opposed to 
the ToD, does not differ significantly from Frege’s doctrine of sense (Sinn) and 
reference (Bedeutung).
Thus, we may correct our first impression in supposing the author of OD to 
have two essentially different opponents: Frege and Russell’s former self on the 
one hand and Meinong on the other. Although this view, of course, is wrong, 
it nevertheless contains a kernel of truth. It reflects the fact that shortly before 
his discovery of the ToD, Russell had criticized Meinong and declared himself
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in agreement with Frege, at least as far as the issue of possible non-existent 
and non-subsistent objects is concerned (see B. Russell (1905 a) and (1905
b)). In so doing, Russell had dissociated himself from POM in which both 
Meinongian and Fregean elements are mixed.27 Actually, in OD, Frege and 
Meinong are grouped together not so much as the two other philosophers who 
happened to have put forward a theory of denoting, but rather as representing 
two mutually opposed views on a specific issue, namely the problem of non­
being, which in some way or other seems to be connected with denoting.28 
Although Meinong and Frege did not take notice of each other’s existence, 
Russell went through both their views and through the conflict between them.
Consequently, our first impression of the objective and scope of the 
second section of OD has to be subjected to two further corrections. In what 
seems to be his assessment of current theories about denoting, not just three 
personalities occur, but five: Frege, the quasi-Fregean Russell, Meinong, 
the quasi-Meinongian Russell, and finally the author of OD who is equally 
dissatisfied by all of them. Furthermore, this criticism appears to be confined to 
one specific issue only, namely the problem of non-being.
Now, assuming that all arguments purporting to undermine other theories 
are to be found in the second section, we seem to be entitled to expect that the 
KFA is the only one occurring in OD. This anticipation, however, is falsified 
by the fact that in the course of the third section, destined to be reserved for 
arguments in favour of the ToD, an additional unannounced argument occurs, 
namely the GEA. It contains a criticism of “the” theory of meaning and 
denotation, i.e., pace Cassin and her followers, of the theory which Frege and
27 For further discussion, see chapter II.
28 Having expounded the main difficulty in Meinong’s view (OD, paragraph 
11), namely that the existent present King of France has to exist in virtue of his 
essence, whereas in fact he does not exist, Russell wrongly suggests that Frege is 
able to avoid this difficulty in virtue of his distinguishing Sinn and Bedeutung. What 
Russell must have had in mind is rather that the awkward consequence of Frege’s 
un-Meinongian view (namely that all sentences which seem to express a proposi­
tion about a non-existent or non-subsistent object, are -  at least from a logical 
point of view -  meaningless) is mitigated by the introduction of the said distinc­
tion. For it allows such sentences to have at least a Sinn, namely the Gedanke 
expressed by them. According to the ToD, of course, this mitigation is not powerful 
enough. Cf. 23.2 below.
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the Russell of POM are supposed to share.29 This argument bears on an issue 
that is quite different from the problem of non-being, namely the question of 
how the supposed meaning of an unambiguously denoting phrase can be made 
the subject of a proposition in such a way as to “preserve” the logical, extra- 
linguistic relation of the meaning to the denotation. The latter requirement 
implies that the meaning itself must somehow be involved in its being made 
the subject of a proposition. That is why it might be called the problem of 
reflexivity.
2.2 The puzzle of O D’s structure solved
It has gradually become apparent that it is far from easy to see how the actual 
structure of OD meets the general outline sketched in its third paragraph. 
What is more, there is something strange and unnatural about the announced 
course of argument. Indeed, OD does not pretend to be a philosophical 
poem like W ittgenstein’s Tractatus. W hat Russell wants to convey could just 
as well have been set out in many other ways. But, and that is the sticking 
point, once the decision is made to start, after a short introduction, with an 
exposition of the ToD itself, it seems to be rather inappropriate to continue 
with a purely negative criticism of existing theories. In the course of the first 
section (paragraph 7), Russell appears to be prepared frankly to admit that his 
interpretation of unambiguously denoting phrases may seem “incredible” . So, 
what the poor reader of Mind is hoping for is, of course, a reason why there is
29 The view put forward by Cassin (1970), namely that in the GEA Russell is 
only concerned with his own former theory of denoting concepts, can be refuted 
in two different ways. Firstly, it flatly contradicts Russell’s own saying (OD para­
graph 3, footnote) that his former theory is “very nearly the same” as Frege’s theory 
of sense and reference. Secondly, Cassin’s view can only be upheld in assuming 
that in the second part of OD, the one containing the KFA, Russell is exclusively 
concerned with criticism of others, namely with Meinong and Frege. In the GEA 
he is supposed to change the target of his criticism. However, in the first paragraph 
of the GEA (OD paragraph 18) Russell says: “The relation of the meaning to the 
denotation involves certain rather curious difficulties, which seem in themselves 
sufficient to prove that the theory which leads to such difficulties must be wrong.” 
In my opinion, the words “in themselves sufficient to prove” are in themselves suf­
ficient to prove that Cassin’s exegesis must be wrong. For this turn of phrase only 
makes sense if in the GEA Russell purports to put forward a new criticism of the 
very same theory which has been criticized before, namely the theory introduced in 
paragraph 11, the theory of what “we may call” (in the context of OD) meaning and 
denotation and what Frege has called Sinn and Bedeutung.
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any need of such an artificial and complicated theory.
In fact Russell does not delude that expectation, as appears from the very 
first paragraph of the second section (OD, paragraph 9), which runs as follows:
The above gives a reduction of all propositions in which denoting 
phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur. Why it is 
imperative to effect such a reduction, the subsequent discussion will 
endeavour to show.
It is, I presume, not accidental that “the subsequent discussion” actually 
meets the increasing impatience of the reader. To do so is the main purpose of 
O D ’s second section, the purpose marked by the word imperative. The reader 
expects a justification of that strange and “incredible” theory. In the KFA, i.e. 
in the joint criticism of Meinong and Frege, Russell purports to give such a 
justification. He wants to compensate for his bold decision to start with a dry 
exposition of his new theory.
This lies at the very root of the difficulty the reader of OD is faced with.
For this purpose of O D ’s second part is not announced in paragraph 3. In so far, 
Russell does more than he has promised. Indeed, he answers the announced 
question, namely why “neither of the theories of Frege and Meinong satisfy” 
him. But in answering that question, he also answers another, unannounced 
one, namely “why it is imperative to effect such a reduction”, i.e. “a reduction 
of all propositions in which denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such 
phrases occur” .
A t first sight, this second question seems to be announced as pertaining 
to O D ’s third part, in which Russell wants to give “grounds in favour” of his 
new theory. But on closer scrutiny, these announced grounds in favour of the 
ToD appear to be essentially more modest. For they are put forward within the 
setting of the match arranged by means of the puzzles. In paragraph 14 O D ’s 
third part is introduced as follows:
A  logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and 
it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with 
as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as 
is served by experiments in physical science. I shall therefore state three 
puzzles which a theory as to denoting ought to be able to solve; and I shall 
show later that my theory solves them.
After the three puzzles have been expounded in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17, 
the game can be played. But it is not a game like patience. It is not played in
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solitude, but in competition with an opponent, namely “the” old theory of 
denoting. In principle each puzzle may give the new theory an opportunity 
to prove its superiority. Provided the old theory fails to deal with the puzzle, 
whereas the new one successfully solves it, there is a “ground in favour of the 
latter”. In view of the score, it is sufficient to establish success or failure. There 
is no need of any explanation. It is sufficient if Russell happens to dispose of an 
argument which proves that, for some reason or other, the old theory is unable 
to solve the puzzle at stake. After having shown that his new theory is capable 
of avoiding the difficulties the old theory gets involved in, the score is 1-0 in 
favour of the former.
A s seen from this perspective, criticism of the old theory is part of the game 
to be played in O D ’s third section. For Russell wants to discuss the puzzles in 
order. So, he starts with puzzle (1), and more in particular with an argument 
which proves, that for some reason or other, the theory of meaning and 
denotation gets involved in unsuspected difficulties in its attempt to deal with 
puzzle (1). That argument is the G EA  (see especially its last two paragraphs, 
namely 24 and 25). Therefore, the position of the G EA  in OD is quite regular! 
Similarly, after the exposition of the GEA , Russell exactly does what he might 
be expected to do, namely explain how the ToD solves puzzle (1) (paragraphs 
26-30).
Russell subsequently moves to the discussion of puzzle (2). But 
unfortunately, he only explains how the ToD successfully solves it without 
even mentioning the old theory. This is an irregular move indeed. It looks like 
cheating. But in fact puzzle (2) is out of the game. Both Meinong and Frege 
would claim to be capable of handling it more satisfactorily than the Russell 
of the ToD. Both would say that the sentences “The present King of France 
is bald” and “The present King of France is not bald” do not express anything 
true or false. Frege would say so because the phrase “the present King of 
France” fails to have a reference. Meinong would say so because the question 
concerning possible hair growth is beyond the essence of that unreal royalty. 
After all, accepting truth-value gaps is not always as disadvantageous as Russell 
suggests.
Anyhow, in the first part of OD, the part in which the ToD is expounded, 
Russell praises the ToD because it eliminates truth-value gaps altogether. In 
paragraph 8, he says:
Thus e.g. every proposition of the form ‘C  (the present King of France)’ is 
false. This is a great advantage in the present theory. I shall show later that 
it is not contrary to the law of contradiction, as might be at first supposed.
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Evidently, this advantage involves a new disadvantage. For if all propositions 
in whose verbal expressions: “the present King of France” occurs are false, then 
the proposition expressed by “The present King of France is bald” must be as 
false as the one expressed by “the present King of France is not bald” .
Russell announces to show later how the ToD is capable of solving this 
problem. Where is this promise fulfilled? Evidently in paragraph 31, where the 
ToD’s solution of puzzle (2) is explained by means of the distinction between 
primary and secondary occurrence. In fact, according to the ToD, not all 
propositions in whose verbal expression “the present King of France” occurs, 
are supposed to be false. This only applies to sentences of the form “the present 
King of France is P” . There the denoting phrase has a primary occurrence. 
Therefore, the contradictory of “the present King of France is bald”, namely “it 
is false that the present King of France is bald” may quite well be true.
Therefore, puzzle (2) constitutes a private problem of the incompletely 
expounded ToD. A t the end of the above-quoted paragraph 8 Russell 
interrupts his exposition of the ToD. Puzzle (2) is introduced in order to 
enable its completion. Essentially it belongs to O D ’s first part. The reason why 
its discussion is postponed obviously is the same as the reason why the KFA 
precedes the exposition of the puzzles: in order to counterbalance the growing 
impatience of the reader.
Suppose O D ’s composition to be modified as follows. The discussion of the 
ToD’s refinement by means of the distinction between primary and secondary 
occurrence is explained immediately after paragraph 8 on occasion of puzzle 
(2). Furthermore, the whole KFA is placed where it belongs, immediately 
preceding the ToD’s solution of the puzzle of non-being. In this new 
arrangement, O D ’s structure would be much more conspicuous. But it would 
have lost a lot of its charm and persuasiveness. For the proposed modification 
would put the whole argument into the football setting. W ithin the rules of 
the game the extra force of the KFA would not count.
W hat is the nature of this extra “ imperative” force? Is it purely rhetorical? 
No, it is due to a significant difference between football and science or 
philosophy. In football an attempt to explain the opponent’s failures does not 
belong to the game itself. But in science and philosophy it does. The KFA 
not only purports to prove that Meinong and the un-Meinongian Frege are, 
for some reason or other, unable to solve puzzle (3). It also purports to explain 
why they fail: they do so because they share the presupposition whose rejection 
constitutes the main principle of the ToD, namely that the denotation acts as 
something the proposition is about. In the next subsection this point will be 
further explained.
According to my analysis, the riddle of O D ’s puzzling structure can only
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be solved if due attention is paid to the conflict between what in paragraph 
3 Russell promises to do and what he actually does. In fact he does more than 
he suggests, more than just giving “reasons in favour” of his theory. In O D ’s 
second part, he purports to explain the supposed failure of Meinong and Frege. 
The KFA plays a twofold role: it acts in the match set up by means of the 
puzzles, and it acts, in virtue of its “imperative” character as justification of 
the ToD. Its being discussed in a separate part of OD is only due to the latter, 
unannounced role it plays.
A s will be more extensively explained below, the G EA  is not capable of 
justifying the ToD. That, of course does not prove that in itself it is weaker 
than the KFA, but only that, in sanctioning the ToD’s adoption, it is weaker. 
This formal inequality does not fit into the mould of the official story, which 
has a great impact on the atmosphere around OD. It is hardly possible to read 
OD without inhaling that atmosphere. That is why the riddle of its structure 
can only be explained in holding one’s breath. In the previous analysis I have 
tried to do so.
2.3 General import of the argument against Meinong and Frege
A s noticed in the previous subsection, the KFA is able to serve the purpose of 
the second section, because it is meant to be both negative and positive. How 
is this unity of destructive and constructive power to be conceived? Evidently, 
the argument purports to show not only that the theories of Meinong and 
Frege for some reason or other fail to give a satisfactory interpretation of 
sentences containing denoting phrases such as “the present King of France”, 
but as well to explain why they fail to do so, namely in virtue of their being 
opposed to the ToD.
W hat does “being opposed to the ToD” mean? Before the latter’s birth, 
nobody knew. So, we shall have to start with the question of how it deviates 
from its predecessors. In spite of all their differences, Frege’s theory and 
Russell’s old theory of denoting are both opposed to a more primitive theory of 
the proposition, whose main idea is that propositions contain what is essential 
to their identity. Consequently, if a proposition is about some entity, that entity 
must be its constituent.
This view leads to several difficulties. For the sake of brevity, I shall confine 
myself to the most familiar one. How can a proposition like the one expressed 
by “The author of Waverley is the same as the author of Ivanhoe” be both true 
and informative? Russell and Frege solved it in assuming that a proposition 
can be about something which is not its constituent. The content, the meaning
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of the phrase “The author of Waverley” actually is a constituent, and it 
denotes something beyond the proposition itself, but nevertheless something 
quite essential, namely something the proposition is about. Thus conceived, 
denoting is intentionality in the extra mental world of propositions.30
According to the ToD, this notion of self-transcendence is half-hearted 
and inconsistent. For however emphatically the externality of the denotation 
may have been stressed by both Frege and the Russell of POM, that cannot 
prevent the denotation from being of vital importance to the very essence of 
the proposition, namely its fitness for being true or false. So, the main idea of 
the ToD is, that the denotation only seems to be something the proposition is 
about, whereas in fact its relation to propositions with which it has to do, is 
much less intimate. The denotation is only relevant to the actual truth value, 
not to the capacity to be true or false.
How does this bear on the issue of non-being? The link is quite evident. 
According to the ToD, propositions do not have to fear the loss of their 
denotations. Their total absence does not injure the proposition’s fitness for 
having a truth value. A nd that casts the opposition between Meinong and 
Frege in a different light. Before the birth of the ToD, they seemed to represent 
the horns of an unavoidable dilemma: either assuming the presence of non­
existent or non-subsistent objects in order to save the proposition’s capacity 
to be true or false, or accepting truth value gaps in order to fully acknowledge 
the absence of the denotation. A s seen from the point of view of the ToD, 
these positions appear to be mutually opposed versions of one and the same 
avoidable presupposition, nam ely th at den otin g p h rases are “ stan d in g for 
genuine co n stitu e n ts o f the propositions in whose verbal expression they 
occur”. (OD, paragraph 10) Indeed, this discovery might have contributed to 
Russell’s acceptance of the ToD. 31
2 .4  O D ’s am b igu ou s ten or (ad  a)
Is this hypothesis confirmed by historical facts? A t least partly. In the passage 
of OF, where the conception of the ToD actually takes place, neither Meinong, 
nor Frege, nor the problem of non-being to which they primarily owe their 
alliance, is mentioned at all.32 Furthermore -  and the importance of this fact 
has often been overlooked -  Russell appears to be very sceptical about the
30 Cf. 0.3 footnote 19.
31 In 7.2 the same issue will be discussed from the perspective of Russell’s own 
former quasi-Meinongianism and the role played by Frege in liberating him from it.
32 In section 8 this statement will be qualified.
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ToD. In OF §44, he even considers abandoning it altogether (Russell, B. (1905
c), p. 385). A s author of OD, however, he takes a much more self-confident 
stand. Evidently, this considerable change must be due to a new insight 
having emerged after the completion of OF, namely that the ToD has the great 
advantage of throwing a new light on the problem of non-being. Thus, as seen 
from OD itself, its origin appears to be twofold. Its writer was not a monk who 
copied a holy manuscript, but rather a very agile philosopher, who, even in his 
exposition of the GEA , changed a lot of things and who, in doing so, not only 
drew from OF, but as well from a whole series of new insights which must have 
come to his mind before or during the composition of O D.33
But -  and this is another fact whose importance has often been ignored -  
in OD the former doubts have not completely disappeared. Some vestige of 
them remains and is in fact quite essential to its tenor. OD itself is much more 
ambiguous than is generally supposed. This appears from the second part of 
the very first paragraph. Supposing himself to have explained what denoting 
phrases are, Russell says:
The interpretation of such phrases is a matter of considerable difficulty; 
indeed, it is very hard to frame any theory not susceptible of formal 
refutation. A ll the difficulties with which I am acquainted are met, so far 
as I can discover, by the theory which I am about to explain.
OD essentially contains a second view on denoting. Its main claim is, that its 
subject matter is much more problematic than at first might be supposed. The 
available theories lead to unsuspected problems. Anyhow, the issue of denoting 
is in need of some new theory. Relying on his own experience, Russell proves 
to be completely certain of this contention. The second claim of OD, which 
of course presupposes the first one, is put forward with much less commitment. 
Russell wants to advocate a very specific new theory on denoting, namely the 
ToD. More conspicuously, this appears from the end of the very last paragraph. 
There, referring to the view of the ToD, he concludes:
I will only beg the reader not to make up his mind against the view -  
as he might be tempted to do, on account of its apparently excessive 
complication -  until he has attempted to construct a theory of his own 
on the subject of denotation. This attempt, I believe, will convince him 
that, whatever the true theory may be, it cannot have such simplicity as 
one might have expected beforehand.
33 See 16.1.
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If OD contained no other critical arguments than the KFA, it would be 
unambiguous in tenor. Consequently, the mere fact of its actually being 
otherwise indicates that it must contain at least one critical argument with a 
quite different legal status. Now, in the body of Russell’s exposition, one and 
only one such argument occurs: the GEA . In paragraph 18 it is introduced as 
follows:
The relation of the meaning to the denotation involves certain 
rather curious difficulties, which seem in themselves sufficient to 
prove that the theory which leads to such difficulties must be wrong.
The words “rather curious” reveal that Russell must have been surprised by 
those difficulties and did not know for certain how to explain them. He merely 
claims that “the theory which leads to such difficulties must be wrong”, not 
that it is wrong in virtue of its being opposed to the ToD. Consequently, the 
G EA  significantly differs in import from the KFA. N ot being conceived from 
the point of view of the ToD, it is rather prospective with regard to a possible 
new theory than retrospective in character. Long before the manuscript OF 
was dug up, an attentive reader of OD could have guessed that it might have 
led Russell to the conception of the ToD.
In being addressed to both Russell and Frege, the GEA , of course, differs 
significantly from the corresponding passage in OF §§35-39.34 After having 
finished that manuscript, Russell must have asked himself whether the problem 
detected in his own former theory is also to be found in Frege’s similar doctrine 
of Sinn and Bedeutung. Having discussed the subject with him about one year 
before, Russell was quite well aware of at least some of their differences, as 
is evidently reflected in OD, paragraph 11, second footnote.35 The essential 
point, however, was not and still is not how great the differences are, but, 
rather, how relevant they are to the problem of reflexivity. Russell must have 
faced a question very similar to the one he had faced when he contacted Frege 
after having discovered the paradox, namely: Is my problem a private one; is 
it merely due to the un-Fregean character of my logic? Both in 1902, when he 
wrote his first letter to Frege, and in 1905, when he only used Frege’s name 
in OD, his answer was negative. A nd in both cases, it is not based on any 
available explanation, but on having sensed the unsuspected and obstinate
2.5 GEA’s import and scope (ad b)
34 This will be cited in perspective in section 8. In the said passage, Frege is not 
mentioned. Still, he is virtually present.
35 For further discussion, see 23.1.
33
nature of the problem itself. That in the former case Russell’s diagnosis, 
although mingled with misunderstandings, was essentially right, has been 
generally acknowledged, both by Frege himself and by others. The question 
whether this also applies to the latter case, deserves an extensive investigation, 
which is far beyond the scope of this chapter, but will be discussed below, in 
25.2.
2.6 The riddle of Russell’s forgetfulness solved (ad c)
However, another related question does indeed belong to the present 
discussion, namely whether a positive result of such an investigation must lead 
to a new, historically enlightened version of revisionism. This, in fact, seems 
to be the position of Makin (2000), who, as far as I can see, has discussed 
the subject more thoroughly than anyone else. I fully agree with his main 
contention, namely that the GEA’s applicability to Frege’s theory cannot 
be disproved by its possibly purely Russellian origin. But I disagree with the 
assumption Makin shares with all other commentators, that the origin of 
the G EA  actually is purely Russellian. This point is beyond the scope of the 
present chapter. It will be discussed in the second part of this thesis, especially 
in section 8. But I equally disagree with another assumption even Makin has 
uncritically taken over from all commentators, namely that the two critical 
arguments contained in OD are of equal legal status. They are both supposed 
to argue in favour of the ToD. The discussion of this tenet falls clearly within 
the scope of the present chapter.
In 2.2 I have argued, that the riddle of O D ’s structure cannot be solved 
unless a formal difference between the KFA and the G EA  is acknowledged, 
a formal difference in view of the ToD. If the KFA is right, then it lends 
support the ToD. But the same does not hold true of the GEA . It fails to be 
“ imperative” with regard to the ToD. For it does not claim to provide an 
explanation of the old theory’s failure. Indeed, if the ToD is right, then the 
problem discussed in the G EA  must be explained in a specific way. Then it is 
supposed to originate from the assumption that “denoting phrases have any 
meaning in themselves” . But this explanation is by far not the only possible, 
let alone the only plausible one.
From Church onwards, all commentators, including Makin, have assumed 
as a matter of course that the two arguments occurring in OD are of equal legal 
status. Both are supposed to be meant as support for the ToD. Therefore, either 
you side with Russell and his favourite theory and the G EA  or you dislike all of 
them.
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Indeed, silently and indirectly, Russell has fostered such an approach.
But -  and that is the sticking point -  he never adopted it himself! On the 
contrary, his strange and misleading behaviour testifies to his remaining 
conviction that the ToD is at variance with the very problem which gave rise 
to its conception! That is the second grain of truth concealed in his notorious 
comment on what led him to the ToD: the G EA  did not lead him to its 
acceptance, quite to the contrary.
Therefore, ignoring these formal difference between the KFA and the 
G EA  amounts to the same as ignoring both the riddle of O D ’s structure and 
the riddle of Russell’s forgetfulness. Russell’s initial doubts about the validity 
of the ToD are based on his realization that it is not equal to the difficulties 
it is supposed to avoid. For these originally and primarily bear on indefinite 
descriptions, whereas the ToD is mainly concerned with definite ones. Indeed, 
denoting phrases containing the word “all” or “some” may be construed in 
a Fregean fashion, as expounded in OD, paragraph 5 and 6. But the word 
“any”, which both in POM §86 and in OF §47 is associated with the variable, 
remains unexplained! O f course, according to OD, paragraph 4, p. 480,
“the notion of the variable” is to be taken “as fundamental”. Nevertheless, 
if the variable denotes any entity whatever in virtue of its having a specific 
meaning, namely ‘any entity’ -and as seen from the general perspective of 
Russell’s philosophy of logic, this idea seems to be equally fundamental -then 
the problem of reflexivity, i.e. the problem of explaining the use of inverted 
commas, equally applies to that meaning.36
In OD, indefinite descriptions are largely overshadowed by definite ones. 
The unsuspicious reader gets the misleading impression that the G EA  does 
not have anything to do with ambiguously denoting phrases like “anything”. 
So, the seriousness of the problem has been considerably eclipsed; but, as has 
appeared above, it has not eclipsed sufficiently to take away Russell’s doubts.
W hat is more, such a reader also gets the impression that making the 
distinction between primary and secondary occurrence is a privilege of the 
ToD. This, however, is certainly not what Russell had in mind. The part of 
OF preceding the discovery of the ToD, especially §23, bristles with similar 
distinctions. A nd although the notion of ‘occurrence’ does not play such a 
prominent role in Frege’s logic, he nevertheless makes use of something very 
similar, in distinguishing between direct and indirect Sinn and Bedeutung 
in order to cope with problems such as puzzle (1). In fact, the primary, but 
somewhat less obvious objective of the G EA  is: to prove that the old theory is
36 This issue will be extensively discussed in chapter V. See especially 22.3 
and 24.1.
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not able to effectuate such a distinction.37
W hat the self-confident Russell probably did have in mind is the 
contention that the old theory fails to do so, because it wrongly supposes that 
denoting phrases have any meaning in themselves and that therefore the ToD, 
denying this presupposition and focussing on the propositions in whose verbal 
expression denoting phrases occur, can smoothly make the distinction required 
to solve the puzzles.
This sounds very attractive indeed, but the trouble is that in this way the 
contrast between direct and indirect discourse is ignored. The insecure Russell 
must have had an inkling of it, for although in OF different conflicting views 
are explored, one thing seems beyond doubt, namely that a proposition can 
only be about another one, if the latter occurs in a different way. So, instead 
of That the S is P, is Q , we could also write: ‘The S is P ’ is Q . Consequently, the 
problem of reflexivity which is concerned with the explanation of inverted 
commas, also applies to propositions.
W hat force, then, was powerful enough to bring about Russell’s final 
self-confidence, to which OD owes its established fame? Evidently, another 
discovery must have been effective in changing his attitude towards the ToD, 
namely the discovery that its main principle could be ingeniously used in order 
to give the Theory of Types its required facelift (see above section 1.1). So, the 
desire to solve another problem, his famous paradox, lies behind Russell’s final, 
wholehearted acceptance of the ToD.38
In its later expositions, from Principia onwards, the discussion of puzzle 
(1) survives, but the misleading intimation that the distinction between 
primary and secondary occurrence is a privilege of the ToD is reinforced to 
such a degree that the G EA  is replaced by a simplified, amputated substitute 
(see Russell, B. and W hitehead A .N . (1910), p. 67). 39 It is the decisive step 
that led Russell and his commentators to underestimate the value of OD 
itself. For that value consists in making clear what OD primarily purports 
to make clear, namely that the issue of denoting is more problematic than 
generally supposed.40 A nd that, of course, does not prevent the ToD from being 
honoured for what it is: a stimulating attempt to cope with an unexpected 
problem.
From POM onwards, Russell was confident in his conviction that there
37 Cf. 20.4 and 20.5.
38 Cf. 25.1.
39 C.f. 24.3.
40 As I shall argue in 15.3, the quintessence of the problem is not denoting as 
such, but the incompatibility of denoting and the axiom of external difference.
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is a connection between denoting and the paradox. A s far as I can see, the 
importance of this conviction has been obscured by his somewhat too anxious 
desire to get rid of the paradox. Maybe, the true value of OD consists in 
showing that the main problem of denoting is just one side of a larger problem 
of which the paradox constitutes the other side. After all, the two problems 
have, each of them, to do with reflexivity, although in mutually opposed ways, 
the famous one with an excess, the other with a deficit of reflexivity.41
41 See 25.
Chapter II
Russell, Meinong and the 
Origin of the Theory of 
Descriptions42
3 How to criticize the official view
3.1 The unofficial versus the official view
Just as natural numbers have not been called ‘natural’ until other, less natural 
ones were adopted, so the ‘official view’ on Russell’s famous Theory of 
Descriptions (ToD) has not been called ‘official’ until fragments of another, 
‘unofficial’ one began to emerge. The most obvious and striking feature of 
the official view consists in its attributing a prominent role to Meinong as the 
philosopher who actually represented in its purest form the view the ToD is 
opposed to. Both the origin and the importance of Russell’s theory are supposed 
to be out-and-out anti-Meinongian.
The official view on the ToD and its history is not just a piece of 
philosophical gossip whose prestige is mainly based on frequent and 
inconsiderate repetition; it has been strongly promoted by Russell himself.
W hat is more, he seems to be its very originator. In My Mental Development
Russell wrote: “ ......the desire to avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of
being led me to the theory of descriptions.”43 This self-ascription has greatly 
contributed to its long-lasting dominance. W ho dares to doubt the reliability 
of the story told by the very person who may be supposed to have been better 
acquainted with the real background and genesis of the ToD than anyone else 
in the whole world?
Indeed, without the help of new, unsuspected evidence no one could have 
mustered up enough courage to challenge Russell’s authority. The required 
support for a rivalling account came from the manuscript O n Fundamentals 
(OF) whose importance was discovered by Coffa (1980). A s appears 
unambiguously from this text, the ToD in fact was discovered on occasion of a
37
42 Slightly revised version of Boukema (2007).
43 Russell, B. (1944), p.13.
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problem that has no obvious connection with Meinong at all, namely the one 
raised by the question of how a denoting concept can be made the subject of a 
proposition.
In subsequent years new, although somewhat more controversial evidence 
has been put forward against Russell’s account, most notably by Griffin 
(1996, p.57), who has argued that the supposed Meinongianism or quasi- 
Meinongianism Russell wanted to get rid of by means of the ToD, is merely 
fictitious. He concludes that
„.contrary to what until recently was the almost unanimous view of 
philosophers, Russell’s reasons for adopting his new theory of definite 
descriptions in 1905 could have nothing whatsoever to do with the need 
to prune back an unduly populous realm of being.
Others, such as Cartwright (1987) and Hylton (1990) have adopted similar 
views. Although I do not know for sure how much support the unofficial 
view has found among Russell scholars, I assume its authority has sufficiently 
increased to provoke the question in how far its example is worth following.
3.2 The need for further criticism
There is one rather obvious reason for being suspicious of the belief that 
Russell’s account is a mere myth. The importance of the fact, noted above, 
that the official story originated from its very protagonist, has been overlooked. 
In virtue of this fact, the emergence of the official view is itself part of the 
true history of the ToD. Therefore, if a considerable amount of painstaking 
exegetical and critical analysis results in a new, refreshing and stimulating 
view, it cannot be plausible, unless it proves to be capable of explaining the 
remarkable and fascinating historical fact that the protagonist has promoted 
another view. If Russell’s own account deviates from what is supposed to be 
the true story, this requires an explanation. W hat kind of motive might have 
enticed him to distort his own mental development?
The weakness of the newly established critical assessment of the official 
story does not only consist in its failure to ask this question and to make an 
attempt at answering it, but also in its being so severe, as to leave no room 
for any sound answer at all. If Russell’s distortion of the historical facts is 
understandable, his account must at least contain some kernel of truth.
How can such a truth be detected? N ot by means of a reactionary attempt
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at gluing together the debris left by the iconoclasts in order to rehabilitate 
the official view. On the contrary, the elements the official view consists of 
are to be subjected to further deconstruction in order to detect the smaller 
pieces that may fit into a new coherent whole. The extremism of the newly 
established critical analysis is not due to its being too critical or too analytical, 
but rather to its being not critical and analytical enough. For the ideal shared 
by all who are seriously engaged in criticism consists in the rejection of no less 
and no more than what on closer scrutiny appears to be false. Trying to avoid 
the rejection of what only seems to be false is just as essential and important as 
trying to avoid the acceptance of what only seems to be true.
3.3 Preliminary analysis of the official view
Analysis cannot proceed without some data, which constitute its raw material.
I shall therefore start by more fully quoting the above-mentioned key passage 
from My Mental Development.
Having described how in June 1901 “the period of honeymoon delight” 
immediately after his visit to the International Congress of Philosophy in 
Paris came to an abrupt end by his discovery of the astonishing contradiction, 
Russell proceeds as follows:
A t first, I hoped the matter was trivial and could be easily cleared up; but 
early hopes were succeeded by something very near to despair. Throughout 
1903 and 1904, I pursued will-o’-the wisps and made no progress. A t last, 
in the spring of 1905, a different problem, which proved soluble, gave the 
first glimmer of hope. The problem was that of descriptions, and its solution 
suggested a new technique.
Scholastic realism was a metaphysical theory, but every metaphysical 
theory has a technical counterpart. I had been a realist in the scholastic or 
Platonic sense; I had thought that cardinal integers, for instance, have a 
timeless being. W hen integers were reduced to classes of classes, this being 
was transferred to classes. Meinong, whose work interested me, applied 
the arguments of realism to descriptive phrases. Everyone agrees that “the 
golden mountain does not exist” is a true proposition. But it has, apparently, 
a subject, “the golden mountain,” and if this subject did not designate 
some object, the proposition would seem to be meaningless. Meinong 
inferred that there is a golden mountain, which is golden and a mountain, 
but does not exist. He even thought that the existent golden mountain 
is existent, but does not exist. This did not satisfy me, and the desire to
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avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being led me to the theory of 
descriptions. W hat was of importance in this theory was the discovery that, 
in analysing a significant sentence, one must not assume that each separate 
word or phrase has significance on its own account. “The golden mountain” 
can be part of a significant sentence, but is not significant in isolation. It 
soon appeared that class-symbols could be treated like descriptions, i.e., as 
non-significant parts of significant sentences. This made it possible to see, 
in a general way, how a solution of the contradictions might be possible. 
The particular solution offered in Principia Mathematica had various defects, 
but at any rate it showed that the logician is not presented with a complete 
impasse. (Russell, 1944, pp. 13-14)
The general tenor of this exposition is quite clear. Russell primarily wants to 
explain how he managed to cope with the paradox. In this connection the 
ToD comes in. Although that theory was not discovered on occasion of the 
paradox but on occasion of another problem, “the problem of description”, 
later on the new technique it provided proved to be of great importance in 
paving the way out of the impasse. So two different questions are answered 
in one stroke, namely “W hat was the decisive development leading to the 
solution of the contradiction?” and “W hat is the main logical importance of 
the ToD?”
W hat is the role of Meinong in this connection? Evidently, he is supposed 
to represent a canonical example of excessive realism. The ToD made it 
possible to circumvent ontological extravagance. W hat is more, it actually 
originated from “the desire to avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of 
being”. In saying so, Russell of course does not want to reveal an unsuspected 
feature of the ToD, but rather to add a little extra to the importance of a 
connection with which all readers who ever studied the ToD are supposed to 
be familiar. For it is a remarkable fact indeed that, although Russell’s numerous 
expositions of the ToD differ significantly from each other in several respects, 
one element is to be found in all of them, namely criticism of Meinong, 
which is always very nearly the same as expounded in this passage.44 So, the 
essential point of Russell’s notorious remark is that this criticism is of pivotal 
importance not only to the nature and the foundation or justification of the 
ToD, but to its genesis as well.
This distinction between genesis and justification may in a quite obvious 
way lead to another similar distinction, namely between the conception and the 
adoption of the ToD. It is, I think, quite significant that both Russell and the
44 See OD paragraph 10, Whitehead and Russell (1910), p.66, Russell (1911), 
p.162, Russell (1918), p.248 and Russell (1919), p.169.
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proponents of the unofficial view have failed to make it. W hat Russell meant 
or at least suggested in saying that he was led to the ToD by his “desire to avoid 
Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being” evidently is, that on occasion 
of “the problem of descriptions” , a problem raised by his former theory of 
descriptions (the theory of denoting concepts put forward in POM, Chapter 
V) and connected with Meinong, he conceived and fully accepted his second 
theory of descriptions which afterwards appeared quite essential to the solution 
of the paradox.
The essential elements contained in this story seem to be as follows:
a1) Meinong actually represented an extreme and excessive realism. 
a2) After his turn from idealism to full realism and before the discovery of 
the ToD, Russell had adopted at least some views very similar to those of 
Meinong.
b1) These Meinongian or quasi-Meinongian elements were essentially 
connected with Russell’s theory of denoting concepts. 
b2) On occasion of a difficulty in that theory, his desire to avoid his own 
Meinongianism arose.
c1) This desire led to the conception of a new theory of denoting, the ToD. 
c2) Immediately after its conception, this new theory was fully and 
wholeheartedly accepted.
c3) Afterwards the link with the paradox was discovered.
A s far as I can see, these elements constitute the meaning of the official view. 
In order to separate their truth from their falsity I shall distinguish three 
varieties of Meinongianism. The first one, trans-realism, will be discussed in 
section 4. Pace Griffin, something like it is actually to be found in Principles. 
Section 5 will be concerned with the second variety: Meinong’s essentialism. 
Neither it, nor something like it, is compatible with Russell’s realism. In 
section 6 I shall argue that the connection with the theory of denoting 
concepts is merely accidental. Inspired by Frege, Russell made use of the theory 
in order to get rid of his own former quasi-Meinongianism. In section 7 the 
third, essentially hidden variety of Meinongianism is taken into account. 
Russell’s discovery of this crypto-Meinongianism, which took place after the 
ToD had been conceived, rejected and tentatively repaired, contributed to the 
adoption of the ToD, but was not sufficient to give rise to its full acceptance. 
The ideological character of the official story is not due to its claim that the 
ToD is out and out anti-Meinongian, but rather to its suppressing both the 
delay in the ToD’s adoption and the problem which caused this delay, namely 
the one on whose occasion it actually was conceived.
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4 Quasi-Meinongianism in Russell’s realism
4.1 Meinong’s ‘excessive realism’
Meinong would fiercely protest against being depicted as a proponent of a 
realism that is more excessive than its Russellian or Fregean variant. Typical of 
Meinong’s theory of objects is not, as is suggested in the passage quoted in the 
previous section, an attempt to allow the intrusion of new and strange denizens 
into the realm of being, but rather to extend the range of possible thought and 
knowledge to objects beyond that realm.
In one important respect Meinong’s realism is even less excessive than 
that adhered to by Frege and Russell. For he refuses to attribute reality to false 
propositions, whereas according to Frege and Russell, these are just as real as 
true ones. It is quite essential to Meinong’s point of view that the complexity 
of propositions, or ‘objectives’ as he calls them, is to be taken with a pinch of 
salt. Just as a real state of affairs may concern something unreal, so a state of 
affairs concerning something real may itself be unreal.45
I do not want to suggest that Russell was completely unaware of these 
points. The latter is mentioned and extensively discussed in Russell, 1904, 
pp. 471-474, the first seems to be acknowledged in OD, paragraph 10, where 
Russell renders Meinong’s view much more fairly in saying:
Thus ‘the present King of France’, ‘the round square’, etc., are supposed
to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but
nevertheless they are supposed to be objects.
Still, the fact that 39 years later Russell spoke of “Meinong’s unduly populous 
realm of being” instead of “Meinong’s unduly populous realm of objects” , is 
not due to a merely insignificant slip of his pen. W hat he wants to convey is 
more complicated than he suggests, because it evidently not only bears on 
his opponent, but on himself as well. Russell and Meinong both assume that 
any object of possible thought or knowledge is as subject matter, or as term, 
as Russell calls it, involved in true and false propositions. W hatever may be 
thought of is such that some propositions about it are true and others are false. 
For if we suppose some object to be such that it stands alone, isolated from all 
propositions, then it would in virtue of that very circumstance be involved 
in the proposition that it is not involved in any proposition.46 Conversely, 
whatever occurs as term in some proposition could possibly be thought of.
45 Cf. below 23.2.
46 Cf. 9.2.
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Russell and Meinong also share the conviction that beyond that realm of 
objects, i.e. beyond the realm of what may occur as object of our thought and 
what actually occurs as term in propositions, there is absolutely nothing.
However, they disagree on the question how this all-embracing, 
transcendental realm is related to the realm of being. According to Russell, 
they are co-extensive, whereas according to Meinong, they are not. Never, 
neither when he wrote Principles, nor when he afterwards extensively studied 
the works of Meinong, nor of course after the adoption of the ToD, did Russell 
feel any inclination to accept objects without being.
Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible 
object of thought -  in short to everything that can possibly occur in any 
proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions themselves. Being 
belongs to whatever can be counted. If A  be any term that can be counted 
as one, it is plain that A  is something, and therefore that A  is. “A  is not” 
must always be either false or meaningless. For if A  were nothing, it could 
not be said not to be; “A  is not” implies that there is a term A  whose being 
is denied, and hence that A  is. Thus unless “A  is not” be an empty sound, it 
must be false -  whatever A  may be, it certainly is. (POM, p. 449)
This view is at odds with the very starting point of Meinong’s theory of objects, 
for that consists in the assumption that although it is always inconsistent 
to say of something that it is not something or not an object, it is far from 
inconsistent to say that something is not real and has no being.
However, Meinong never succeeded in convincing Russell of this view.
In December 1904 Russell writes to him: “I have always believed until now 
that every object must in some sense have being, and I find it difficult to admit 
unreal objects.”47
We are now in a position to understand, at least partly, Russell’s somewhat 
puzzling slip of the pen in My Mental Development. A s seen from the point 
of view of his persistent traditional and un-Meinongian conviction that the 
notion of being is transcendental and coextensive with the notion of object 
or term of a proposition, Meinong’s attempt to extend the realm of objects 
beyond being amounts to the same as an attempt to overcrowd the realm of 
being.48
47 Lackey, 1973, p.16.
48 For further discussion see 5.1 and 7.3 below.
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4.2 Russell’s realism
Meinong’s trans-realism, his attempt to stand up for both the epistemological 
importance and the unreality of unreal objects, is part of a larger philosophical 
project. He is dissatisfied with traditional metaphysics, because in his opinion 
it does not succeed in fulfilling its own promise of being the most universal 
of all sciences. Meinong wants to free it from its established confinements in 
order to widen its scope.49
In this respect there exists a very remarkable similarity with Russell’s turn 
from traditional idealism to his revolutionary absolute and unrestricted realism. 
Due to the established inclination to overrate Moore’s positive and Bradley’s 
negative contribution to this revolution and to underrate Leibniz’s part that is 
both positive and negative, this similarity has often been overlooked. However 
stimulating the new ideas of Moore might have been to Russell, it is Leibniz, 
not Moore, who made him aware of the logical principle involved in all kinds 
of metaphysical idealism, not only in the particular version propounded by 
Leibniz, but also, to mention two important examples, in Bradley’s holistic 
monism and in Russell’s former pluralistic holism, namely that eventually every 
proposition must have a  subject and a  predicate:
In the belief that propositions must, in the last analysis, have a subject and 
a predicate, Leibniz does not differ either from his predecessors or from his 
successors. Any philosophy which uses either Substance or the Absolute 
will be found, on inspection, to depend upon this belief. Kant’s belief in an 
unknowable thing-in-itself was largely due to the same theory. It cannot 
be denied, therefore, that the doctrine is important. Philosophers have 
differed, not so much in respect of belief in its truth, as in respect of their 
consistency in carrying it out. In this latter respect, Leibniz deserves credit. 
(Russell 1900, p. 15)
W hat does the “belief that propositions must, in the last analysis, have a 
subject and a predicate” have to do with idealism? A nd why does its rejection 
lead to realism? Here we meet the second obstacle that might prevent us from 
understanding the nature of Russell’s realism.50 These questions cannot be 
answered as long as the classical Aristotelian and Kantian view of logic as 
a kind of formal proto-science which precedes real knowledge and does not 
involve any metaphysical assumptions, is taken for granted. But there are
49 See Meinong (1904), p.4.
50 Cf. 0.2.
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good reasons not to do so, for Russell never subscribed to such a view, neither 
during51 nor after his idealist period. Therefore, the subject-predicate principle 
is to be construed as logico-metaphysical in character. There is one, and as far 
as I can see only one, way to meet this requirement: by taking into account the 
notion of substance, mentioned in the above-quoted passage.
The idealist principle Leibniz made Russell aware of, bears on the 
connection between truth and being. Whatever is true is eventually, “ in the 
last analysis”52, true about what is supposed to be the only really real kind of 
thing, namely a concrete existent, a substance. Single substances are, in virtue 
of their being ‘in themselves’ and not in something else, the ultimate subjects 
of propositions. A nd what is true about them, consists in their being qualified, 
in their having predicates, which are supposed to be their private properties. 
These predicates or ‘accidents’ are not in themselves. The only way they are is 
to be in the substance they belong to. Their esse is in-esse.53
In my opinion, the idealism Russell is opposed to is not primarily 
epistemological in character, as Hylton (2004), pp. 207-212 has suggested, but 
metaphysical. W hat is more, generally it is not called idealism at all, but rather 
“conceptualism”.54 It involves the exclusion of all kinds of things from the 
realm of real being. Whatever cannot be construed as a concrete individual 
or as one of its private properties must be unreal, or at least not fully real. It is 
relegated to the realm of the merely ideal, i.e. the realm of abstract conceptual 
deviations from reality which may point to it because they are derived from it, 
but do not properly belong to it.55
W hat kinds of items are deemed to dwell in this limbo? Universals, 
relations, propositions (especially false ones), space, time, and last but not 
least: plurality. A nd these, of course, are exactly the things Russell is anxious 
to allow unrestricted entrance into the realm of being. Just as idealism is based 
on restricted aboutness of propositions, so the main philosophical principle 
underlying the logic of POM claims their unrestricted aboutness.
51 See Russell (1897), §56, pp.64-66.
52 Such an analysis is based on the Aristotelian principle that the more uni­
versal only exists in its less universal specifications. A  ‘generic’ universal such as 
‘coloured’ is supposed to have no other being than being embodied in specific ways 
of being coloured, such as being red. Russell denies this principle. See POM, §134, 
p.138: “Redness, in fact, appears to be (when taken to mean one particular shade) 
a simple concept, which, although it implies colour, does not contain colour as a 
constituent.”
53 Cf. 22.2.
54 See 0.3.
55 “Entia rationis cum fundamento in re" (Beings of reason with a foundation in 
the real thing).
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However, Russell’s realism is not unlimited without qualification. It 
does not at random attribute being to whatever might supposed to be real, 
but, at least as far as logic is concerned, only to those items that must be 
acknowledged because they are presupposed in the very assumption that they 
are not. For example, there must be truth, for if there were no truth, it would 
be true that there is no truth. Also: there must be many truths, for if there were 
only one truth, then that very truth would be the only one there is, which is 
absurd.56 For the sake of brevity, I’ll call this feature of Russell’s realism reflexive 
determinism.
4.3 Russell’s quasi-Meinongianism
We are now in a position to allow due weight to the context in which the 
most notable piece of evidence in favour of Russell’s supposed ‘Meinongianism’ 
occurs, namely the passage from Principles subsequent to the one quoted in 4.1. 
There Russell says:
Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimaeras and four-dimensional 
spaces all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could 
make no propositions about them. Thus being is a general attribute of 
everything, and to mention anything is to show that it is.
Existence, on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only amongst beings. 
To exist is to have a specific relation to existence -  a relation, by the 
way, which existence itself does not have. This shows, incidentally, the 
weakness of the existential theory of judgment -  the theory, that is, that 
every proposition is concerned with something that exists. For if this 
theory were true, it would still be true that existence itself is an entity, and 
it must be admitted that existence does not exist. Thus the consideration 
of existence itself leads to non-existential propositions, and so contradicts 
the theory. The theory seems, in fact, to have arisen from neglect of the 
distinction between existence and being. Yet this distinction is essential, 
if we are ever to deny the existence of anything. For what does not exist 
must be something, or it would be meaningless to deny its existence; and 
hence we need the concept of being, as that which belongs even to the 
non-existent. (POM §427, pp.449-450)
The larger context of this passage will be discussed in 5.3. For the present 
purpose it is sufficient to note that Russell is arguing against one of the main
56 Cf. e.g. Russell (1906), p.133.
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points implied by the idealist principle mentioned in the previous section, the 
restriction of the aboutness of propositions to existents or, what amounts to the 
same, to substances and their accidents.57 In order to prove that this restriction 
is intolerable, Russell makes use of his favourite reflexive mode of argument:
If it were true that whatever is true is true of some existent, then it would be 
true as well that existence belongs to all entities. That very supposed truth 
however would itself be an example of a proposition concerning a non-existent 
universal.
Therefore, being is wider than existence. Although a sentence of the form 
“A  is not” can never express a true proposition, a sentence of the form “A  does 
not exist” may quite well do so, for example “Existence does not exist”. And 
of course, it is quite easy to give similar examples Russell might have had in 
mind, such as: “The relation ‘greater than’ does not exist” or “The number 2 
does not exist” .
A s far as these and similar examples are concerned, Russell’s contention is 
quite innocent. Both Meinong and Frege would agree with him. But no doubt 
Russell also wants his view to be applied to examples of a different kind, such 
as “Zeus does not exist” or “Pegasus does not exist” . A t least, that seems to be 
implied by the first part of the text quoted above. For according to Russell, 
Homeric gods are entities because and in so far as they can be mentioned.
A nd mentioning a Homeric god of course does not consist in the use of the 
phrase “Homeric god” or of some denoting phrase derived from it, but in the 
use of one of the divine proper names that actually occur in Homer’s Iliad or 
Odyssey.58
57 Russell takes the notion of existence, borrowed from traditional metaphys­
ics, as widely as possible. If something is really in space and time or only in time, it 
exists. If space and time and the points or moments they consist of, are real, they 
exist as well. See: Russell (1903a), p. 449: “Both being and existence, I believe, 
belong to empty space.” Finally, if God really is, then God exists in spite of His be­
ing beyond time. See: Russell (1905a), p.486, where the “super-sensible existence 
attributed to the Deity” is mentioned in this connection. See also Russell (1900), 
§§110-111.
58 I concede that in the case of chimaeras this interpretation is less plausible, 
because, as far as I know, they lack proper names. I do not think however, that this 
difficulty is serious enough to prove that Russell never could have held the view
I attribute to him. In fact, he is not primarily concerned with language at all. His 
main argument is rather, that if a definite chimaera occurs in a certain story, then 
denying the existence of that particular chimaera would be impossible unless the 
story is really about some entity. And every particular entity which actually is pre­
sented to the mind can be mentioned by means of a proper name.
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5 Quasi-Meinongianism without essentialism
5.1 The possibility of quasi-Meinongianism without essentialism
Russell and Meinong both accept that “Zeus” is a genuine proper name 
standing for a non-existent object. They agree on the truth of the proposition 
that Zeus does not exist. W hat other propositions about Zeus are supposed to 
be true? Take for example the proposition that according to Greek mythology 
Zeus, assuming the form of a white bull, carried off a pretty nymph called 
Europa. Both Russell and Meinong, I presume, would accept its truth without 
further ado.
But what about the supposed fact that Zeus abducted the said nymph? Is 
it a real fact? According to Meinong it is! Why so? Why not assume that the 
supposed facts concerning Zeus are just as unreal as Zeus himself? Such a view 
seems much more appropriate to a philosopher who wants to speak in defence 
of the unreal!
Both the adherents of the official view and their opponents have 
overlooked the importance of this rather obvious question. Ayer (1971) 
and Quine (1967) assume as a matter of course that it is impossible to allow 
fictional characters or Homeric gods to be genuine objects without giving 
credit to all established stories that purport to be about them. Applied to the 
Russell of Principles this amounts to the same as assuming that if he concedes 
that Homeric gods and chimaeras are entities -  and, as appears from the text 
quoted in the previous section, there is overwhelming evidence in favour of 
that assumption -  then he must suppose propositional functions such as ‘x is a 
god dwelling at the top of the Olympus’ or ‘x is a chimaera’ to be true for some 
values of x.
However, as Griffin (1996), p.49 has pointed out, these adherents of the 
official view just ignore that according to POM §73, p.74 ‘chimaera’ is a 
null-class concept, i.e. the propositional function ‘x is a chimaera’ is false 
for all entities. Taking this textual evidence as point of departure, Griffin 
argues in the opposite direction, concluding that Russell’s supposed quasi- 
Meinongianism must be a myth. Indeed, as Griffin is prepared to admit, 
this challenging conclusion asks for a new interpretation of Russell’s saying 
that chimaeras are entities. A nd Griffin actually provides an ingenious 
interpretation (p.54), namely that Russell failed to use inverted commas. W hat 
he actually meant is not that chimaeras are entities, but rather that denoting 
concepts derived from the class concept ‘chimaera’, such as ‘all chimaeras’ or 
‘some chimaeras’, are entities.
In my opinion it is quite implausible that Russell failed to use the very
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italics or inverted commas that according to POM §56, p.53 are of utmost 
logical importance.59 Furthermore, neither in §427, where chimaeras are 
actually said to be entities, nor in any other part of the chapter to which that 
section belongs, denoting concepts are at issue. Finally, if Griffin’s exegesis 
were right, Russell could just as well have mentioned things like even prime 
numbers greater than 2. Ignoring the fact that he did not do so, amounts to 
ignoring the main point of the text, namely that being is not confined to 
existence.
A s soon as the assumption shared by Griffin and his opponents is 
abandoned, another much less far-fetched solution appears to be possible.
The inverted commas Russell could have used are rather scare quotes. W hat 
is more, it is quite understandable that he did not use them, for according to 
the dictionary a chimaera is something that according to ancient Greek stories 
is a creature with a lion’s head, a goat’s body and a snake’s tail that can exhale 
fire. A nd as far as Homeric gods are concerned, there is no need of scare 
quotes at all, because Homer occurs in their definition. O f course, in saying 
that ‘chimaera’ is a null class concept, Russell did not mean that there are no 
entities which according to ancient Greek stories are such and such, but rather 
that there are no entities which are such as ancient Greek mythology supposes 
them to be. After all, why would Russell’s firm belief in the aboutness of Greek 
mythology force him to believe in Greek mythology itself?
5.2 Russell’s realism versus Meinong’s essentialism
Against this interpretation a serious objection could be raised, namely that 
it imputes a very strange and abstract, not to say inconsistent, belief in 
characterless characters to Russell. This difficulty may help us to get down to 
the very heart of the matter. For if the Russell of Principles actually held the 
view I attribute to him, Meinong would strongly disagree.
He would blame Russell for crypto-psychologism. For the assumption that, 
apart from the fact that Zeus does not exist, all real facts concerning him 
involve human imagination and belief, seems to be very near psychologism.
It implies that the nature (Sosein) of the object called Zeus would be wholly 
determined by the mental acts performed by the Greeks. In short, as seen 
from Meinong’s perspective, the view I attribute to Russell is an inconsistent 
and half-hearted mixture of objectivism and subjectivism. On the one hand, 
Zeus would be some particular object whose identity is fixed independently of 
human thought. On the other hand, his being such and such would merely
59 See 9.2.
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consist in his actually being supposed to be so and so by certain people.
Most philosophers are prone to thinking that whatever is unreal is either 
in the mind or somehow created by it. According to Meinong this view is 
inconsistent. For whatever is in the mind must be a real part of a real mental 
process. And whatever is produced by the mind must be real as well. Creation 
cannot be real unless it results in something real. Although unreal objects are 
outside being, they must in some way or other be in touch with being. Unreal 
objects need to be propped up by real facts concerning them in order to be 
objects at all. But these facts cannot all of them be mental. The only facts that 
may provide the needed support are Soseinsobjektive, i.e. facts constituting their 
essence, their being what they are. Zeus for example derives his identity from 
the fact that he is male, not female, super-human, none of the mortals, master of 
thunder and lightning, not of love or fertility.
Meinong’s essentialism is based on the idea that objects need to have intrinsic 
properties in order to be distinct objects at all. Because distinctness or difference 
is a relation, this assumption may be viewed as a particular application of the 
general principle that “every relation is grounded in the nature of the related 
terms” . It goes without saying that this axiom of internal relations, as Russell 
called it, is incompatible with the very essence of his realism.60
5.3 The context of POM §427
It is a remarkable and revealing fact that the notorious §427 in which chimaeras 
and Homeric gods are ranked among entities, is part of a chapter on Logical 
Arguments against Points. This chapter is almost entirely devoted to a criticism 
of Lotze, who takes a stand close to Leibniz and also close to the idealist Russell, 
although the latter is not mentioned by the Russell of Principles.61
One of the canonical idealist arguments against the possible reality of empty 
space is that apart from the different things that occupy space, all points are 
exactly alike. They seem to be different, but their difference consists in nothing 
at all. Points are colourless and without character. Or, as the idealist Russell used 
to say, there is a conception of diversity without diversity of conception.62 The 
realist Russell’s retort is:
60 See Russell (1899), p.143 and Russell (1959), Ch.5, where “a paper read to 
the Aristotelian Society in 1906, which deals with Harold Joachim’s book on The 
Nature of Truth’’, is extensively quoted.
61 Cf. Russell (1897), pp.185-187.
62 Cf. 0.2.
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To be exactly alike can only mean -  as in Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles 
-  not to have different predicates. But when once it is recognised that there 
is no essential distinction between subjects and predicates, it is seen that 
any two simple terms differ immediately -  they are two, and this is the sum- 
total of their differences. (POM, p.451)
In saying that “there is no essential distinction between subjects and 
predicates” Russell means that any predicate, and more generally any 
constituent of a proposition, may occur as a genuine subject. For according 
to him, the in-esse, which marks the traditional absolute distinction between 
substances and their accidents, is to be rejected.
This argument may also be applied to Homeric gods. Apart from all the 
stories told about them, they are indeed exactly alike. But that does not 
prevent them from differing immediately from each other. Therefore, the very 
same argument that seemed to be a serious objection to my interpretation, 
namely that it forces upon Russell the strange and unacceptable view that 
fictional characters are in themselves colourless entities, in fact forces upon 
him a view much too commonsensical and Aristotelian to be compatible 
with the radical externalist stand of his logic. Maybe this externalism is to be 
rejected, but if so, not in virtue of its being at odds with common sense, but in 
virtue of its possible inconsistency. A nd if it is to be rejected, that cannot be a 
sound reason for denying that Russell ever adhered to it.
6 The accidental link with denoting
6.1 Russell’s quasi-Meinongianism as independent from the issue of 
denoting
Thus far I have argued for the actual existence of Russell’s quasi- 
Meinongianism. I have done so in making use of a rather uncommon view on 
the nature of Russell’s realism, or rather on the way it is opposed to his former 
idealism. In this connection two aspects of his realism have appeared to play a 
prominent role. Its Platonic trans-existential import prompted Russell to quasi- 
Meinongian extravagance, its externalist slant restricted it in such a way as to 
make it compatible with the quite un-Meinongian concession that Homeric 
gods and chimaeras do not and need not possess the properties ascribed to 
them by Greek mythology.
But, however important these two features of Russell’s realism may be for 
the nature and limitations of his quasi-Meinongianism, they neither forced
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him to adopt it, nor prevented him from actually doing so. This indeed is quite 
essential to the view I argue for. Russell’s manifest quasi-Meinongianism, 
although surrounded by fundamental ideas, is itself not fundamental at all. It 
does not reveal any manifest deep-rooted ontological extravagance, but rather 
a quite superficial and momentary extravagance in giving examples of non­
existent entities. Russell’s argument against Lotze would have been just as good 
as it is, if he had refrained from allowing Homeric gods and chimaeras entrance 
into the realm of being.
The theory of denoting concepts is not able to add anything to the limited 
importance of Russell’s quasi-Meinongianism. For although that theory 
presupposes that there are Russellian proper names, it itself is not concerned 
with them. Once the view is adopted that “Zeus” is a genuine proper name, the 
distinction between meaning and denotation cannot be applied to it. That, 
indeed, is one of the most conspicuous and notorious differences with Frege’s 
theory of sense and reference.63
6.2 The theory of denoting concepts as first aid
Although the theory of denoting is unable to support the existence of Russell’s 
quasi-Meinongian extravagance, or its non-existence or its emergence, or even 
the desire to avoid it, nevertheless, once for whatever reason, its emergence 
has actually taken place and, for some other reason, the desire to effect its 
disappearance is awakened, the said theory could possibly be of great help. 
W hat is more, it seems to be the only available assistant. For if Russell wants to 
banish Zeus and his congeners from the realm of being, he will have to give up 
his former belief that “Zeus” and similar expressions are genuine proper names. 
A nd in that case there are only two possible options. Either such an expression 
is supposed to have no logically relevant signification at all, or it is supposed 
to be a denoting phrase in disguise, which expresses a complex meaning (made 
up of all the properties which according to Meinong are essential to Zeus), but 
does not denote anything. It goes without saying that the latter alternative is to 
be preferred.
A s far as I know, the manuscript O n Meaning and Denotation, written in the 
second half of 1903, is the earliest text that testifies to the actual existence of 
such a move:
Such phrases as “Arthur Balfour”, “two”, “yellow”, “whiteness”, “good”,
“diversity”, and single words generally, designate without expressing: in
63 Cf. 10.1.
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these cases, there is only a single object for the phrase, namely the 
object which it designates. But when a phrase contains several words, not 
simply juxtaposed, but in any way combined so as to acquire unity, then 
the phrase, as a rule, expresses a complex meaning. In such a case, there 
may be no object designated: for example, “the present king of France” 
expresses a meaning, but does not designate an object. The same holds of 
“the even prime other than 2” , “the rational square root of 2”, “the bed in 
which Charles I died”, or “the difference between Mr. Arthur Balfour and 
the present Prime Minister of England”. In all such cases, the meaning 
expressed is perfectly intelligible, but nothing whatever is designated. In 
the case of imaginary persons or places, such as Odysseus or Utopia, the 
same is true. These appear to be proper names, but as a matter of fact they 
are not so. “Odysseus” may be taken to mean “the hero of the Odyssey”, 
where the meaning o f this phrase is involved, and not the imagined object 
designated. If the Odyssey were history, and not fiction, it would be the 
designation that would be in question: “Odysseus” would then not express 
a meaning, but would designate a person, and “the hero of the Odyssey” 
would not be identical in meaning with Odysseus, but would be identical 
in designation. A nd so in the other cases, “the present King of England”, 
“the even prime”, “the positive square root of 2”, “the bed in which 
Cromwell died”, “the difference between Mr. Chamberlain and the present 
Prime Minister of England”, are all phrases which have both meaning and 
designation.64
What might have caused Russell’s desire to get rid of his own quasi- 
Meinongianism? If, as I have argued in 6.1, it is not much more than an 
insignificant lapse, then the desire to correct it need not be very fundamental 
either. Anyhow, it seems to be occasioned by Russell’s study of the works of 
Frege and Meinong. The example of Odysseus seems to be borrowed from 
Frege’s Über Sinn und Bedeutung.65
Furthermore, from the first part of the text quoted above, it might be 
inferred that according to Russell all proper names of abstract entities 
are derived from single words. If this conjecture is right, expressions such 
as “Odysseus” or “Zeus” cannot be construed as proper names of non­
existent entities. For whatever their etymology may be, they are not used as 
nominalisations of single words. A nd because they are, of course, just as little 
proper names of existent entities, they cannot be proper names at all.
64 Russell 1903b, p.318.
65 Frege (1892a), p.148-149.
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Is the aid lent by the quasi-Fregean variant of the theory of denoting 
concepts sufficient to satisfy Russell’s desire to get rid of his former quasi- 
Meinongianism? In order to answer this question, it may be helpful to split up 
Russell into three personalities: the quasi-Meinongian, the desirous and the 
quasi-Fregean ones.
The quasi-Meinongian Russell does not labour under any constraint. True, 
he supposes himself to be forced to accept Zeus’s being, but the unavoidability 
of that is accepted with just as little reluctance as Zeus’s being itself. For stoical 
acceptance of the necessity of reflexive determinism (see 4.2) affords the 
freedom to deny existence, for example the existence of Zeus. A nd Russell’s 
opponent, the idealist Lotze, has to go without this freedom because he 
wrongly supposes himself to be free to refuse that necessity.
A s seen from the point of view of the desirous, unsatisfied Russell, being 
forced to accept Zeus’s being is actually a constraint. He wants to get rid both 
of Zeus’s being and the supposed force that forced him to accept it. In fact, 
he wants to get more freedom than the freedom to deny existence, namely the 
freedom to deny being as well. A nd that, after all, might be a very deep desire 
concealed under the surface of the rather superficial ones discussed in the 
previous section.66
Is the quasi-Fregean Russell able to fulfil this deeper need? According to 
Peter Hylton he is:
If we have a sentence containing the name or the definite description “A ” 
then, as before, if the sentence is meaningful it must express a proposition. 
Given the theory of denoting concepts, however, this proposition need 
not contain the object A  itself; it may, rather, contain a denoting concept 
which denotes A  (or purports to do so). There being a proposition of that 
kind, however, does not require that there actually be such an object as A  
(or at least the requirement is by no means obvious).
It now becomes possible for the sentence “A  is not” to be both meaningful 
and true -  i.e., to be meaningful even though there is no such thing as A. 
The difference is that now A  need not be counted among the constituents 
of the proposition; instead of containing an object (A), the proposition 
is now said to contain a denoting concept which, as it happens, does not 
denote anything.67
6.3 The insufficiency of the quasi-Fregean solution
66 My use of the opposition between freedom and constraint is borrowed 
from Quine (1948).
67 Hylton, 2003, pp.216-17.
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Hylton, I presume, is prepared to admit that a sentence such as “Zeus abducted 
Europa” will express a proposition which is neither true nor false, as soon as 
“Zeus” is construed as a denoting phrase in disguise. So, in general, the quasi- 
Fregean solution will result in truth-value gaps. But, at least as I understand 
Hylton, there is one exception: the sentence “Zeus is not” will express a true 
proposition, because its not being about anything at all seems to provide the 
very reason for its being true!
To me, this interpretation is overly paradoxical, and I can hardly believe 
that Russell would have accepted it. Anyhow, Hylton deserves credit for 
having discussed the crucial question, which indeed must be answered 
affirmatively if the unofficial view is to be rescued in another way than the 
one proposed by Griffin. A nd if the first aim I have set myself (see 3.2) is 
attainable, if it is possible to lay bare a substantial kernel of truth contained in 
the official view, then Hylton’s solution is to be rejected.
W hat might lend credibility to his view is the fact that the proposition 
expressed by “The god of thunder and lightning dwelling at the top of the 
Olympus is not” seems to be equivalent to the proposition that ‘the god of 
thunder and lightning dwelling at the top of the Olympus’ (i.e. the denoting 
concept) has no denotation. This solution, although never put forward by 
Frege, would be quite Fregean in spirit. For it is based on the un-Meinongian 
principle, used long before the introduction of the distinction between sense 
and reference, that the problem of non-being is to be avoided in translating 
non-being into non-having and changing the subject matter accordingly.68 
Evidently the viability of such an eliminative paraphrase is based on the un- 
Russellian assumption that equivalent sentences always express one and the 
same proposition.69 Finally, this approach is based on Frege’s belief that any 
sense may occur as subject of a proposition by means of the indirect sense, 
which is supposed to be in some way derived from the direct sense, as is 
indicated by the inverted commas. A nd that is exactly the issue at stake in the 
GEA . In this way, the KFA, especially puzzle (3), is reduced to the G EA  (see 
below 23.2 and 23.3). However, as is argued in 23.1, such a solution is beyond 
the limits of Russell’s perception.
68 Frege (1884), §46, p.59.
69 See for Frege’s view: Frege, 1879, p.2-3 and for its denial, although without 
any reference to Frege: pp.228-229.
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7 Conception and delayed adoption of the ToD
7.1 Trans-Fregean discoveries
A s appears from POM, § 476, p.502, Russell initially rejected Frege’s notion 
of indirect sense.70 He did so not because it involves an infinite regress, but 
because he supposed it to be superfluous. For he rather inconsiderately assumed 
that a denoting concept may occur as term of a proposition more or less in 
the same way as other concepts may. “If we wish to speak of the [denoting] 
concept, we have to indicate the fact by italics or inverted commas.”71 Inverted 
commas are deemed to merely indicate a change in occurrence.72
From 1903 onwards Russell begins to realize that the peculiar way in which 
denoting concepts primarily occur, namely in a subject-position without 
being the subject of a proposition, prevents them from being made the subject 
of a proposition in the same way as a predicate or a relation.73 So he comes 
to see the need of something like Frege’s indirect sense. In order to become 
the subject of a proposition, a complex denoting concept C  has to occur in 
another, larger denoting concept ‘C ’ which denotes C. The inverted commas 
are now supposed to indicate an addition.
It is quite essential in this connection, that, although the larger denoting 
concept ‘C ’ always has to be definitely denoting, the denoting concept C  which 
is supposed to be denoted by ‘C ’, may just as well be ambiguously denoting. In 
the manuscript OF, §35, p. 381, Russell more or less accidentally hits on the 
question how the supposed additional inverted commas are to be explained.
In making an attempt to answer this question, he discovers that they cannot 
be explained at all, because all denoting concepts, whether they do or do not 
occur in another denoting concept, occur in any event in an entity position,
i.e. as denoting.74
In discussing the nature of this unsuspected problem, Russell makes an 
unmarked change from ambiguously denoting concepts such as ‘any man’ (his 
very first example) to definitely denoting concepts such as ‘the centre of mass 
of the Solar System’ (OF, p.383). Then he makes a second discovery.
70 See 10.4
71 POM, §56, p.53.
72 See 9.2.
73 See: Russell (1903b), pp.320-321 and OF, p.363. The latter passage will be 
extensively discussed in section 11.
74 See below section 14.
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In the case of unambiguously denoting concepts, the problem concerning 
the explanation of the inverted commas can be avoided by means of a 
(quasi-Fregean) eliminative paraphrase. For the proposition that ‘the S ’ 
denotes something is equivalent to, and therefore, at least according Frege’s 
assumption, identical with, the proposition that the class-concept S or the 
propositional function ‘x is an S ’ has one and only one instance. A nd that may 
be expressed by means of quantifiers in the way indicated by Frege himself.75 
Applying this procedure to sentences of the form “The S is P” leads to the 
ToD. This then is the way the new theory is conceived.76
In the very same section, Russell also discovers another possible advantage 
of the ToD, namely that it may explain the informative character of identity 
statements in a much better way than the old theory of denoting concepts has 
done. However, a few pages later the brand-new theory is rejected:
The most convenient view might seem to be to take everything and anything 
as primitive ideas, putting
(x). f  ‘x .= . f  ‘(everything)
(x). f  ‘x .= . f  ‘(anything).
But it seems that on this view everything and anything are denoting 
concepts involving all the difficulties considered in 35-39 [i.e. the problem 
concerning the inverted commas], on account of which we adopted the 
theory of 40 [the ToD]. We shall have to distinguish between “everything” 
and everything, i.e. we shall have: “everything” is not everything, but 
only one thing. A lso we shall find that if we attempt to say anything 
about the meaning of “everything”, we must do so by means of a denoting 
concept which denotes that meaning, and which must not contain that 
meaning occurring as entity, since when it occurs as entity it stands 
for its denotation, which is not what we want. These objections, to all 
appearance, are as fatal here as they were in regard to the. Thus it is better 
to find some other theory.77
Russell realizes that the problem concerning the inverted commas is much 
more general than the ToD seems to suppose. It is indeed possible to eliminate, 
by means of quantifiers and bound variables, other kinds of denoting concepts 
as well, such as ‘all men’, ‘some men’ etc., but not ‘any entity’. For according
75 Frege (1884), §78, point 4, p.91.
76 See 21.1.
77 OF, §44, p.385.
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to POM §87,p.91 any entity is intimately connected with the variable. Indeed, 
as seen from Frege’s perspective, the variable is supposed to have no meaning 
on its own account. But that amounts to the same as reducing propositions 
about anything to singular propositions about propositional functions. 
However appealing such a view may be from a purely technical perspective, 
it is at variance with the very principle of Russell’s realism, set out in 4.2 and 
especially with the radical pluralism discussed in 6.1.78
7.2 The discovery of crypto-Meinongianism
In OD however, Russell appears to be much more self-confident about the 
viability of the ToD. He decides to take the variable as fundamental and 
irreducible. The reduction of all kinds of ambiguously denoting phrases, 
save the ones beginning with the word “any”, to sentences containing 
bound variables, is set out without any critical discussion of the former 
theory of denoting concepts. The main part of the text is devoted to definite 
descriptions. In a somewhat modified form, the “rather curious” problem 
concerning the explanation of the inverted commas is discussed in connection 
with them, mainly in order to prove that neither Russell’s own former theory 
nor Frege’s theory of sense and reference is able to adequately explain how 
George IV could ever have been curious about the possible identity of the 
author of Waverley with Scott.
Reference to Frege is also made in another part of OD, the second part 
in which his view on the problem of non-being is discussed together with 
Meinong’s theory of objects. After having explained how sentences in which 
definite descriptions occur may be reduced to sentences in which they do not 
occur, Russell introduces this second part by saying:
Why it is imperative to effect such a reduction, the subsequent discussion 
will endeavour to show.
The evidence for the above theory is derived from the difficulties which 
seem unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine 
constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur.79
From the use of the word “ imperative” it may be inferred that Russell’s attitude 
towards the ToD had been subjected to a considerable change. Evidently this
78 The subject will more extensively be discussed in chapter V. See especially 
24.1.
79 OD paragraph 10.
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is due to a new discovery made shortly before OD was written, namely that 
the problem of non-being, which happened to be ignored in OF, puts the ToD 
in a much more favourable light.80 It reveals an unsuspected advantage of the 
new theory and at the same time, as its counterpart, the disadvantage of the 
presupposition Meinong or the quasi-Meinongian Russell and Frege or the 
quasi-Fregean Russell have in common.
W hich advantage does Russell have in mind? It is mentioned as such in 
the above-quoted paragraph 10. According to the ToD a proposition expressed 
by a sentence of the form “The S is P” cannot be true unless the denoting 
phrase “the S ” actually denotes something, i.e. unless there is some entity 
e that is such that the proposition expressed by “The S = e” (which has to 
be construed according to the paraphrase proposed by the ToD) is true.81 
From this it appears that the denotation is actually allowed to play some 
role of importance. But, and that is the distinctive feature of the ToD, this 
role is supposed to be limited to actual truth or falsity. The damage caused 
by the absence of the denotation will be limited accordingly. In the case of 
propositions expressed by simple sentences of the form “The S is P”, it merely 
results in their falsity, which of course does not prevent propositions about such 
relatively simple ones, i.e., propositions in whose verbal expression “the S ” has 
a secondary occurrence, from sometimes being true.
We now know what is supposed to be an advantage, but not yet why.
The answer is rather obvious: There will be no truth-value gaps anymore.
If we suppose, just as the quasi-Fregean Russell did, that “Zeus” is a definite 
description in disguise, say “the Z”, and if we suppose as well, for the sake of 
argument, that all sentences in Greek mythology containing “Zeus” are of the 
form “The Z is P” , then they are all false. A s far as this point is concerned, we 
have returned to the view of the quasi-Meinongian Russell. There is, however 
a significant difference. For now we are able to say that Zeus is not, without 
contradicting ourselves and without any need to transcend the realm of being. 
We simply say that for any entity e the proposition expressed by “The Z=e” 
is false. The gist of the matter is that the true proposition expressed by “Zeus 
is not”, which indeed seems to be about something without being, is in fact a 
proposition about something else, namely the real falsity of an infinite number 
of real propositions. Neither Meinongian unreal objects nor Fregean truth- 
value gaps are involved.
W hen viewed from the perspective of this much longed-for freedom of 
speech, both Meinong and Frege appear to labour under the same constraint. 
For trusting appearances, they both overrate the importance of the denotation
80 See above 2.3.
81 OD paragraph 28.
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in supposing that it belongs to the subject matter of the proposition. They 
both assume as a matter of course that a sentence such as “The smallest 
prime number is even” does express a proposition about the number 2. This 
number, they think, must be available in order to safeguard the proposition’s 
being true or false at all. If it were not there, the proposition’s being a genuine 
proposition would be impossible. In this respect they regard the denoting phrase 
“the smallest prime number” as “standing for a genuine constituent” of the 
proposition.82
A s soon as another example is considered, say “The greatest prime number 
is odd”, the peaceful unanimity between Meinong and Frege suddenly gets 
disturbed. Meinong believes it does express a true proposition about an 
unreal object. Frege refuses to admit unreal objects and supposes the thought 
expressed by this sentence to be neither true nor false.
W hat is the source of their controversy?
It is to be found in the very presupposition they share. For the assumption 
that the denotation, if there is any, has to play the role of subject matter, 
posseses two mutually opposed sides, namely that if there is truth or falsity, 
the denotation must be present, and if the denotation is absent, there can 
neither be truth or falsity. According to the law of contraposition these 
two implications imply each other; they are equivalent. This equivalence 
seems to imply that their difference is logically irrelevant. But such a view 
is not acceptable, for in their actual application, they exclude each other. O f 
course, the two-sided principle itself cannot decide how it is to be applied 
in a particular case such as the above-mentioned example. But as soon as in 
virtue of other considerations a decision is made in favour of the proposition’s 
capacity to be false or true or in favour of the complete absence of the 
denotation, then it actually can be applied. Meinong argues: There is truth 
or falsity, in this case even truth; therefore “the greatest prime number” must 
have a denotation. Frege, on the contrary, having rejected this conclusion, 
concludes that Meinong’s premise must be wrong: There is no such number; 
therefore there can be no truth or falsity either.
It is quite evident that in drawing this conclusion, Frege makes use of the 
hypothetical principle that if there is no denotation, then there is no truth or 
falsity either. But as I have noted above, this principle amounts to the same 
as the one actually used by Meinong. This other side of Frege’s presupposition
82 And Frege and the quasi-Fregean Russell do so in spite of their emphatic 
claim that the denotation is not a constituent of the proposition. As seen from the 
perspective of the ToD, this claim does not express anything more than a good but 
powerless intention. That is why the author of OD ignores it.
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will be less evident as long as it remains unused.83 That is the reason why I call 
it crypto-Meinongianism. In the same way, an epigone of Sartre who argues, “We 
are free, therefore God does not exist” could be called a crypto-determinist.
A s seen from the perspective of the ToD, crypto-Meinongianism is to be 
found almost everywhere, most notably in the very principle of Russell’s own 
realism. W hat is more, crypto-Meinongianism in fact amounts to the same 
as Russell’s own reflexive determinism set out in 4.2. A nd it is of course also to 
be found in his quasi-Meinongianism, as appears from the first sentence of 
the passage quoted in 4.3: “Homeric gods, chim aeras...all have being, for if 
they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them.” 
Therefore, the general tenor of the official story deserves much more credit 
than generally supposed. By means of paraphrase the ToD purports to reveal 
that the real subject matter of propositions is different from their apparent 
one. In that way it seems to be able to leave undamaged the realm of truth and 
falsity without being committed to ontological extravagance.
7.3 The official story as ideological distortion of the facts
How much truth is contained in the official story and how much falsity? In 
the previous discussion I have distinguished three forms of Meinongianism 
and two ways of “being led” to the ToD. According to me, these distinctions 
are sufficient to assess the official story. I shall now apply them to the seven 
elements contained in it, i.e. the elements enumerated in 3.3 as (a1), (a2), 
(b1), (b2), (c1), (c2) and (c3).
Ad (a l )  In how far is it true that Meinong actually represented an extreme 
and excessive form of realism? A s trans-realist he did not do so. For he only 
wanted to acknowledge objects of knowledge and enquiry beyond what is real. 
That is why he adopted unreal objects. A s an essentialist he opposed these 
objects to be really distinguished from each other in virtue of their intrinsic 
essential properties. Assuming true propositions or “objectives” to be real, as
83 But in fact the assumption that there must be an object if there is truth or fal­
sity is also used in Frege (1893), pp.18-20, where an arbitrary reference is assigned 
to denoting phrases which in their ordinary usage would be vacuous. In this way 
Frege’s crypto-Meinongianism becomes manifest. In order to prevent truth-value 
gaps from intruding into his concept-script, Frege needs an object to fulfil the sup­
posed role of the denotation. And that is exactly what is meant in OD paragraph 
13, where Russell says: “Another way of taking the same course [i.e., the one taken 
by Meinong] (so far as our present alternative is concerned) is adopted by Frege, 
who provides by definition some purely conventional denotation for those cases in 
which otherwise there would be none.”
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an essentialist, he extended the realm of true facts. N ot only Zeus’s unreality is 
supposed to be a real fact, but e.g. his being male as well.
A s seen from Russell’s perspective, the most important presupposition of 
Meinong’s philosophy is quite general. It consists in an assumption Meinong 
has in common with the un-Meinongian Frege. The latter refuses to accept 
unreal objects. W hat is more, he also refuses to accept “Zeus” as a genuine 
proper name. That is why Frege deserves to be called “un-Meinongian”. He 
rejects both trans-realism and Russell’s quasi-Meinongianism. But as a crypto- 
Meinongian Frege shares with Meinong the assumption that a proposition in 
whose verbal expression a definite description occurs, cannot be a really true 
or false proposition unless it is about the object answering the description. As 
seen from the perspective of the ToD -  and the official story is a story from that 
perspective -  crypto-Meinongianism is of the greatest importance. It forces one 
to adopt objects in order to save truth or falsity. If a proposition is really true or 
false, then the object about which it seems to be true or false, must be adopted. 
If it is not, a truth value gap results. That is exactly what the ToD is opposed to 
in providing a distinction between real and apparent aboutness.
Ad (a2) Did the realist Russell ever adopt views similar to those of 
Meinong? In POM Russell neither embraced Meinong’s essentialism, nor 
something like it. For it is directly opposed to the nature of his realism. 
Furthermore, he rejected trans-realism, but accepted something like it, 
namely the view that e.g. Zeus has being, but does not exist. This quasi- 
Meinongianism evidently is based on “reflexive determinism”, alias crypto- 
Meinongianism. Zeus must be, otherwise it could not be true that he does not 
exist.
Ad (b l )  Were these (quasi-) Meinongian elements in Russell’s realism 
connected with his theory of denoting concepts? No, the only manifest link is 
that the theory of denoting was of essential import to the rejection of quasi- 
Meinongianism Zeus can be banished from the realm of entities in assuming 
that “Zeus” is not a proper name, but an unambiguously denoting phrase in 
disguise. That phrase has meaning, but no denotation. In making this turn, 
Russell obviously was influenced by Frege. He absorbed Fregean views into his 
own theory of denoting concepts.
Ad (b2) Did Russell’s desire to remove Meinongian or quasi-Meinongian 
elements arise from his own realism, on occasion of a problem in his theory 
of denoting concepts? N o, the “problem of descriptions” on whose occasion 
the ToD was conceived, did not obviously have anything to do with the
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Meinongian issue of non-being. This is the most obvious falsity contained in 
the official story.
Ad (c l )  Did the said desire lead to the conception of the ToD? Quite 
evidently not. But after the conception of the ToD Russell must have 
discovered that it puts the Meinongian issue in a fresh light. Thanks to the 
ToD he became aware of crypto-Meinongianism as a presupposition shared by 
his former quasi-Meinongianism and the quasi-Fregean solution adopted in 
order to avoid it. This discovery meets a very deep Russellian desire, viz. the 
desire to deny Zeus’s being without getting involved in a contradiction. This 
greatly contributed to the adoption of the ToD. That is the most important 
kernel of truth contained in the official story. But it did not, as it wrongly 
suggests, lead to its conception.
Ad (c2) Was the ToD adopted immediately after its birth? No, OF is full of 
doubts concerning the ToD’s viability. The discovery of crypto-Meinongianism 
contributed to Russell’s self-confidence, but was not sufficient, as appears 
from the ambiguous tone of OD, discussed in 2.4. The full adoption of the 
ToD took place only after 1905. W hen exactly, I do not know. Anyhow, all 
later expositions of the ToD differ from OD in not containing the GEA , not 
mentioning the issue of denoting and not mentioning Frege. The problem of 
George IV’s curiosity remains, but is discussed in an “imperative” way, i.e. by 
means of a Q.E.D. argument which purports to be of equal justifying force as 
the KFA.
Ad (c3) Was the ToD’s usefulness for avoiding the paradox discovered 
after its full adoption? A s far as I can see, the answer must be negative. For 
the above-mentioned change in attitude towards the ToD must have been 
occasioned by some new discovery. But which one? Besides the link with the 
paradox I do not know of any possible other candidate.
Furthermore, this seems to be the only plausible explanation of the riddle 
of Russell’s forgetfulness, discussed in 1.5 and 3.2. For if (c3) were true, then 
Russell’s distortion of the facts would be without any incentive or “reason”. 
That is why in my opinion the rise of the official story belongs to the ToD’s 
full adoption. Why forget the true origin of the ToD unless it actually casts a 
shadow on its glory? I shall explore this shady side in the following part of this 
dissertation.

PART TWO
In Frege’s Companionship 
Towards, Through and Beyond 
the Gray’s Elegy Argument
Chapter III
Genesis and Nature of Another 
Quasi-Fregean View
8 From Meinong to Frege: a consequential shift of emphasis
8.1 Uncontroversial evidence provided by OF
In the previous chapter I have discussed the conflict between the manuscript 
OF and the official story promoted by the later Russell. I have done so 
primarily with an eye to the part played by Meinong. In the present and 
the next two chapters the same conflict will be treated, but primarily with 
respect to the view the part played by Frege. In order to explain what this 
shift of emphasis means, I shall start with a short overview of uncontroversial 
data, relevant to both chapters. By “uncontroversial” I mean their being 
acknowledged by all commentators, including myself, who have taken notice 
of OF. Therefore these data may serve as a starting point, which is common 
in two ways, namely common to the subject matter of the previous chapter 
and the three succeeding it as well as common to my opponents and myself.
It precedes both bifurcations. That is why it may help to clarify how the shift 
from Meinong to Frege affects the attitude of the adherents of the unofficial 
view towards the official view. A nd it may equally help to explain my 
corresponding change of attitude to both the official and the unofficial story.
In the official story Meinong plays a prominent role as the opponent from 
whom Russell liberated himself by means of the ToD. A s we have seen Frege is 
not mentioned in that story at all. The manuscript OF contains evidence that 
is incompatible with this official story. Primarily and most conspicuously, it 
disproves the role attributed to Meinong. For in OF Meinong is not mentioned 
at all. A nd that is not by accident. He is not mentioned because the very issue 
that could have occasioned Russell to use his name, the problem of non-being, 
fails to be discussed in it. Maybe that is just an accident. Maybe Russell could 
have paid attention to that issue. But in fact he did not. In fact he was led to 
the ToD by the desire to avoid another problem, namely the curious problem 
that is also discussed as the G EA  in OD. Parts of the corresponding passage in 
OF are literally the same as the parts of the GEA . Evidently Russell made use
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of OF in writing OD: in these corresponding passages Frege is not mentioned 
at all, whereas in OD he plays a rather prominent role.
8.2 Two ‘unofficial’ conclusions
From these incontestable data all commentators have drawn two conclusions, 
which in my opinion are not in the least warranted:
a) It is necessary and sufficient to correct the official story by a purely 
material change. In other words: the problem that is supposed to have 
led Russell to the ToD is to be substituted by another one, namely the 
curious difficulty discussed in OF and the GEA.
b) This substitution has an unlooked-for consequence that is supposed to 
be inevitable, namely that not only Meinong is to be removed from 
the official story, but equally anyone else. For the problem associated 
with his name is to be replaced by a problem that is not associated 
with anyone’s name, save the name of Russell himself. According to 
the unofficial story, in the process that led Russell to the ToD, he was 
in fact lonelier than he has suggested. O f course the adherents of this 
view cannot deny that the names of both Meinong and Frege do occur 
in OD. But -  and that is the essential point -  their respective roles are 
supposed to be reduced to external public opponents of the ToD, who 
appeared on the stage post festum, i.e. in the course of Russell’s attempt 
to publicly defend a theory which had been conceived and adopted in 
an unaccompanied soliloquy.
8.3 Criticism of the first conclusion
The first conclusion is based on the assumption that the form of the official 
story is in any extent unassailable and cannot be affected by new material.
The formula “Russell was led to the ToD by the desire to avoid... ” is to be 
preserved, whereas Meinong’s unduly realm of being is to be replaced by the 
curious problem discovered in O F  and discussed in the G E A . The latter is supposed 
to have played exactly the same role as the former should have played according 
to the official story.
In the previous chapters I have argued that this lack of criticism of the 
official story’s form  leads to an excessive rejection of its material. In the genesis 
of the ToD Meinong is supposed to have played no significant part at all. This 
criticism is so severe that it prevents its adherents from questioning any further
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the form of the story told by the autobiographical Russell. W hat is more, it 
equally prevents them from investigating and explaining the possible motive 
behind such a remarkable distortion of the historical facts. A nd finally it 
prevents them from accepting this distortion of the facts by Russell himself as 
itself a fact that belongs to the history of the ToD.
The view I have advocated simply consists in challenging the form  of the 
official story by means of the distinction between conception and adoption 
of the ToD. In my opinion not only the evidence provided by OF, but also 
evidence derived from OD itself, may justify such an approach. It enables 
a much more mitigated criticism of the material side of the official story: 
although Meinong did not play any role in the conception of the ToD, he 
actually did in its acceptance.
A s seen from this perspective the question concerning the motive behind 
Russell’s distortion of the facts can be asked and tentatively answered. His 
story is ideological: it springs from the desire to add a little extra to growing 
but still incomplete self-confidence. Essentially it is based on the repression 
of doubts, namely the doubts that in my opinion are to be found in both OF 
and OD. Russell wanted to forget that the discovery of the ToD’s capacity 
for rendering aid to a possible solution of the paradox made him fully adopt 
the ToD. He wanted to believe that he embraced it somewhat earlier, 
independently of the theory of types. A nd he succeeded in believing what 
he wanted to believe by forgetting what he wanted to forget. This move is 
not criminal, but rather subliminal. Its possibility is based on the reflexivity 
of deception and self-deception which is often forgotten (especially by 
Hegelians). You cannot successfully forget what you desire to forget unless you 
forget the desire to forget it as well.
The official story makes us believe that the story itself is just an external 
account, i.e. a retrospective of a past and completed process. O f course, the 
person who reminds us of that particular piece of history happens to be the 
protagonist in that history. The autobiographical Russell is obviously aware 
of this identity. He does not pretend to speak about someone else. But -and 
that is the sticking point -he has forgotten that his account distorts the facts 
in a very specific way, namely in a way which exactly meets the desire to 
fully adopt the ToD. A s such, not in virtue of its both being told by Russell 
and being about Russell, but in virtue of its being the finishing touch of the 
ToD’s adoption, the official story is an essential part of the history it purports 
to describe. If my analysis is right, the rise of the official story coincides 
with the final and complete adoption of the ToD. It made that adoption 
possible. Therefore it did not originate in 1944 when Russell wrote My Mental 
Development, but at some time between 1905 and 1910. That is why it is in
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complete accordance with the disappearance of the G EA  from all expositions 
of the ToD written after OD. The official story was virtually present in Principia 
already.
8.4 Criticism of the second conclusion
The second conclusion (b) only seems to be an inevitable consequence of 
the first (a) as long as the assumption is taken for granted that not only the 
un-Meinongian Frege, but Frege in general is absent from O F  in exactly the same 
way as Meinong. That is why we are confronted with a new issue: the issue of 
Russell’s supposed loneliness. It is quite different from what has been of central 
importance in the previous chapters. There I have been primarily concerned 
with Russell’s supposed self-confidence. W hat on first thoughts seems to be an 
insignificant shift of emphasis, the transition from Meinong (and Frege) to 
Frege (and Meinong), now appears to be quite consequential. It consists in 
moving from one opposition, namely doubt versus certainty, to another one: 
companionship versus loneliness. A nd the possible companion is of course 
Frege.
The adherents of the unofficial view have all been surprised by OF. The 
manuscript surprised them on account of the absence of the problem associated 
with Meinong’s name, not on account of the supposed absence of Frege. The 
belief that Frege did not play any significant role in the genesis of the ToD 
existed long before OF became accessible. In spite of their controversies all 
commentators have assumed it as a matter of course. It seemed to go without 
saying that in OD Frege is only put on the scene as a public opponent, not as a 
companion who in some way or other could have helped Russell in conceiving 
or adopting the ToD. The hot issue was something else, namely the possible 
validity of the G EA  as an attack on Frege’s theory of sense and reference. The 
discovery of OF in 1980 has not significantly changed this general agreement.
W hat is more, this consonance is in complete harmony with the official 
story! For in it, Russell is equally silent about Frege. According to the 
adherents of the unofficial view, this silence is harmless anyway. That is why 
they tend to be just as silent about this silence as Russell himself. Maybe 
some defenders of the unofficial story have observed that in all expositions 
of the ToD written after OD both the G EA  and Frege have disappeared. 
Anyhow, when faced with this fact, they remain faithful to their creed. They 
will explain it as a change in Russell’s strategy, i.e. as a change in the way 
he preferred to defend the ToD. A nd according to them, that does not have 
anything to do with the ToD’s genesis.
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8.5 Two unnoticed passages in OF
In order to challenge this view, I shall in the course of this second part 
discuss two passages in OF which in my opinion are sufficient to prove Frege’s 
involvement in the genesis of the ToD. The first passage (to be discussed in 
the present chapter, see below 11.2) precedes the one corresponding to the 
GEA. Although in it Frege is not actually mentioned, Russell must have had 
him in mind; for the issue that could have occasioned him to use Frege’s name 
is present. It is true, Russell is concerned with the fundamental implications 
of his own theory of denoting concepts, but in that connection he obviously 
makes a quasi-Fregean move, the move inspired by the Frege of indirect sense.
In the second passage, to be discussed in chapter V, 24.1, Frege is actually 
mentioned twice. This happens a few pages after the conception and possible 
rejection of the ToD. The issue at stake is the question in how far the variable 
can be taken as more fundamental than denoting in virtue of a supposed 
meaning. The Frege mentioned in this connection is evidently different from 
both the one of indirect sense and the un-Meinongian one, who actually 
occurs in OD but not in OF. For the sake of convenience I shall call the Frege 
connected with the issue of the variable the fundamental Frege.
In the previous chapter I have distinguished three possible forms of 
Meinongianism in order to gauge the amount of truth concealed in what the 
official story suggests, namely that thanks to the ToD Russell liberated himself 
from his own Meinongianism. In the remaining part of this book I shall 
proceed in the same way: distinguishing three relevant forms of Fregeanism 
in order to make clear how much truth is contained in what the official story 
is silent about: Frege’s actual role in the genesis of the ToD, i.e. both in its 
conception and in its possible adoption.
The result of my enquiry is that the official story’s silence about Frege is less 
far innocent as is generally supposed. It distorts the historical facts to the same 
extent as does its silence about the problem discussed in the GEA . Therefore, 
besides the riddle of Russell’s having forgotten the problem which actually 
occasioned the ToD’s conception (see 1.5 and 3.2), another riddle is now to be 
acknowledged: the riddle of Russell’s having forgotten Frege’s companionship. 
How is the latter to be explained? In my opinion, the very reason for which 
that riddle is to be acknowledged also provides its solution. Frege was to 
be forgotten because he was too intimately involved in the embarrassing 
genesis of the ToD. He was to be forgotten together with the curious problem 
discovered by Russell as quasi-Fregean, i.e. as inspired by the Frege of indirect 
sense. A nd the un-Meinongian Frege was to be forgotten on account of his 
kinship with the Frege of indirect sense. Both represent the only Frege who
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actually occurs in OD: the Frege of the theory of sense and reference as applied 
to unambiguously denoting phrases. Finally, the fundamental Frege was to 
be forgotten because of his being too far away from the fundamental Russell, 
the Russell of the unrestricted variable (see 24.1). Eventually he could not 
assist Russell in fashionably styling his brand new theory. A s I hope to show 
in the final chapter, the fundamental Frege actually played a significant, but 
unsuccessful role in the possible adoption of the ToD.
8.6 Approach and tenor of this chapter
In 1958 Geach recommended the readers of OD to ignore Russell’s use of 
Frege’s name.84 There actually are two good reasons why he might have given 
that advice, namely that the way Frege is dealt with in OD is misleading 
indeed and that the differences between Russell and Frege are probably much 
more fundamental than Russell himself ever realized. But I do not accept the 
third reason behind Geach’s recommendation, namely that the core of OD is 
purely Russellian and as such has nothing to do with Frege. Ever since 1980 
many, if not all of the commentators have assumed that OF justifies Geach’s 
opinion. In the previous subsections I have explained why I strongly disagree 
with this premature conclusion. That is why I want to replace Geach’s advice 
by another one, namely: not to ignore Russell’s casual use and his omission of 
Frege’s name in OD and OF.
The two above-mentioned passages from OF in which Frege is concerned, 
both throw a fresh light on corresponding passages in OD. They both show 
that Frege is present where he is supposed to be absent. They both show why 
and in which way Russell’s use of Frege’s name in OD is misleading: not as 
Geach seems to suppose, on account of its mere existence, but on account of 
its being too restricted. The risk of misunderstanding the limited part Russell 
has allowed Frege to play in OD is very grave indeed. But it cannot be avoided 
by raising the restriction to a maximum. For if there is anything unnatural 
about Frege’s presence in OD, it is only to be found in the limitations imposed 
upon him, not in the mere fact that he is allowed to enter the discussion.
He accompanied Russell from the very start. A t the very moment when the 
curious problem was discovered from which the ToD originated, Frege was, 
intellectually speaking, standing next to Russell.
During the years preceding the composition of OD, Russell had been deeply 
concerned with both unsuspected similarities and unsuspected differences 
between Frege and himself. From 1902 to 1904 he had corresponded with
84 Geach, P.T. (1958), p.72.
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Frege and during that period he had written a rather extensive appendix 
attached to Principles, entitled “The Logical and Arithmetical Doctrines 
of Frege”.85 The most recent letter received from Frege is dated 13th of 
November 1904. Russell replied it 12 December 1904. After that date, their 
correspondence stopped, to be resumed only for insignificant reasons in 1912. 
The manuscript OF is written in June 1905, i.e. only six months after Russell’s 
last reply.86 I presume that during that period, in his mind, Russell continued to 
converse with Frege.
In 1958, when Geach put forward the above-mentioned advice, the 
correspondence between Russell and Frege was not yet available. Still the 
Appendix A  of Principles was certainly available, as was Russell’s reference in 
OD (paragraph 3, footnote) to the second section of that Appendix (POM 
§476). W hether Geach ever took notice of this reference, I do not know.
A t any rate, he could have done so. But in my opinion that would not have 
been sufficient to change his mind. For the fourth and most important reason 
behind his recommendation is not to be found in the lacking access to sources 
now available, nor in any lack of attention to the then available sources. The 
real reason is much more important and interesting: it is based on the belief 
that significant points of contact between Russell and Frege could not have 
existed given their fundamental differences. A nd this assumption, for its part, 
is based on the quite general view that whatever seems to be contradictory 
must be contradictory and is therefore impossible. It amounts to the same as 
the tenet that in logic there cannot be any surprise. If something is logically 
possible, then it must be evidently possible. Elements that seem to contradict 
each other must, on pain of contradiction, lie apart from each other.
This then, is the dogma of externalism or the dogma of undialectical 
thought mentioned in 0.2. It is the most fundamental assumption to which my 
view is opposed. The dogma that I have challenged in the previous chapters, 
the belief that OD must have been written after the full adoption of the ToD, 
is equally the result of a special application of the dogma of externalism. For 
it is based on the assumption that whatever jeopardizes the glory of the ToD 
must, on pain of contradiction, be external to its origin. Indeed, it seems 
to be contradictory that the very same problem that occasioned the ToD’s 
conception has also prevented Russell from adopting it. N ot yielding to the 
temptation to conclude that ‘therefore’ it must be impossible, constitutes the 
dialectical slant of my analysis. It results in the rejection of the first dogma of
85 For Frege’s correspondence with Russell see Frege (1976), pp.200-252.
86 The only exchange of letters after that date took place in 1912, but it is in­
tellectually insignificant. Russell invites Frege to give a lecture at the Mathematical 
Congress in Cambridge. Frege politely excuses himself.
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absence, derived from the official view: the dogma of the absence from OD 
and OF of Russell’s doubts concerning the viability of the ToD. In view of the 
GEA , it results in taking the word “curious”, which occurs in its introduction, 
as revealing.
With regard to the GEA , the rejection of the second dogma derived from 
the official story, the dogma of Frege’s absence from the genesis of the ToD, 
is not less consequential. For it means that Frege is present in the Russellian 
version of the GEA . A s I hope to show in the next chapter, it is not possible to 
understand the G EA  as applied to Russell’s own theory of denoting concepts, 
without taking into account the Frege who actually, as appears from OF, 
influenced Russell, the Frege of indirect sense. The very first passage, in which 
Russell takes notice of this Frege, is to be found in POM §476. A nd this 
section of POM is referred to in OD, footnote to paragraph 3. In POM §476 
Frege’s view is discussed from the perspective of POM §56.87 There the story 
about the genesis of the G EA  has to start. There, as I hope to show in chapter 
IV, the key to deciphering its secret code is to be found.
In the last chapter I shall continue the discussion of Russell’s use of Frege’s 
name, but from a radically different perspective, namely with respect to the 
role played by the fundamental Frege, who is present in OF and systematically 
ignored in OD. In that connection attention will be paid to what, at least in 
my opinion, may be supposed to be the most fundamental difference between 
Russell and Frege. I shall argue, that in spite of it and in spite of Russell’s 
having misunderstood it, the GEA , or at least part of it, is actually applicable 
to Frege’s theory of sense and reference, even more so than to Russell’s own 
theory of denoting concepts.
9 Russell’s innocent view as starting point
9.1 From OD towards the GEA’s background
The very first entrance of Frege in OD is to be found in its third paragraph, the 
one in which Russell purports to announce the composition of his article:
The course of my argument will be as follows. I shall begin by stating the 
theory I intend to advocate * ;  I shall then discuss the theories of Frege and 
Meinong, showing why neither of them satisfies me;
87 This connection might be overlooked on account of an evident misprint in 
the first sentence of §476. For there reference is made to §96, which does not have 
anything to do with the issue at stake. Evidently, Russell had §56 in mind.
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Here evidently the reader of OD is introduced to the un-Meinongian Frege.
But the footnote indicated by the asterisk contains an entry which leads to the 
Frege of indirect sense. The text of this footnote runs as follows:
*I  have discussed this subject in Principles of Mathematics, Chap.V, and 
§476. The theory there advocated is very nearly the same as Frege’s and is 
quite different from the theory to be advocated in what follows.
The two passages from Principles are different in nature. Its chapter V is 
entitled “Denoting” and contains Russell’s own former theory. Section 476, 
however, is part of Appendix A , entitled “The Logical and Arithmetical 
Doctrines of Frege”. It is the second section of that Appendix and bears the 
subtitle “Meaning and indication”. It is the only one dedicated to Frege’s 
theory of Sinn and Bedeutung, or ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, as I have so far 
translated these terms. There, Russell starts his exposition in saying:
The distinction between meaning (Sinn) and indication (Bedeutung)* 
is roughly, though not exactly, equivalent to my distinction between a 
concept as such and what the concept denotes (§56).
Now, in section 56, which is the first in chapter V, the distinction between ‘A  
concept as such and what the concept denotes’ is explained as follows:
A  concept denotes when, if it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not 
about the concept, but about a term connected in a certain peculiar way 
with the concept. If I say “I met a man”, the proposition is not about a  man: 
this is a concept which does not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy 
limbo of the logic-books. W hat I met was a thing, not a concept, an actual 
man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public-house and a drunken wife. 
A gain the proposition “any finite number is odd or even” is plainly true; yet 
the concept “any finite number” is neither odd not even. It is only particular 
numbers that are odd or even; there is not, in addition to these, another 
entity, any number, which is either odd or even, and if there were, it is 
plain that it could not be odd and could not be even. O f the concept “any 
number”, almost all the propositions that contain the phrase “any number” 
are false. If we wish to speak of the concept, we have to indicate the fact by 
italics or inverted commas.
Apart from its terminology, the last sentence of this passage very much
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resembles the GEA’s second paragraph (OD paragraph 19)88. The text runs as 
follows:
W hen we wish to speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase, as opposed 
to its denotation, the natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas. Thus 
we say:
The centre of mass of the solar system is a point, not a denoting complex; 
“The centre of mass of the solar system” is a denoting complex, not a point. 
Or again,
The first line of Gray’s Elegy states a proposition.
“The first line of Gray’s Elegy” does not state a proposition.
In my opinion it is rather doubtful whether this part of the GEA’s introduction 
is applicable to Frege’s theory. But for the time being, I want to leave that 
question aside. For in the present chapter I am not concerned with the GEA’s 
exegesis, let alone with its possible application to Frege, but only with an 
enquiry into its quasi-Fregean origin. A t any rate, the above-quoted passage is 
actually applicable to Russell. O f course, it is not meant as a description of the 
view expressed in Principles §56, but it actually corresponds to it. In order to 
inform the reader of OD on the question “W hat is that curious problem, of 
which you suppose to have had it in common with Frege, concerned with?” 
Russell makes use of an exposition of his own former view. For the sake of 
convenience, I shall call it the innocent view.
9.2 The innocence of the innocent view
According to §56, there is in fact no problem at all. Normally a proposition 
containing a denoting concept will not be about that concept, but about 
what it denotes. However, in some particular cases, a proposition containing 
a denoting concept may be about the concept itself. It may be important to 
observe that the possible human need to speak about denoting concepts is
88 Of course, also another difference is involved: in the GEA only unambigu­
ously denoting concepts are discussed, in POM ambiguously denoting concepts are 
supposed to be of greater importance. See 13.3 and 21.3.
76
much more irrelevant to Russell’s view than his turn of phrase suggests.89 In 
this respect the innocent view is not innocent at all. It is based on the idea 
that the being of something which is such that nothing is true or false about 
it, is impossible. For if there were any entity like that, i.e. an entity that does 
not occur as subject in any proposition, then that very entity would on that 
account occur as subject in the proposition that it does not occur as subject in 
any proposition, which is an evident contradiction.90 Therefore, if there are 
denoting concepts at all, there must be propositions about them. This necessity 
does not have anything to do with our need to change the subject matter of 
our discourse.
The innocence of the innocent view is due to Russell’s assumption that 
denoting concepts may occur as subjects of propositions in exactly the same 
way as other concepts. This requires an explanation. According to Principles, 
a concept is whatever may occur in a proposition otherwise than as subject 
or ‘term’ of that proposition. Concepts are different from things. For a thing 
is defined as what cannot occur in a proposition otherwise than as its subject.
In the proposition expressed by the sentence “Socrates is human”, Socrates 
occurs as subject. In Russell’s terminology he is a ‘thing’ because he cannot 
occur otherwise.91 The only way a proposition can have to do with Socrates 
is: being about him. The said proposition has not only to do with Socrates, but 
with what is meant by “is” and “human” as well. However it is not about these 
constituents. That is why they are concepts, not things.
But although in this particular proposition they do not occur in the same 
way as Socrates does, there must be other propositions in which they do occur 
in that way. If this requirement were not fulfilled, these constituents would not 
be genuine entities at all. They would be such that nothing is true or false about 
them. Socrates has no need of any other proposition in order to prove that 
he is a real entity. For he actually occurs and cannot occur otherwise than as 
subject. But what corresponds to the word “human” only proves, by the way it 
occurs in the above proposition, that it is not a thing but a concept. In order to 
prove that it is an entity, it is in need of a proposition in which it actually
89 See Landini (1998), p.73, who has rightly criticized previous commentators 
of the GEA in saying: “The gate to the fortress was open all the time. We have 
only to ask: Are denoting concepts capable of the two-fold nature essential to con­
cepts generally? According to Principles the answer has to be “yes.” Its fundamental 
doctrine -  whatever is, can occur as term of a proposition -  requires it. Therein 
lies the secret. The answer “yes” spells doom for the theory of denoting concepts.” 
Makin (2000) has also adopted this view.
90 See POM §49, p.46.
91 In this respect, things are like substances. However they are not supposed to 
have anything in them. Cf. 18.5 and 22.2.
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occurs as term or as entity, i.e. as something that the proposition is about. Now 
according to Russell this requirement can easily be met. For in the proposition 
expressed by “Humanity belongs to Socrates”, the said concept actually 
occurs as entity. This proposition is not a simple singular subject predicate 
proposition, but a relational proposition, i.e. a proposition about two different 
entities, namely humanity and Socrates.92
It may seem that this proposition is not about exactly the same entity as 
the predicate that occurs as predicate in ‘Socrates is human’. But according 
to Russell the transformation from “human” into “humanity” only indicates 
a change in occurrence, i.e. not a change in what occurs, but only in how it 
occurs.93 In fact, “humanity” is a proper name derived from an expression which 
is not a name at all, namely “human”. Things are represented by proper names 
anyhow. Concepts are represented by proper names if they occur in the same 
way as a thing.
Let us now turn to denoting concepts. The first point to be observed is 
that although there may be and actually is something special about denoting 
concepts, there is nothing special about the reason why they deserve to be 
called “concepts”. They are simply called like that because, like all other 
concepts, they differ from things in being able to occur otherwise in a 
proposition than as its subject. Now, normally a denoting concept occurs in 
such a way that the proposition in which it occurs is not about it, but about 
what it denotes. That is sufficient to prove that it is a concept.
The second point about a denoting concept to be observed is, that for it 
to occur as a concept amounts to the same as for it to occur as denoting, i.e., 
in the way it normally occurs. Denoting something else and not being itself a 
subject are equivalent.
The third point to be observed is that, like all other concepts, denoting 
concepts must be able, on pain of loosing their right to be called entities, 
to occur otherwise than they normally do. There must be propositions in 
which they occur as such, i.e. as being themselves a subject or term of those 
propositions. Taking into account the second point, this is only possible if 
denoting concepts are able to occur as non-denoting. This however is less 
special than it appears to be. For just in the same way a predicate can only
92 According to Russell every relational proposition is about more than one 
entity. But not every proposition about more than one entity is relational. “Brown 
and Jones are two of Mrs. Smith’s suitors” is about more than one subject, but it is 
not relational. In the latter case order is relevant (see POM §219), in the former 
case it is not. This marks a significant difference with Frege. See below 22.
93 See POM §49, p.46.
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occur as subject, if it occurs as non-predicative, a relation can only occur as 
subject, if it occurs as non-relating.
After these remarks the innocence of the innocent view may be described 
as follows. It consists in the quite natural assumption that denoting concepts 
are capable of occurring as subject in essentially the same way as other 
concepts, namely in dropping their special character. In language this change 
will be expressed in becoming a proper name derived from the denoting phrase 
in the same way as “humanity” appeared to be derived from “human”. The 
inverted commas (mentioned in POM §56 and in OD par. 19) or italics 
(mentioned in POM §56) are to be construed in this way according to the 
innocent view. They are supposed to play exactly the same role as the addition 
of “ity” to “human”: the role of indicating a change of occurrence. They do not 
represent a material addition to what occurs, but merely a change in the way of 
occurrence. The inverted commas do not contribute anything to that change, 
but only “indicate” it as a “fact” .
10 Frege’s difference from Russell as explained in §476
10.1 Why the innocent view cannot be incorporated into Frege’s 
theory
If the above-sketched analysis of the innocent view is right, then it is purely 
Russellian. It cannot be integrated into the conceptual framework of Frege’s 
theory. For it is quite essential to the latter that the distinction between sense 
and reference is applied to all and only all genuine expressions which are 
supposed to express a judgeable content, i.e. something which is true or false.
In the 23.1 I shall more extensively discuss what this means and how it is, at 
least partly, misunderstood by the Russell of OD on account of his neglect of 
the fundamental Frege. In this connection however it is sufficient to observe 
that according to Frege both complex definite descriptions such as “the centre 
of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century” and 
simple proper names such as “Berlin” are such genuine expressions. In other 
words, the distinction between sense and reference is not based on complexity.
This is sufficient to explain why a Fregean or even quasi-Fregean version 
of the innocent view held by Russell in POM §56 is impossible. For according 
to that view the meaning of a definitely denoting phrase, which has both 
meaning and denotation, can occur as subject of a proposition, a fact that 
is indicated by the phrase’s being transformed into a proper name of that
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meaning. That proper name will just name that meaning without having any 
meaning itself, for although derived from a denoting phrase, it is not itself a 
denoting phrase. The distinction between meaning and denotation cannot 
be applied to it. Therefore, as soon as the Fregean view is adopted that the 
distinction between sense and reference is equally applicable to proper names, 
Russell’s innocent view simply does not work.
10.2 Harmless endless regress in Frege’s theory
If all genuine expressions that are supposed to express a proposition, i.e., a 
true or false thought or judgeable content, have both sense and reference, 
then the only way to speak about a sense will have to be essentially different 
from the way discussed in the previous subsection. For then a certain sense 
must be named by an expression which itself has a sense. It will name what 
it names not immediately like a Russellian proper name, but it will name its 
reference in virtue of the sense expressed by it. A nd this latter sense must be 
different from the sense named by it. For one and the same sense cannot have 
different references. For example, if we want to name the sense expressed 
by “the Morningstar”, we want to name a sense that has the Morningstar as 
reference. Now, the only way to do so successfully is by means of an expression 
that does not express a sense referring to the Morningstar. For we do not want 
to speak about the Morningstar, but about one of the senses which point to 
the Morningstar. W hich one? N ot the one expressed by “ the Eveningstar”, 
but the one expressed by “the Morningstar”. A nd it is not difficult to do so: we 
already have done so by means of the expression “the sense expressed by the 
‘Morningstar’” .
This Fregean view leads to an endless regress. But it is a harmless regress, 
because it does not prevent us from successfully referring to whichever 
sense we want to speak about. Speaking about the sense expressed by “the 
Morningstar” is not a never-ending process. But mentioning all the senses 
involved in speaking about the sense expressed by “the Morningstar” actually 
is an endless process. For in speaking about that sense we have to express a 
new, as yet unmentioned sense. A nd if we want to speak about that sense, we 
have to do so by means of another, as yet unmentioned sense, etc.
According to Frege -  and in this respect he does not differ from Russell
-  senses or meanings are not created by us or by our language. They are 
expressed or mentioned by our language. There is an actual infinity of senses. 
Only a finite number of those senses are actually expressed or mentioned.
A nd although the number of actually expressed senses may indefinitely be
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increased, it will always be finite and remain greater than the number of 
actually mentioned senses.
10.3 Direct and indirect sense and reference
Frege also discusses another way of mentioning a sense, which leads to the 
same harmless kind of endless regress. A s seen from both his and Russell’s 
perspective, this method of referring to senses or meanings is much more 
important. In his article O n Sense and Reference, Frege wants to argue that 
identity of reference (Bedeutung) implies identity of truth-value. In order to do 
so, he has to discuss cases in which Leibniz’ law, i.e., the so-called principle of 
substitution, seems to be violated. He explains these cases by the assumption 
that in oratio obliqua the very same expression, which normally expresses a 
certain sense, indicates that sense by means of a sense derived from the sense it 
indicates. The latter is called the indirect sense.94
This part of Frege’s theory may be illustrated on occasion of puzzle (1) in 
OD, which actually is very Fregean in character.95 In paragraph 15 that puzzle 
is stated as follows:
If a  is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and 
either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering 
the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV wished to know 
whether Scott was the author of Waverley; and in fact Scott was the author 
of Waverley. Hence we may substitute Scott for the author o f ‘Waverley’ , and 
thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott.
Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first 
gentleman of Europe.
Frege’s solution of this puzzle would be as follows. In the sentence “George IV 
wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley” , neither the proper 
name “Scott” nor the denoting phrase “the author of Waverley” denotes what 
it normally denotes.96 For both occur in indirect speech. A nd in indirect 
speech “Scott” names the sense which in direct speech is expressed by that 
proper name. The same applies to “the author of Waverley” . Therefore the 
substitution of “Scott” for “the author of Waverley” is not legitimate. For
94 See Frege (1892a), p.145.
95 In the next chapter, however, this will be put in perspective. See 20.5.
96 In order to accommodate this view, I use Russell’s “denote”. Frege would 
prefer “determine” (bestimmen) or “correspond” (entsprechen).
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although the direct reference of “Scott” is the same as the direct reference 
of “the author of Waverley” , the direct sense of “Scott” is not the same as the 
direct sense of “the author of Waverley”. Therefore the indirect reference of 
the two expressions is not the same either. Indirect speech does not prove that 
the principle of substitution is false, but that the condition of its applicability, 
namely sameness of reference, is not fulfilled.
10.4 Russell’s awareness of the difference between Frege and himself
I have not only discussed this Fregean solution of puzzle (1) in order to 
illustrate the distinction between direct and indirect sense and reference, 
but also in order to make clear both the role and the genesis of the GEA.
The role of the G EA  in the setting of OD is: to prove that puzzle (1) cannot 
be solved by adherents of the old theory of meaning and denotation as put 
forward by Frege and Russell. It cannot be solved in spite of the firm belief of 
its adherents that they are able to do so. For in their solution they presuppose 
that the meaning or sense can occur as something a proposition is about.
The G EA  starts in challenging that innocent assumption by revealing an 
unsuspected problem. A nd in its two last paragraphs (OD, par. 24 and 25) 
it concludes that on that account the proposed solution of puzzle (1) fails.97 
But the G EA  is neither written by Russell and Frege together, nor by a third 
person different from both. It is written by Russell. But it could not have been 
written by the innocent Russell of POM §56 who in §476 takes notice of the 
somewhat different Fregean view and supposes it to be equally innocent (see 
quotation below). Therefore, the question is to be asked how the innocent 
Russell lost his innocence. It amounts to the same as the question concerning 
the genesis of the GEA . A s far as I know all commentators have assumed that 
it is to be located in the corresponding passage in OF, which indeed starts in 
a quite innocent tone of voice. But -  and that is the other reason why I have 
discussed the Fregean solution of puzzle (1) -  the Russell who is on the verge 
of discovering the unsuspected difficulty discussed in the GEA, is significantly 
less innocent than the innocent Russell of POM §56. Evidently he has made 
a quasi-Fregean move. In my opinion it is impossible to fully understand the 
G EA  without having made an attempt to first understand the nature of this 
move and the reasons behind it.
There are several reasons why Frege never lost his own innocence in this 
respect. Even if he had been aware of a Russellian alternative, he would not
97 See 20.5. There I shall show that the situation is in fact more complicated.
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have been able to incorporate it into the conceptual framework of his own 
theory. Besides, he never wrote an appendix on the works of Russell. Nor did 
he ever seriously try to understand Russell’s works. Finally, he never made an 
attempt to explain the notion of indirect sense. Russell, on the other hand, 
actually wrote an appendix on the works of Frege and very seriously tried 
to understand them. In the course of that process the innocent Russell at 
least lost something of his original innocence. For in studying O n Sense and 
Reference, he realized that another view was at least possible. In the mentioned 
second section of the Appendix, POM §476, he takes notice of the two above­
mentioned interrelated differences. The fist of them is very well known and 
often-discussed; it is also to be found in OD par. 11, second footnote: it states 
that Frege’s theory is more sweeping. For the distinction between sense and 
reference is applied to both definite descriptions and proper names. The second 
difference is not mentioned in OD. However, in my opinion it is a quite 
important clue to understanding the GEA . This mostly forgotten difference is 
a consequence of the first, namely that according to Frege, a sense or meaning 
can only occur as subject of a proposition, if it is referred to by another sense 
or meaning. And, as I have explained above, this involves a harmless infinite 
regress. In POM §476, p.502, Russell says:
This theory of indication is more sweeping and general than mine, as 
appears from the fact that every proper name is supposed to have the two 
sides. It seems to me that only such proper names as are derived from 
concepts by means of the can be said to have meaning, and that such 
words as John merely indicate without meaning. If one allows, as I do, that 
concepts can be objects and have proper names, it seems fairly evident 
that their proper names, as a rule, will indicate them without having any 
distinct meaning; but the opposite view, though it leads to an endless 
regress, does not appear to be logically impossible.98
98 The turn of phrase “that concepts can be objects and have proper names” 
reveals a quite fundamental misunderstanding. It will be discussed in 23.1. Here 
however, it is rather harmless. Russell uses the Fregean word “object” as synony­
mous with “subject”, i.e. something the proposition is about.
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11.1 Possibility of the quasi-Fregean view
Although not even something like the view of the innocent Russell can be 
integrated into Frege’s theory, something like the latter can be integrated 
into the former. The essence of the Fregean approach is: making use of the 
distinction between sense and reference in order to explain how the sense may 
occur as subject of a proposition. This approach may be adopted in the theory 
of denoting concepts without accepting Frege’s equal treatment of proper 
names and definite descriptions. Frege’s theory must lead to mediatism because 
it is sweeping. But mediatism as such is not in need of such a sweeping theory.
Retaining the basic conceptual framework of Russell’s theory, such a quasi- 
Fregean shift could be effectuated in the assumption that after all, there is 
something special about denoting concepts. A  non-denoting concept as such 
can occur as entity without being denoted. But, according to this possible view, 
a denoting concept cannot occur as subject of a proposition unless it is denoted 
by another denoting concept. This assumption equally involves a harmless 
infinite regress.
If it is adopted, the inverted commas are to be explained in a different 
way. According to the innocent Russell (see 9.2), they are to be construed as 
an addition similar to the ending “ity” to “human”. In other words: they are, 
of course, an addition, namely an addition to the denoting phrase that is put 
between them. Nevertheless, they are supposed not to symbolize an addition, 
but something else, namely a change in occurrence of the denoting concept 
expressed by the denoting phrase between them. Adding inverted commas to 
a denoting phrase results in a proper, i.e. non-expressive name of the meaning, 
which is normally expressed by that denoting phrase. That is why, according 
to this innocent view, italics are more appropriate than inverted commas. For 
they change what is italicized without adding anything to it.
According to the quasi-Fregean view, however, inverted commas are 
supposed to be less misleading than italics. For if the meaning we want to 
speak about is to be denoted, not just named, then it is to be denoted by a 
denoting concept, which is different from -and larger than the denoting 
concept we want to speak about. To the latter something must be added 
in order to get the former. For a denoting concept cannot denote itself.
Any denoting concept denotes something else. Furthermore, the denoting 
concept by means of which another denoting concept is made the subject 
of a proposition must be somehow derived from it, like Frege’s indirect sense 
is supposed to be derived from the direct sense. In this view, there is a real
11 The quasi-Fregean move in ‘On Fundamentals’
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addition to be symbolized. The most appropriate way symbolizing it is by 
additional symbols. Therefore inverted commas will do better than italics.
11.2 Actual adoption of the quasi-Fregean view and the reason 
behind it
U p to now I have only discussed the possibility of replacing the innocent view 
adopted in POM §56 by a quasi-Fregean view, i.e., a view similar to the one 
discussed in POM §476. There Russell takes notice of the principle Frege’s 
approach is based on. But he does not feel any need to adopt it. Therefore, two 
questions may be asked, namely whether he ever actually adopted it and if so, 
why. These two questions are both answered by the passage in OF mentioned 
in section 8. It occurs about 19 pages before the discovery of the problem, 
which gave rise to the ToD’s conception. W hether in it the shift from the 
innocent to the quasi-Fregean view actually took place, I do not know. Maybe 
it is to be construed as just a reminder of an earlier change.99 Anyhow, in its 
margin Russell has put the words: “Important principle” (see CP vol.4, p. 703). 
The text (CP vol.4, p. 363, 24-32) runs as follows:
It seems that if we wish to put a denoting meaning in an entity-position, 
and say something about the meaning itself, we can only do so by means 
of a denoting concept; for if, instead of a denoting concept, we put the 
meaning in question, then, since the position is an entity-position, we shall 
be talking unintentionally about the denotation of the meaning instead 
of about the meaning. Thus a denoting meaning can only be spoken of by 
means of denoting concepts which denote the meaning in question. This is 
what inverted commas do: they give a denoting concept which denotes the 
meaning of what is between the inverted commas.
In this passage the reason is to be found why Russell left his former innocent 
view. He did so because he realized that in POM §56 he had overlooked a 
quite essential difference between denoting concepts and other concepts. It 
may be explained in comparing the following two pairs of propositions
(1a) Socrates is human.
(1b) Humanity belongs to Socrates.
99 Russell (1903b), pp.321-322 seems to justify this assumption.
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(2a) The centre of mass of the solar system is a point, not a denoting 
complex.
(2b) “The centre of mass of the solar system” is a denoting complex, not a 
point.
In the above-quoted text the notion of position occurs, more in particular 
the notion of entity-position. In POM it is virtually present, but actually 
absent. In OF and other manuscripts it plays a prominent role. There Russell 
elaborates the so-called ‘substitutional theory’ in the hope of solving the 
paradox by means of it.100 The main idea behind it is, that the variable must 
be unrestricted in scope and restricted in position. The variable is explained 
by means of denoting. It is supposed to be a specific ambiguously denoting 
concept, namely ‘any entity’. The unrestricted range of the variable is due 
to the unrestricted extension of the notion of entity. It excludes absolutely 
nothing, for it is impossible to mention something that is not an entity.101
The positional restriction of the unrestricted variable is to be explained as 
follows. In (1a) what is symbolized by the word “human” can be replaced by 
any other predicate without impairing the significance of the proposition. If 
we substitute ‘Greek’ for ‘human’, we get another proposition, which is equally 
true. If we replace ‘human’ by ‘English’, we get a false proposition, but still a 
genuine one. For a proposition is something that is true or false. But if ‘human’ 
is replaced by another kind of concept, say a relation such as ‘greater than’, the 
result is not a genuine proposition at all.
The fact that what is symbolized by “human” can only be replaced by a 
predicate, not by something else, is not due to what it is. It is not due to its 
being itself a predicate, but to its position. In (1a) it occupies a predicate- 
position, i.e. a special kind of meaning position. In (1b) the very same predicate 
occurs in an essentially different kind of position, namely an entity-position. 
There it may, according to Russell, be replaced by anything whatever. The 
result will always be a genuine, true or false, proposition. For the notion of 
the unrestricted variable is based on the principle of the unrestricted possible 
aboutness of the proposition. Even a sentence like “Difference belongs to 
Socrates” is supposed to express a genuine, but false proposition.
The situation may be illustrated by the following fictional account. There 
are different countries, each having its own language. The possibility that 
different countries have the same language is not excluded. A ll people whose 
native language differs from English, speak one and only one foreign
100 See Landini (1998).
101 See 4.3 above.
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language, namely English. A nd English is the only possible foreign language. 
Furthermore, people are allowed to visit a foreign country, provided they know 
the language of that country. In this world native speakers of English would be 
like Russellian things. Their countries would correspond to entity-positions. 
The freedom of movement allowed to local inhabitants would be restricted to 
the Anglo-Saxon world. But all people of the whole world could meet there.
Now, a predicate is like, say, a Hungarian. A  Hungarian who happens to 
be at home in a meaning-position, can only be replaced by other Hungarians. 
There, Hungarians cannot meet anyone else but fellow-Hungarians. For 
strangers are not allowed to enter the country. But if a Hungarian happens to 
be at home, that is not due to his being Hungarian. For like all non-native 
speakers of English, a Hungarian may travel to the whole Anglo-Saxon world.
Most remarkable in this connection is that the most free and cosmopolitan 
countries (entity-positions) are originally inhabited by the less free and 
cosmopolitan people (things). A nd the freest people (concepts) originally 
inhabit the less free countries (meaning-positions).
In (1b) the ending “ity” attached to “human” only indicates a change in 
position, but an essential one. It is more essential than the change Socrates has 
undergone. He is replaced from the position of a subject in a singular subject- 
predicate proposition to the position of term of a dyadic relation in a relational 
proposition. Nevertheless, he has only moved from one entity position towards 
another one. In fact, being a thing, he is not able to move in any other way.
But what is symbolized by “human” in (1a) is transposed from a predicate- 
position, i.e. a special kind of meaning-position, to an entity-position in (1b).
But -  and that is the essential point the innocent Russell must initially 
have overlooked and later have realized -  the change indicated by the 
inverted commas in (2b) cannot be explained in the same way. For in (2a) 
the denoting concept expressed by the phrase “the centre of mass of the solar 
system” already occupied an entity position in spite of the fact that (2a) is not 
about that denoting concept. In other words: denoting takes place in an entity- 
position. That is why the unrestricted variable, which in fact is a particular 
case of denoting, can only have an unrestricted range in an entity-position. 
Denoting concepts are less ordinary than Russell supposed them to be in 
Principles: they differ from all other kinds of concepts by their capacity to 
occur in an entity position instead of something the proposition is about. A s 
soon as an ordinary concept such as ‘human’ is moved to an entity-position, 
the proposition will be about that concept. But a denoting concept normally 
occurs in an entity position anyhow, without itself being something the 
proposition is about.
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Therefore, the inverted commas in (2b) cannot be construed as indicating 
that the denoting concept expressed by “the centre of mass of the solar system” 
has been moved into an entity-position. The inverted commas are to be 
explained otherwise: as providing a change from its normal entity-position 
in which it actually denotes, into an extraordinary position provided by the 
greater denoting concept by which it is denoted and in which it occurs as non­
denoting thanks to that particular change o f position.
12 The quasi-Fregean view as mitigated mediatism
12.1 Mitigated mediatism in view of the GEA
The view sketched in the previous section may be called mitigated 
mediatism. It is mediatism because according to it, the only way a denoting 
concept can occur as subject of a proposition is by means of another denoting 
concept, which denotes it. But it is mitigated because it presupposes the 
immediatism of the innocent view. In that mediating denoting concept the 
denoting concept we want to speak about, is immediately present. For in that 
position, it is supposed to occur as neither denoting nor denoted. It is quite 
important to distinguish these two requirements, but it is even more important 
to distinguish in view of each the assumption that it is sound from the 
assumption that it can be fulfilled. The latter constitutes the innocence, i.e. the 
naivety and obvious weakness of the quasi-Fregean view. In the present and 
following section I shall only discuss its strength.
A s far as the soundness of the above-mentioned assumptions is concerned, 
Russell never changed his mind. For the innocent Russell of POM §56, the 
quasi-Fregean Russell as well as the Russell who wrote the G EA  after having 
rejected the quasi-Fregean solution are all of the same opinion. It may be 
stated as follows: If there are denoting concepts at all, it must be possible 
for them to occur as subject of a proposition in such a way that either in the 
subject position of that proposition itself or somewhere else, they occur as 
non-denoting and non-denoted. In other words: if for some reason or other 
mediatism is to be considered, then it must be mitigated in order to be sound at 
all. Russell never actually adopted something like unmitigated mediatism.
Nevertheless, it is actually discussed in the GEA , but only as a seeming 
way out, which, in order to prove the difficulty’s inevitability, is dismissed as 
unsound.102 Unmitigated mediatism simply consists in the assumption that it is 
sufficient to denote the denoting concept we want to speak about. There is
102 See below 20.2, 20.3 and 20.4.
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no need to require anything more. The denoting concept we want to speak 
about need not itself participate in its being made the subject of discourse, just 
as someone who is gossiped about in the newspaper need not perforce have 
collaborated in his being made the topic of discourse. Now, if we want to speak 
about a certain denoting concept, it is always possible to find some denoting 
phrase, which actually does express that concept. If we, for some reason or 
other, dislike the use of quotation marks, we may denote the phrase as the one 
which is to be found on some definite line of some definite page of a definite 
print of some definite book. Having thus succeeded in mentioning the phrase, 
we may successfully mention the denoting concept as the one expressed by 
that phrase.
The Russell of the G EA  does not deny the viability of this procedure, 
but he wants to deny that it is sufficient. That is why, in its third paragraph 
(OD, par 20), after having described the nature of the problem, he provides 
a possible alternative description in saying “also that the meaning cannot be 
got at except by means of denoting phrases”. W hat Russell must have had 
in mind in this connection is: the problem is, mentioning a phrase that does 
express the meaning we want to speak about, is the only possible way to do 
so. This view presupposes that unmitigated mediatism is unsound. Otherwise, 
there would not be any serious, let alone any inevitable difficulty at all. In the 
said third paragraph of the GEA , Russell gives a very fundamental reason why 
unmitigated mediatism cannot be accepted. It will be discussed in section 16. 
Here I only want to observe that in the G EA  the issue is explained, whereas in 
OF it is assumed as a matter of course. Anything corresponding to the GEA’s 
third paragraph is not to be found in OF.103
Frege must have been of essentially the same opinion as Russell: When we 
want to speak about the sense of a certain expression, we can do so by quoting 
or otherwise mentioning that expression and describing the sense as the sense 
of that expression. But there is also another procedure, which in the context 
of Frege’s argument proves to be much more important: not mentioning the 
expression, but using it in indirect speech. The latter alternative is not only 
more important to Frege, but to Russell as well. That is why not so much the 
Frege of the quotation marks is relevant to him, but the Frege of indirect sense.
12.2 Frege’s mitigated mediatism as more problematic
Nevertheless, the notion of indirect sense is much less elaborated than the 
view of the quasi-Fregean Russell. For in the latter the said idea of
103 See 16.1.
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participation, i.e., the rejection of unmitigated mediatism, is quite clear. The 
denoting concept we want to speak about occurs twice: as denoted by a larger 
denoting concept and as non-denoting and not denoted in the said larger 
denoting concept. However, if we ask Frege whether and if so, in which way 
the direct sense occurs in -  or is part of the indirect sense referring to it, he 
probably would not know what to answer. Evidently, his use of the phrase 
“the indirect sense” suggests that among all the senses referring to some 
definite sense, say the sense of the expression “the Morningstar”, one is more 
intimately connected with that one sense than with all the others. It not only 
points to it, but in some way is also derived from it.
Russell’s quasi-Fregean view is not only more elaborate than the view of 
Frege himself, it is also more promising. For Russell’s meaning is essentially a 
special kind of concept. A nd all concepts, according to him, are distinguished 
from non-concepts, i.e. from things, in virtue of their being susceptible of two 
different kinds of occurrence: as concept or meaning and as entity. In case of 
a denoting concept, this amounts to the same as: occurring as denoting versus 
occurring as non-denoting. This distinction appeared to be essential to the 
way the denoting concept we want to speak about is supposed to be involved 
in its own being made the subject of a proposition. For it is to be involved in 
it as non-denoting. A s such it occurs in the larger denoting concept, which 
actually denotes it. In so far it is clear how this embedding denoting concept 
is supposed to be derived from the denoting concept it is supposed to denote. 
It contains it as non-denoting or as entity. In (2b) the phrase containing the 
inverted commas denotes the denoting concept the proposition is about and 
the phrase contained in the converted commas is to be construed as proper 
name of the very same denoting concept that occurs as non-denoting.
Nothing resembling such a twofold occurrence is to be found in Frege’s 
logic. Nevertheless, without it the question how the indirect sense is supposed 
to be derived from the sense which is its reference, can hardly be answered. 
For if any sense always occurs in the same way, then the direct sense cannot 
participate in the constitution of the indirect sense referring to it. Suppose we 
want to speak about the sense of the phrase “the Morningstar” in another way 
than we have done, i.e., without mentioning the phrase. A nd suppose as well 
that a sense cannot occur in different ways. Then this is equally true of the 
sense we want to speak about. It will never stop referring to the Morningstar. 
And as such it can never help us in speaking about that sense itself. It can 
only help us in speaking about what is unambiguously determined by the 
Morningstar, such as its mass, its rotation or its average distance from the sun.
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13 Russellian subtlety: the complex as different from its 
meaning
13.1 The view’s virtues as important to the GEA
In the present section I shall continue postponing the discussion of the quasi- 
Fregean view’s weakness. I do so, because in my opinion it is impossible to 
understand the G EA  unless a serious attempt is made to understand its other 
side, i.e. Russell’s road to the discovery of its weakness and the virtues of the 
view whose weakness he discovered. For in OF §35 he made that discovery not 
as an outsider, but as a serious adherent of the quasi-Fregean view, an adherent 
who wanted to clarify it.
The advantage of such a historical and benevolent approach is that it 
enables us to recognize the quasi-Fregean Russell in the GEA . For among 
the different possible views discussed in it, one and only one has actually 
once been embraced by Russell himself, namely the quasi-Fregean view. A ll 
alternative options are no more than implausible evasions. They are seriously 
considered, but not seriously adopted. In my opinion this has been overlooked 
both by those who tried to ridicule the G EA  and by those who made an 
attempt to construe it as a valid argument.
Although the G EA  is an argument, it is not purely argumentative; it is a 
discovery put in the form of an argument by the same person who actually 
made the discovery. Ignoring the importance of this fact is of the same nature 
as ignoring that the word “house” is English but nevertheless not purely 
English. In fact it is but the English form of a word that also occurs, for 
example, in German or in Dutch, but in different forms, namely as “Haus” 
or “huis” . It might be objected that these words are different and all of them 
derived from an original that is different from all of them, say the Gothic “hus” 
or the Sanskrit “kosha”. However, the origin and what is derived from it are 
both different forms of the same, i.e., of something, which is not outside, but 
in those forms. This also applies to the G EA  and the origin from which it is 
derived. They do not differ from each other as A  and B, nor as A  and A B, nor 
as A C  and BC, but rather as A B  and BA, i.e., as opposed forms of the same.
The mediatism Russell adopted from Frege within the framework of his 
own theory may not only be called mitigated, but subtle as well. For it is based 
on a subtle distinction between the denoting concept we want to speak about 
and the denoting concept as it occurs in the larger denoting concept by means 
of which we want to speak about it. The former is called meaning, the latter 
complex. Therefore, the quasi-Fregean view has two unsuspected and often
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neglected features, which may both be expressed by the words: not sufficient.
If we want to speak about the meaning of an unambiguously denoting phrase, 
we may do so by mentioning that phrase. But that is not sufficient. It must be 
possible as well to do so by means of the meaning we want to speak about.
It must occur in the denoting concept by means of which we speak about it. 
This then, is what typifies the quasi-Fregean view as mitigated mediatism (see 
previous section). The reason behind it will be discussed in section 16.
The second feature of the quasi-Fregean view is constituted by the 
mentioned subtle distinction between the “complex”, i.e., the concept as 
occurring in the larger one and the concept as denoted by the larger one, i.e., 
as meaning. It is not sufficient to denote by means of a denoting concept exactly 
the same concept. For we want to speak about it as meaning or denoting. But 
we can only speak about it by means of it as non-denoting. In other words, we 
want to speak about a denoting concept as denoting by means of it as not 
denoting. That is why the denoting concept we want to speak about is to be 
distinguished from that very same concept as it occurs in the larger denoting 
concept by means of which we speak about it. In other words, the addition 
symbolized by the inverted commas is to be construed as: the meaning of....
. For we want to speak about the meaning by means of something which 
elsewhere, namely in its normal denoting occurrence, has meaning.
The Russell who in OF §35 (p.381) starts to explain the use of inverted 
commas, 13 lines before the difficulty is discovered, assumes as a matter of 
course that precisely this subtle distinction is to be made.
“The use of inverted commas may be explained as follows. When a concept
has meaning and d e n o ta t io n .. ”
13.2 Subtlety versus two modes of indifference
The subtlety of Russell’s mitigated mediatism may be rejected in two different 
ways. The first version may be called indifferent mitigated mediatism. It neither 
occurs in OF nor in the GEA . Russell never considered, let alone adopted 
it. Nevertheless, it is relevant in this connection because he rejected it as 
a matter of course. The only reason why I pay attention to it, is that it may 
serve as a foil, highlighting what the subtle distinction between complex and 
meaning amounts to.
Indifferent mitigated mediatism differs from the quasi-Fregean view in 
being less ambitious. According to it, there is one and only one reason why
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denoting is needed in order to make a denoting concept the subject of a 
proposition. It is supposed to be necessary because the denoting concept we 
want to speak about, has to be put into another position. There it has to occur 
as non-denoting. A  larger denoting concept has to provide the new position. 
A nd that is the only task it has to perform. Consequently, the inverted 
commas are to be construed as a tautological addition. After all, we want to 
speak about the very same denoting concept we have put into its new position. 
Therefore, the addition symbolized by the inverted commas may be construed 
as: the concept which is the same a s . .
When we want to speak about the predicate indicated by “human” in the 
proposition expressed by “Socrates is human”, it is sufficient to put it into an 
entity-position. In case of a denoting concept the situation is, according to this 
view, essentially the same, save that another denoting concept is needed in 
order to provide a new position. Just as it is sufficient to speak about humanity, 
so it is sufficient to speak about a denoting concept as it occurs in its new 
position, viz. as non-denoting.
The subtlety of the quasi-Fregean view consists in the assumption that 
it is not sufficient to speak about the concept as non-denoting. The larger 
denoting concept is supposed to have a twofold task: it has to provide a new 
position and it has to denote what occupies that position not as it actually 
occurs in it, not as entity, but as meaning or denoting. In other words, it has 
to make possible a non-denoting occurrence of a denoting concept and it has 
to compensate and transcend that very occurrence by denoting it as concept 
or meaning. Consequently, the inverted commas have to symbolize a non- 
tautological addition, namely: the meaning of. .  .
This view may also be applied to other kinds of concepts, for example to 
the predicate “human”. Denoting widens the scope of what a proposition may 
be about. It is not sufficient to speak about humanity. Thanks to denoting 
concepts we are able to speak about the meaning of humanity, i.e., about the 
predicate as predicate.
The obvious weakness of the quasi-Fregean view is in fact not due to its 
subtlety. Rather its failure consists in the assumption that a denoting concept 
will automatically stop denoting as soon as it is put into a larger denoting 
concept. Indifferent mitigated mediatism is based on the same failure. In OF 
§35 Russell, as adherent of subtle mitigated mediatism, discovered this failure. 
In the next two sections I shall discuss the nature of this discovery.
In any event, both in OF §36 and in the corresponding part of the G EA  
(OD paragraph 22), another kind of indifferent view is introduced. Russell 
takes it into account on occasion of the said discovery, but he never adopted
93
it. In the next chapter (see especially 17.3, 18 and 20.1), I shall extensively 
discuss it. Here I only want to indicate in which way it is related to the above­
sketched indifferent mitigated mediatism.
A s far as it consists in rejecting the subtle distinction between meaning and 
complex, the view occurring in OF §36 and in the G EA  is similar. On that 
account it may be called “indifferent” as well. But it is dissimilar in being based 
on a somewhat rash assessment of the failure discovered in OF §35. It assumes, 
that the concept’s refusal to stop denoting, is due to its being imbedded into 
a larger denoting concept. In other words, the freshly discovered failure is 
wrongly supposed to be based on the subtlety of the quasi-Fregean view. A s 
far as the meaning is concerned, this results in indifferent immediatism. The 
meaning is supposed to be the same as the complex. It can be mentioned 
immediately, whereas the denotation is mentioned by means of the complex, 
i.e., as the denotation of the complex. The inverted commas do not, according 
to this view, symbolize a tautological addition, but a substraction of “the 
denotation of......” from what is meant by the phrase in it normal use.
This view is not just less ambitious than the quasi-Fregean one; it is more 
experienced and has another ambition, namely explaining and avoiding its 
failure.
13.3 Denoting as widening the scope of being about
Indifferent mitigated mediatism, however, is just less ambitious than the 
quasi-Fregean view. It is based on a rather low opinion of denoting. It treats 
description as but a substitute for naming or enumerating. A n  indifferent 
adherent of mitigated mediatism must be prepared to admit that there is 
something special and extraordinary about denoting concepts. For the only 
way to name them is, according to the view in question, to put them into a 
larger denoting concept. That is why the inverted commas are to be explained 
as: the complex which is the same a s .  . But even in this case denoting 
makes naming possible. It is its servant. Mentioning by name is the real thing. 
It is always sufficient. We make use of description when we want to avoid 
mentioning by name or when we do not know the name or when we are too 
lazy to enumerate all the prime numbers smaller than 1000. Speaking about 
them by means of the denoting concept ‘all prime numbers smaller than 1000’ 
saves a lot of time and energy.
The spirit of Russell’s theory of denoting concepts is in direct opposition 
to this view. I have deliberately chosen the example of the prime numbers 
smaller than 1000. For although enumerating all prime numbers smaller than
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1000 is possible, enumerating all prime numbers is impossible. Their number 
is infinite. Nevertheless by means of the denoting concept ‘all prime numbers’ 
we are able to understand propositions about them all. Thanks to the fact that 
there are denoting concepts, we are able to grasp propositions about infinitely 
many entities. W ithout them mathematics would be impossible. In POM §141, 
p. 145, Russell says:
Indeed it may be said that the logical purpose which is served by the theory 
of denoting is, to enable propositions of finite complexity to deal with 
infinite classes of terms: this object is affected by all, any and every, and if it 
were not effected, every general proposition about an infinite class would 
have to be infinitely complex. Now, for my part, I see no possible ways of 
deciding whether propositions of infinite complexity are possible or not; 
but this at least is clear, that all the propositions known to us (and it would 
seem, all propositions that we can know) are of finite complexity.
In O D ’s second paragraph, not written for mathematicians but for readers 
of Mind, something similar is put forward: denoting is important because it 
widens the scope of our knowledge. W ithout denoting it would be confined to 
what we are acquainted with:
The subject of denoting is of very great importance, not only in logic and 
mathematics, but also in theory of knowledge. For example, we know that 
the centre of mass of the solar system at a definite instant is some definite 
point, and we can affirm a number of propositions about it; but we have 
no immediate acquaintance with this point, which is only known to us by 
description. The distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about 
is the distinction between the things we have presentations of, and the 
things we only reach by means of denoting phrases. It often happens that 
we know that a certain phrase denotes unambiguously, although we have 
no acquaintance with what it denotes; this occurs in the above case of the 
centre of mass. In perception we have acquaintance with the objects of 
perception, and in thought we have acquaintance with objects of a more 
abstract logical character; but we do not necessarily have acquaintance with 
the objects denoted by phrases composed of words with whose meanings we 
are acquainted. To take a very important instance: there seems no reason 
to believe that we are ever acquainted with other people’s minds, seeing 
that these are not directly perceived; hence what we know about them is 
obtained trough denoting. A ll thinking has to start from acquaintance;
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but it succeeds in thinking about many things with which we have no 
acquaintance.104
14 The discovery
14.1 Principle of discovery and discovered innocence
The discovery to be discussed in the present section seems to be rather trivial. 
In the next section I shall try to explain why it nevertheless is important.
Here I only want to pay attention to the main opposition involved in it, the 
opposition between the principle of discovery and the discovered innocence.
In order to do so, I shall start with the following series of sentences:
(1a) Socrates is human
(1b) Humanity belongs to Socrates
(1c) The meaning of humanity occurs in (1a)
(3a) The first line of Gray’s Elegy states a proposition 
(3b) “The first line of Gray’s Elegy” does not state a proposition 
(3b') The meaning of the first line of Gray’s Elegy does not state a 
proposition
(3b'') The meaning of “the first line of Gray’s Elegy” does not state a 
proposition
Sentences (1a) and (1b) do not have anything to do with denoting. But (1c) 
does in a somewhat strange way. It is the result of the principle discussed in the 
previous section: making use of denoting in order to speak about a concept as 
concept. Sentences (3a) and (3b) are borrowed from the GEA , par. B. In them 
denoting is prominently present. Sentence (3b') is nothing but the result of 
applying the proposed explanation of inverted commas to (3b). This evidently 
leads to a failure. In (3b'') the inverted commas are re-introduced in a slightly 
different way in order to correct the failure.
In order to discuss the principle of discovery, I shall I start with proposition 
(3a). It is unproblematic, for it just provides an example of a denoting phrase
104 In the present study no attention is paid to the epistemological aspect of 
denoting as applied in Russell’s later work. I leave it aside because in my opinion 
it is hardly of any importance to understanding the GEA. That is why I strongly 
disagree with Kremer (1994) who fails to take any notice of OF.
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occurring in the way it normally does. It expresses a denoting concept which 
actually denotes what the proposition is about, namely the first line of Gray’s 
Elegy. The phrase denotes what it denotes in virtue of the actually denoting 
concept or meaning expressed by it. According to the theory of denoting 
concepts, it is primarily the meaning or the concept as meaning which denotes 
the denotation, not the phrase. The phrase may be called a denoting phrase 
because it happens to be one of the phrases which express something denoting, 
namely the concept as meaning.
Is there according to the theory of denoting concepts any need to move 
from (3a) to (3b) and its possible explanations? In 9.2 I have argued that our 
need to speak about meanings is in fact much more irrelevant to Russell’s 
theory than he suggests. W hat is at stake is not our need to change the subject 
of our discourse, but the need of any entity to be capable of occurring as 
subject of a proposition. That need amounts to the same as the need to prove 
that it actually deserves to be called an entity. A s such it is general and does 
not have anything in particular to do with denoting.
But there is also another reason why the transition from normal to 
exceptional use is to be made, namely that an analysis of the proposition or a 
theory about propositions itself consists of propositions. There is no vantage 
point outside propositions. I do not say this in order to criticize Russell, 
but in order to highlight a principle, which is essential to the very spirit of 
his philosophy; so much so that he often fails to mention it, even in POM, 
Ch.V. Russell was dissatisfied with traditional logic because it presupposes a 
lot of things, i.e., a lot of propositions, that do not meet what according to 
traditional logic propositions ought to be (see below 22.2).
A s applied to (3a) this point may be explained as follows. I have started 
in putting forward a lot of things about an ordinary example like (3a), which 
according to the theory of denoting concepts must be true. ‘Things’ which 
are true are propositions. One of those propositions is, that the meaning 
in question denotes the denotation. This relational proposition however is 
not just an ordinary one. For it is not only about the denotation, but also 
about the very same meaning that occurs in (3a), about which (3 a) itself 
is silent. In other words: ordinary occurrences of denoting concepts show 
extraordinary things according to the theory in question. A nd appealing to a 
Wittgensteinian absolute vantage point of silence beyond the sayable would be 
at variance with the spirit of Russell’s philosophy. Therefore, according to him, 
it must be possible to say in the theory what according to that theory ordinary 
propositions show. If the theory of denoting concepts is not able to meet this 
requirement, that in itself is sufficient to prove that the theory is wrong.
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It is quite evident that (3b) not only differs from (3a) on account of 
the inverted commas, but equally on account of the negation added to the 
predicate. Both (3a) and (3b) are supposed to be true. But the predicates 
occurring in them are incompatible. Therefore (3b) must be about something 
different from what (3 a) is about. The latter is about the denotation of the 
phrase “the first line of Gray’s Elegy”, the former about the meaning expressed 
by it. A t least, we may assume that it is about that meaning as long as the 
inverted commas are taken for granted.
A s I have argued in 9.2, the innocent Russell of POM §56 actually 
supposed the inverted commas to be unproblematic. But he had something 
more in mind, which is not mentioned in the GEA , namely that they are 
unproblematic because a denoting concept can be made the subject of a 
proposition in exactly the same way, as for example, a predicate. If that 
hypothesis is right, then the innocent Russell must have supposed that (3b) 
differs from (3a) in the same way as (1b) from (1a). Then the inverted commas 
in (3b) are not just left unexplained, but explained in a simple and naïve way: 
as similar to the ending “ity” in “humanity” . The innocence is to be found 
in the supposed similarity, not in what it is supposed to be similar to. For in
9.2 Russell’s view on how what is meant by “human” in (1a) occurs in (1b), 
appeared to be far from innocent! The difference is supposed to me merely 
external, not intrinsic.
A s explained in section 11, once, either in OF or earlier, Russell became 
aware of his own inattention: the difference between what is meant by 
“human” in (1a) and what is meant by “humanity” in (1b) is, according to 
him, due to a change in position. Such a change in position is not accounted for 
in the transition from (3a) to (3b) unless the inverted commas are construed 
as representing an addition, which actually gives a new kind of position to 
the denoting concept occurring in (3a). This shift in position is supposed to 
be similar to the shift from a predicate-position to a subject-position. Here 
we are confronted with essentially the same innocence, but now within the 
framework of the quasi-Fregean view.
In (3b') the subtle version of this view is actually applied to (3b). The 
inverted commas are explained as translatable into: the meaning of . . And 
the denoting concept expressed by “the first line of Gray’s Elegy” is expected 
to occur as non-denoting, i.e., otherwise than in (3a). But unfortunately, 
this expectation is not fulfilled. Actually it occurs in exactly the same way. 
Consequently (3b') is not true, at least not in the way we hoped it to be true. 
The predicate is the same as in (3b), but unintentionally the subject has 
changed.
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This failure might be corrected by adding inverted commas where first we 
supposed them to be superfluous. This is effectuated in (3b'') The inverted 
commas occurring in it may be construed in two ways: either as indicating 
the desired change of occurrence as a fact, or in the same way as explained by 
the quasi-Fregean view in (3b'). If we choose the former alternative, then the 
correcting inverted commas indicate the change of occurrence we expected 
to take place automatically on account of the change in position. Conceived 
in this way, (3b'') is about the same subject as (3b). If the latter alternative 
is chosen, we get a harmful infinite regress. For then the inverted commas in 
(3b'') are to be explained as an addition, which gives rise to the same problem 
as (3b'). Thus we need new inverted commas for correcting the result. These, 
in turn, are to be explained in the same way, etc.
This is actually the point of view expressed in OF §35, p.382, where Russell 
is discovering the problem. The quasi-Fregean explanation appears to be 
circular. It purports to avoid the innocent explanation of the inverted commas, 
but it is only successful in getting the desired meaning if it makes use of them.
The first innocent part of this text roughly corresponds to the one quoted 
and discussed in section 11. The enquiry starts as a restatement of the 
“important principle” of the quasi-Fregean view:
The use of inverted commas may be explained as follows. W hen a 
concept has meaning and denotation, if we wish to say anything about 
the meaning, we must put it in an entity-position; but if we put it itself in 
an entity-position, we shall be really speaking about the denotation, not 
the meaning, for that is always the case when a denoting complex is put 
in an entity-position. Thus in order to speak about the meaning, we must 
substitute for the meaning something which denotes the meaning. Hence 
the meaning of denoting complexes can only be approached by means 
of complexes which denote those meanings. This is what complexes in 
inverted commas are.
But in the subsequent part of that passage Russell takes a little, but very 
consequential step forward by illustrating the “important principle” by means 
of an example. In fact this example is significantly different from the examples 
discussed in the GEA . It is an ambiguously denoting concept, namely “any 
man”. Here I shall leave this difference aside. It will be extensively discussed 
below (21.3). A t any rate, in this last part of §35 the above-mentioned 
circularity is discovered:
14.2 Discovery and loss of innocence in OF §35
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If we say ‘“any man” is a denoting complex’, “any man” stands for ‘the 
meaning of the complex “any man”’, which is a denoting complex. But this 
is circular; for we use “any man” in explaining “any man”. A nd the circle is 
unavoidable. For if we say “the meaning of any man”, that will stand for the 
meaning of the denotation of any man which is not what we want.
15 Persuasiveness and concealed weakness
15.1 Apparent triviality of Russell’s discovery
This short piece of text might be called the crucial passage in OF. It contains 
the very discovery of the curious problem on whose occasion two pages later 
the ToD is conceived. Nevertheless, in spite of its incontestable historical 
importance, it seems to offer nothing more than the discovery of something 
quite trivial, namely that a denoting phrase, if it is embedded in another 
denoting phrase, remains just as much denoting as it was on its own account. 
For example, we may speak about the actual number of citizens of Paris. In 
that case we make use of the proper name “Paris” . That proper name may be 
replaced by an unambiguously denoting phrase, such as “the capital of France”. 
It denotes the bearer of the proper name “Paris” . Putting the phrase into a 
larger denoting phrase, or putting the denoting concept expressed by it into a 
larger denoting concept, of course does not make any difference. Speaking or 
being about the number of citizens of Paris amounts to the same as speaking or 
being about the number of citizens of the capital of France. Why was Russell 
surprised about this? Had he been enchanted by a curious expectation? If so, 
why should his disenchantment be of any importance? Why suppose it to be 
the discovery of a “curious problem” ? If you get rid of a curious belief, the only 
curious thing you discover is the belief itself. You become aware of something 
strange in yourself by becoming aware of something normal outside yourself.
If the view I have proposed in the preceding section is right, then in that 
crucial passage of OF Russell simply discovered the innocence in his own 
quasi-Fregean view. Our problem is to understand what is surprising about this 
innocence. If it is not an obvious failure, how could it be concealed? In other 
words: if the quasi-Fregean view is wrong, where is its power of persuasion to 
be found?
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In my opinion it is to be found in the quite fundamental notion of occurrence. 
Russell fails to distinguish sufficiently occurrence as role from occurrence as 
position. 105
If you like clarity, the distinction has to be made in any case. For even if 
you are inclined to both externalism and clarity -  as-the-far-from-innocent 
Russell obviously was -  then you cannot ignore this distinction. Something 
like difference in position can, after all, not be denied. Therefore the question 
is whether that is sufficient. If you think it is, you suppose difference in 
role to be reducible to difference in position. This view cannot be clearly 
expressed unless use is made of the notion of occurrence as role. The axiom 
that difference in occurrence is nothing more than difference in position does 
not make any sense unless you have an idea of what it would mean for it to be 
more than just this difference. A  clear externalist has to pay attention to what 
is external to his own view.
According to me, Russell’s theory of denoting concepts cannot be explained 
unless this distinction is made. For its quintessence simply is that denoting 
concepts differ from other kinds of concepts, because as denoting they play a 
meaning-role in an entity-position. They occupy the position of something the 
proposition is about, without being themselves something the proposition is 
about. They take the place of something else without playing its role. W hat 
happens behind the linguistic level according to this theory, when in the 
sentence “Scott was born in Edinburgh” the proper name “Scott” is replaced by 
the denoting phrase “the author of Waverley” ? A t the level of the proposition 
the change is supposed to be as follows. The entity-position formerly occupied 
by Scott himself is now occupied by the denoting concept expressed by “the 
author of Waverley” . However, the proposition is not about that denoting 
concept. Although it occurs in the same position as Scott, named by his 
proper name, it does not play the same role. The proposition is still about 
Scott, but now in virtue of the denoting concept’s pointing to him. By this 
replacement, Scott himself is pushed backwards, farther away from language. 
The arrow pointing from the meaning to the denotation is perpendicular to 
the line of the sentence. The predicate expressed by “born in Edinburgh” is 
not any longer attributed sideward, but obliquely backwards, towards what the 
denoting concept denotes.
A s far as I can see, this account of the theory of denoting concepts by 
means of the distinction between position and role just leaves the content of
15.2 Its importance explained by distinguishing roles from positions
105 Wahl (1993), p.81 has touched this point without elaborating it any further.
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the theory for what it is. Nevertheless, the form  of the theory has changed.
By means of the non-exclusive distinction between position and role another 
distinction can be introduced: namely the exclusive distinction between 
accepting or rejecting externalism. The latter distinction puts the theory 
in a new form: the form of excluding externalism. If the theory of denoting 
concepts is to be consistently upheld, it is to be freed from externalism. A nd if 
externalism is wholeheartedly accepted, this theory is to be rejected. The two 
are incompatible.
Nevertheless, from a psychological or historical perspective, the two may be 
reconciled with each other, but at the cost of confusion. If my analysis is right, 
that is their only possible reconciliation. O f course, this third way is not an 
alternative you can deliberately adopt. You only can get involved in it without 
being aware of the confusion. Actually, that is the way Russell got involved in 
it. That is where his original innocence is to be located. He lost what he lost 
of it by becoming aware of it. A nd the two views he successively discovered to 
be confused, namely the innocent one and its quasi-Fregean successor, both 
seemed to be convincing thanks to their undiscovered confusion. Their power 
of persuasion and their weakness were in fact closely knit.
Russell’s original, innocent view, the one put forward in POM §56, seemed 
to be convincing as long as role and position were not distinguished. Not 
making use of the distinction, it may be rendered as follows: “A ll concepts 
must be susceptible of not only occurring as concept, but also as entity. 
Therefore, of course, denoting concepts are capable of occurring that way. If 
they actually do so, we have to indicate the fact by means of italics or inverted 
commas”. This view is convincing as long as you primarily think of occurrence 
as role. Russell just forgot that according to his own externalism as applied to 
predicates, a change of role is nothing more than a change of position. The 
transition from “human” to “humanity” is supposed to be nothing more than a 
change from a meaning-position to an entity-position.
The first discovery is made in the context of the substitutional theory, 
i.e., a theory in which the notion of position is of central importance. In 
this way Russell became aware of what he initially had overlooked. Now, 
although primarily focused on occurrence as position, occurrence as role is not 
completely forgotten. Therefore, in this case, the situation is somewhat more 
complicated. A  change in position is supposed to be necessary and sufficient 
to achieve the desired change of role. Normally a denoting concept plays a 
meaning-role. Therefore, in order to change its role into an entity-role, “we 
have to put it into an entity-position”. But that is not sufficient. For “if we 
put it itself in an entity-position [i.e., without any addition], we shall be really
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speaking about the denotation, not the meaning, for that is always the case 
when a denoting complex is put into an entity-position”. Therefore, we have 
to put it into a new entity position, a position within the larger denoting 
concept which has to denote it. Put into that extraordinary entity-position, it 
will play an entity-role, just as when what is meant by “human”, put into an 
extraordinary position, automatically comes to play an entity-role.
15.3 Confused force of the quasi-Fregean view
The force of persuasion of the quasi-Fregean view is based on the supposed 
similarity between denoting concepts and other concepts as conceived 
from a half-heartedly accepted externalist perspective. For the quintessence 
of externalism is the axiom that sameness and difference must, on pain of 
contradiction, be outside each other. Something may be different from 
something else, but not different from itself. Into one and the same thing 
difference cannot intrude. Identity is pure and absolute. If one and the same 
entity seems to be in different forms and on that account it seems that as it 
is in one form, it differs from itself as it is in another form, then this must be 
an illusion. In reality there may be different forms, provided their difference 
remains outside what is supposed to have these forms. Internal difference as 
two-sidedness is supposed to be contradictory.
A s applied to the concept symbolized by the words “human” and 
“humanity” in (1a) and (1b), this view means that although that concept may 
be in different positions, that difference of position cannot be in it. Indeed, 
human and humanity seem to be different forms of one and the same. But in 
reality it cannot differ from itself. In reality there is only difference between 
two different positions. The concept occurring in both is different from these 
positions and indifferent to both.
If this view is whole-heartedly accepted, then what seems to be the most 
essential difference in role acknowledged by Russell, the difference between 
occurring as term of a proposition, i.e., as something the proposition is about 
versus occurring otherwise, i.e., as meaning or concept, must be reduced to a 
difference in position. Then so-called denoting concepts are to be rejected from 
the very outset. For the role they are supposed to play is in flat contradiction 
with their position. In other words, they are to be banished from logic not on 
account of some curious, unsuspected property they happen to reveal after 
having been accepted, but on account of what they basically and essentially 
are supposed to be.
If externalism is wholeheartedly rejected -  and that is the view I advocate
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-  then occurrence as entity, i.e., as acting as something the proposition is 
about, cannot be reduced to occupying a certain kind of position. The twofold 
occurrence of what is meant by ‘human’ may be explained otherwise, i.e., as 
being more than just a replacement. There might be an internal two-sidedness 
involved. A s seen from this perspective, denoting concepts are acceptable. 
Their being capable of changing their role without any change in position 
need not perforce be excluded. It may be construed as being due to an internal 
two-sidedness as well. The difference symbolized by the addition of the 
inverted commas is then not to be construed according to the scheme A  versus 
A B, or A B  versus A C , but rather according to the model A B  versus BA. Such 
a view is on the other side of the innocent Russell of POM §56.
If externalism is half-heartedly accepted, then we start with the view 
of the innocent Russell. We treat Socrates’s being human in an externalist 
fashion. In spite of that, we welcome denoting concepts on account of their 
capacity to widen the range of items a proposition may be about. We welcome 
them without being aware of their being incompatible with externalism. Our 
starting point is the view that, of course, there is no problem at all. Then we 
realize that we have forgotten something: the change of position required by 
externalism. The Fregean model, making use of denoting in order to speak 
about what denotes, seems to solve the problem. A nd finally, in the crucial 
passage in OF, we discover the inadequacy of the Fregean assistance. And 
that is quite clearly not the discovery of something trivial. For we discover 
that, if you whole-heartedly accept externalism, denoting concepts are to be 
rejected.106
15.4 The Frege of indirect sense as compared with the 
un-Meinongian one
A s seen from this perspective, there is a remarkable correspondence between 
the role played by Frege in this connection and the role he appeared to play 
in the previous chapter. In both cases Frege’s more sweeping theory of sense 
and reference helped Russell to lose his innocence. In both cases the theory 
of denoting concepts was applied where initially it had not been. W hat at first 
was supposed to be a proper name, i.e., an expression beyond the scope of
106 Or -  and that is the continental counterpart of the discovery (see 0.3 foot­
note 19) -  if denoting, i.e., something like intentionality, is to be accepted, it must 
be outside the realm of externalist logic. And if logic is supposed to be externalist 
anyhow, intentionality only seems to be possible as being more fundamental than 
logic.
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the theory of denoting concepts, was thanks to Frege construed as a denoting 
phrase. According to Russell’s innocent quasi-Meinongianism, “Zeus” is 
the proper name of a real but non-existent entity. According to the Russell 
inspired by the un-Meinongian Frege, “Zeus” is to be construed as a denoting 
phrase in disguise. It does express a meaning, but fails to have a denotation. 
Only, after the conception of the ToD, did Russell discover the inadequacy of 
the Fregean assistance, as the adopted view leads to an excessive amount of 
truth-value gaps. The ToD is able to avoid them without accepting Zeus and 
his congeries as entities.
Russell’s innocent view on the way denoting concepts can occur as 
subject of a proposition is similar to his innocent quasi-Meinongianism. For 
his answer is: it does not have anything specific to do with denoting. The 
inverted commas just indicate, that the denoting phrase has been transformed 
in a proper name of the concept occurring as entity. Thanks to the sweeping 
nature of Frege’s theory of sense and reference, Russell adopted something 
similar to the Fregean distinction between direct and indirect sense and 
reference. W hat initially had been construed as a nominalised denoting 
phrase, was now supposed to be a genuine denoting phrase containing such 
a proper name. Then, just before the conception of the ToD, Russell became 
aware of the inadequacy of the Fregean assistance. The adopted view leads to 
an unintended shift of reference. The alleged proper name embedded in the 
denoting phrase is itself nothing but an actually denoting phrase.
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Chapter IV
Russell with Frege in the Gray’s 
Elegy Argument
16 From OF to the GEA’s dilemma
16.1 Correspondence and difference between OF and OD
In the previous chapter I have observed a chronological order of exposition.
I have done so with respect to the GEA. In the present chapter the jump is 
made to the G EA  itself. The relatively short but very eventful period between 
the moment Russell wrote the crucial passage in OF and the moment he wrote 
OD and decided to make use of material contained in OF, is left out. Being 
beyond the scope of the present chapter, it will be discussed in the next one.
How did Russell make use of OF in fashioning the G EA? OF §36, the 
passage immediately following the crucial section 35 quoted in 14.2, almost 
literally corresponds to G EA  paragraph D and E (OD, paragraph 21 and 
22). However, no other part of the G EA  corresponds in that way to OF 
§35. Something very similar to the crucial passage cannot be found in it. 
Nevertheless something which is in the same way related to the copied part, 
actually is contained in the GEA , namely paragraph D. That is the paragraph 
where the ‘happening’ starts. It is followed by almost exactly the same text as 
the one following the crucial passage. Schematically: G EA  paragraph D : G EA  
paragraph E+F = OF §35 : §36.
In my opinion this fact is significant enough to formulate the hypothesis 
that G EA  paragraph D corresponds to the crucial passage. If this conjecture 
is right, then paragraph D must explain why the quasi-Fregean view fails. 
Nevertheless, in it, the essence of the crucial passage is put into a new form. Is 
it possible to reconstruct the transformation of OF §35 into G EA  par. D? In my 
opinion it is. The following three elements, missing in the former passage, can 
be found in the latter one:
a) The original example, namely “any man”, is replaced by a definitely 
denoting phrase. This is quite a consequential and often forgotten 
shift. Its importance for the ToD will be discussed in the next chapter,
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in 21.3. Anyhow, the problem discovered in OF is general and 
illustrated by an ambiguously denoting concept. Being general, it may 
equally well be illustrated by an unambiguously denoting concept. U p 
to here, the shift is innocent.
b) The nature of the failure of the quasi-Fregean view is such, that some 
specific examples are more appropriate to illustrate it than others.
If we substitute “the so and so” for Russell’s “C ”, then the point in 
question may be put as follows. We want to speak about the meaning 
expressed by the phrase “the so and so”. According to the quasi- 
Fregean view, this is possible by means of a larger denoting concept in 
which the meaning we want to speak about occurs as non-denoting. 
That is why we speak in fact about the meaning of the so and so, if 
there is any, whereas we wanted to speak about the meaning of the 
non-denoting complex whose meaning is expressed by the denoting 
phrase “the so and so”. The best way to illustrate this is by taking 
an example that is such that the so and so, i.e., the denotation of the 
phrase “the so and so”, actually has a meaning. The first line of Gray’s 
Elegy meets this requirement.
c) The third and last element by which G EA  par. D differs from OF §35 
is to be found in its second half, the passage beginning with the words 
“Similarly ‘the denotation of C ’ does not mean . . . ” . W hat is the role 
played by this addition? Something like it is not contained in OF §35. 
Nevertheless it can be found in OF §37. There Russell says:
For the relations of meaning and denotation, it is instructive to observe the
following pair of facts:
(1) If C  is a denoting complex, “the meaning of C ” does not denote the 
meaning o f C, but the meaning of the denotation of C.
(2) If C  is a denoting complex, “the denotation of C ” does not mean the 
denotation of C, but “the denotation of C ”.
In this rather puzzling passage, Russell not only takes notice of the relation of 
meaning and denotation, but also, on occasion of it, of the fact that the failure 
of the quasi-Fregean view regards both meaning and denotation. For the time 
being, I want to leave this text unexplained. Here I only want to highlight the 
twofold nature of the move made in it.
A t first view the denotation seems to be taken into account for no other 
purpose than showing that the failure of the quasi-Fregean view is greater 
than we have supposed it to be. But on nearer scrutiny this cannot be a sound
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explanation. For there is no real problem at all in getting the denotation we 
want to get. W ithout any difficulty we can speak about the first line of Gray’s 
Elegy. In the previous sentence I have successfully done so by using the phrase 
“the first line of Gray’s Elegy” in the way it is normally used.
However, this objection may also be applied to the meaning. If we so wish, 
we can successfully speak about the meaning expressed by the phrase “the 
first line of Gray’s Elegy”. In the previous sentence I have in fact done so. The 
problem Russell has in mind in the above-quoted passage must be a different 
one. He does not want to deny that we are able to obtain the meaning we 
want. The real difficulty is, that we are not able to get it in a specific way, a way 
that, for some reason or other, ought to be open as well, but in fact is blocked. 
A nd this very specific way is also blocked in the case of the denotation. For, as 
I have mentioned, but not explained in 12.1, according to the quasi-Fregean 
view, mediatism must be mitigated. It must be possible to speak about the 
meaning by means of that very same meaning as non-denoting or as complex. 
A nd if we take that for granted, then it is evident, that the failure to get the 
meaning in that specific way, also regards the denotation. For if we want to 
speak about the denotation of a complex, supposing that the complex is named 
and is neither denoted nor denoting, then we fail to get what we wanted in 
this case as well. If we get anything at all, then it is the denotation of the 
denotation we wanted to get.
This then is only one side of the move made in OF §37: making clear that 
the failure’s extension is greater than we had supposed it to be. The other 
side of the same move leads to the reason behind the soundness of the quasi- 
Fregean view as being mitigated mediatism. This reason is equally greater 
and more fundamental than we have supposed it to be. Mitigated mediatism 
demands more and is more ambitious than we expected. It not only demands 
that the meaning we want to speak about participates in its being spoken 
about, but also that it participates in our speaking about its denotation as 
such, i.e. as denotation of the same complex, which is supposed to have that 
meaning.
16.2 Paragraph C as concerned with explaining ambiguity
Now this is exactly what is explained in GEA , paragraph C, i.e., in the 
paragraph immediately preceding that corresponding to O F’s crucial passage. In 
OF, something like G EA  paragraph C  cannot be found, save the above-quoted 
§37. Now, in my opinion, this part of the G EA  is much clearer and much more 
elaborate than OF §37. It actually not only highlights the obvious failure of
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the quasi-Fregean view, but its virtue and soundness as well. Both sides are 
equally important. W ithout a failure there would not be any problem at all.
But without a serious and inescapable requirement, there would be no problem 
either. The failure to fulfil an arbitrary or even unreasonable requirement 
cannot be serious at all. The more artificial and far-fetched the demand is, the 
more insignificant the failure to meet it. In order to understand the GEA , it 
is not sufficient to understand that something fails. The most important and 
challenging point is: to understand what is wanted.
Before quoting and discussing paragraph C, I need to say a few words 
about what precedes it. The role of paragraph B has clearly been explained in 
section 9.1. Russell wants to explain what the problem is about. Evidently, it is 
concerned with speaking about “the meaning of a denoting phrase as opposed 
to its denotation. The natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas.” Adding 
these inverted commas is sufficient to change the subject matter of discourse 
from the denotation to the meaning. Therefore, the situation is as follows. It 
seems to be possible to use one and the same denoting phrase in two different 
ways: without and with inverted commas. Both ways are different from a 
third possible use, namely quoting the phrase. Now, it is hardly possible to 
describe the difference between the first two modes of use without making use 
of the third. For in order to introduce some definite example, we first have to 
mention the phrase we are supposed to take. Then, ignoring the third mode of 
use, we consider the two other uses of that phrase. Now, Russell wants to use 
the quasi-variable C, without using phrase-quoting quotation marks in order to 
avoid confusing them with the relevant inverted commas. That is why, when 
he wants to mention the phrase, he just speaks about the phrase C . But when he 
speaks about C  right away, he wants to speak about the denotation. In the last 
sentence of paragraph B and the first of paragraph C  he says:
Thus taking any denoting phrase, say C, we wish to consider the relation 
between C  and ‘C ’, where the difference of the two is of the kind 
exemplified in the above two instances.
We say, to begin with, that when C  occurs it is the denotation that we 
are speaking about; but when “C ” occurs, it is the meaning.
In this passage the transition is made from the difference between C  and “C ” 
to the relation between them. These two elements constitute the crux of the 
problem as explained in the second part of paragraph C. The inverted commas 
seem to mark a slight and subtle difference. After all, it cannot be by accident 
that two different entities are indicated by means of different uses of one
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and the same phrase. There must be a reason behind it, just as according to 
Aristotelians there is a reason why different kinds of things, such as a living 
being, a climate or urine may all be called healthy. A  climate can be called 
healthy because it promotes the health of a living being, urine because it is a 
sign of it.
In scholasticism a lot of things have been said about this standard example. 
Probably Russell was not acquainted with these discussions on the topic of 
the so-called “analogy”. Nevertheless, Aristotle and his followers may help 
to clarify both the nature of the G EA  and the reason why I suppose it to be 
very important. In the Aristotelian tradition, logic is supposed to precede 
metaphysics, and metaphysics to transcend logic. Equivocation may in fact 
play a role in logic, but according to the view in question, it ought to be 
avoided and actually can be avoided. For logic is confined to univocal terms. In 
metaphysics, however, equivocation cannot and ought not be avoided. For the 
notion of being is beyond all univocal categories. The categories are not kinds 
of beings, but senses of being.
Russell’s view differs significantly from this one. According to him, 
logic does not precede metaphysics.107 A  metaphysically neutral logic is an 
illusion. Logic has to do with the very notion of being and therefore is itself 
‘transcendental’ and unrestricted. However, Russell adopts the traditional 
principle that in logic ambiguity ought and can be avoided. A nd that is of 
utmost importance to the GEA . It constitutes one of the rules of the game 
played in it. The ambiguity marked by the inverted commas must, on pain of 
contradiction, be explained by means of unambiguous terms. In other words: 
irreducible ambiguity is supposed to be logically impossible.
According to me, this axiom amounts to the same as externalism. I want 
to challenge externalism. A s seen from this rather unorthodox point of view, 
Russell’s logic is too traditional. Nevertheless, I admire the G EA  because it 
reveals the limits of externalism, although I quite well realize that it purports 
to disprove the possibility of denoting concepts.
16.3 The relation as “ not merely linguistic through the phrase”
The relation of the meaning to the denotation, also mentioned in the GEA’s 
first introductory paragraph A , is discussed in pararagraph C  as follows:
107 This point has also been discussed in 4.2.
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Now the relation of meaning and denotation is not merely linguistic 
through the phrase: there must be a logical relation involved, which we 
express by saying that the meaning denotes the denotation.
The essential point is evidently, that the relation is “logical” and not 
“linguistic through the phrase”. W hat does this statement exclude? How would 
the relation be if it were “linguistic through the phrase” ? In that case the 
phrase would play an essential role. Without language the relation would no 
longer hold. The relation of the meaning to the denotation would be based on 
a linguistic mediator in the same way as the relation of sister in law to mother 
in law is mediated by a male person who happens to be the former’s husband 
and the latter’s son. Without that man and without the institution of marriage 
the said relation would be destroyed. Applied to denoting, this would mean 
that the meaning denotes the denotation in virtue of its being expressed by a 
phrase or several phrases which on their own account have a denotation.
Indeed, this is in flat contradiction with the theory of denoting concepts. 
For according to that theory, a denoting phrase cannot denote on its own 
account. It denotes what it denotes in virtue of the fact that it expresses 
a meaning which on it own account denotes. The meaning need not be 
expressed in language in order to denote what it denotes. The relation of the 
meaning to the denotation would remain what it is, if language and its users 
were destroyed or had never existed.
Indeed, language is essential to the way we become aware of meanings.
We need a phrase expressing a certain meaning in order to focus on it. 
Therefore, speaking about meanings without using denoting phrases is 
humanly impossible. But -  and that is the crux -  it must be possible to use 
the phrase, which is supposed to express the meaning, in such a way that both 
its meaning and its denotation are mentioned but not that phrase. It must be 
possible to express in language the true proposition that this meaning denotes 
its denotation without mentioning the phrase, i.e., without speaking about 
language. For that supposed fact or true proposition is according to the theory 
itself an extra-linguistic fact. Here we finally meet the reason, mentioned in 
10.3, why one of the procedures proposed by Frege, is to be ruled out in this 
connection.
16.4 The difficulty as dilemma
The full importance of this requirement cannot be discussed without taking 
the remaining part of paragraph C  into account. There Russell says:
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But the difficulty which confronts us is that we cannot succeed in both 
preserving the connection of meaning and denotation and preventing 
them from being one and the same; also that the meaning cannot be got at 
except by means of denoting phrases. This happens as follows.
These words constitute the most important part of the GEA . They give in 
general terms a description of the same difficulty that will be illustrated as a 
happening in the following paragraphs. The correspondence is expressed by 
the word “this” in the last sentence. For that word indicates the difficulty or 
our being confronted with it. That happens as follows. To anyone who purports 
to give an exegesis of the GEA , this ought to be of crucial importance. Any 
explanation of what happens must meet the description of the difficulty.
The exegesis of the text must be such that it enables us to understand how 
the difficulty is present in the happening. A s far as I can see, no available 
interpretation meets this elementary requirement. How could that happen? 
The requirement itself has been overlooked. For it is impossible to see it from 
an externalist point of view. Externalism does not allow one and the same to 
be in different forms.
Evidently Russell puts the difficulty in the form of a dilemma. We cannot 
succeed in doing two different things together, which must be combined. We 
want both A  and B. But the best we can achieve is either A  without B or 
B without A . So, we are confronted with the unwanted incompatibility of A  
and B. A  hidden law seems to forbid their union. This law does not force us 
to choose either of them. It even allows us to choose neither A  nor B. But if 
we choose A , this forbids us to succeed in B. Or, what amounts to the same 
according to the law of contraposition: if we choose B, this forbids us to 
succeed in A . Success in one of them implies failure in the other. Nevertheless 
we want both. This is the form  of the problem as presented by Russell in the 
GEA , the form of a dilemma. O ur problem, therefore, is to understand its 
content in such a way that the dilemma can be proved to be in the happening 
described in the following paragraphs.
W hat is A  and what is B? A  is portrayed as preserving the connection between 
meaning and denotation, B as preventing them, i.e. meaning and denotation, 
from being one and the same. To this Russell adds the following: “Also that 
the meaning cannot be got at except by means of denoting phrases.” The 
word “also” may be construed in two different ways: either as indicating an 
extra difficulty or as indicating a new version or appearance of the very same 
difficulty. In my opinion, the latter alternative is to be preferred. The addition 
evidently corresponds to the previous turn of phrase “not linguistic through 
the phrase.” If the above-explained interpretation of these words is right, then
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the addition following “also” is to be construed as follows. The words “getting 
the meaning by means of denoting phrases” simply mean: getting the meaning 
by mentioning one or more denoting phrases which express the meaning we 
want to speak about.
From this perspective, it is quite easy to understand the content of B. 
“Preventing meaning and denotation from being one and the same” is to be 
construed as: avoiding the obvious failure of the quasi-Fregean view, i.e., the 
failure discovered in OF §35. Russell’s description is somewhat elliptic. For 
the sake of convenience he ignores the subtle difference between the complex 
and its meaning, i.e., the denoting concept as non-denoting and as denoting.
In the course of the happening actually an attempt is made to ignore it. 
Therefore, portraying the failure as “not preventing meaning and denotation 
from being the same” is more adequate than it seems to be. A t least, given 
that the subtle difference between meaning and complex is being ignored, this 
depiction is accurate. We want to mention the complex (or its meaning via 
the complex), but instead of the complex we mention the denotation of the 
complex (and instead of the meaning of the complex the meaning, if there is 
any, of the denotation of the complex).
This interpretation of B leads to a conclusion that is in complete 
accordance with what I have said before. The problem is not, that we cannot 
succeed in getting the meaning we want. For as long as we do not care about 
the way we get it, there is no difficulty at all. We can get it by mentioning 
a phrase expressing the meaning in question and speaking about it as the 
meaning of that phrase. But according to Russell, the problem is that we 
cannot get the meaning we want except in that way. It is the only possible 
way. A nd that is problematic as soon as we realize its insufficiency. A s faithful 
adherents of the theory of denoting concepts, we ought to want more. A nd we 
are even able to say what the ‘more’ is that we want. For we want, for example, 
to speak about the meaning of the phrase “the first line of Gray’s Elegy” in 
another way than we have just done, namely without mentioning that phrase.
16.5 “ Preserving the connection” and the axiom of external 
difference
But why should we want that? Here the content of A  comes in. We want to 
“preserve the connection of meaning and denotation”. But what does the word 
“connection” mean in this connection? Is it just synonymous with “relation” ? I 
do not know. Nevertheless, I am quite sure, that the use of the word “preserve” 
does not make sense, unless both the relation of the meaning to the denotation
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is involved and something different from the relation itself, namely the way 
it appears in the description of meaning and denotation. Preserving the 
connection between meaning and denotation is opposed to ignoring it. And 
we evidently ignore that the relation is logical and not linguistic through the 
phrase, if we think it is sufficient to speak about both denotation and meaning 
as denotation and meaning of a phrase we mention. By mentioning the phrase 
we get what we want, we prevent meaning and denotation from being one and 
the same, we succeed in avoiding the curious shift of reference, but we do not 
preserve the relation. Quite the contrary, we ignore it.
But that is not the only possible way to ignore it. The relation of the meaning 
to the denotation is a many-one relation. Each meaning has one denotation, 
but one and the same denotation may be denoted by different meanings. 
According to the axiom of externalism, the difference between the meanings 
must be outside the denotation. The latter is supposed to be absolutely 
identical with itself. Differing from itself is supposed to be contradictory. That 
is why the substitution principle mentioned in puzzle (1), is just a specific 
application of the main principle of externalism.108 If the Morningstar is 
not something different from the Eveningstar, then the Morningstar cannot 
differ in any respect from the Eveningstar. Therefore, whatever is true of the 
Morningstar must also be true of the Eveningstar.
I challenge the validity of the substitution principle in order to highlight 
the GEA’s validity and in order to clarify my exegesis. Preserving the relation 
leads to difficulties, provided it is conceived in an externalist fashion. “There is 
no backward road from denotation to meanings”, as Russell says in paragraph F. 
If you ignore this, remaining faithful to externalism, then you do not preserve 
the relation. Then you think that the inverted commas may just be construed 
as “the meaning o f .. .”. Preserving the externally conceived relation of the 
meaning to the denotation means: realizing that the normal use of a denoting 
phrase cannot be its primary use in the sense in which health as said of a living 
being is supposed to be primary (primum analogatum). For the name of the 
meaning cannot be derived from the name of the denotation.
The quasi-Fregean view does not ignore this. For it does not suppose that 
it makes sense to speak of the meaning of the denotation. It assumes, that 
the normal use of a denoting phrase can be explained. Both meaning and 
denotation can be named by means of an extra-linguistic mediator, namely the 
complex. It is supposed to have a complex proper name. The complex has one 
meaning and both the complex and the meaning have one denotation. In this
108 Cf. 10.3.
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way the ambiguity marked by the unexplained inverted commas in paragraph 
B is explained as due to the relation of the meaning to the denotation. The 
relation is manifested in a connection between the expressions by means 
of which we speak about a particular meaning and its denotation. There is 
a partial overlap just as in a somewhat more simple way the relation of the 
solar system to its centre of mass is made manifest in a connection between 
“the Solar System” and “the centre of mass of the Solar System”. It is not by 
accident that there is a partial overlap.
In this discussion I have tried to make clear that the GEA , although 
evidently derived from OF, cannot be reduced to it. The G EA  is based on a 
new perspective, namely that the problem discovered in OF §35 may be put 
in the form of a dilemma: either trying to preserve the relation of the meaning 
to the denotation and consequently failing to get the meaning or getting 
it without preserving the relation. Putting the problem into this new form 
presupposed a broader perspective on the virtue of the quasi-Fregean view. In 
the next section I shall continue my exegesis in discussing how it, i.e., being 
confronted with the dilemma, happens.
17 This happens as follows: the GEA’s structure
17.1 Detecting the main turning point
It is impossible to deduce from Russell’s abstract account of the problem, 
how “it” happens. Even if we accept what I have argued for in the previous 
section, namely that the happening starts with the quasi-Fregean view, its 
sequel cannot be foreseen. Nevertheless, something else can be deduced from 
the exegesis of paragraph C  put forward in the previous section, namely the 
criterion by means of which the happening as actually described by Russell may 
be screened. We know what we are looking for, if we try to find the essential 
turning point corresponding with the nature of the dilemma. W hat is more, 
if the happening starts with the quasi-Fregean view, then it starts with a 
very serious and subtle attempt to speak about the meaning in preserving the 
connection of meaning and denotation. We know why this attempt fails. We 
know that it fails to get the desired meaning. We know that it will not succeed 
in “preventing meaning and denotation from being one and the same”.
But we do not know beforehand what will be the follow-up of this 
discovery. Will the adherent of the quasi-Fregean view without further ado 
conclude that the attempt to preserve the connection is to be abandoned? If
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so, then the essential turning point is to be found there. However, although 
we cannot foresee on account of paragraph C  whether it will actually happen 
like that, we can foresee something else. For we know that the decision to 
abandon immediately the quasi-Fregean view as the only possible way of 
preserving the connection of meaning and denotation, would be premature. 
For in fact it is one of two (and the only two) essentially different possible 
ways of preserving the connection, i.e., of making manifest the externally 
conceived many-one relation of the meaning to the denotation. A s seen from 
an externalist viewpoint, it is impossible to speak about the meaning by means 
of the denotation. Therefore, there must be something else about which we 
can speak immediately. It has to act as point of reference by means of which 
its relatives can be mentioned. This item either must be something between 
meaning and denotation, i.e., something which differs from the denotation by 
its having one meaning, or it must be the meaning itself. Other possibilities are 
not available. From this it may be inferred that the G EA  would be much more 
systematic and imperative, if the decision to abandon the attempt to preserve 
the connection between meaning and denotation were not made immediately 
after the discovery of the quasi-Fregean view’s failure.
Now, in fact, this decision is not made. For in the second half of paragraph 
E a new possible view, different from the quasi-Fregean one, is introduced, 
namely the one mentioned in 13.2 as “ indifferent immediatism”. It consists 
in rejecting the assumed difference between meaning and complex. The two 
are now deemed to be identical. Nevertheless the complex is still supposed 
to be immediately accessible. The denotation can be mentioned by means of 
the complex. The meaning being the same as the complex can be mentioned 
immediately. This, then, is the second and last possible way of preserving the 
connection.
Therefore, the essential turning point is to be located where this second 
view has proved to be insufficient as well. Now, the argument against it is 
to be found in the first two sentences of paragraph F. In the next sentence,
the one beginning with the words “Thus to speak about C  itself......” a new
possible view is introduced. There the attempt to preserve the connection 
between meaning and denotation is actually abandoned. There, between the 
words “The centre of mass of the Solar System is a point” and the words “Thus 
to speak of C  i t s e l f . ” , the dividing line is to be drawn. It marks both the 
essential structure of the happening and the way the happening corresponds to 
“this” , i.e., the dilemma sketched in paragraph C.
A s said in 16.1, paragraphs E and F almost literally correspond to what 
in OF immediately succeeds the crucial passage. Therefore, this part of the 
happening may be equally construed as a verbatim account of what happened
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after the discovery. A s seen from this perspective, it might seem to be no 
more than just a report of what happened to happen in Russell’s mind at that 
very moment. However, it is quite surprising that it equally well meets the 
systematic requirements explained above!
A s seen from the systematic perspective of paragraph C  two questions are 
to be asked about the happening, namely where its essential turning point is 
to be found and also, whether, and if so where, the other side of the dilemma, 
the problem introduced by the word “also”, is illustrated. The latter question 
has not yet been discussed. It must be answered negatively. N o particular 
part of the happening corresponds to the problem “that the meaning cannot 
be got at except by means of denoting phrases”. Nowhere in the G EA  is the 
successful attempt discussed to speak about the meaning as the meaning of 
some denoting phrase. This aspect of the problem is to be construed as an 
alternative description of the dilemma as a whole, not as a description of one 
of the things that will happen.
17.2 The GEA’s dialectical slant
Once upon a time Russell had been a neo-Hegelian. It is beyond doubt that he 
not only studied works of Bradley and other then prominent neo-Hegelians, 
but at least some parts of Hegel’s Logic as well. A s far as I can see, it is very 
improbable that he ever read the Phenomenology o f Spirit and even more 
improbable that in writing the GEA , he had Hegel in mind, let alone the 
Phenomenology. Nevertheless, there is a striking, twofold similarity between 
the G EA  and the first chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology, which is entitled 
“Sensuous Certainty”. Firstly, both discuss an unintended shift of reference.
In Hegel’s case, it has to do with what in his opinion deserves to be called the 
most primitive, undeveloped view of reality: whatever is, is an un-mediated 
‘this’. Hegel wants to prove that, as soon as you try to say what you mean, 
you fail. For what you say is universal, whereas what you mean is something 
absolutely isolated and particular.
Secondly, not only in its first chapter, but also throughout the whole book, 
save in its last chapter, Hegel wants to describe an experience of something we 
(philosophers) already know and understand. This is similar to the way Russell 
proceeds in the GEA. For the abstract dilemma expounded in paragraph 
C  is introduced ahead of the events, ahead of the happening or concrete 
experience of being confronted with the difficulty, viz. the incompatibility of 
two equally sound and important requirements. Its acceptance as inevitable 
defines the end of the story.
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Therefore, the happening has to start with not yet accepting this 
incompatibility. We, poor readers of the GEA , are not supposed to take 
what is announced in paragraph C  for granted. It is in need of a proof. A nd 
it can only be proved by what happens if we stubbornly try to preserve both 
the connection and the difference as exemplified in paragraph B. We are not 
prepared to accept simply that it is impossible, unless experience forces us 
to do so. A nd experience only can be imperative after all possibilities have 
been tried out. This quasi-Hegelian mode of expression is not just rhetorically 
adequate, but historically as well! For, as said before, the quasi-dialectical 
movement of experience is an almost literal report of what Russell himself has 
experienced in OF §35 and 36. The unexpected failure of the quasi-Fregean 
view came as such a surprise to him that he did not dare believe his eyes. 
Feeling its fundamental importance, he wanted to check whether it really was 
inescapable.
17.3 Four stages and three transitions
In fact the quasi-dialectical movement is not very complicated at all. The 
essential conclusion is reached in three turns. Then, in the G EA  but not in 
OF, it is reinforced by means of the link with puzzle (1). This leads to the final 
conclusion that the theory in question is not able to cope with the curiosity 
of George IV. The full acceptance of the difficulty announced in paragraph C, 
namely that preserving both the connection and the difference is impossible, is 
reached after the rejection of three preceding views. Each of them differs from 
the point of view of the essential conclusion in not yet fully accepting the said 
incompatibility. Including the final one, there are four different stations to be 
distinguished and three transitions: from the first to the second station, from 
the second to the third and from the third to the last.
W hich evidence does justify my claim that four views and three transitions 
are involved? Textual evidence, not abstract reasoning. In case of a difficult 
philosophical text, it is often quite well possible to grasp its main structure 
on the basis of significant turns of phrase, even before its content is fully 
understood. In my opinion the G EA  is such a text. The first transition 
evidently is made halfway through paragraph E, where Russell says: “This 
leads us to s a y . ” . In the remaining part of that paragraph the second view, 
consisting in not distinguishing the meaning from the complex anymore, is 
introduced. In paragraph F Russell starts by giving reasons why this second 
view is to be rejected. Then, after the second sentence of the paragraph, i.e., 
at the main point of division mentioned before, the third view is introduced
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by means of the words “Thus to speak of C  i t s e l f . ” . In the remaining part of 
paragraph F, the nature of this view is elaborated. Paragraph G starts with the 
ultimate conclusion: “Thus it would seem that C  and “C ” are different entities, 
such that “C ” denotes C .” Then this third view is rejected as well. It evidently 
is rejected because the connection is not preserved. Russell says: “but this 
cannot be an explanation, because the relation of “C ” to C  remains wholly 
mysterious”.
Having established the structure of the GEA , the remaining task is to 
understand its content, i.e., both the nature of the four views involved in it 
and the nature of the three transitions between them. With the help of the 
historical background discussed in the previous chapter, this task should not 
exceed our forces. Note, however, that his help might also be misleading. It 
would be historically unjustified to make excessive use of it. For it happens 
to be a historical fact that the G EA  is not been written in order to inform 
the reader of OD about its genesis. Material from OF has only been used in it 
because Russell deemed it suitable for the purpose of OD. Furthermore, the 
passage in OF corresponding with the G EA  is itself not an autobiographical 
glance back, but an account of thoughts raised by a freshly made discovery.
That is why neither all the possible points of view discussed in the previous 
sections are to be found in the GEA , nor all the four points of view actually 
involved in it have been extensively treated in the previous sections. In 
fact, we are only acquainted with three of the four perspectives discussed in 
the GEA . The first is the quasi-Fregean view formerly embraced by Russell, 
and which I have called subtle mitigated mediatism. The second point of 
view might be called, for reasons mentioned in 13.2, indifferent immediatism. 
Russell had never adopted this view, although he had actually considered it 
in OF as a possible escape from the difficulty. A s immediatism it resembles 
the innocent view he had once actually adopted in POM §56. But because 
of its indifference, it differs from it. A nd in virtue of its being a version of 
immediatism, it also differs from the “ indifferent mediatism” I have introduced 
in 13.2 in order to explain the subtlety of the first view. Therefore, a lot of 
subtlety is required in order not to confuse the second view with its relatives. 
In this section I have mentioned it as the only possible way, different from the 
first one, to preserve the externally conceived relation.
The third view has actually been discussed in 12.1 as opposed to the 
quasi-Fregean view in virtue of its not being mitigated. It might be called 
unmitigated mediatism. The requirement that the meaning we want to speak 
about participates in its own being spoken about, is abandoned. Russell never 
adopted it, but, just as the second view, it is actually considered in OF as a
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possible way out, which eventually appears to lead to ignoring the logical 
relation. That is why it represents the other side of the dilemma: accepting the 
difference without preserving the connection.
Considered as such, i.e., as leaving the relation mysterious, the third view 
leads to the fourth one, i.e., to accepting the dilemma as inevitable. For the 
sake of convenience I shall call it impossibilism. For according to it denoting 
cannot be attributed to a meaning or concept. Something like a meaning 
denoting its denotation is impossible. Russell, of course, actually adopted just 
this view. It is the point of view from which he wrote the GEA . It equally is 
the point of view from which in its paragraph C  the dilemma is announced. In 
the previous section it has been extensively discussed.
In view of the question whether, and if so, how a denoting concept can 
occur as subject of a proposition, Russell actually adopted three different views, 
the innocent one, the quasi-Fregean one and finally impossibilism. In making 
the transition from the second to the third view, he actually considered two 
hypothetical intermediate alternatives. The G EA  is written from the point of 
view of impossibilism. It shows in the form of a quasi-dialectical argument the 
road from the quasi-Fregean view to impossibilism via the two minor stations. 
The innocent view is not mentioned. It only helped Russell to introduce the 
inverted commas, marking the difference between meaning and denotation in 
paragraph B. But it is not externalist enough to play a part in the happening. 
For in supposing the proper name of the denoting concept to be derived from 
the denoting phrase expressing the concept and naming its denotation, it 
surreptitiously makes use of a backward road from denotation to meaning.
18 Equality and inequality between the first and the 
second view
18.1 General importance of comparing the two
Now we seem to be sufficiently prepared for reading the G EA  in order to 
understand its structured content. Nevertheless, before embarking upon the 
dialectic of the argument, one question remains to be discussed: W hat is the 
importance of the difference between the first view, the quasi-Fregean one, 
and its immediate successor? A t first sight this question seems to regard only 
paragraph E. There Russell suggests that the failure of the first view “makes us 
to say” that the supposed difference between meaning and complex is to be 
abandoned. However, what I want to discuss in the present section is not the 
quasi-dialectical reason behind this transition, but the possible equality and
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inequality between the two views involved in it.
A t first sight this question only seems to be relevant when this transition 
is actually made. However, the move from the quasi-Fregean view to its 
indifferent rival presupposes that the latter constitutes a possible option. In 
rejecting the previously supposed difference between meaning and complex, 
it excludes the subtlety of the quasi-Fregean view. Similarly, being subtle, 
the latter view excludes its indifferent rival, as has been discussed in section 
13. However, the issue deserves to be reconsidered in the light of the GEA. 
W ithin the setting of the GEA , the two act as two possible ways of preserving 
the connection between C  and “C ”.
A t first sight the difference between the two approaches seems to be less 
important than what they have in common. After all, if what has been said in 
the previous section is right, their distinction precedes the essential bifurcation 
marked by the dilemma expounded in paragraph C: either preserving the 
connection and not the difference or preserving the difference and not the 
connection. Still, the assumption that the subdivision into two specific 
modes of preserving the connection is of minor importance to preserving 
the connection in general seems to be inspired by the axiom of externality. 
Rejecting this axiom as such, and not only some of its particular applications, 
is quite essential to my approach to the GEA . In my opinion it is impossible to 
understand fully what preserving the connection between “C ” and C  means, 
unless attention is paid to its specific varieties. Therefore, what seems to be 
no more than a subordinate division may quite well help to exemplify one of 
the horns of the main dilemma. W hat is more, it may even help to exemplify 
both horns. For both the first and the second view fail to prevent meaning 
and denotation from being one and the same. They fail in what constitutes 
the other horn of the main dilemma. Its two sides are not opposed as A  versus
B, but rather as A B  versus BA. While opposed to each other, they are in each 
other.
Even if what I have said thus far is right, even if the minor dilemma is to 
be taken into account in order to understand the main one, even then there 
seems to be no logical order between the first and the second view. With 
respect to the rules of the game fixed in paragraph C, the two seem to be equal. 
They both score the same number of points, namely one. To this extent there 
seems to be no other than an autobiographical reason behind Russell’s choice 
to start his account of the happening with the quasi-Fregean view and not with 
its less subtle rival. The setting of the G EA  seems to be such that subtlety does 
not count.
In my opinion the criteria expounded in paragraph C  may be construed in
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two different ways: either purely formally or also intrinsically. A s seen from 
the former perspective both views are equal indeed. Both fail in preventing 
meaning and denotation from being one and the same and both do not fail 
in preserving their connection. But ‘not failing’ is susceptible to difference 
in quality, which is not beyond the scope of paragraph C. The subtlety of 
the quasi-Fregean view serves a quite important goal: displaying denoting as 
essentially associated with meaning, i.e., with occurring as meaning or rather 
playing a meaning-role.
The second view differs from the first both in being less faithful to 
the quintessence of the theory of denoting concepts and in being more 
experienced. This twofold difference in quality marks the general drift of 
the G EA  as a whole. In virtue of its being the most faithful and the less 
experienced stage, the quasi-Fregean view deserves to be treated first. A s such 
it is farthest away from the GEA’s dialectical conclusion.
In the following subsections I shall start in comparing the two views from 
the purely formal perspective. Subsequently three points will be discussed: 
their similarity in explaining the absence of inverted commas in case of the 
denotation, their dissimilarity in explaining the inverted commas and finally 
their equality in failing to get what they want. This section will be concluded 
by a discussion of the above-mentioned difference in quality.
18.2 Equality as for the denotation
The common starting point of both views is that the normal use of a denoting 
phrase, its use without inverted commas, cannot be primary. For if C  occurs, we 
are speaking about the denotation. But according to the axiom of externality, 
if different meanings or complexes have the same denotation, those differences 
must, on pain of contradiction, be outside the denotation they share.
Therefore, there is no backward road from denotation to meaning. Anyhow, 
whether there is, or is not, any difference between meaning and complex, 
neither the meaning nor the complex can be called after the denotation. 
Something else must act as that from which the other(s) derive their name. 
And this ‘something else’ must be the complex as named anyhow. The G EA  
is based on the assumption that if the connection between C  and “C ” can be 
preserved at all, the complex is the only possible ministering angel. In fact the 
complex is nothing else but what in 11.2 I have called the denoting concept in 
its extraordinary occurrence as non-denoting and not denoted.
A s far as the denotation is concerned, both views agree. Just as the primary 
use must be extraordinary, so the ordinary use, the use of the phrase in 
speaking about the denotation, must be secondary, i.e., derived from its primary
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use as the name of the complex. This primary use is supposed to be concealed in 
the normal use just as the relation ‘promoting’ is concealed in the meaning of 
the word “healthy” when applied to conditions of life. In case of the denotation, 
the relation is denoting. It seems not to be concealed at all. But that is due to the 
fact that we, as adherents of the theory of denoting concepts, actually use it. But 
in normal discourse a phrase which is called ‘denoting’ by us is used in complete 
silence about denoting. People who never heard of denoting phrases or denoting 
concepts nevertheless use phrases expressing concepts Russell baptized ‘denoting’. 
Just as in order to speak prose, you need not be acquainted with the notion of 
prose, so you may use denoting phrases without having the slightest idea about 
what denoting is. But according to the first two views discussed in the G EA  it is 
impossible to explain the ambiguity of denoting phrases without being acquainted 
with the notion of denoting.
The normal use of a denoting phrase, which is indicated by Russell by means 
of the character C  without inverted commas, is to be analyzed as the denotation 
of the complex itself, just as ‘healthy’ when said of food, is to be analyzed as 
promoting health itself. Indicating the functional addition “the denotation of . . . ” 
by D( ), we may say that C  = D (C  itself) and indicating C itself in bold type, we 
get: C  =  D (C).
But as long as the identity sign is construed in the way in which it is normally 
used in connection with denoting phrases, that is not sufficient. For normally, 
it is used to indicate identity of denotation. The denoting phrase “the author 
of Waverley” differs in complexity and meaning from “the author of Ivanhoe” . 
Nevertheless it is true that the author of Waverley = the author of Ivanhoe. The 
proposed analysis of C  however purports to provide a paraphrase of denoting 
phrases just as the ToD purports to provide a paraphrase of sentences containing 
denoting phrases. Therefore, in order to summarize in a formula what the two 
views in question have in common, we must use the Fregean symbol =  for 
identity of meaning or complexity: C  =  D (C).
In explaining how the two views are to be applied to the denotation, I have 
introduced bold type in order to indicate the complex itself. Instead of bold type I 
could have used a special kind of inverted commas. But according to the views in 
question there is no need to do so, because the transformation into bold type will 
spontaneously take place as soon as the implicit addition “the denotation o f . ” is 
rendered explicit. For what remains of C, if that hidden addition is revealed, will 
of course be different from C. It will not be represented by a denoting phrase, but 
by a non-denoting name of the complex itself. The phrase as a whole is supposed 
to be denoting in virtue of the functional addition concealed in it, just as the 
phrase “the centre of mass of the Solar System” is not denoting because the Solar 
System is mentioned in it, but because of what precedes that proper name.
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18.3 Difference in explaining the inverted commas
According to the quasi-Fregean view C and “C ” differ from each other as D(C) 
and M (C). Strictly the inverted commas cannot be construed as symbolizing 
a functional addition. For in that case the C between them would be the 
same as the C without them. And the denotation cannot act as argument of a 
function whose value is supposed to be the meaning or the complex. There is 
no backward road. Therefore, although of course the inverted commas are an 
addition to C, they symbolize something else, namely the substitution of one 
functional addition, namely M( ), for another one, namely D( ), whereas the 
argument they have in common is not C but C.
According to the second view, there is no need to distinguish the meaning 
from the complex. Therefore, the difference and connection between C and 
“C” is to be explained as D(C) versus C. The inverted commas, which of 
course are an addition to C, are now supposed to symbolize a substraction, 
namely the substraction of D( ) from D(C). In so far, they resemble additions 
like “in itself’, “pure”, “neat” or “bare”. They do not of course, symbolize 
the inverse of the function D( ). For such a function cannot exist if there is 
no backward road from denotation to complex. The inverted commas are 
supposed to symbolize the deletion of the functional addition hidden in C. In 
the same fashion the primary use of “healthy” could be defined in saying: it is 
what remains of “healthy” as said of life conditions, if the unuttered relation of 
promoting is taken away.
18.4 Parity in failing to preserve the difference
The failure of the two views is indeed slightly different, but essentially the 
same. For the principle of the happening sketched by Russell simply is, that the 
desired transformation of C into C does not take place. As far as the proposed 
paraphrase of C is concerned, the result is of course exactly the same. Both 
views want to speak about C or D(C), but in fact they speak about D(C), i.e. 
about the denotation (if there is any) of the denotation they want to speak 
about. The failure is very grave indeed. It overshadows the ambition to express 
the same meaning as the one expressed by the phrase C. If the proposed 
articulation of C were adequate, then a fortiori D(C) would denote the same as
C. But, in fact, if it denotes something at all, it denotes something else. Thus, 
a fortiori, the proposed analysis is wrong.
The adherent of the quasi-Fregean view wants to speak about “C” in describing
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it as M (C). But in fact M(C) is made the subject of discourse. In speaking 
about the meaning, we actually speak about (if there is any) the meaning of 
what is denoted by the meaning we want to speak about. In case of the second 
view, the shift of reference is somewhat less complicated. We want to speak 
about “C ” or C, but in fact are speaking about C, i.e. about the denotation of 
the meaning (or complex) we want to speak about.
18.5 Philosophical inequality: meaning and complexity
Although in view of the formal criteria expounded in paragraph C the quasi- 
Fregean view is matched by its less complicated rival, from a philosophical 
perspective it is superior. This point is of pivotal importance to the structure of 
the GEA. For as I have explained in the previous section, the argument results 
in the dissociation of meaning and denoting. Now, as being opposed to this 
final conclusion, the quasi-Fregean view is superior. That is why it deserves 
to be treated first. Irrespective of its once having been adopted by Russell, 
it constitutes the counterpart of the GEA’s conclusion, offering maximal 
resistance towards it and being farthest away from it.
According to the quasi-Fregean view the meaning is to be distinguished 
from the complex itself, because denoting is essentially supposed to be a 
peculiar relation of a peculiar kind of concept as concept, i.e. as playing a 
meaning-role, to something the proposition is about. The so-called complex 
itself is in fact nothing else but the denoting concept as playing an entity- 
role. In assuming that the meaning is to be identified with the complex, the 
first step is made towards dissociating meaning from denoting. For according 
to the latter view denoting is no longer essentially associated with playing 
a role different from the one played by something the proposition is about. 
Irrespective of how they occur, some complex meanings are supposed to have 
a denotation. If we want to speak about the meaning, it is sufficient to get it as 
an entity. This, I think, is the view introduced in paragraph E where Russell 
says:
.w h e n  we distinguish meaning and denotation, we must be dealing with 
the meaning: the meaning has denotation and is a complex, and there is 
not something other than the meaning, which can be called the complex, 
and be said to have both meaning and denotation. The right phrase, on the 
view in question, is that some meanings have denotations.
The main difficulty in understanding the subtle distinction between meaning
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and complex is due to Russell’s terminology. It suggests that if their difference 
has anything to do with complexity, the complex must be more complex than 
the meaning. In that case it seems to deserve the title “complex” because it 
pre-eminently is complex. And if that is not what Russell had in mind, then 
the difference between meaning and complex must be construed as a difference 
in something else.
However, this quite natural assumption is false. W hile the distinction 
certainly has to do with complexity, still the complex is supposed to be less 
complex than the meaning. This appears from several passages in OF preceding 
the crucial one. For example, in §19 (p.373) Russell says:
The broad rule is that when complexes occur as meaning, their complexity is 
essential, and their constituents are constituents of any complex containing 
the said complexes; but when complexes occur as entities, their unity is what 
is essential, and they are not to be split into constituents.
The nature of this view may be explained by applying the axiom of 
externality to subject and predicate. It will require some effort to do so; for 
both the inclination to adopt the said axiom and the inclination not to go 
too far in carrying it out consistently, are very strong indeed. W hen we see 
a concrete thing, say a tree, we are spontaneously prepared to assume that 
it is one complex. It has different branches, maybe even leaves and flowers. 
Furthermore, it shows a great variety of properties. These are supposed to be in 
it. In short, we supposed to see what Aristotle and his followers have called a 
concrete substance.
Now, we may make use of this philosophical notion in order to elaborate the 
view of common sense further as follows. We say that eventually everything 
either is a substance or is in a substance as its private property. W hatever is 
general is conceptual; it only exists in what is less general. And ultimately 
the less general must exist in something that is absolutely non-general, an 
individual substance having all kinds of properties in it without being itself in 
something else.
O n occasion of his study of Leibniz, Russell realized that the logic and 
metaphysics of substance is repressive. Individuals swallow up whatever is not 
individual. Ultimately neither space, nor time, nor universals nor relations can 
be supposed to be real. For there cannot be anything between individuals nor 
anything they share. They cannot be together. Therefore, there even cannot be 
plurality, for only together many individuals are many.
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From this Russell not only concluded that it has become necessary “to 
base metaphysics on some notion other than that of substance”109, but also 
that an appeal to the notion of being-in must be reduced to a minimum. The 
latter assumption amounts to the same as the axiom of externality. Occurring 
in a proposition is supposed to be the only acceptable form of being-in. The 
propositions constituents are deemed to be in the proposition but not in each
other.110
As applied to the above-mentioned tree, this leads to the following view. 
Many different things are true of it. Both the tree and what is true of it occur 
in true propositions or facts about it. But what is true of the tree is not in 
the tree itself. The diversity of properties and relations must be outside the 
one subject having them. In the facts about the tree, the tree itself occurs as 
entity, i.e., as devoid of all change and complexity. Indeed, there actually is 
complexity. A nd if we look at the tree we may see complexity. But in fact we 
see a complexity of complex facts about something simple. 111 In giving an 
account of what we think we see, we confuse the thing with the facts about it.
If you want to see meanings, you cannot see them with your bodily eyes. 
You have to think about the tree and look sideward with your mind’s eye to 
what is true about it. But as soon as you start to think about what is true about 
the tree, you get it as entity, not as meaning. One of the predicates, which are 
true of that entity, is the predicate complex. But, just as the properties of the 
tree are not in the tree, so complexity is not in what is called complex. Having
109 Russell (1900), §71, p.126.
110 Cf. 0.3, 22.2 and 25.3. In 9.2 it has been said that Russellian things resemble 
substances, because they cannot occur in a proposition otherwise than as some­
thing the proposition is about. Nevertheless, they differ from substances because 
they do not have anything in them. Russellian propositions also resemble substanc­
es, but in a different way. Just as it is supposed to be true of substances that what­
ever is real, either is a substance or is in a substance, so it is supposed to be true of 
Russellian propositions, that whatever is real, either is a proposition or occurs in a 
proposition. However Russellian propositions differ from substances because they 
are much less possessive. They do not have anything private in them. Each con­
stituent of a proposition also occurs in other propositions. If occurring in a proposi­
tion is supposed to be the only acceptable form of being-in, then the unity of the 
proposition becomes a serious problem. See POM Ch. XVI, pp.137-142. Stevens 
(2005) has taken the problem of the unity of the proposition as a clue to Russell’s 
development. I think it is actually a clue to his development after his “revolt into 
pluralism”, not a clue as to the revolt itself. It is a consequence of the way Russell 
abandoned continental philosophy.
111 See POM §47, p.44 “.every  term is immutable and indestructible. What 
a term is, it is, and no change can be conceived in it which would not destroy its 
identity and make it another term.”
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realized this, we may feel the need to speak about what is true about the tree 
not as entity, but as meaning, i.e., as revealing complexity. Then we may use a 
denoting concept and speak about the meaning o f the complex.
In the above-mentioned case we want to make use of denoting in order 
to speak about a non-denoting concept as concept. The quasi-Fregean view, 
however, is conceived in order to speak about a denoting concept as concept, 
or -  what amounts to the same -  as actually denoting. But essentially the 
ambition is the same: speaking about the complexity elsewhere revealed by a 
concept, which occurs as entity, i.e., not as revealing complexity but only as 
something of which it is true that it is a complex.
From POM onward Russell makes use of the notion of complexity in 
order to clarify and justify the distinction between meaning and denotation. 
Primarily ambiguously denoting concepts are supposed to be of greatest 
importance. They enable us to deal with infinite plurality by means of 
propositions with finite complexity. In this case the less complex is the 
denoting concept, the more complex its denotation. In the manuscripts 
written after POM and before OD gradually more attention is paid to 
unambiguously denoting concepts. W hat remains however, is the use of the 
notion of complexity in order to justify the distinction between meaning and 
denotation. But it is used the other way round. A  definite description may 
reveal a much greater complexity than its denotation. This idea is also to 
be found in OD, paragraph 11, where the favourite example of the centre of 
mass of the Solar System at the beginning of the twentieth century is used 
to illustrate it. In this case, of course, the meaning is complex, whereas its 
denotation is devoid of complexity.
Viewed from this perspective, the essential point is that the meaning 
denotes in virtue of its complexity, i.e., in virtue of the complexity revealed by 
its occurring as meaning. A nd revealing complexity is supposed to be different 
from being something of which the predicate ‘complex’ is true.
19 Russell’s puzzling account of the first view’s failure
19.1 From the main problem of exegesis to the most conspicuous one
In the first chapter of his Phenomenology o f Spirit Hegel puts considerable effort 
into explaining both the nature of the view in question and why it deserves 
to be first. W hat is more, Hegel also carefully distinguishes between the view 
whose insufficiency is to be proved and the happening or experience which is 
supposed to prove it. These issues are all of them relevant to the GEA as well,
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especially to paragraph D. However, Russell proceeds much more carelessly. He 
just starts with the happening itself. We, poor readers of OD, see the slapstick, 
we see the banana skin, we see the slip caused by it, but we fail to understand 
to whom  the happening happens, let alone why the story of misfortunes has 
to start here. Obviously, Russell was so much acquainted with the view in 
question, that he gravely underestimated the reader’s risk of misunderstanding 
it, of getting confused and eventually supposing the argument to be confused. 
In this way, oblivious of any harm and even before having conceived or 
adopted the official story, he paved the way of its rise in promoting the GEA’s 
eclipse.
In my opinion the general lack of understanding of the GEA is mainly due 
to the lack of attention paid to the question why it is so difficult to understand 
it. In spite of their disagreements, all commentators share the opinion that 
the text is very obscure and enigmatic indeed. All make an attempt to solve 
its numerous problems of interpretation. But they all fail to pay sufficient 
attention to the problems themselves. Above all, they want to go away from 
those problems to their solution.112 That is why they failed to see Russell’s 
failure. They did not even look for, let alone try to reconstruct, the missing 
link between paragraph C and D. Instead, they plunged into the most eye­
catching difficulty: Russell’s own use of inverted commas.
19.2 Russell’s use of inverted commas
After having made an attempt to reconstruct the missing link, I shall now 
try to disentangle Russell’s use of inverted commas. Evidently, it cannot be 
deduced from what has been said in the previous section. But it is equally 
evident that it cannot be understood without any knowledge of both the 
nature of the view discussed in paragraph D and the nature of its failure. Both 
the factual details of the text and the reconstruction of what is behind it are to 
be taken into account. They have to meet each other. As far as I can see, such 
an approach leads to the following results:
a) Russell makes actually use of two types of inverted commas: double 
and simple ones. This is only a device of punctuation. In the original 
version of the text, simple quotation marks are used in order to 
indicate their being enclosed by quotation marks. Inverted commas 
are double in order to mark their not being enclosed. This
112 Cf. as antidote the Cartesian principle mentioned in 0.3.
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typographical distinction does not reveal anything about their 
possible meaning.113
b) One mode of using inverted commas is obviously to be found in the 
text, namely the inverted commas introduced in paragraph B. They 
constitute the subject matter of the problem discussed in the GEA. 
They are to be explained. But in the attempt to explain them, they 
are of course not used.
c) A t least one possible other mode of using inverted commas is to 
be considered: using them in order to quote an expression, more in 
particular a denoting phrase. However, this use cannot occur in the 
attempt to explain the inverted commas introduced in paragraph B. 
For according to paragraph C it must be possible to speak about the 
meaning expressed by a denoting phrase in its normal use without 
mentioning that phrase.114 For the relation of meaning to denotation 
is not linguistic through the phrase. A nd quoting a phrase is one 
possible way of mentioning it.
However, from this principle it cannot be deduced that in Russell’s 
discussion of the problem no quotations occur. For in fact he is not 
just making an attempt to explain the inverted commas introduced 
in paragraph B, observing the rules fixed in paragraph C, he is also 
speaking about it and about its failure. In that connection quoting 
a denoting phrase might be helpful, for example, in order to 
successfully indicate the wanted meaning.
As far as I can see, Russell had decided not to quote denoting 
phrases at all. Indeed, the first line of Gray’s Elegy is actually quoted 
by means of inverted commas. But the first line of Gray’s Elegy is not 
a denoting phrase. In speaking about denoting phrases, Russell prefers 
the character C, indicating complexity. And, as explained in 16.2, he 
speaks about the phrase by the way as phrase C. The reason behind 
this strategy apparently is that he only wants us to take a phrase in 
order to consider two modes of its use, its normal use in order to 
speak about the denotation, and its use in order to speak about the 
meaning expressed by it in its normal use. Quoting the phrase could 
possibly suggest that a third mode of use is to be considered as well. 
For in fact quoting a phrase is using it in order to speak about it. In 
my opinion, trying to explain quoting quotation marks in observance 
of the axiom of externality leads to essentially the same problem as
113 In Russell (1956), pp.41-56 the simple and double inverted commas are 
exchanged.
114 See 16.3.
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the one discussed in the GEA. I assume that Russell was not aware of 
this correspondence. Anyhow, in speaking about denoting phrases, he 
avoided quoting quotation marks, because he did not want to speak 
about them. They were beyond the scope of the problem as conceived 
by him.
d) If the decision is taken not to use inverted commas in order to 
mention denoting phrases, then two possible modes of use remain 
available which both might be useful in the discussion of the failure 
of the quasi-Fregean view. In the previous section, I have introduced 
bold type in order to explain both the ambition of the two views in 
question and their failure. Both views are based on the belief that 
there is no need for bold type or something similar, because the 
change from C to C will take place automatically as soon as C occurs 
as argument of the function D( ) or (in case of the quasi-Fregean 
view) of M( ). But as soon as the failure is discussed, the distinction 
between C and C is relevant again. It is relevant to describing the 
transformation, which is expected, but does not take place.
Instead of bold type I could have introduced a specific kind or a 
particular mode of using inverted commas. They could be called 
complex-mentioning inverted commas. According to both the quasi- 
Fregean view and its indifferent rival, the inverted commas thus used 
are superfluous. For I use them in order to introduce what according 
to them is the primary use of a denoting phrase. But the happening 
consists in their appearing not to be superfluous. If they are not 
used, we do not get the meaning we want. And if we want to get it, 
without mentioning the phrase of course, we have to add them in 
order to correct the failure. That is why complex mentioning inverted 
commas may also be called failure correcting. As such they are actually 
used by Russell in the first part of paragraph D.
e) But this mode of using inverted commas is not very appropriate for 
describing the situation in which the failure occurs. For the adherent 
of the view in question deliberately refuses to use inverted commas, 
let alone complex mentioning ones. But if we want to describe what 
the unsuspecting testee does, we have to distinguish what he wants 
to speak about from what he is actually speaking about. In that case 
scare quotes may be helpful. For we may say, in case of the quasi- 
Fregean view for example, that in speaking about “the meaning of 
C”, i.e., about the so-called meaning of C, not the desired meaning
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is actually mentioned, but (if anything at all) the meaning of the 
denotation.
Now, although most prominently scare quotes are used to indicate 
what is wrongly described as so and so, their use may be kindly 
extended to what is described as so and so or what may be described 
as so and so. For the sake of brevity I shall call scare quotes used in 
this way kind scare quotes in order to distinguish them from the unkind  
ones. The essential feature of scare quotes is that they do not change 
the subject matter of discourse, as phrase quoting or semi-technical 
inverted commas do, but only the way it is described. They mark 
the change from just describing something as the so and so towards 
describing it as described or describable as so and so. As soon as this 
reflexive move is made in order to express distanced lack of consent, 
they become unkind. Russell uses both kind and unkind scare quotes 
in paragraph D. As far as I can see, other modes of using inverted 
commas than those enumerated are not involved in the GEA.
19.3 Application to the first part of paragraph D
In the first part of paragraph D the failure is discussed of the quasi-Fregean 
attempt to explain the meaning-mentioning inverted commas. The text is as 
follows:
The one phrase C was to have both meaning and denotation. But if we 
speak of “the meaning of C”, that gives us the meaning (if any) of the 
denotation. “The meaning of the first line of Gray’s Elegy” is the same as 
“The meaning of ‘The curfew tolls the knell of parting day’”, and is not the 
same as “The meaning of ‘the first line of Gray’s Elegy’.” Thus in order to 
get the meaning we want, we must speak not of “the meaning of C ”, but of 
“the meaning of ‘C ’”, which is the same as “C” by itself.
Russell’s use of inverted commas may be explained as follows: In the second 
sentence unkind scare quotes are used. For the meaning is wrongly described 
as the meaning of C. Then, in the third sentence, kind scare quotes are used. 
Russell wants to say: what actually is described as the meaning of the first line 
of Gray’s Elegy, is the same as what may also be described as the meaning of 
“the curfew tolls the knell of parting day”. For the first line of Gray’s Elegy = 
“the curfew tolls the knell of parting day”. But the meaning thus described 
is not the same as what should have been described as: the meaning of “the
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first line of Gray’s Elegy”. Here the inverted commas are correcting, complex 
mentioning. Then, in the last sentence, what has been illustrated by a 
concrete example is rephrased in general terms by means of the character 
C. Thus, in order to get the meaning we want, we must not speak of what is 
wrongly described as the meaning of C, but of what ought to be described as 
the meaning of “C ”, i.e., by means of correcting complex mentioning inverted 
commas. And that is the same as “C”, i.e., the meaning indicated by means of 
the inverted commas introduced in paragraph B. Here the distinction between 
meaning and complex appears to be relevant. For two different modes of use 
must be involved if we say: the meaning of “C”= “C”. That is why in the 
previous section I have introduced bold type in saying: M(C) = “C ”.
19.4 Acrobatic feat in the second part of paragraph D
The second part of paragraph D is concerned with the failure of the quasi- 
Fregean view as applied to the denotation. In the previous sections I have put 
considerable effort in trying to explain why the denotation is relevant at all. In 
fact, the answer appeared to be that if the axiom of externality is adopted, both 
the meaning-indicating inverted commas must be explained and their absence 
in case of normal use. According to the quasi-Fregean view the connection 
between C and “C ” is to be found in a non-linguistic mediator, called the 
complex. C and “C ” are supposed to differ as D(C) and M (C).
As explained in the previous section, the failure is similar in both cases. 
That is why the second part of paragraph D starts with the word “similarly”. 
Just as in speaking about M(C) we want to get M (C), so in speaking about 
D(C) we want to get D(C). In the first case we get (if anything at all) the 
meaning of the denotation of the complex instead of the meaning of the 
complex. In the second case we get (if anything at all) the denotation of the 
denotation of the complex instead of the denotation of the complex. As far 
as I can see, that is exactly what Russsell wants to convey in the sentence 
beginning with “similarly”. But his wording is somewhat puzzling. He says:
Similarly “the denotation of C” does not mean the denotation we want, but
means something which, if it denotes at all, denotes what is denoted by the
denotation we want.
The turn of phrase “does not mean the denotation we want” must be elliptical. 
It is to be explained as: does not mean something, which denotes the denotation 
we want. If that is correct, then the inverted commas occurring in this
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sentence must have been used in order to speak about something which has 
meaning. In principle two candidates are available: either the phrase or the 
complex. In my opinion the latter is to be preferred. That is why I remain 
faithful to the assumption that throughout the GEA Russell does not use 
inverted commas in order to speak about denoting phrases.
It is true that the question how the inverted commas are to be construed in 
this particular case is in itself of minor importance. Both alternatives result in 
a correct and intelligible reading. But I prefer the second one, because it more 
pre-eminently reveals the ambition of the quasi-Fregean view, viz. the one 
expressed in the formula C = D(C). The proposed explanation of the normal 
use of a denoting phrase purports to be a paraphrase, an analysis, which reveals 
hidden complexity. As seen from this perspective, the failure is primarily, that 
the proposed paraphrase results in quite a different complexity. It provides a 
complex whose meaning does not even denote the same thing. If I am not 
mistaken, this reading is in accordance with the rather puzzling corresponding 
passage from OF §37, quoted in 16.1.
Now, in consideration of the nature and ambition of the view in question, 
it would be appropriate to discuss the proposed description of the denotation 
in making use of the same complex. This is what we expect Russell to do: 
taking some particular denoting phrase and then making an attempt to speak 
about both the meaning and the denotation of that phrase without mentioning 
it. That would be in complete accordance with paragraph C. After all, we 
want to consider C and “C”, not X and “C ”. For the connection between a 
particular meaning and its denotation is to be preserved.
But above all, Russell wants to illustrate the twofold failure of the view in 
question. A nd he sets great store by doing it in such a way that not getting 
what we wanted consists in getting something else. That is why in case of the 
meaning he takes his favourite example of the first line of Gray’s Elegy. For the 
first line of Gray’s Elegy actually has a meaning. But this very same example 
cannot be used in order to illustrate the failure in explaining the denotation. 
For although the first line of Gray’s Elegy has a meaning, it fails to have a 
denotation. After all, it is not a denoting phrase.
Russell could have looked for another example from the very start, an 
example that is such that the twofold application to one and the same C 
would in both cases result in getting something else. Such a super-favourite 
example would be such that instead of M(C) we get M (C), i.e., the meaning of 
C, i.e., the meaning of the denotation and instead of D(C) we get D(C), i.e., 
the denotation of C, i.e., the denotation of the denotation. In other words, in 
order to serve as super-favourite example, the denoting phrase C must be such
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that C, the denotation of that phrase, has both meaning and denotation. As 
seen from the perspective of the quasi-Fregean view there are, as far as I can 
see, two types of examples which satisfy this requirement. Either we can take 
a phrase C such that it denotes a denoting phrase, or such that it denotes a 
complex. Both are supposed to have meaning and denotation.
But unfortunately each type has its own drawback. Firstly, Russell does not 
want to get involved in denoting denoting phrases. The setting of the GEA is 
such that mentioning denoting phrases is to be avoided. We have to take one, 
in order to exemplify the difference and the possible connection between C 
and “C ”. Secondly, the complex is too close to the very heart of the problem. 
For the difficulty to be illustrated is that we cannot get the complex. The 
nature of the failure would gravely be obscured if we took a denoting phrase 
whose denotation is exactly the kind of thing we fail to get. Therefore those 
promising super-favourite examples are in fact much less useful than the 
familiar first line of Gray’s Elegy.
For the sake of systematic parity Russell could have abandoned his fondness 
of palpable results. But once again he evidently did not do so. He also could 
have altogether abandoned his desire to illustrate, as much as possible, the 
nature and ambition of the view in question. But evidently he did not do so. In 
fact he tried to find a kind of compromise. In order to garantee that in case of 
the proposed translation of C the failure consists in getting something else, he 
takes an example different from the first line of Gray’s Elegy, i.e., an example 
which is such that it actually has a denotation. But in order to remain in touch 
with the nature of the view in question, he takes something that is as close to 
the first example as possible, namely C = “the first line of Gray’s Elegy”.
In this way the situation becomes very complicated and confusing indeed. 
The adherent of the quasi-Fregean view is forced to perform an acrobatic feat 
which seems to show the nature of his view. But in fact it is primarily invented 
in order to show his failure palpably. Nevertheless, it shows the failure in a way 
that somehow resembles what he would like to do if no failure were involved 
at all. W hat he would like to do is: applying M( ) and D( ) to one and the 
same example. W hat he is forced to do is: applying M( ) to the first line of 
Gray’s Elegy and D( ) to “the first line of Gray’s Elegy”. In short, the very same 
meaning we wanted to get in the first part of paragraph D, now acts as the 
denotation we want to get. The remaining part of paragraph D runs as follows:
For example, let “C” be ‘the denoting complex occurring in the second of
the above instances’. Then
C = “the first line of Gray’s Elegy”, and
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The denotation of C = The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. But what 
we meant to have as the denotation was “the first line of Gray’s Elegy”.
Thus we have failed to get what we wanted.
Here Russell starts in identifying C by means of the problematic inverted 
commas exemplified in paragraph B. For he says: let “C” be “the denoting 
complex in the second of the above instances”. W hat does that mean? In fact 
“C” is nothing else but the meaning expressed by the phrase C in its normal 
use. Therefore: the meaning expressed by the phrase C = the meaning of the 
phrase:
the denoting complex occurring in the second of the above instances.
From this it may be inferred that C, i.e., the denotation of the phrase 
C = the denotation of the above mentioned phrase = the denoting complex 
occurring in the second of the above instances = “the first line of Gray’s Elegy” 
= the meaning expressed by the denoting phrase occurring in the first example 
of paragraph B = the meaning we unsuccessfully tried to speak about in the 
first half of paragraph D. Now we try to get it as denotation, whereas in fact we 
get its denotation, i.e., the first line of Gray’s Elegy = The curfew tolls the knell 
of parting day.
20 Dialectics of the argument
20.1 First transition
The transition from the first to the second view, or rather from the evidence 
provided by the experienced failure of the first view to the second view, is 
expounded in paragraph E. Russell starts with a general summary of the failure 
illustrated in the previous paragraph. Then, in saying “This leads us to say....”, 
he actually makes the move to the second view:
The difficulty in speaking of the meaning of a denoting complex may 
be stated thus: The moment we put the complex in a proposition, the 
proposition is about the denotation; and if we make a proposition in which 
the subject is ‘the meaning of C’, then the subject is the meaning (if any) of 
the denotation, which was not intended. This leads us to say that, when we 
distinguish meaning and denotation, we must be dealing with the meaning:
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the meaning has denotation and is a complex, and there is not something 
other than the meaning, which can be called the complex, and be said 
to have both meaning and denotation. The right phrase, on the view in 
question, is that some meanings have denotations.
The essential point in the summary of the previously exemplified failure is 
that the complex which we hoped to get as non-denoting, actually denotes. It 
refuses to occur in any other way than as deputy of its denotation. It refrains 
from abandoning its submissiveness, behaving like a person who cannot speak 
otherwise than on behalf of another, superior authority.
Now, the very reason why, according to the first view, the meaning is to be 
distinguished from the complex, is: the meaning is the denoting concept as 
actually denoting, i.e., as playing a meaning-role. The complex is supposed to 
be the very same denoting concept as playing an entity-role, i.e., as named and 
not as denoting. But in paragraph D we have learned that the complex actually 
denotes. It refuses to behave otherwise. Therefore, the reason for distinguishing 
meaning and complex has appeared to be invalid. The complex behaves in the 
same way as we expected the meaning to behave. W hen we distinguish meaning 
and denotation, i.e., “C” and C, we are not, as the quasi-Fregean view assumes, 
dealing with something between them, but with the meaning alias complex itself.
It is quite remarkable that in the first part of the text the denotation is 
not mentioned at all, whereas in the second part meaning and denotation 
are mentioned together in the phrase “when we distinguish meaning and 
denotation”. As far as I can see, this is due to the fact that, as explained in 
section 18.2, the explanation of the denotation as C = D(C) essentially remains 
the same. The change only consists in the way the meaning and the meaning 
indicating inverted commas are construed. But, of course both views have to do 
with meaning and denotation.
The inference from the first view’s flaw to the second view is not a piece of 
classical deductive proof. Neither in this way nor otherwise, can the validity of 
the second view be proved. But the inference is not, or at least not obviously 
dialectical in the classical sense of that word either, i.e., as a valid inference 
from problematic premises. For it seems to be based on what has been proved 
to be the case, namely that the first view fails in the way summarized by 
Russell. Therefore, if the inference purports to be dialectical, then a hidden, 
plausible but unwarranted premises must be involved. Indeed, it is based on the 
assumption that the difficulty can be avoided by rejecting the subtle distinction 
between meaning and complex. The seriousness and generality of the problem 
is not yet fully acknowledged. The evasive behaviour of denoting complexes is 
supposed to be due to their being put into a larger actually denoting complex.
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Occurring in the so-called meaning of C, the complex C actually denotes just as 
the larger complex in which it is embedded. But the bare complex, devoid of all 
denoting additions, will abandon its submissiveness and present itself instead of 
its denotation. Strip the hidden addition D( ) from C and you will get C. For the 
formula C = D(C) is still supposed to be valid.
According to this view denoting is due to an accidental addition. That is why 
Russell conveys it in saying: “Some meanings have denotations.” If you want 
to speak about the denotation of a meaning that happens to have one, you may 
do so in adding again what you have stripped from C in order to get the bare 
complex C.
It is hardly possible to elaborate this view consistently. For if in M(C) the 
complex C denotes in virtue of the functional addition, why not assume that in 
D(C) it will behave in exactly the same way? If that were true, you would never 
be able to get the denotation of the complex. For either you would have C bare, 
i.e., C, or D(C), i.e., the denotation of the denotation of C, but never D(C). 
W hether it is possible to avoid this inconsistency, I do not know. A t any rate, 
Russell does not discuss it.
20.2 Second transition
In paragraph F another, much easier argument against the second view is put 
forward. In fact Russell simply reminds its adherent of what has already been 
said in the first part of paragraph E, namely that “the moment we put the 
complex in a proposition, the proposition is about the denotation”. The first part 
of paragraph F runs as follows:
But this only makes our difficulty in speaking of meanings more evident. For 
suppose C is our complex; then we are to say that C is the meaning of the 
complex. Nevertheless, whenever C occurs without inverted commas, what 
is said is not true of the meaning, but only of the denotation, as when we say: 
The centre of mass of the solar system is a point.
The second view is to be rejected as well. It is based on a wrong diagnosis of 
the first view’s disease. Although conceived in order to avoid the difficulty, 
it only makes it more evident. Assuming that the problem is due to some 
complication, it wants to make things more simple. But in doing so, it only gives 
a less complicated form to the very same failure. The lesson to be learned is: we 
cannot immediately name the complex at all. It cannot occur otherwise than as 
denoting or denoted.
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Therefore, if we still want to speak about it, we have to denote it by means of 
another denoting complex. And in the latter complex the complex we want to 
speak about cannot play any role. For it will always occur as denoting. And it is 
impossible to denote a complex by means of its denotation. For there is no road 
back from denotations to meanings or complexes denoting it. This then is the 
transition to the third view, which may be called unmitigated mediatism. In the 
remaining part of paragraph F this is explained as follows:
Thus to speak of C itself, i.e., to make a proposition about the meaning, our 
subject must not be C, but something which denotes C. Thus “C”, which 
is what we use when we want to speak of the meaning, must be not the 
meaning, but something which denotes the meaning. And C must not be a 
constituent of this complex (as it is of ‘the meaning of C’); for if C occurs in 
the complex, it will be its denotation, not its meaning, that will occur, and 
there is no backward road from denotations to meanings, because every object 
can be denoted by an infinite number of different denoting phrases.
As said in section 17.1, here, between the first and the second part of paragraph 
F, the dividing line between the two horns of the dilemma sketched in paragraph 
C is to be located. Here the border is crossed, but not deliberately. For the time 
being, the adherent of the third view does not think about preserving or not 
preserving the connection between meaning and denotation. The main issue is: 
how to get the meaning we want. Of course we want it without mentioning the 
phrase. But above all, we want it in preventing meaning and denotation from 
being one and the same. The curious shift of reference is to be avoided. And it 
can successfully be avoided if we accept that denoting complexes cannot occur 
otherwise than as denoting. Any attempt to get C in bold type has been proved 
to be doomed to failure.
The principle of the dialectic is quite simple. Gradually, as we get more 
experienced, the theory of denoting concepts also gets increasingly thinner.
W hat now remains is but a shadow of the quasi-Fregean view. Its failure has 
given rise to a loss of subtlety and mitigation, i.e., participation of the meaning 
as complex in the meaning by means of which it is made subject of a proposition. 
W hat remains is pure, indifferent and unmitigated mediatism. It is significant 
that in this part of the text, Russell does not give any concrete example. For, in 
fact, as will appear in the next paragraph, it is impossible to give any at all. The 
banana skin has been removed. Therefore nothing seems to prevent us from 
getting the meaning we want. But instead, we do not get anything at all!
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In the first part of paragraph G Russell gives the essential reason why the third 
view cannot be accepted:
Thus it would seem that “C ” and C are different entities, such that “C” 
denotes C; but this cannot be an explanation, because the relation of “C ” 
to C remains wholly mysterious; and where are we to find the denoting 
complex “C ” which is to denote C?
Unmitigated mediatism is to be rejected simply because it does not succeed in 
preserving the connection between “C” and C. For it is not sufficient to just 
state that “C” denotes C. Denoting is a many-one relation. A nd according to 
the axiom of externality, the only way to preserve such a relation is: to describe 
the one as related to one of the many. So we have to describe C as denoted by 
some meaning or complex. And we cannot identify that meaning or complex 
by simply repeating that it denotes C. For denoting C is a property shared by 
many meanings or complexes. The moment we have picked out one of those 
many meanings, we can identify C by it. Then we are allowed to use the 
definite article in speaking about the denotation of that particular meaning.
But we cannot legitimately use it in order to find a particular meaning. We are 
not allowed to speak about “the” meaning denoting C, unless we are able to 
add something to that description. And, of course, we are able to do so, in case 
we do not care about mentioning the phrase we started with. If we start with 
the phrase “the first line of Gray’s Elegy”, then, of course, we can identify one 
particular meaning, namely the meaning expressed by that phrase.
Russell does not mention this illegitimate way out. If he had done so, his 
statement in paragraph C “that the meaning cannot be got at except by means 
of denoting phrases” would have been much more intelligible. In fact, he 
assumes as a matter of course that preserving the connection means: describing 
meaning and denotation, not in mentioning the phrase, but in mentioning 
some extra-linguistic item which is capable of doing the same job. For the 
relation of the meaning to its denotation is “not linguistic through the phrase”.
Now, the said extra-linguistic item appeared to be the complex, i.e., 
the denoting concept acting as entity. It appeared to be the only possible 
ministering angel in preserving the connection. But that very same ministering 
angel also appeared to be more diabolic than we supposed. The failure of the 
first and the second view has been caused by the complex, or rather by the 
attempt to get it as C. That is where the banana skin lies. The third view 
seems to be viable as long as we only think of the complex’s diabolic side.
20.3 Third transition
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We only see it as something that is to be removed in order to prevent us from 
loosing our footing. And then, after having successfully removed it, Russell 
reminds us of having eliminated the only available ministering angel as well. 
The two are one and the same. The banana skin itself is the only available 
point of application. W ithout it nothing happens. No movement can be made. 
No slip or failure can be demonstrated. A nd that is the very failure of the third 
view. It fails to show anything at all, let alone its failure. N ot even an attempt 
to get the meaning can be made. We are left with no more than the desire 
to get it. That is why Russell says that in this way “the relation of ‘C’ to C 
remains wholly mysterious”.
As explained in section 17.3, the fourth and final view coincides with the 
perspective of the author of OD. The last transition is to be construed as going 
from a half-hearted and one-sided view of the difficulty sketched in paragraph 
C, to its full acknowledgement. Both horns of the dilemma are indispensable 
and incompatible. And just as in the third view no more than an extremely 
thin version of the theory of denoting concepts is left, in the fourth and final 
view nothing of it is left at all. This view is to be rejected. A  theory that leads 
to such grave and fundamental difficulties must be wrong.
20.4 The disembodied Frege
Before paying attention to the last part of the text, I want to discuss a question 
which I have postponed deliberately: If the quasi-Fregean view gradually gets 
thinner and thinner in the course of the GEA’s dialectic, how much quasi- 
Fregeanism remains? My answer to this question is very unorthodox indeed. It 
constitutes the counterpart of the rather unorthodox starting point, expounded 
in the previous chapter. That the quasi-Fregean view gradually gets thinner 
in fact only means that it loses its typical Russellian embodiment. Firstly the 
subtle distinction between the denoting concept as meaning and the denoting 
concept as entity is abandoned. Secondly the very possibility of the denoting 
concept’s occurring as entity is abandoned together with participation. Both 
points are typically Russellian and un-Fregean. However, what remains in the 
third view is exactly what Russell once adopted from Frege. It is the “important 
principle” mentioned in the margin of OF p.363, quoted in 11.2. A  meaning or 
sense can only become subject of a proposition by means of another meaning 
or sense pointing to it. In other words, the so-called complex, which appeared 
to constitute both the banana skin and the ministering angel, is not at home 
in the world of Frege’s logic at all. Therefore, paragraph D and E can hardly 
be applied to his theory of sense and reference. The application only becomes
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possible when the Russellian body of the quasi-Fregean view has disappeared. 
Then we meet the disembodied Frege.
This spectral being, although purely Fregean, is of course not to be confused 
with the real Frege. It represents an isolated aspect of the theory of sense and 
reference, which is at home in another, quite un-Russellian body. Nevertheless 
it is such that it could be incorporated in, and mitigated by, Russell’s theory of 
denoting concepts. For in fact the quasi-Fregean view is just an ingenious mix 
of the two elements introduced in 9 and 10, the innocent, purely Russellian 
view put forward in POM §56, and the Fregean principle, mentioned in POM 
§476, that a sense can only become the subject of a proposition by means of 
another sense.
Now, at first, Frege’s answer to the question how a sense becomes subject of 
a proposition seems to be very close to Russell’s quasi-Fregean view. W hat is 
more, Frege’s theory of direct and indirect sense and reference might be called 
quasi-Russellian! For the only way of justifying Frege’s use of the phrase “the 
indirect sense”, is a quasi-Russellian one. A n attempt to explain the definite 
article could be made by saying that the indirect sense differs from all other 
senses having the same reference in containing the direct sense as non-referring. 
Such an answer presupposes the possibility of different kinds of occurrences.
I do not want to say that Frege actually ever accepted different kinds of 
occurrences, but that he would be forced to make use of them if he were 
pressed to explain further the notion of indirect sense and if he were prepared 
to defend it at all. But in fact, not accepting different kinds of occurrences is so 
much of essential importance to the body of his logic that Frege would prefer 
rejecting the notion of indirect sense altogether.
These considerations inevitably lead to the conclusion, that it is impossible 
to apply the GEA as a whole to Frege’s theory of sense and reference. But there 
is no need to do so. For part of the GEA actually can be applied to it, namely 
the part beginning halfway through paragraph F. There is no need to convince 
Frege of the impossibility of catching the complex itself. He would never be 
prepared to participate in such a hunt. From the very outset he would whole­
heartedly accept the principle of the third view, namely that meanings or 
senses cannot occur otherwise than as referring. Indeed, as seen from Russell’s 
perspective, which is also the perspective of the GEA as a whole, it is very 
hard to accept the said principle. For Russell had to reject the most vital 
parts of the body of his own theory in order to reach that conclusion. Only a 
very severe lesson of unlooked-for experience could force him to embrace the 
Fregean principle. Only there, at the border of the essential dilemma, Frege’s 
ghost appears on his way.
In the first part of paragraph G, the passage quoted and discussed in the
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previous subsection, Russell starts his criticism of the third view. No doubt, 
it is meant to be self-criticism. But it is equally meant as criticism of Frege.
If so, how to assess the validity of this two-fold criticism? In my opinion 
the latter part is stronger than the former!115 For the Russell of the beloved 
theory of denoting concepts could possibly reject the criticism in making an 
appeal to a new kind of occurrence. After all, in the part of OF preceding 
the crucial passage, he shows a considerable readiness to accept a great 
variety of occurrences. W ithout clearly distinguishing occurrence as role from 
occurrence as position, he starts to accept, on occasion of the discovery made 
in the crucial passage, that roles are to be reduced to positions. The axiom of 
externality forces him to do so (see 15.2). Therefore, Russell is moving towards 
a fuller acceptance of the said axiom. That is why he could also have chosen to 
challenge its validity.
As will be explained below (22.3), in Frege’s logic the axiom of externality 
plays a much more prominent and stable role: Any appeal to ambiguity is out 
of the question. Logic itself does not have anything to do with it. Something 
like ambiguously referring or denoting phrases is completely un-Fregean. This 
means that Frege simply has no choice. He must accept the demand explained 
in paragraph C. The fact that one and the same phrase can either be used in 
direct speech in order to express a certain sense or in indirect speech in order 
to indicate that sense, cannot be supposed to reveal a logical ambiguity or two- 
sidedness. The linguistic ambiguity is to be unambiguously explained. Now, 
the first part of Russell’s criticism simply is that Frege is not able to preserve 
the connection. W here to find “the” so-called indirect sense? Frege’s use of the 
definite article does not reveal anything more than a personal desire.
In O n  Sense and Reference, he is so much concerned with proving the 
universal validity of the principle of substitution, which in fact is but a specific 
appearance of the axiom of externality, that he limits himself to an anxious 
warning to the reader of the ambiguity involved in direct and indirect speech. 
Bewitched that by that ambiguity we might be seduced into believing in the 
existence of real exceptions. But in this connection Frege just forgets to do 
what according to his own principles he ought to have done: unambiguously
115 I use an exclamation mark, because, as far as I can see, all commentators who 
have taken notice of the differences between Russell and Frege, have assumed that 
the GEA, as applied to Frege cannot have more cogency than as applied to Russell. 
This assumption is based on another one, namely that if the GEA is applicable to 
Frege at all, the argument as a whole must be applicable to his theory. Eventually 
this belief is based on the tenet of Russell’s supposed loneliness (see 8.4). Frege 
is deemed to be an external opponent, who only appeared on the scene the mo­
ment Russell felt the need to justify and defend the previously conceived and fully 
adopted ToD. I want to challenge all these assumptions.
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explaining this ambiguity. In the GEA Russell suggests that the only possible 
option that Frege could provide is no explanation at all. For it only consists 
in the statement that the two-fold use of the same expression is completely 
accidental.
20.5 Frege in the” inextricable tangle”
In the remaining part of the text, the link with the puzzle of George IV’s 
curiosity is explained. This move is not surprising. For the GEA is part of OD 
on account of the role it has to play in it. The GEA as a whole purports to do 
with regard to puzzle (1) exactly the same as what the KFA purports to do 
with respect to puzzle (3): proving that the old theory of denoting is unable to 
solve it.
Although in itself this consideration is right, it might lead us astray. For 
we might suppose it to be sufficient to predict what the argument will be 
like. We expect Russell to proceed as follows: “It has been proved impossible 
to speak about the meaning otherwise than by mentioning the phrase. But 
within the perspective of the theory of meaning and denotation, puzzle (1) 
can only be solved if it is possible to speak about the meaning otherwise than 
by mentioning the phrase. That is why Frege makes an appeal to the indirect 
sense. Such an appeal is doomed to failure. Therefore, the theory of meaning 
and denotation or sense and reference is not able to solve puzzle (1).”116
The very first word of the remaining part of the text, the word “moreover”, 
is sufficient to prove that Russell actually proceeds differently. He wants 
to confront both Frege and himself as possible adherent of the theory of 
unmitigated mediatism with an extra difficulty. Even if it were possible to 
find “the” indirect sense, that would not be sufficient to solve puzzle (1)! For 
according to Russell, the difficulty concerning the curiosity of George IV is 
that a denoting phrase in its normal use may nevertheless occur in such a way 
that its meaning is relevant. In other words: there are two different reasons 
why Russell is not prepared to accept Frege’s approach to cases which seem at 
variance with the principle of substitution. Firstly, the indirect sense cannot be 
found and secondly, at least in some of such unruly cases, something else must 
be found, not a supposed occurrence of “C”, but an occurrence of C in which 
nevertheless the meaning is relevant.
116 Cf. 10.3.
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Let us look at the text, before discussing the nature of this twofold criticism. It 
runs as follows:
Moreover, when C occurs in a proposition, it is not only the denotation that 
occurs (as we will see in the next paragraph); yet, on the view in question,
C is only the denotation, the meaning being wholly relegated to “C”. This 
is an inextricable tangle, and seems to prove that the whole distinction of 
meaning and denotation has been wrongly conceived.
(H) That the meaning is relevant when a denoting phrase 
occurs in a proposition is formally proved by the puzzle about the author 
of Waverley. The proposition “Scott was the author of W averley” has a 
property not possessed by “Scott was Scott”, namely the property that 
George IV wished to know whether it was true. Thus the two are not 
identical propositions; hence the meaning of “the author of Waverley” 
must be relevant as well as the denotation, if we adhere to the point of 
view to which this distinction belongs. Yet, as we have just seen, so long 
as we adhere to this point of view, we are compelled to hold that only the 
denotation can be relevant. Thus the point of view in question must be 
abandoned.
This concluding part of the GEA reinforces the criticism of the third view.
Its twofoldness must correspond with a supposed twofold failure of the third 
view. As noted in the first part of paragraph G (see 19.3), its first failure is that 
the inverted commas are not explained. “The relation of “C ” to C remains 
wholly mysterious.” And “C” cannot be identified at all. The second failure 
is that refraining from any appeal to the complex C inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that the only possible way in which the meaning could be relevant 
to a proposition, is: by occurring in it as denoted. For if “C” and C do not have 
anything in common, if the twofold use of one and the same phrase does 
not reveal anything of logical importance at all, if it is to be construed as a 
case of mere misleading and logically irrelevant equivocation, then neither 
the meaning itself nor a part of it is present in C. As soon as C occurs, the 
proposition is only about the denotation. The meaning does not play any 
role in what it is about. If the meaning is of any importance to what the 
proposition is about, it must be about the meaning, i.e., the meaning must be 
denoted. In that case not C occurs, but something else, namely “C ”. Indeed, 
the use of the same character suggests a connection, but in fact there is none.
It would have been better to speak about B instead of “C ”. This is what Russell 
means in saying that the meaning is “wholly relegated to “C ” ”.
W hy is Russell of opinion that the curiosity of George IV cannot be
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explained unless the meaning of the phrase “the author of Waverley” cannot be 
entirely reduced to its being denoted by another meaning and another phrase? 
Because according to him, puzzle (1) requires that the proposition that Scott is 
the same as the author of Waverley and the proposition that Scott is the same 
as Scott do not only differ in meaning, but also in what they are about. After 
all, George IV did not want to know anything about meanings. He wanted 
to know about Scott and about the author of Waverley whether they are the 
same. And he did not want to know about Scott and about Scott whether 
they are the same. Therefore, it is not sufficient to point out, as Frege no 
doubt would have done, that the two propositions differ in meaning or sense. 
Their difference in meaning must bear on what they are about. But neither 
Frege, nor any other adherent of unmitigated mediatism, is able to meet this 
requirement.
Frege would point out that although the proposition or ‘thought’ expressed 
by the sentence “George IV wanted to know whether Scott was the same as 
the author of W averley” actually is about George IV, it only seems to be about 
Scott and the author of W averley. According to him, this proposition actually 
is about the direct sense expressed by the proper name “Scott” in its normal use 
and about the direct sense expressed by “the author of W averley”. That is why 
in this case the identity of reference, required for any legitimate application of 
the principle of substitution, fails.117
According to Russell, however, this explanation is too artificial. It cannot 
be accepted, because George IV wanted to know something about Scott 
himself, not about the sense expressed by his name. Therefore, even if Frege 
were capable of identifying the so-called indirect sense, that would not be 
sufficient to solve puzzle (1) adequately. For in OD that puzzle is deliberately 
put in such a form that George IV wanted to judge the very same ‘judgeable 
content’, which according to Frege would justify the application of the 
principle of substitution, if it were true. Therefore, as an unmitigated mediatist 
and in spite of his having introduced the notion of indirect sense, Frege is 
forced to conclude something that evidently is not true, namely that George 
IV wished to know whether Scott is the same as Scott. Even if he were able to 
identify the indirect sense, he would be forced to this conclusion.
The phrase “inextricable tangle”, used in the last sentence of paragraph G, 
is to be taken for what it is. It is used in order to highlight the very climax of 
the GEA. It indicates a kind of double bind or redoubled predicament resulting 
from the double-edged sword of Russell’s criticism of the third view. As seen 
from his own perspective, this third view is nothing more than the last
117 This has been explained in 0.3.
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convulsion of his former theory of denoting concepts. It does not deserve to 
be adopted; for unmitigated mediatism cannot stand up to the light of day. It 
cannot consciously be embraced or consistently elaborated at all. To Russell, 
who in paragraph D, E, and the first part of F, has demonstrated the fiasco of his 
own former mitigated mediatism, this is evident anyhow.
But to Frege this is not yet evident at all. For Frege actually adopted 
unmitigated mediatism. And the only possible way of adopting it is: in 
confusion. That is why Russell’s criticism of Frege’s unmitigated mediatism 
is similar to Frege’s criticism of psychologism. For according to Frege, 
psychologism can only be adopted in confusion.118 In fact the nature of Frege’s 
view is concealed by the quasi-Russellian notion of indirect sense. For it 
suggests something like participation. It suggests that among all the senses 
referring to one and the same sense S, one is more intimately knit with S than 
all the others.119 Its prerogative seems to be, that it somehow contains S. And 
if it contains S, it must contain it as non-referring, i.e., not as S, but as S. But 
Frege is silent about such a possible further elaboration of his view. That is why 
he seems not to be plagued by banana skins.
Russell mercilessly points out that Frege’s theory is not Fregean enough. It 
contains a vague, half-hearted and rudimentary appeal to different occurrences. 
If these are eliminated -  and they are to be eliminated on account of the axiom 
of externality -  then the so-called indirect sense cannot be identified. And the 
underlying reason why it cannot be identified is equally the reason why, even if 
it could be identified, puzzle (1) cannot be solved. For it requires that the direct 
sense is relevant to the direct referent. This then is the inextricable tangle, the 
redoubled predicament, which primarily and pre-eminently regards Frege.
The phrase “inextricable tangle” has played on the imagination of a lot of 
commentators.120 It has become customary to join it with the definite article in 
order to indicate the problem Russell discovered in OF. This use of the phrase 
is not warranted. For as such the inextricable tangle does not occur in OF at all. 
Of course, the problem of which the inextricable tangle is a pointed version 
actually occurs in OF.121 Evidently, the just-mentioned commentators have 
unconsciously made use of the axiom of externality. For according to it, one 
and the same thing cannot assume different forms. If what occurs in different 
contexts is one and the same, then the difference between these contexts is 
irrelevant. And if the difference between them were relevant, then what occurs 
in one of them would be something different from what occurs in the other.
118 See Frege (1893), pp. XVIII-XIX.
119 See below 25.2.
120 See e.g. Rodriguez-Consuegra (1993) and Noonan (1996).
121 Namely after the conception of the ToD. See 21.2.
Chapter V
Russell and the Fundamental 
Frege
21 From the ToD’s conception to its predicament
21.1 The conception of the ToD
Having extensively explained the pivotal part played by the Frege of indirect 
sense in both the GEA’s genesis and its final conclusion, I shall now, in 
this final chapter, discuss the rather ambiguous role of the fundamental 
Frege. In order to do so I return from the GEA, i.e., from the passage in OD 
corresponding to OF §§ 35-39, to OF itself. I shall start, in this subsection, 
with an attempt to explain OF §40, where the ToD is actually conceived 
on occasion of the problem discussed in §§35-39.122 There, in OF §40, 
the fundamental Frege is not yet visible on the scene. Nevertheless, he is 
inconspicuously present, acting from the prompt-box. The text runs as follows:
It might be supposed that the whole matter could be simplified by 
introducing a relation of denoting: instead of all the complications about 
“C” and C, we might try to put “x denotes y”. But we want to be able to 
speak of what x denotes, and unfortunately “what x denotes” is a denoting 
complex. We might avoid this as follows: Let C be an unambiguously 
denoting complex (we may now drop the inverted commas); then we have
($y):C denotes y: C denotes z.3z.z=y.
Then what is commonly expressed by F  ‘C will be replaced by
($):C denotes y: C denotes z .3 z .z=y : F ‘y
A t first sight the move made by Russell is very surprising. How could 
“the matter be simplified by introducing a relation of denoting”? For “the 
complications about ‘C’ and C” are concerned with the very relation of
147
122 Cf. Makin (1996).
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denoting. According to the first sentence of the GEA, it is “the relation of the 
meaning to the denotation” that “involves certain rather curious difficulties”. 
But the attempt made by Russell in the above-quoted passage does not consist 
in reconsidering the fact that “C ” denotes C, but in introducing denoting 
as a relation between two different entities: x denotes y. W hat is more, 
he introduces the variables x and y in order to avoid denoting complexes 
(indicated by the character C). The formula “x denotes y” is quite different 
from the formula “B denotes C” which I have used in 20.5 in order to 
summarize the third view discussed in the GEA. Of course, Russell does not 
want to adopt this view. The character C is used in such a way that it can be 
substituted by any concrete example whatever of a definitely denoting phrase 
in its normal use. The variables x and y are introduced in order to be used in 
a different way: such that they cannot be substituted by a constant. This pre­
eminently happens, when they act as variables bound by quantifiers.
The aim of Russell’s introducing a relation of denoting is to get rid of 
complexes silently denoting in a direction perpendicular to the propositions 
in which they occur. The implicit relation is to be made explicit. It is to be 
turned ninety degrees. Instead of being presupposed, it is to be stated. And 
it is to be stated in such a way, that the complications about “C” and C are 
avoided. But in order to avoid them, it is not sufficient to explicitly state the 
relation of denoting. For we do not only want to speak about the relation but 
also about its object y. And if we speak about what x denotes, then we re­
introduce a denoting complex.
But this difficulty may be avoided. Quantifiers and bound variables can 
be used in order to state that a definitely denoting concept actually denotes 
something. For if we want to attribute a predicate F  to what is denoted, we 
can repeat the variable y. For we may say: there is one and only one y such that 
x denotes y and y has the property F .
But what about x? It does not occur as a bound variable. W hat is more, in 
fact x is to be replaced by “C”. Therefore, the puzzling inverted commas are 
still there. A t this moment, the fundamental Frege, concealed in his prompt­
box, whispers an important message: “One and only one is a second-order 
property. By means of quantifiers and bound variables it can be attributed to 
first-order properties or concepts. This procedure does not have anything to do 
with denoting, let alone with inverted commas. See Foundations o f Arithmetic, 
§78, point 4”. As seen from Russell’s perspective, this h int may be assimilated 
as follows. Frege uses the notion of concept in a different way. But nearest to 
what he calls concepts or properties are what in POM are called propositional 
functions. And these may just as well be derived from a simple proposition 
containing a predicate such as ‘human’ as from a proposition containing a class
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concept such as ‘man’. Now, according to POM §57 all denoting concepts 
are derived from class-concepts. Therefore to each unambiguously denoting 
concept corresponds a propositional function. It may be obtained by dropping 
the definite article and replacing it by “y is-a”. From the denoting concept 
“the so and so”, we get the propositional function “y is-a so and so”. The latter 
inverted commas may be dropped the moment the variable y is bound by 
quantifiers. For then the constant part of the propositional function occurs as 
meaning.
The usual way of explaining the ToD is as follows. Sentences containing 
unambiguously denoting phrases, especially sentences of the form “The S is P”, 
express propositions whose logical structure is different from the one suggested 
by natural language. The real logical structure may be revealed by means of 
paraphrase. “The S is P” is to be translated into: One and only one entity is S 
and it is P. Or more formally: 3y[S(y)AVz(S(z)^z=y)AP(y)]
This explanation does not reveal the actual genesis of the ToD. In the 
above-quoted passage from OF, its genesis is actually contained. But it is 
not at all easy to understand it. Its most intriguing and dialectical feature is 
that the problematic relation of denoting and the puzzling inverted commas 
are integrated into the proposition in order to get rid o f them. This may be 
illustrated by introducing intermediate steps between “The S is P” and its final 
translation.
If we say “The S is P”, then, according to the theory of denoting concepts, 
we presuppose something which is not stated, namely that “the S” denotes 
the S. In the GEA the attempt is discussed to state this and to explain the 
difference and the connection between “the S” and the S. From the failure of 
this attempt we might conclude that it is preferable to remain silent about the 
drawback of the proposition. But Russell’s strategy is directly opposed to this 
option. He wants to put the proposition’s dark side in the limelight. Following 
this procedure without any qualification, we get:
(a) “The S” denotes the S and it is P
Evidently this paraphrase is unhelpful. But it may be transformed. Instead of 
the full problematic side of the proposition, we only assimilate its homeopathic 
dilution, namely that “the S” denotes something. The essence of this procedure 
is, that unambiguously denoting is ambiguously stated. In this way we get:
(b) “The S” unambiguously denotes something and it is P
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Now, as soon as we realize that “the S” denotes something if and only if 
one and only one entity is an S, both the inverted commas and the relation of 
denoting can be eliminated. In this way we get the final paraphrase.
21.2 The ToD as challenging denoting
As seen from the perspective of its actual genesis, the ToD is essentially the 
possible successor of the theory of denoting concepts. It challenges the validity 
of the latter theory. This challenge may be extended by a criticism of Frege’s 
theory of sense and reference. As such the new theory has been put forward in 
an article on denoting .
According to the GEA, paragraph G, “the whole distinction of meaning 
and denotation has been wrongly conceived”. It has been conceived in such 
a way, that the meaning of a denoting phrase is not relevant to what the 
proposition is about. In which way does the ToD correct for this failure? By 
assuming “that denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but 
that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning.” 
(OD, paragraph 4). In fact this statement is rather confusing. For it sounds like 
degrading the meaning, whereas according to the GEA, its upgrading is required. 
Somehow the meaning’s excessive submissiveness has to disappear.
This difficulty may be explained as follows. The submissiveness of the 
meaning is based on cooperation. In the theory of denoting concepts the 
different parts of the meaning, that expressed by “the” and that expressed by 
“so and so”, are supposed to constitute one complex whole, which denotes the 
denotation. And as such, i.e., as denoting together the parts submit themselves 
to the denotation. Therefore, if a denoting phrase is not any more supposed 
to have one unitary meaning, the unwanted altruism of the meaning has 
disappeared. The remaining parts each live their own life without being 
denoting. They  do have meaning in themselves. So, in fact only the marriage 
between “the” and “so and so” is exposed as mere appearance, not the parties 
engaged in it. The statement that denoting phrases do not have any meaning 
in themselves amounts to the same as the statement that all meanings are non­
denoting. Therefore, what seems to be a degradation of the meaning is in fact 
the emancipation of its remaining parts.
The source of the difficulty is that according to the ToD, an emancipation 
of a denoting meaning is impossible. The GEA suggests that the relation of 
the meaning to the denotation is to be conceived in a different way. O n that 
account, we expect the very same meaning to be upgraded as denoting. But 
according to the axiom of external difference, that is impossible. W hat the
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ToD proposes is: disappearance of denoting, i.e., of denoting meanings and 
emancipation of something else, namely their remaining parts.
In fact the ToD is more radical than Russell makes us believe. For in OD 
he generally uses the expression “denoting phrase” without scare quotes.123 
But if denoting meanings are to disappear according to the ToD, then the very 
reason for calling a phrase denoting disappears as well. For it only deserves 
to be called denoting on account of its expressing a denoting meaning. If it 
only seems to express such a meaning, it only seems to be denoting. O n that 
account it might be called a “denoting phrase”.
Upgrading the remaining parts of the meaning by breaking their submissive 
union corresponds to degrading the denotation. This, of course, does not 
imply that what seemed to be denoted has to disappear, but only that its being 
denoted is supposed to be mere appearance. O n that account it may be called 
“denotation”, i.e., the so-called denotation.
Consequently a proposition in whose verbal expression an unambiguously 
“denoting phrase” occurs, may by accident be about the “denotation” of 
that phrase. But it can never be about the “denotation” in virtue of its being 
expressed by a sentence containing the denoting phrase. The proposition 
expressed by “The author of Waverley is the same as Scott” is actually about 
Scott, because he is named by name. But it only seems to be about the so- 
called author of Waverley. It seems to tell us that someone in particular is the 
same as Scott, whereas in fact it tells us that one and only one entity wrote 
Waverley and that it is the same as Scott. The property of being the same as 
Scott is not attributed to anyone in particular. That is why the proposition 
expressed by “Scott is the same as Scott” differs significantly from the 
proposition expressed by “The author of Waverley is the same as Scott”. They 
differ in what they are about. For in the former Scott occurs twice, whereas in 
the latter he only occurs once.
These considerations yield a twofold result. In the fist place they show how 
the ToD proposes to escape from the inextricable tangle. In this way it throws 
a fresh light on George IV’s curiosity. That is the other, positive side of the link
123 Except in OD’s very first sentence where so-called denoting phrases are intro­
duced. For quite other reasons, that sentence will be explained in 22.1.
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with puzzle (1). It actually occurs in OF §40. For immediately after the above­
quoted passage Russell says:
Thus e.g. F  ‘(the author of W averley) becomes
($y): “the author of Waverley” denotes y: “the author of Waverley” denotes
z.3z.z=y: F  ‘y
Thus “Scott is the author of Waverley” becomes
($y): “the author of Waverley” denotes y: “the author of Waverley” denotes
z.3z.z=y:Scott=y
This, then, was what surprised people as well as it might.
In the second place the question as to which modest role is left to the 
“denotation” can now be answered (see also OD paragraph 28). It does not 
act anymore as something the proposition is about, unless it happens to be 
mentioned by name. It actually plays the role of a truth-maker. If a proposition 
of the form the S is P is true, then there must be one particular entity d such 
that the S is the same as d and P(d). In order to understand the proposition 
that the S is P, you need not be acquainted with the so-called denotation 
unless it happens to be part of the predicate P. But if you investigate whether 
the proposition is true, you may meet d and mention it by name.
21.3 The ToD as challenged by denoting
The previous account of the ToD as challenging denoting is essentially 
incomplete. One crucial question has been ignored, namely: what is a 
proposition expressed by a sentence of the form “the S is P” actually about? If 
it is not, or at least not essentially, about what seems to be denoted by “the S”, 
it must be about something else; maybe not about something else in particular, 
but at any rate about something or other. For as far as I can see, the ToD 
cannot be construed as challenging being about in general. This notion was 
and remains of utmost importance to Russell’s logic. The possible elimination 
of denoting only implies that a particular mode of being about is abandoned, 
not being about in general. W hat is supposed to occur as being denoted by 
a denoting concept occurs as something the proposition is about. But if a 
proposition is about something, it need not per force occur as denoted.
The title of OD is problematic, because it contains a new theory that 
purports to challenge the very notion of denoting. But another title, say, “On 
being about” or “O n being on”, would probably have been more appropriate. 
For the very quintessence of the ToD is: propositions expressed by certain
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sentences differ in what they are about from what those sentences suggest. 
Therefore it is quite remarkable that in OD itself this issue is hardly discussed. 
W hat is more, in OF it is discussed, although in a somewhat different way.
As has been noted in 2.6 and 7.1, it is impossible to understand the context 
of discovery of the ToD, unless one important difference between OF and 
OD is taken into account. In OF the problem concerning the explanation of 
inverted commas is general. Both unambiguously and ambiguously denoting 
concepts are concerned. As applied to the latter, the difficulty may be put in 
the form of an argument. The GEA is such an argument. But the example 
discussed in the crucial §35 of OF, namely “any m an”, could equally well 
give rise to an argument. Let us, for the sake of brevity, call it the A n y  M an  
Argum ent or AMA.
As seen from the perspective of the theory of denoting concepts, the 
difference between these two versions of one and the same basic problem 
is immaterial. That is why in OF§38 Russell harmlessly moves from the 
discussion of C versus “C ” in general to an example. A nd the example happens 
to be an unambiguously denoting concept, namely “the centre of mass of the 
Solar System”. Then, after having made this shift, the ToD is conceived as a 
successful attempt to avoid by means of quantifiers and bound variables the 
problematic inverted commas in case of unambiguously “denoting phrases”.
But then the difference between the GEA and the AM A suddenly gets 
additional importance. For according to the theory of denoting concepts, 
which is above all a theory of ambiguously denoting concepts, the variable 
is to be explained by means of denoting. It is to be construed as any entity.
This point requires an explanation. In the next section I shall discuss its quite 
un-Fregean background. Here I only want to sketch the way in which the 
viability of the ToD is jeopardized by the AM A or rather the AEA, i.e., the 
A n y  Entity Argum ent. It remains in jeopardy, as long as Russell holds on to the 
explanation of the variable by means of the denoting concept “any entity”.
If the problem discovered in OF §35 were confined to unambiguously 
denoting concepts, a conservative version of the ToD would be acceptable. In 
that case it could be construed as providing a reduction of different kinds of 
denoting to one irreducible form of ambiguously denoting, the one expressed 
by “any”. W hat is said in the previous subsection, namely that all meanings are 
non-denoting, would only be applied to “the”, “some”, “a”, “all” and “every”, 
but not to “any”, or at least not to “any entity”. But in fact the problem 
discovered in OF §35 is not confined to unambiguously denoting concepts. As 
AEA it forces Russell to reject the conservative version of the ToD. In OF §44, 
about two pages after the ToD’s conception, Russell actually concludes that “it
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is better to find some other theory”.
But that is not the end of the story. In OF §47, p.387 Russell realizes that a 
different view of the variable is needed in order to save the ToD:
The interesting and curious point is that, by driving denoting back and 
back as we have been doing, we get it all reduced to the one notion of 
any , from which I started at first. This one notion seems to be presupposed 
always, and to involve in itself all the difficulties on account of which we 
have rejected other denoting concepts. Thus we are left with the task of 
concocting de novo a tenable theory of any, in which denoting is not used. 
The interesting point which we have elicited above is that any is genuinely 
more fundamental than other denoting concepts; they can be explained by 
it, but not it by them. And any itself is not fundamental in general, but only 
in the shape of anything.
In other words: the AEA forces Russell to either reject the ToD or to elaborate 
it in such a way that the variable is taken as more fundamental than denoting. 
This marks indeed the essential turning point in OF: from denoting as more 
fundamental than the variable towards an attempt to take the variable as more 
fundamental than denoting. I deliberately use the word “attempt”; for viewed 
from Russell’s perspective, taking the variable as fundamental and irreducible 
is by far not as easy as might be supposed.
A t this juncture the fundamental Frege is invited to leave his prompt 
box and to appear on the scene. I call him “fundamental”, because his 
possible assistance is based on what precedes the distinction between sense 
and reference. He is consulted on account of his view of the variable. The 
question is not whether he might be prepared to accept the theory of definite 
descriptions, but rather whether he could help in fashioning Russell’s theory of 
indefinite descriptions.
In order to understand the role Frege is allowed to play in this connection, 
it is quite important to distinguish the view actually considered and maybe, 
adopted by Russell, from the view Frege himself would have put forward.
This distinction is not made in OF. Nevertheless, it must be made in order 
to adequately describe what happens. Russell actually chooses a rather 
precarious compromise between the conservative and the Fregean version of 
the ToD. According to the former, the variable has meaning in itself and in 
virtue of it ambiguously denotes any entity. According to Frege the variable 
neither has any meaning in itself, nor is it denoting. Russell’s compromise
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consists in assuming that the variable does not have any meaning in itself, but 
nevertheless ambiguously denotes. In other words, something like a shadow of 
denoting, namely denoting without meaning, is retained.
Before discussing the nature of this rather hybrid way of taking the variable 
as fundamental (see section 24.1), I shall first pay attention to the differences 
between Russell and Frege (22) and then to Russell’s misconceptions about 
them (23).
22 Fundamental difference and unsuspected similarity
22.1 The un-Fregean background of OD’s first sentence
The very first sentence of OD is not only longer, but also much more puzzling, 
than the first line of Gray’s Elegy. It runs as follows:
By a “denoting phrase” I mean a phrase such as anyone of the following: a 
man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, 
the present King of France, the centre of mass of the solar system at the first 
instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, 
the revolution of the sun round the earth.
The words “such as” leave room for further examples. But the examples Russell 
has in mind only bears on the choice of “so and so”. He does not want the 
reader to think of similar phrases such as “few men”, “most men” or “each 
man”. According to his former theory, there are five and only five irreducible 
kinds of ambiguously denoting concepts. They are marked by the words a, 
some, any, every and all.
In OD the number of kinds is reduced. For in paragraph 6, both the 
difference between a and some and the difference between every and all is 
supposed to be merely verbal. But nothing is said about any . This remarkable 
silence must in my opinion be due to the role it used to play in the explanation 
of the variable. Indeed, in paragraph 4, Russell boldly states that he takes “the 
notion of the variable as fundamental”. But this statement may be construed 
in different ways. According to the conservative version of the ToD, one 
and only one denoting concept remains, namely the variable “any entity”. In 
the previous section I have explained why in OF this version of the ToD is 
rejected: it is threatened by the AEA. But in OD the AEA is not mentioned. 
Therefore, in no way does Russell prevent the reader of OD from supposing 
him to adopt the conservative version of the ToD. This, I think, is in itself
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sufficient to prove that the emergency assistance rendered by the fundamental 
Frege (to be discussed in 24.1) did not result in an unproblematic solution.
The above-mentioned five-fold classification belongs to the theory of 
denoting concepts.124 But it is derived from a classification preceding that 
theory. For, as said in 13.2, denoting concepts are supposed to replace 
enumerations. According to Russell, there are five and only five kinds of 
enumeration. And, however important denoting concepts are supposed to 
be, they do not require any new classification. The form of an ambiguously 
denoting concept corresponds to the form of enumeration it is supposed to 
replace.
Russell’s classification of enumerations or “combinations” is based on the 
following two main principles. Firstly, it may either be a conjunction or a 
disjunction. Secondly, both may or may not be equivalent to a conjunction or 
disjunction of singular propositions. A t first view this procedure results in four 
kinds of enumeration, namely:
1) “a and b are P” is equivalent to “a is P and b is P”.
2) “a and b are P” is not equivalent to “a is P and b is P”.
3) “a or b is P” is equivalent to “a is P or b is P”.
4) “a or b is P” is not equivalent to “a is P or b is P”.
The combination occurring in case 1) is called propositional conjunction. 
Russell’s example in POM §59, p.56 is: “Brown and Jones are paying court to 
miss Smith.” This conjunction is called propositional, because it is equivalent 
to a conjunction of singular propositions, not because it is identical with it.
In POM Russell repeatedly emphasizes that different propositions may be 
equivalent and that therefore equivalence is not sufficient for proving them to 
be identical.125 In OD this un-Fregean principle is less pre-eminent.126 A t any 
rate, if a propositional conjunction is replaced by a denoting concept, then the 
specific way it ambiguously denotes, will be indicated by the word every.
Conjunctions of the second type are called numerical. The rather un- 
Fregean example is: “Brown and Jones are two of Miss Smith’s suitors.” A ll 
indicates the corresponding form of ambiguously denoting concepts.
124 See also Dau (1986).
125 See e.g. POM §48, p.45, where it is applied to “Socrates is human” and “Hu­
manity belongs to Socrates”. See also POM §219, pp.228-220, where it is applied 
to propositions like “5>3” and “3<5”.
126 That it is less pre-eminent in OD is evident e.g., from paragraph 6. That it is 
still there, appears from paragraph 32, footnote.
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Numerical propositions are of utmost importance to the genesis of Russell’s 
realism. Because they are not equivalent to, let alone identical with, a 
conjunction of singular propositions, they are pre-eminently suitable for 
disproving the logic and metaphysics of substance. If eventually, “in the 
last analysis”, whatever is true can be reduced to singular subject-predicate 
propositions, then there cannot be real plurality! For only together many 
individuals become many.127
Disjunctions are treated in the same way. However, Russell’s terminology 
is somewhat puzzling. In case 3) we expect him to speak about “propositional 
disjunction”, but actually he calls it “constant disjunction”. The reason behind 
this terminology will become intelligible as soon as the remaining cases are 
discussed. Be this as it is, the example is: “Miss Smith will marry Brown or 
Jones.” The corresponding denoting concept will be prefixed by some.
The disjunction, which is not equivalent to a disjunction of singular 
propositions is illustrated by: “If it was one of Miss Smith’s suitors, it must have 
been Brown or Jones”. From this proposition it can neither be inferred that 
it must have been Brown, nor that it must have been Jones. Just as “two” can 
neither be truly predicated of Brown, or of Jones, so the necessity indicated by 
“must” only regards one o f the two, but not one in particular. That is why Russell 
calls it variable disjunction. The corresponding denoting concept is prefixed by 
a.
If the variable disjunction is called “variable” because the predicate is not 
true of some one in particular, than it is quite reasonable to speak about a 
“constant conjunction” because the predicate is true of some one in particular 
although we may as yet not know which one.
A t first view, the above-sketched four-fold division seems to be exhaustive. 
Indeed it is, if we assume as a matter of course that a conjunction of terms is 
only to be compared with a conjunction of propositions and a disjunction of 
terms with a disjunction of properties. But an oblique equivalence may also be 
taken into account. In principle this could give rise to two additional cases. 
However, Russell only considers one of them, namely a disjunction of terms 
being equivalent to a conjunction of singular propositions.
Schematically: (5) “a or b is P” is equivalent to “a is P and b is P”.
The corresponding example is: “If it was Brown or Jones you met, it was a very 
ardent lover”. This mode of combination is called variable conjunction. As it is,
127 See Russell (1900), §10, p.12.
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as Russell says128, “half way between a conjunction and a disjunction”, it could 
equally well have been called a disjunction, say a “general disjunction”. It is 
also halfway between the regular equivalence of (1) and (3) and the regular 
non-equivalence of (2) and (4). Therefore (5) may be put in the middle of the 
square marked by (1), (2), (3) and (4). Variable conjunction may be expressed 
in saying: it does not matter which one you choose. That is why the corresponding 
denoting concept is prefixed by any. The variable may be substituted by 
whatever constant you wish.
Any, when combined with the unrestricted notion of entity or term  is 
supposed to explain the variable. Any entity whatever is such, that something 
is true or false about it. But however important the denoting concept “any 
entity” may be, the class-concept “entity” may occur otherwise, say as a 
predicate, and the specific form of ambiguously denoting indicated by “any” 
may be derived from another class-concept. In this connection the principle 
that equivalent propositions may be different, is of essential importance. Let us 
compare the following three propositions:
(a) Every man is mortal
(b) Any man is mortal
(c) Vx (x is a m a n ^ x  is mortal)
According to the theory of denoting concepts, these three propositions are 
equivalent. They imply each other. Nevertheless, they are different, because 
they are not about the same combination of entities. In propositions (a) and
(b), the same material is involved, but it is combined in a different way.
The denotation of “every man” differs from the denotation of “any man”. 
Furthermore, in (c) the material of combination is also different. This 
proposition is not about men, but about any entity. Let us, for the sake of 
completeness, take two other propositions into account, namely:
(d) All men constitute mankind
(e) All men are mortal
If the word “all” is construed in the way fixed by Russell, then (d) is true, but 
(e) is false. For men are not mortal together. Therefore (e) is not equivalent to, 
let alone identical with, (a), (b) or (c).
Now the change effectuated by the conservative version of the ToD, or -  
what amounts to the same -  the conservative way of taking the variable as 
fundamental, is, in spite of its conservatism, quite considerable. According to
128 POM §59, p.57.
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this view, the propositions (a), (b), (c) and (e) are identical. Their difference 
is supposed to be merely verbal. And among them one, namely (c), actually 
reveals the true structure of the proposition, whereas (a), (b) and (e) conceal 
it. As far as “every”, “all” and “any” are concerned, one and only one denoting 
concept remains, namely “any entity”. The same procedure may be applied to 
“some”, “a” and to the existential quantifier, which can by means of negation 
be derived from the universal one. Taking into account the original paraphrase 
of sentences containing unambiguously denoting phrases, we get a simplified 
theory in which all apparent forms of denoting are reduced to one indefinable 
and archetypal case.
22.2 Russell’s way of opposing traditional logic
Russell’s sketched classification of enumerations or combinations has as its 
counterpart a classification of relations.129 Both are, at least partly, conceived 
with an eye to a possible reduction to singular subject-predicate propositions. 
Plural and especially numerical propositions are bracketed together with 
relational propositions. They are supposed to be the most simple types of non­
singular propositions.130 In POM §94, p.95 Russell says:
Next after subject-predicate propositions come two types of propositions 
which appear equally simple. These are the propositions in which a relation 
is asserted between two terms, and those in which two terms are said to be 
two.
The two types differ from each other. For in plural propositions the order 
of enumeration is logically irrelevant, whereas in relational propositions 
it is of quintessential importance.131 Furthermore, relations are themselves 
constituents of the proposition, whereas conjunction or disjunction of terms 
does not add anything to the enumerated terms. They only indicate the mode 
of their combination. In the proposition expressed by “Brown is older than 
Jones”, the words “older than” represent a connecting constituent of the 
proposition. In propositions like that expressed by “Brown and Jones are two”,
129 The classification of relations has played a prominent role in Russell’s revolt 
against idealism. See Russell (1899), in which asymmetrical relations play more or 
less the same role as numerical propositions. See also Griffin (1991), Chapter 8. Cf. 
above 4.2.
130 Cf. 9.2, footnote 85.
131 See POM, Chapter XXVI, §§208-216, pp.218-226.
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the word “and” does not represent anything connecting Brown and Jones.
A n attempt to reduce relational propositions to singular subject-predicate 
propositions had actually been made by Leibniz. According to him, the 
proposition that Brown is older than Jones is only about Brown, not about 
Jones. It may be construed as: Brown is (older than Jones). Indeed, Leibniz 
does not want to suggest that only Brown is concerned. But Jones is the single 
subject of another proposition, namely: Jones is (younger than Brown). So, 
what seems to be something between two subjects is supposed to consist of 
converse relational predicates, each to be attributed to one single subject.
Leibniz’s reductionist approach is not arbitrary. It is based on an attempt 
to elaborate more consistently the logic and metaphysics of substance than 
most Aristotelians were used to do.132 The general principle of traditional, 
Aristotelian logic might be called the principle of the privileged subject. W hat 
is true of something is more general and therefore less real than that of which 
it is true. For what is universal is only true of what is less universal. The more 
universal exists only in what is less universal. Every true proposition is such 
that the predicate is in the subject (predicatum in-est subiecto).133 Colours 
are qualities, red is a colour and some roses are red. But in the last analysis, 
qualities only exist in being coloured in such and such a way. And a particular 
shade of red eventually only exists in red individuals. W hatever is not an 
individual substance is ideal, not real. It is only conceptual and does not 
have any other being beyond being thought by real human thinkers or being 
understood by God.
In his rather idiosyncratic version of neo-Hegelian idealism, Russell made 
a loose use of the notion of substance. He did so in order to contrast the 
“abstract” character of geometrical space with a more “concrete” manifold. In 
geometry points and lines do not have any other being but being related to 
each other. Therefore their very reality seems to be jeopardized. For a relation 
cannot be real unless it is grounded in intrinsic properties of its bearers. 
Geometrical space is “abstract” because it lacks the required “thinghood” or 
“substantiality”.134
In M y Philosophical Development, Russell says:
I first realized the importance of the question of relations when I was 
working on Leibniz. I found -  what books on Leibniz failed to make clear 
-  that his metaphysic was explicitly based upon the doctrine that every 
proposition attributes a predicate to a subject and (what seemed to him
132 Cf. 0.2 and 18.5.
133 See Leibniz (1686), section VIII, p.433.
134 Cf. 0.2.
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almost the same thing) that every fact consists of a substance having a 
property. I found that this same doctrine underlies the systems of Spinoza, 
Hegel and Bradley, who, in fact, all developed the doctrine with more 
logical rigour than is shown by Leibniz.
The lesson Russell learned from Leibniz is that the notion of substance and 
being-in is incompatible with the reality of relations, plurality, universals, 
space and time. In fact Russell had never deliberately rejected the reality of 
relations and plurality. But from Leibniz’s lesson he concluded that the only 
way to save the reality of relations is: elaborating a logic and metaphysics 
without the notion of substance and the notion of being-in annexed to it. This 
project constitutes the drive behind the logic of POM.
Viewed from this perspective, the traditional principle of privileged being 
about is to be rejected because it restricts both reality and the scope and variety 
of propositions. Reality is restricted to the model of substance: being in itself, 
having private properties, called “accidents” and not being in something else. 
And propositions, which are not about such a single substance, are eventually 
supposed to be reducible to propositions attributing an individual accident to 
an individual substance.
Therefore a realist logic must be based on the principle o f the unrestricted 
subject.135 In order to elaborate it, Russell has to start with an alternative 
analysis of the subject-predicate proposition. According to Leibniz, there must 
be a reason why it is true that Socrates is human, namely that the predicate 
“human” actually is in Socrates. According to Russell, being-in is to be rejected 
and with it the so-called reason why what is true is true. A  true subject- 
predicate proposition is not made true by its subject or by a fact concerning it. 
Truth is indefinable. A  true proposition just is a fact.
Subject and predicate are not opposed by having the other in itself versus 
being in the other, but simply by occurring as something the proposition is 
about versus occurring as something the proposition is not about. But the 
predicate is no less real than the subject. For it must be capable of occurring
135 Landini (1998) has stressed the importance of the “unrestricted variable” to 
Russell’s logic. It is preserved in the Ramified Theory of Types. But as far as Leibniz 
is concerned, I disagree with Landini. In my opinion he wrongly suggests that 
Russell once adopted from Leibniz the Scholastic principle Quodlibet Ens est Unum  
(pp.3-7). Russell’s entities are not perforce one, but may occur as one. This is a 
subtle, but very consequential difference. A Russellian thing resembles a substance, 
because it cannot occur otherwise than as one. But Russell proudly accepts a lot 
of entities which are not things and are nevertheless not less real: concepts and 
combinations of entities. Initially the latter are supposed to be entities as well. For 
they may occur as one.
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as subject in another proposition. Otherwise it would be something of which 
nothing is true or false. In this way we enter the view explained in 9.2.
Evidently the next step consists in considering elementary non-singular 
propositions, i.e., the above-mentioned plural and relational propositions. 
After having studied their classification, the notion of denoting is introduced. 
Although in 13.3 some attention has been paid to its importance, I want to 
conclude this subsection by explaining its reflexive character.
In The Philosophy o f Leibniz §7, p.8, Russell says: “That all sound philosophy 
should begin with an analysis of propositions, is a truth too evident, perhaps, 
to demand a proof’. This statement sounds as if Russell never had been of a 
different opinion. Nevertheless, it is one of the things he learned from Leibniz. 
But he also learned from him that it is difficult to carry it out consistently. For 
there is no vantage point outside the realm of propositions from which they 
might be analyzed. The analysis itself consists of propositions (see also 14.2). 
Look at any subject-predicate proposition and you will observe that different 
constituents are contained in it. This very fact does not fit into the mould of 
a subject-predicate proposition. It is itself a plural proposition, a proposition 
about different items. Look at any subject-predicate proposition and you will 
see that the proposition is about the subject. Being about is a dyadic relation. 
The proposition that the proposition “Socrates is human” is about Socrates, 
is itself a relational proposition. Therefore, there is no need to study different 
kinds of sentences extensively in order to discover new forms of propositions. 
The same argument is equally applicable to the question whether there are 
denoting concepts. If there are none, then every proposition must be such 
that it contains what it is about. Any term of a proposition would occur in it 
as one of its constituents just as Socrates occurs in the proposition expressed 
by “Socrates is human”. Now, this very assumption is a proposition about 
any proposition. It is about infinitely many propositions. Even if they were 
contained in an infinitely complex proposition, we would not be able to 
understand it. Therefore, the very assumption that there are no denoting 
concepts would be unintelligible to us, if there were no denoting concepts. 
This does not prove that there must be denoting concepts, but it proves that 
if there were none, we would not be able to ask whether there are any. The 
very pinnacle of the principle of the unrestricted subject is to be found in 
propositions about any entity, i.e., propositions in which the unrestricted 
variable occurs.
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From the very start, i.e., already in his idealist phase, Russell wanted to be, as a 
philosopher, open-minded with respect to the sciences. Frege, by contrast, was 
a professional mathematician, gravely dissatisfied with the way his science and 
especially arithmetic, was being practised. He admired Euclid’s achievement 
in geometry and he hoped to become himself the Euclid of modern arithmetic. 
Frege concerned himself with just as much -and  as little -  philosophy as he 
deemed to be a prerequisite for saving the scientific character of his beloved 
science.
W hy was Frege so much dissatisfied with the state of arithmetic in his 
days? The answer can be dug up from the introduction to his mathematical 
dissertation.136 There he points out that in modern times new kinds of 
numbers, not accepted by the Greeks, had gradually been adopted: irrational, 
negative and imaginary numbers. Frege is not opposed to this extension as 
such, but to the way it has been effectuated namely, by means of an appeal to 
geometrical intuition (Anschauung). The introduction of new kinds of numbers 
has been justified by representing them as points or extensions on a line or in 
a plane. Frege wants to justify the new numbers in a different way, by restoring 
the classical Greek separation of arithmetic from geometry! Identifying a 
number, say V2, with an extension is based on a confusion, according to him.
A  certain length may be associated with that number, provided it is compared 
by another length acting as comparative unit. A  proportion of lengths may 
illustrate V2. W hat is more, the same proportion may be found between areas, 
weights or electrical resistances. Therefore, there is nothing particularly 
geometrical about V2. That number is unimaginable and free from whatever 
measurable magnitude. The basic principles of arithmetic cannot be based on 
some kind of sensual intuition; they must be purely logical.
Now, if logic happens to be a province of philosophy, then qua 
mathematician the mathematician has to concern himself with philosophy.
But unfortunately, according to Frege, the very same kind of confusion can 
be found in traditional logic: the confusion between what is shared by many 
and the many sharing it. W ith this observation Frege obtains a very unusual 
and original philosophical point of view. From Thales onwards, Western 
philosophers have seriously tried to reconcile unity and plurality. According 
to Frege by contrast, the real difficulty is to clearly distinguish them from each 
other.
The Fregean distinction between what is shared by many and the many 
sharing it may be applied in many different ways. For comparing Frege with
22.3 Frege’s way of opposing traditional logic
136 See Frege (1874), pp.50-51 as compared with Frege (1885), p.107.
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Russell, one basic application is of pre-eminent importance: that concerning 
the question at the extent to which the traditional distinction between subject 
and predicate is logically relevant. According to Frege, this question can be 
settled by investigating whether different sentences may have the same proof- 
value. If they have, i.e., if in all possible proofs they may be substituted for each 
other without impairing the validity of the inference concerned, then their 
semantic difference is logically irrelevant, irrespective of its importance to 
human discourse.
In Begriffssschrift Frege illustrates this by means of the following two 
sentences:
Near Plataeae the Greeks conquered the Persians
Near Plataeae the Persians were conquered by the Greeks
According to Frege these two sentences have the same proof-value. They 
are logically equivalent. Nevertheless they differ semantically. W hat is more, 
they differ in what they primarily are about. The former sentence is primarily 
about the Greeks, the latter primarily about the Persians. Therefore, the 
difference between subject and predicate, i.e., between a constituent the 
proposition is about and another constituent the proposition is not about, is 
logically irrelevant. The distinction is merely one in emphasis made in human 
interaction.137
This view does not imply that ‘being about’ is logically irrelevant, but 
only selective, unequal ‘being about’! The distinction between subject and 
predicate may be restored, provided their difference is supposed to be based on 
something else. This actually happens in the course of Frege’s development. 
Three years later he introduces the distinction between concept and object.138 
The concept is said to have a “predicative nature”.139 So, concept and object 
are opposed as “predicate” and “subject”, but not in the way that is supposed 
to be logically irrelevant in Begriffsschrift. They are dissimilar in shape. The 
proposition expressed by “Socrates is human” is just as much about Socrates as 
about the concept expressed by “.... is human”.
According to Frege, there is no problem at all in speaking about a concept, 
provided we actually use an incomplete expression. We only get involved 
in difficulties the moment we try to speak about a concept by means of a 
complete expression. “The concept human” is a complete expression and
137 See Frege (1879), p.3.
138 See Frege (1882), p.92. There, as far as I know, the first appearance of this 
distinction is to be found.
139 Frege (1892c), p.168.
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therefore can only name an object, not a concept. Actually it names not the 
concept itself, but an object derived from it, namely its extension.
Thus far the problem seems to be very simple. A nd it actually is simple 
as long as we take for granted that the word “object” can be used to name 
objects, and the word “concept” to name what differs in shape from objects. 
We are so much used to the assumption that if something really is such and 
such, it can be called after what it is, namely such and such. For example, we 
see something of which it is true that it is a horse and then say: “Hello horse”. 
According to Frege however, this assumption is due to the very same kind of 
confusion we have met before, the confusion between the many individuals 
having something in common with what they have in common. It is promoted 
by an unsuspected ambiguity of natural language.
“Horse” is a general word. As predicate it belongs to the right side of “is” 
and cannot be conceived without it. Together with “is” and the indefinite 
article it constitutes a genuine, but incomplete expression, namely “.... is a 
horse”. This expression unambiguously names one specific predicate. If you 
want to name one of the objects of which this predicate is true, you ought to 
use a proper name such as “Bucephalus”. Now, we may also consider the word 
“object” as used by Frege. In fact the same applies to it. It names a concept, 
namely the one named “.... is an object”.
But what about the word “concept” as used by Frege? As long as we remain 
faithful to natural language, there is no reason whatever to assume that it 
differs significantly from “horse’ or “object”. Originally it belongs to the 
expression “.... is a concept”. This expression names a particular concept that 
can be truly or falsely predicated of so-called objects named by a complete 
expression. But Frege primarily introduced the word “concept” in order to 
predicate it truly of concepts like the one expressed by “.... is a horse”. But 
the concept named “.... is a concept” cannot be significantly predicated of 
a concept similar to the one named “... is a horse”. This, then, is the real 
difficulty: by means of the word “concept”, he wants to do more than natural 
language allows him.140 He wants to introduce a second-order predicate, 
i.e., a predicate whose argument place can be occupied by something like 
the concept named “... is a horse”. In a concept script such a predicate can 
be expressed by means of a quantifier and a bound variable, for example as 
follows:
V x{F (x)v -  F  (x)}
140 Cf. Frege’s letter to Russell, July 28, 1902 in Frege (1976), pp.222-224.
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If for the open argument-place indicated by the free variable f  we substitute 
the concept named “.... is a horse”, we get the following true proposition:
Vx{x is a horse v  — x is a horse}
This proposition is just as much about the concept named “... is a horse” 
as about the second order concept symbolized by the remaining part of the 
sentence. Just as the difference between first-order concepts and objects is 
a dissimilarity in shape, so is the difference between second- and first-order 
concepts. According to Frege, the bound variable does not have any meaning 
in itself. It is just an accessory part of the genuine symbol naming the second- 
order predicate. If the variable had any meaning in itself, it would ambiguously 
indicate objects. But according to Frege ambiguity is foreign to the nature of 
logic. The variable’s sole role is: raising the level of discourse from objects to 
concepts.
Nevertheless, the variable is restricted. It shows the form of an object, 
without mentioning any object. The free variable f  ( ) shows another form, the 
form of a first-order concept. Therefore, it is restricted as well. In this way we 
get a hierarchy of types. So, we are tempted to say that Frege does distinguish 
different types or categories of entities. But exactly because he does distinguish 
types, he does not accept the transcendental notion of “entity” or something 
like it. W hatever you want to speak about belongs to a definite type in virtue 
of its shape. Therefore, this very statement is illegitimate. The best and 
only way to accept it is in silence. However, as will be explained in the next 
subsection, this quasi-Wittgensteinian feature of Frege’s logic is to be put in 
perspective.
22.4 Sense, reference and Frege’s rapprochement to Russell
By means of the distinction between sense and reference Frege, introduces 
something very much like a transcendental notion. For that distinction may 
be represented by a dividing line parallel to the sentence and perpendicular to 
the lines marking the differences in type. A nd these differences in type are in 
fact nothing else but dissimilarities in shape between the parts constituting the 
sentence or its content. The sentence “Socrates is human” is itself a genuine 
and complete expression. According to Frege, it consists of two dissimilar 
parts. One of them, namely the proper name “Socrates”, is just as complete as 
the whole sentence in which it occurs. The other constituent, the remaining 
part of the sentence “... is human”, is incomplete but nevertheless just as
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genuine as “Socrates” or the sentence as a whole. Both the sentence as a whole 
and each of its genuine parts have sense and reference. Just as “Socrates” 
is complete, so its sense and its reference, viz. Socrates himself. A nd the 
expression “... is human” is incomplete in the same way as are its sense and its 
reference: it can be completed by something complete.
In this way the distinction between sense and reference is both type­
indifferent and complexity-indifferent. If a certain expression has sense and 
reference, then all three must be of the same type. If Socrates is an object, then 
both his proper name and the sense expressed by it must equally be objects. 
Furthermore, if a genuine expression is composed of genuine parts, then the 
very same complexity is to be found in both its sense and its reference. In other 
words, the opposition between sense and reference is not based on a contrast 
in complexity. That is one of the reasons why Frege’s theory is significantly 
different from Russell’s theory of denoting concepts.
Nevertheless, in virtue of this remarkable difference, Frege is forced to 
meet Russell! For although according to Frege, each variable is restricted to 
one particular type, within that type each variable is unrestricted. A  first-order 
concept must be defined for all possible objects, without any exception.141 
Otherwise it is not a genuine concept at all. Maybe this view is contestable.
A t any rate, the later W ittgenstein vehemently criticized it.142 But in this 
connection I am not discussing the validity of Frege’s logic, but only its 
nature. A nd its nature is such that it would be preposterous and completely 
un-Fregean to assume that, for example, the sense of a complete expression 
would be an exceptional kind of unmentionable object, beyond the range of 
significance of first-order concepts. In other words, if by the introduction of 
the distinction between sense and reference, new kinds of objects are to be 
adopted, they must be treated as genuine objects, being capable of occurring 
as something that a thought can be about. Just as there are objects of which 
the predicate named “...is a horse” can be truly predicated, so there must 
be objects of which the predicate “.... is a sense” can be truly predicated. 
Otherwise the introduction of the notion of sense would be vacuous. The same 
argument can be applied to different types of incomplete senses.143
By far not everything in Frege’s universe is a sense. But anything whatever, 
be it a sense or something else, is referred to by innumerable senses. And 
this “being referred to” is supposed to be completely independent of human 
language. For the relation of sense to its reference (Frege prefers to say that the 
sense determines its reference) is not “linguistic through the phrase”.
141 See Frege (1891), p.135 and Frege (1903), §56, p.69-70.
142 Wittgenstein (1953), Part I, §71.
143 See Frege (1892b).
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Senses are specific kinds of “entities”, but they cannot be confined in an 
ontological prison. For they are everywhere, in any category, and they are 
around everything, even around every sense. Therefore the notion of reference 
is pre-eminently transcendental. For absolutely everything is a reference, i.e., 
is something about which some things are true or false. This, then, is a very 
remarkable similarity with Russell, a similarity due to the introduction of sense 
and reference!
The importance of this point may be highlighted in taking into account the 
fact that reference and truth-value are linked by Frege. Bedeutung is whatever 
is of importance to, or identical with, the truth-value. A nd truth is directive 
to logic.144 A t first sight this seems to imply that a lot of things, including 
senses, are outside the scope of reference. However, this is only true within 
the limits of a specific context. If we want to know something, a lot of things 
are irrelevant. But maybe, when seen from another point of view, they are. 
Reference is not confined to things human beings happen to be interested 
in. According to Frege, a true thought is nothing else but a fact.145 Therefore 
supposing certain things to be beyond the scope of reference amounts to the 
same as supposing them to be beyond the realm of what facts are concerned 
with.
In Begriffsschrift Frege introduced the sign = for identity of proof-value.146 
He supposed this sign to be synonymous with the sign = used in mathematics. 
Later he realized this assumption to be unwarranted.147 Identity of proof- 
value is stronger than identity in mathematics. By means of Leibniz’s law, i.e., 
the principle of substitution, the latter is allied with identity of truth-value. 
Identity of proof-value implies identity of truth-value, but not the other way 
round. In fact, Frege’s sense is nothing else than proof-value. If in whichever 
proof two expressions can be substituted for each other salva validitate, i.e., 
without impairing its validity, they have the same sense. If two expressions 
can be substituted for each other in any sentence salva veritate, i.e., without 
impairing its truth-value, they have the same reference.
144 See e.g. Frege (1918), p.342.
145 Ibid. 359.
146 Frege (1879), §8, pp.13-15.
147 Frege (1892a), p.143.
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23 The fundamental Frege as escaping Russell’s perception
23.1 Russell’s misconception of Frege
In the previous subsection I have argued that Frege’s introduction of 
the distinction between sense and reference involves an unsuspected 
rapprochement to Russell. The applicability of the GEA’s last part to Frege is 
based on what this rapprochement consists in, viz., the principle that any sense 
or any meaning must be such that a proposition can be about it without being 
about an expression expressing that sense or meaning. W hat is more, I have 
advocated that the GEA, in virtue of its quasi-Fregean origin, is more pre­
eminently valid as criticism of Frege than as criticism of Russell’s former theory 
of denoting concepts. For an appeal to a special kind of occurrence is still open 
to Russell, but is foreign to the nature of Frege’s logic.
This rather unorthodox view seems to imply that I do not worry about 
Russell’s possible misunderstandings of Frege’s logic in general and of his 
theory of sense and reference in particular. In this section I shall discuss these 
misunderstandings in order to show why, in my opinion, they leave the validity 
of the GEA untouched in spite of their weighty consequences. Their main 
impact consists in limitations imposed upon the role Frege has been allowed 
to play in OD. In the next subsection I shall illustrate this in view of the un- 
Meinongian Frege.
Russell’s main misconception of Frege can be found in the very first point 
of difference mentioned in Appendix A  of POM. There (§475, p.501) Russell 
says: “Frege does not think that there is a contradiction in the notion of 
concepts which cannot be made logical subjects”. Evidently Russell has in 
mind Frege’s saying: “it is a mere illusion to suppose that a concept can be 
made an object without altering it”.148 W hat Frege actually means has been 
explained in 22.3. The difference between concept and object is construed as 
a categorical difference, displayed by a dissimilarity in shape. It does not have 
anything to do with inequality in being, or not being, the subject matter of a 
proposition. Russell wrongly identifies Frege’s objects with logical subjects.
In this way Frege’s view is not, as Geach seems to suppose, “distorted into 
his own mould”, i.e., Russell’s mould, but depicted as being more strongly 
opposed to it than it actually is. In fact Russell perceives what deviates 
from his own mould as if it were opposed to it. In his eyes Frege appears as 
collaborating with traditional logic. And maybe in Frege’s, eyes Russell has 
appeared in a similar way: as the logician who fails to radically criticize the
148 Frege (1884), p.X.
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Aristotelian scheme of subject and predicate. In their correspondence this 
point plays a prominent role without ever being cleared up.
This misunderstanding is quite consequential. Russell fails to see why and 
in how far Frege’s theory of sense and reference is more sweeping than his own 
theory of denoting concepts, viz., as it is based on the principle of equality of 
the constituents of a proposition as being something the proposition is about. 
Consequently Frege’s parsing of the proposition and its verbal expression must 
be based on a different principle. In fact it is based on dissimilarity in shape. 
This quite un-Russellian analysis must be completed before the distinction of 
sense and reference can be introduced. For the latter distinction is applied to 
all and only all genuine logical symbols that contribute to expressing what is 
true or false.
This implies that Frege’s distinction is not applied to a lot of expressions 
that might be supposed to deserve it. For example, it cannot be applied to the 
word “is” as it occurs in “Socrates is human”. It cannot even be applied to the 
word “human” in isolation. For only the expression “. .  is human” deserves 
to be called a genuine symbol. It also implies, that some genuine symbols, 
which are used in Frege’s own Begriffsschrift, are not allowed to have sense or 
reference, namely those symbols that mark the framework of proof: the vertical 
judgement stroke and the long horizontal conclusion stroke. They do not 
contribute to expressing what is true or false.
These examples are harmless in so far as Russell never supposed them to 
be capable of having meaning and denotation. But there are other examples, 
which do satisfy this requirement. Already in his Begriffsschrift §9, more than a 
decade before the introduction of the sense-reference distinction, Frege wrote 
that an expression like “every positive integer” does not have any meaning in 
itself!149 The reason behind this view is essentially the same as that formulated 
twenty-six years later by Russell in favour of the ToD: such an expression 
consists of parts that do not really belong together. In his theory of sense and 
reference, Frege remains faithful to this view. Expressions like “every positive 
integer” or “some men” or “any man” do not have sense and reference, because 
they fail to be genuine logical expressions. But according to Russell’s theory 
of denoting concepts, they have meaning and denotation. Here we are faced 
with an unsuspected difference: As far as ambiguously denoting phrases are 
concerned, Russell’s former theory is more sweeping than Frege’s!
This other side of the difference never got through to Russell. In comparing 
Frege’s theory of sense and reference with his own theory of denoting concepts, 
he always left ambiguously denoting phrases aside. W ithin the limits of
149 See Frege (1879), p.17.
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this perspective, he quite well perceived two real interrelated differences. 
Frege’s theory is indifferent towards complexity and is not only applied to 
unambiguously denoting phrases, but to proper names as well. Therefore it is 
more sweeping.
In OD this view is put forward in a rather confusing way. After having 
criticized Meinong in paragraph 10 on account of the contradiction involved 
by the existent present king of France who in fact does not exist but in virtue 
of his very essence is forced to exist, Russell introduces Frege as follows:
The above breach of the law of contradiction is avoided by Frege’s theory. 
He distinguishes, in a denoting phrase, two elements, which we may call 
the meaning and the denotation. “Thus the centre of mass of the solar system 
at the beginning of the twentieth century” is highly complex in meaning, 
but its denotation is a certain point, which is simple. The solar system, the 
twentieth century, etc., are constituents of the meaning; but the denotation 
has no constituents at all.
This account of Frege’s view is in fact an account of Russell’s own view. 
However, Russell is aware of this distortion and then adds the following 
footnote:
Frege distinguishes the two elements of meaning and denotation 
everywhere, and not only in complex denoting phrases. Thus it is the 
meanings of the constituents of a denoting complex that enter into its 
meaning, not their denotation. In the proposition “Mont Blanc is over 1,000 
metres high”, it is, according to him, the meaning of “M ont Blanc”, not the 
actual mountain, that is a constituent of the meaning of the proposition.
If Russell had realized that in another respect Frege’s theory is less sweeping, 
he would have hailed him as precursor of the theory of indefinite descriptions. 
For he used to be overpolite in honouring his predecessors. But in paragraphs 
4, 5 and 6, the part of OD devoted to the discussion of ambiguously denoting 
phrases, only Bradley is mentioned, not Frege!
23.2 The fundamental Frege as un-Meinongian
It is quite remarkable that about four fifths of the part of OD containing its 
famous KFA is devoted to Frege. This is due to the fact, which was discussed 
in our chapter II, that in the period shortly before OD Russell adopted a quasi-
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Fregean view in order to avoid his own former quasi-Meinongianism. That 
is why in OD the main target of Russell’s criticism is Frege, not Meinong. 
Primarily he wants to prove that the un-Meinongian Frege is unable to 
adequately deal with the problem of non-being.
But there is something strange about the way Frege is introduced. He is 
supposed to avoid the Meinongian contradiction in virtue of the distinction 
between sense and reference. But in fact Meinong could probably have made 
a similar distinction without abandoning his firm belief in unreal objects.
A nd although Frege never mentioned Meinong, his attitude was distinctly 
un-Meinongian long before he adopted the theory of sense and reference. In 
other words, the un-Meinongian Frege who appears in OD is unduly isolated 
from the fundamental one. In order to show this, I shall start with the question 
concerning the way in which the fundamental Frege is un-Meinongian. In the 
next subsection I shall discuss puzzle (3), in which the climax of the KFA is 
reached. In doing so, I shall deliberately and as long as possible postpone the 
introduction of the distinction between sense and reference.
Meinong’s view may be summarized in two points.150 Firstly, the universe of 
scientific and philosophical discourse is wider than reality. We can judge and 
think about what is not real. Scientists may discover that what was supposed 
to be real is in fact unreal, for example the proportion of natural numbers 
whose square is 2. Secondly, although something (a proposition or ‘objective’, 
as Meinong used to call it) may be true or false about something unreal, what 
is true or what is a fact, is real and what is false is unreal. A  real fact may be 
about something unreal and an unreal fact may be about something real. 
Therefore, if we discover that something we supposed to be true is in fact false, 
we discover something about something unreal, namely an unreal “fact” or 
“objective”.
Frege rejects both principles. Firstly, according to him, the universe of 
scientific discourse is “confined” to reality. Therefore it can neither be true nor 
false that something is unreal. If a judgeable content is true about something, 
it must be real. Only what is real can really be named. “Sherlock Holmes” does 
not name an unreal person. It just is a real expression of which it is false that 
it is a name. A nd the word “name”, or more precisely the expression “... is a 
name”, is a real name of a first order-concept.
Secondly, what is false is not less real than what is true. Truth and falsity are 
indefinable. They both presuppose reality. If a false judgeable content would be 
unreal, it could not truly be denied.
Frege’s next step is quite un-Russellian. It consists in the introduction of
150 Cf. 4.1.
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the notion of “existence” in a quite peculiar way, namely as a second order 
predicate which can truly or falsely be applied to first-order concepts, not to 
objects. Frege is led to this view by an approach to numerical propositions 
that is different from the one discussed in 22.1. Russell happened to be 
concerned with Brown and Jones who are two of Mrs. Smith’s suitors. Frege is 
concerned with dissimilarity in shape between the constituents a proposition 
is indifferently about. According to him, the predicate “two” cannot be 
attributed to objects. For if we count, what we count is specified by a concept.
If we want to answer the question “How many suitors has Mrs. Smith?”, then 
that concept is the one named “.... is a suitor of Mrs. Smith”. If the question 
is “How many suitors of Mrs. Smith are mentioned by Russell?”, then another 
concept is involved. But in any event, the number is attributed to one concept. 
It has two or more instances. And this having two is a second-order predicate to 
be expressed by means of quantifiers and their bound variables.
Frege’s favourite number is zero, whereas Russell does not like it at all.151 In 
Die Grundlagen der Arithm etik §46, p.59, he says:
.... the content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept. 
This is perhaps clearest with the number 0. If I say “Venus has 0 moons”, 
there simply does not exist any moon or agglomeration of moons for 
anything to be asserted of; but what happens is that a property is assigned to 
the concept “moon of Venus”, namely that of including nothing under it.
Among numbers zero is pre-eminently allied with existence. For, as Frege 
says in §53: “Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the 
number nought.” A nd denial of existence is in fact nothing but affirmation 
of the number nought. After Galileo had discovered four moons of Jupiter, 
astronomers must have asked whether other planets such as Venus also have 
moons. In doing so, they grasped something real, namely the concept “moon 
of Venus”. And when they finally concluded that Venus has zero moons or 
that moons of Venus do not exist, they denied an equally real second-order 
predicate to the said concept. Nothing unreal was involved. A  concept is not 
less real when nothing falls under it.
Suppose that one of those astronomers had made a mistake and had jumped 
to the conclusion that Venus has one moon. Then he could have exclaimed:
“I have seen the moon of Venus”. Here the definite article appears. According 
to Frege, this is of utmost logical importance. For it indicates the shift from 
concept to object. In §51 he says:
151 See POM, chapter XXII, §§172-177, pp.184-187.
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With a concept the question is always whether anything, and if so what, 
falls under it. With a proper name such questions make no sense. We should 
not be deceived by the fact that language makes use of proper names, for 
instance Moon, as concept words, and vice versa; this does not affect the 
distinction between the two. As soon as a word is used with the indefinite 
article or in the plural without any article, it is a concept word.
How could a more prudent astronomer challenge the opinion of his rash 
colleague? According to Frege, he cannot put forward that the moon of Venus 
does not exist. For if “the moon of Venus” stands for anything at all, it stands 
for an object, not a concept. But he cannot say either that the moon of Venus is 
unreal. For whenever you say something true or false, its subject matter must be 
real. As seen from Frege’s perspective, there is no other possible solution than 
making a linguistic turn. The expression “the moon of Venus” is not a name, 
although it looks like one. In this statement nothing unreal is involved, only truth 
or falsity about real items.
Being not a name amounts to the same as: not naming anything. Therefore, 
the linguistic turn consists in re-introducing something very much like 
“existence”. For the name-like expression “the moon of Venus” plays a similar role 
as the concept “moon of Venus” in the proposition that moons of Venus do not 
exist. Just as the concept has nothing falling under it, so the said expression has no 
reference; it is bedeutungslos, as Frege would say. Indeed there are two differences. 
The purported name is complete and can be named by an equally complete 
expression containing quotation marks. Therefore it is an object, not a concept. 
Furthermore, if it actually has any reference, then it can only have one. The 
concept named “.... is a moon of Venus” could have as many objects falling under 
it as you like. Besides zero and one, there are other possibilities. But an expression 
whose namehood is questioned can only have zero referents or one. For referring 
or indicating is essentially unambiguous. W hen one and the same expression, say 
“the town”, has different referents in different contexts, then, according to Frege, 
it is not a genuine name at all. The verbal expression together with one specific 
nonverbal context may be a genuine and unambiguous name.
23.3 Application to OD’s puzzle (3)
Let us now look at the KFA. It starts in a rather unconvincing way. For in OD, 
paragraph 12, Russell simply states that by the sentence “The present King of 
France is bald”, a false proposition is stated. Both Meinong and Frege would 
deny this, although on different grounds. Meinong would deny it because
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the essence of the present King of France does as yet not include anything 
about his possible hair growth. Frege would deny it because the expression 
“the present King of France” does not name anything at all. That sentence is 
neither true nor false, for it fails to be about something real.152
Evidently Russell has been aware of the insufficiency of his first argument. 
For he adds a lot of things to it in order to make it more compelling. It 
culminates in the exposition of puzzle (3) in OD, paragraph 16. There Russell 
says:
Consider the proposition “A  differs from B”. If this is true, there is a 
difference between A  and B, which fact may be expressed in the form “the 
difference between A  and B subsists”. But if it is false that A  differs from B, 
then there is no difference between A  and B, which fact may be expressed 
in the form “the difference between A  and B does not subsist”. But how 
can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition? “I think, therefore I am” 
is no more evident than “I am the subject of a proposition, therefore I 
am”, provided “I am” is taken to assert subsistence or being, not existence. 
Hence, it would appear, it must always be self-contradictory to deny the 
being of anything; but we have seen, in connection with Meinong, that to 
admit being also sometimes leads to contradictions. Thus if A  and B do not 
differ, to suppose either that there is, or that there is not, such an object as 
“the difference between A  and B” seems equally impossible.
This is a remarkable argument, for it is based on a cautious rapprochement to 
Meinong’s second principle, viz. that the opposition between truth and falsity 
somehow corresponds to the opposition between real and unreal. Russell’s 
view is only semi-Meinongian. For he does not adopt the assumption that false 
propositions, or “objectives”, as Meinong calls them, are unreal. Nevertheless, 
according to him, truth and falsity of a real proposition correspond to the 
reality or unreality of something else, namely what is named by the denoting 
phrase derived from the sentence. If the true sentence “Caesar died” is 
transformed into the unambiguously denoting phrase “the death of Caesar”, 
then something different from both the proposition and its truth-value is 
mentioned. But if this procedure is applied to a sentence expressing a false 
proposition, then the unambiguously denoting phrase derived from the 
sentence does not denote anything at all.
Returning to Venus, let us consider the proposition expressed by “The 
Morningstar differs from the Eveningstar”. According to Frege, the discovery 
that this proposition is false belongs to the primitive scientific achievements
152 Cf. 2.2.
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of astronomy. According to Russell’s argument it amounts to the same as 
the discovery that the supposed difference between the Morningstar and the 
Eveningstar is not real.
How would the fundamental Frege deal with this puzzle? Suppose he is 
prepared to accept that Russell’s principle to each genuine sentence expressing 
a judgeable content, whose truth is questionable, corresponds a complete 
expression whose namehood is questionable in the same degree. Even in that 
case, he would not accept that the reality of something could be disproved. 
Frege would simply take recourse to the above-mentioned linguistic turn. The 
discovery that the Morningstar is not different from the Eveningstar amounts 
to the same as the discovery that the real expression “the difference between 
the Morningstar and the Eveningstar” is not truly a name. Nothing unreal is 
involved.
Now, Russell could object that in this way all scientific discoveries are 
unduly transformed into linguistic discoveries. Frege, I presume, would not 
be indifferent to this criticism. For once he criticized his own former view 
on identity on precisely the same grounds! In Begriffsschrift §8, he had tried 
to rescue the informative character of identity in assuming that it is to be 
construed as having the same content. The proposition that 5>3 is about 
numbers, but the proposition that 5=2+3 is about symbols. For the latter 
means that different things, namely “5” and “2+3”, have the same content. 
According to this view the proposition that the Morningstar is the same as 
the Eveningstar would be informative thanks to its being about different 
expressions. But, Frege objects in O n  Sense and Reference, this is not sufficient 
for explaining the cognitive, scientific value of identity statements. This then 
is one of the reasons that made him introduce the distinction between sense 
and reference.
Does this distinction matter to puzzle (3)? Yes, instead of the phrase its 
sense could act as having or not having a reference. In this way the statement 
that the expression “the difference between the Morningstar and the 
Eveningstar” is not truly a name, can be substituted by the statement that 
the sense expressed by that expression does not have a reference. A nd if the 
drawback of an undue linguistic turn is to be avoided, mentioning the phrase 
is to be avoided as well. Therefore sense-mentioning inverted commas are to 
be introduced. In this way the KFA is transformed into a new version of the 
GEA!
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24 Appearance and disappearance of the fundamental Frege
24.1 The fundamental Frege in OF §§56-57
In the first section of this chapter I have followed the course of OF in 
discussing the conception, the nature and the predicament of the ToD. The 
very same problem on whose occasion the new theory is conceived, also 
threatens its viability. This seems to be a contradiction. But it is not, because 
in fact the ToD is jeopardized by the other side of the problem it successfully 
avoids. The problem of unambiguously denoting concepts, i.e., the one 
discussed in the GEA, is avoided. But the problem of ambiguously denoting 
concepts, whose most pointed version may be put into the AEA, challenges 
the ToD. O n account of it, Russell is forced to reject the ToD’s conservative 
version in which the variable is still explained by the ambiguously denoting 
concept “any entity”. The only way to save the ToD from ruin is: taking the 
variable as more fundamental than denoting concepts.
In this connection the fundamental Frege appears on the stage. A t the end 
of 21.3 I have deliberately postponed the discussion of the role he actually 
plays in OF. For the context of his emergence is not only determined by the 
above-sketched visible circumstances, but by two invisible forces as well, 
namely the un-Fregean background of Russell’s logic and the limitations of his 
perception. That is why, in section 22 and 23, I have successively discussed 
these elements.
Concerning the latter, I have argued in 23.1 that Russell both overestimates 
and underestimates the difference between Frege and himself. This seems 
to be a contradiction, but it is not. For Russell overstates the difference in 
supposing that according to Frege, a proposition cannot be about a concept. 
This exaggeration is based on his failure to see that Frege does not want 
to be concerned with unequal being about at all. Russell just ignores that 
Frege’s analysis of the proposition follows a quite different pattern. From the 
very start, it is involved in a struggle with natural language. Genuine logical 
expressions are to be detected and to be distinguished from apparent ones. In 
this connection Frege anticipates the theory of indefinite descriptions. But 
from the very start, i.e., already in POM Appendix A, Russell fails to see this. 
This blind spot has obscured OD and has contributed to the disappearance of 
the fundamental Frege from it.
But it is not sufficient to account for his disappearance. In OF the 
fundamental Frege actually appears, not of course as a precursor of the theory 
of indefinite descriptions, but as providing a different view of the variable.
This Frege, once actually perceived by Russell, equally disappears from OD,
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but evidently in a different way. He is consciously ignored. This, then, is the 
first phase of the more long-lasting process whose meaning and consequences 
constitute the subject matter of this section as a whole: the process terminating 
in Frege’s total elimination from later expositions of the ToD.
Before quoting the rather puzzling passage from OF §§56-57, I shall try 
to summarize Frege’s view of the variable in such a way that what in it is 
acceptable to Russell can be distinguished from what is not. In doing so I shall 
make use of what has been discussed in section 22. In fact Russell accepts two 
elements from Frege:
a) The variable does not have any meaning in itself.
b) Nevertheless its range is “determined” but not by a denoting concept.
It is determined by the propositional function whose argument place it 
indicates.
Ad a) Frege’s system of logic is immune to the AEA. Only the GEA is relevant 
to it. As far as I can see, the latter undermines the distinction between sense 
and reference in general. For according to Frege, all genuine expressions, 
whether complete or not, unambiguously “determine” their reference if there is 
one. As the word “determine” suggests, something like ambiguously denoting 
is foreign to the nature of his logic. Frege never supposed the variable to have 
any meaning in itself. Therefore, the distinction between sense and reference 
cannot be applied to it. However serious the impact of the GEA might be, his 
view of the variable just remains what it was.
Russell is in a quite different predicament. Never before had he supposed 
the variable to be without meaning. W hat is more, he had not done so because 
he supposed the variable to denote ambiguously in virtue of its constant 
meaning. It unambiguously means something particular, namely “any entity” 
and in virtue of that constant meaning it enables propositions of finite 
complexity to be about infinitely many entities. Therefore, Russell’s system of 
logic is much more seriously threatened by the AEA than by the GEA. If he 
wants to save the ToD, he is forced to abandon the notion “unambiguously 
denoting in virtue of constant meaning”. That is the only reason why he is 
prepared to accept at least something of the Fregean view.
But he is not prepared to adopt more than what is urgently needed. The 
Fregean view that neither the variable nor anything else ambiguously denotes, 
is unacceptable to Russell. Viewed from this perspective it would amount to 
a disavowal of the very spirit of his former “revolt into pluralism”. If Frege 
were right, then all plurality could be relegated to higher predicates. The
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proposition that there are infinitely many natural numbers would attribute 
one second order predicate to a single first-order concept. The proposition 
that every man is mortal would be reduced to a proposition about concepts. In 
POM §88, p.90 this view is ascribed to Bradley and criticized as follows:
The variable is, from the formal standpoint, the characteristic notion of 
Mathematics. Moreover, it is the method of stating general theorems, which 
always mean something different from the intensional propositions to which 
such logicians as Mr Bradley endeavour to reduce them. That the meaning 
of an assertion about all men or any man is different from the meaning 
of an equivalent assertion about the concept man, appears to me, I must 
confess, to be a self-evident truth -  as evident as the fact that propositions 
about John are not about the name John.
As far as I can see, the Russell of OF is not prepared to revoke this statement. 
Therefore to him, the only qualified way out is the view that the variable 
ambiguously denotes without any constant meaning.
Ad b) According to Frege, the range of the variable need not be specified 
by means of something like a denoting concept, because it is, without saying 
specified by the argument place of the function the quantifier is applied to.
The shape of that argument place shows the range of the variable. Its range is a 
range of significance. A  first order predicate can only be significantly, i.e., truly 
or falsely, be applied to something whose name is complete, i.e., to an object.
This aspect of the Fregean doctrine is appealing to the Russell of OF. For 
the proportional function, as he likes to call it, takes over the job of the failing 
denoting concept “any entity”. This adds to the credibility of ambiguously 
denoting without denoting meaning.
But as seen from Russell’s angle, the orthodox Fregean view contains three 
inedible ingredients.
The first consists in the assumption that the variable is restricted in its range. 
Russell cannot accept this without renouncing to what is quintessential to his 
realism. A t no price is he willing to give up the unrestricted variable. Even 
in his later ramified theory of types, it is preserved.153 Therefore, the range of 
significance is to be construed in the following un-Fregean way: the variable 
marks an entity position, which can be occupied by anything whatever 
without preventing the proposition from being true or false. However, if this is 
Russell’s view, it must be asked whether the propositional
153 See Landini (1998).
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function is itself supposed to be an entity. As far as I know this question is not 
discussed in OF.
According to Frege the first order concept or concepts to which the quantifier 
is applied, occur as something the proposition is about. The proposition 
expressed by “All whales are mammals” is neither about whales nor about any 
other objects.154 It is about the concepts named “.... is a whale” and “.... is a 
mammal”. For the above-mentioned reason, this is unacceptable to Russell. 
Even if the said proposition is supposed to be conditional and therefore not 
about whales, it must still be about anything whatever.
Therefore, the universal quantifier cannot be construed as a second- 
order predicate. That is the counterpart to Russell’s refusal to construe the 
propositional function as something the proposition is about. According to 
Frege, the quantifier belongs to the judgeable content and as such has nothing 
in particular to do with the assertion symbolized by the vertical judgement 
stroke. Russell rejects this view. According to him the universal quantifier is 
to be construed as universal assertion. Consequently he fails to use the Fregean 
concavity equipped with the variable.
Instead of — F  (x) Russell simply writes: I— F  (x)
The symbol I— is seen as the quasi-Fregean symbolic equivalent of “always 
true” as introduced in OD, paragraph 4.
Nevertheless, in the passage from OF to be quoted below, Russell does 
attach importance to Frege’s horizontal content stroke. He proceeds as if, 
according to Frege —  F  (x), could be isolated from
The former is construed as symbolizing “the truth of F (x )”. Unfortunately 
I am unable to satisfactorily explain what Russell must have had in mind. 
Moreover, the exegesis of the text is made even more difficult by his referring 
to *2.31,  a numbered proposition from  a lost draft o f Principia.
A t any rate the main idea behind Russell’s remarks must be, that —  F(x) 
paves the way of the universal assertion. The proportional function is not itself 
something true or false. It has true or false propositions as its instances. The 
universal assertion is neither about the propositional function, not about its 
instances, but about whatever these instances may significantly be about. The 
former conjunction or disjunction of terms denoted by a denoting concept is 
replaced by a universal assertion of all instances of a propositional function. In 
saying this, I make use of the denoting phrase “all instances of a propositional 
function”. But that is, Russell would say, due to the fact that I am speaking
154 Frege (1884), §47, pp.60-61.
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about the assertion. Making a universal assertion does not involve any appeal to 
denoting concepts.155
The text in OF §§56-57 runs as follows:
If we adopted Frege’s symbol —  F  ‘x for “the truth of F  ‘x ”, and if we 
decided that this symbol was to confine the range of x to F  ‘x, then 
“—  F  ‘x ” would mean “the truth of F  for any x ”, which would enable us to 
state *2.31 formally.
We may put it thus:
“F  ‘x ”.= “F  ‘x, where x may be anything”
“ .F  ‘x ”. = . “F  ‘x, where x may be anything, is true”.
The point about meaning and denotation is still unsettled. Does F  ‘x 
have a constant meaning, as well as a variable denotation? Consider first a 
particular F ,  say xDx. Then
.xDx.= . “xDx” is true, where x may be anything.
N o value need be assigned to x, because xDx is always true. There is no 
distinction of meaning and denotation; there is only the difference between 
F  ‘x by itself and “ I— F  ‘x ”, as Frege does, as the assertion of “—  F  ‘x ”. 
Thus we seem to have pure ambiguous denotation without any constant 
meaning.
24.2 Disappearance of the fundamental Frege from OD
If this view actually is adopted in OD paragraph 4, then Russell might be 
justified in being silent about the A EA . Nevertheless, the author of OD turns 
out to be equally silent about three other issues: his possible indebtedness to 
Frege, his opinion on denoting phrases of the form “any so and so” and finally 
the question whether the variable is supposed to be denoting. The last point is 
of greatest importance. It bears on the very essence of the proposed theory in 
relation to denoting. If in an article on denoting a new theory is put forward, a 
theory based on taking “the notion of the variable as fundamental” , then we
155 See Russell (1919), p.156: “A  descriptive function, e.g. “the hardest proposi­
tion in A’s mathematical treatise,” will not be a propositional function, although its 
values are propositions. But in such a case the propositions are only described: in a 
propositional function, the values must actually enunciate propositions.”
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are entitled to asking in which way it is fundamental with respect to denoting.
A t least three alternatives might be considered: either the variable denotes in 
virtue of its meaning, or it denotes without meaning, or it neither denotes nor 
has any meaning in itself. If Russell had wholeheartedly adopted the second 
alternative, then the import of the proposed theory would be that denoting in 
virtue of a supposed meaning is to be reduced to denoting without meaning. 
But he does not say so.
That is why I remain faithful to the view explained in chapter I,
2.4, namely that O D ’s last sentence is to be taken for more than just an 
insignificant sign of polite modesty. In OD Russell primarily claims to show 
that the issue of denoting is much more difficult than might be supposed. The 
available theories lead to unsuspected problems. Tentatively a new theory is 
put forward.
Shortly after O D ’s publication, Moore asked Russell the following question 
on account of paragraph 37:
You say ‘all the constituents of propositions we apprehend are entities 
with which we have immediate acquaintance.’ Have we, then, immediate 
acquaintance with the variable? A nd what sort of an entity is it?
Two days later Russell replied:
I admit that the question you raise about the variable is puzzling, as are all 
questions about it. The view I usually incline to is that we have immediate 
acquaintance with the variable, but it is not an entity. Then at other 
times I think it is an entity, but an indeterminate one. In the former view 
there is still a problem of meaning and denotation as regards the variable 
itself. I only profess to reduce the problem of denoting to the problem of 
the variable. This latter is horribly difficult, and there seem equally strong 
objections to all the views I have been able to think of. 156
24.3 Frege’s total eclipse and the rise of the ToD as such
For the sake of convenience I have called the new theory of denoting put 
forward in OD the theory of descriptions. However, in OD itself the newborn 
brainchild is still nameless. A s far as I can see, it only got its name the moment 
it was legitimated. A t that instant Russell did more than just give a name to a 
nameless theory. He changed both his attitude towards it and the way he
156 I borrow these quotations from Hylton (1990), p.256.
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presented it to the world. He did not only change his degree of self-confidence 
about it, but also his view on the nature of the theory. Henceforth it was no 
longer put forward as a new theory of denoting, but as a theory of descriptions. 
The essence of this turn consists in turning away from the perilous issue of 
denoting.
The new approach starts with renaming ambiguously and unambiguously 
denoting phrases. From now on they are called “indefinite” and “definite 
descriptions”. Thus far only the name of the topic has changed. But the 
strategy is changed as well. The question put forward by Russell simply is, 
whether descriptions are names or not. This is the essential dilemma. Whether 
you do or do not prefer to distinguish descriptions from non-descriptive proper 
names, is immaterial. For the question is only, whether descriptions name 
anything. If they do, a proposition in whose verbal expression the description 
occurs, is about what it names. W hether the description names in virtue of its 
supposed meaning or sense does not matter.
Essentially this approach is Fregean in character. For Frege’s being the 
precursor of the theory of indefinite descriptions is, as I have argued in 23.1, 
not based on his theory of sense and reference, but on what precedes it, namely 
the distinction between genuine and spurious logical expressions, i.e., between 
real and apparent names. However, Russell is not aware of the Fregean slant of 
his new strategy. For he never recognized Frege as forerunner of his own theory.
Anyhow, the message can now be put forward in a very concise and 
appealing way: descriptions are not names. The two main problems discussed 
in OD remain, but the arguments related to them are considerably simplified.
If “the round square” were a name, then the true proposition expressed by 
“The round square does not exist” would be about a non-existent entity, which 
is impossible. Similarly: if “the author of Waverley” were a name, then what 
it is supposed to name would either be identical with Scott or different from 
him. Therefore the proposition expressed by “Scott is the author of Waverley” 
would either be about Scott and Scott or about Scott and something else. In 
the former case the proposition would be trivial, in the latter it would be false. 
But in fact it is neither trivial nor false. Therefore “The author of Waverley” is 
not a name, QED.
Whatever the value of these arguments may be, they purport to be at least 
as “ imperative” as the KFA in OD. The G EA  has disappeared and the word 
“curious” , expressing uncertainty about its possible explanation, as well. W hat 
is more, together with the whole issue of denoting, the A E A  has equally 
disappeared. There is no more any need to explain in which way the variable is 
fundamental as compared to denoting.
Just as Meinong is inevitably associated with the problem of non-being, so
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Frege is associated with the problem of informative identity. However, in his 
later expositions of the ToD, Russell fails to mention Frege. Only Meinong 
remains. How is this to be accounted for? Evidently, both the un-Meinongian 
Frege and the Frege of indirect sense and informative identity have to 
disappear because they are associated with denoting. And, as I have tried to 
make clear in the previous subsection, the same applies to the fundamental 
Frege as perceived by Russell. Consequently, the new approach results in 
Frege’s total eclipse.
Finally, Russell’s recollection of the true origin of the ToD disappears as 
well. The rise of the ToD as such is, as far as I can see, simultaneous with the 
rise of the official story. In chapter II, I have analyzed this story and argued 
that it contains much more true material than the adherents of the unofficial 
story want us to believe. Nevertheless, in the light of OF and an unbiased 
analysis of OD, it cannot unthinkingly be accepted. Its over-simplified form 
is to be criticized. A nd this criticism inevitably leads to the riddle of Russell’s 
forgetfulness. A s I have argued in 2.6 and 7.3, this riddle cannot be solved 
unless the link with the paradox is taken into account. In the next, concluding 
subsection I shall tentatively discuss this issue.
25 The link with the paradox
25.1 The paradox in the official story and beyond it
According to the official story, the ToD is connected with the paradox or 
“contradiction”, as Russell preferred to call it. It constituted the decisive 
achievement that helped him and W hitehead to find their way in elaborating 
the Ramified Theory of Types. The ToD is deemed to be more fundamental 
than the theory of types. Neither Russell nor W hitehead ever supposed it to be 
final. The young W ittgenstein admired the ToD but was very much dissatisfied 
with the theory of types. A nd the short-lived cooperation between the pupil 
and his master was based on the latter’s willingness to admit that the proposed 
solution of the paradox was capable of improvement.157
A s seen from Russell’s perspective, the ToD provided a model of a new 
attitude to realism. In this connection Meinong acts as icon of excessive 
realism, i.e., as a caricature of Russell’s former self. He plays a symbolic role, 
comparable to those played by Don Juan, Socrates and Abraham in the 
philosophy of Kierkegaard. The ToD provides the matrix of an “eliminativistic
157 See Landini (2007).
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approach”.158 We can freely do as if we speak about a lot of things without 
really speaking about them, i.e., without assuming them to be real entities.
The realm of what propositions are really about may be restricted without 
impairing our freedom of speech. The beloved notion of the unrestricted 
variable can be preserved. A ll entities are of the same type. A ll higher types 
consist of non-entities or constructions involved in being about entities. But 
the notion of entity is applied in a stricter way. For as a naïve realist, Russell 
supposed that whatever appears as something a proposition can be about, 
must be acknowledged as an entity. In this way propositions and collections or 
combinations of entities were all of them supposed to be entities. For even if 
they are many, they can be counted as one.
This approach inevitably involves reflexivity. For if propositions are 
entities, then a proposition about any entity is also about itself. Similarly, if 
denoting concepts are entities, then the denoting concept “any entity” is itself 
among the entities ambiguously denoted by it. If all collections are entities, 
then at least some collections contain themselves as an element, like the 
collection of all entities, the collection of all collections or the collection of 
all abstract entities, i.e., all entities that do not “exist”. Assuming with Frege, 
Russell and the young W ittgenstein that the paradox is due to reflexivity, a 
kind of eliminativistic programme based on enlightened realism is needed to 
solve it. The ToD paves the way of such an approach.
This, then, is the only link with the paradox put forward in the official 
story. In my opinion three other links are ignored. In the first place, Russell 
suggests that the ToD had been fully adopted before its possible usefulness 
in dealing with the paradox was discovered. In my opinion Russell finally 
accepted the ToD at least partly because of its usefulness but without being 
prepared to admit that he did so. The official link with the paradox is that ToD 
promoted its solution. The suppressed link with the paradox is that the desire 
to solve the paradox promoted its adoption. A s far as I can see, this is the only 
possible explanation of the riddle of Russell’s forgetfulness.159
His attitude was just a little bit too forward-looking. A s explained in the 
previous subsection, the full adoption of the ToD coincided with turning away 
from denoting and what was connected with it. In doing so Russell ignored 
another remarkable link with the paradox: the problem of denoting on whose 
occasion he conceived the ToD was in fact discovered in the course of an 
earlier attempt to solve the paradox.160 In POM Russell turns out to be very 
hopeful about his theory of denoting concepts. It constitutes the ray of light in 
the darkness caused by the ‘contradiction’. In POM §56, p.54 he says:
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The whole theory of definition, of identity, of classes, of symbolism, and 
of the variable is wrapped up in the theory of denoting. The notion is 
a fundamental notion of logic, and in spite of its difficulties, it is quite 
essential to be as clear about it as possible.
Now, suppose that Russell had paid some more attention to the fact that the 
ToD originated from an unsuspected difficulty discovered in the course of an 
attempt to avoid the paradox. In that case he could have asked whether the 
curious problem of denoting is somehow allied to the problem he wanted to 
avoid above all. In this way a third ignored link with the paradox could have 
appeared to him: the connection consisting in a possible kinship between the 
problem discovered in OF §35 and the paradox. This may seem rather far­
fetched. But in the next subsection I shall try to argue that Frege may help us 
to see the connection.
25.2 Frege’s assistance in seeing an unsuspected link
Suppose that in October 1905 Russell had sent a letter to Frege containing an 
explanation of the last part of the GEA . Would Frege have brushed aside the 
“inextricable tangle” ? I think he would have taken this matter just as seriously 
as that reported to him in Russell’s famous letter of 16 June 1902.161 W hat is 
more, from Frege’s perspective, there would have been a striking similarity 
between the two difficulties. They both have to do with reflexivity, whereas 
in principle reflexivity cannot be allowed in his logic. It is supposed to be 
inadmissible because it is at variance with the axiom of external difference.
Frege excludes all kinds of reflexivity, allowed in Russell’s logic of POM.
For example, according to the latter system, concepts can truly or falsely be 
applied to themselves. If in the proposition expressed by “Socrates is human”, 
Socrates can be replaced by any entity whatever without impairing the unity of 
the proposition, then it makes sense to apply the predicate “human” to itself. 
According to Frege, this is impossible because a first-order concept can only be 
applied to what belongs to a lower type, namely an object.
In some way or other Russell’s paradox has to do with reflexivity. How then 
could it intrude into Frege’s system of logic? It could because Frege applied 
the principle of the distinction of the many sharers (in this case objects) from 
what they share (in this case a concept) somewhat less rigorously then he 
realized. For he more or less surreptitiously assumed that among all objects that 
could possibly fall under a concept, one is more intimately connected with 
the concept than all other objects are connected with it, namely the concept’s
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extension. The extension is derived from the concept. A  one-to-one relation 
intimately connects them. They somehow share the same character. For the 
extension or value range shows how the concept behaves in the same way as a 
graph showing the character of the mathematical function represented by it.
There are at least two reasons why Frege needed this assumption. Firstly, he 
said that a concept could not be made an object without altering it. In other 
words: it can be made an object in altering it. Speaking about the concept 
horse we do not mention the concept itself, but instead an object. W hich 
object? N ot just an arbitrary object. N ot just some individual horse either.
We actually mention the concept’s extension instead of the concept itself. 
Secondly, Frege needed extensions in order to carry out his logicist programme. 
In ordinary life numerals are primarily used “attributively” , as Frege puts it. 
“Five” names a second-order predicate applicable to first-order concepts. But in 
arithmetic, “five” is used as proper name of an object, namely the number five. 
W hich object? The extension of the said second-order predicate.
In adopting extensions Frege virtually adopted reflexivity. For the question 
may be legitimately asked whether an extension does or does not fall under the 
concept from which it is derived. On that account extensions may be divided 
in two kinds, say, reflexive and non-reflexive ones. A nd then we may ask 
whether the extension of the concept named “ ... is a non-reflexive extension” 
is itself reflexive or not. That, then, is the Fregean version of the paradox. But 
before receiving Russell’s bad tidings, Frege was not aware of having allowed 
reflexivity. Very shortly after having realized this, he concluded that extensions 
are to be eliminated from logic and that therefore his life’s work, the reduction 
of arithmetic to logic, was doomed to failure. Russell was very much impressed 
and surprised by this drastic conclusion.158 But he could have been surprised by 
something else as well, namely that Frege remained faithful to the remaining 
part of his logic. The link between logic and arithmetic was irreparably 
damaged, but not logic itself. Quite to the contrary, Frege’s logical system now 
was freed from something incompatible with its own principle: the presence of 
the one shared by many in one of the many sharing it. The axiom of external 
difference does not tolerate correspondence. For correspondence implies a 
subtle difference and a differentiated identity, i.e. an identity in different forms. 
A  concept and its extension were surreptitiously supposed to correspond as 
different forms of one and the same character.
A s seen from this perspective, there is a remarkable similarity with the 
problem concerning sense and reference. For just as Frege had illegitimately 
assumed that each concept is exclusively allied with one particular object,
158 See Russell (1959), chapter 7.
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namely its extension, so he assumed that each sense is exclusively allied with 
one particular sense referring to it, namely the indirect sense. Just as the 
extension of a concept is supposed to be derived from the concept itself, so the 
indirect sense is supposed to be somehow derived from its reference.
In both cases an indirect form of reflexivity is introduced. Indeed a 
concept can never be applied to itself. But it can be applied to its extension. 
Similarly, a sense can never be referred to by itself, but it can be referred to 
by the indirect sense derived from it. In both cases the assumption is very 
natural indeed. W ithout them the ambiguity of natural language seems to 
be completely arbitrary and inexplicable. For the word “horse” cannot only 
be used as a predicate, but also to indicate the “species”, as Frege says, i.e., 
(according to him) the concept’s extension.159 A nd the name “Morningstar” 
cannot only be used to name the Morningstar but also to name the sense 
expressed by it in its normal use.
However, Frege is so much concerned with warning the reader of the danger 
of confusing the different things that happen to have the same name in natural 
language, that he forgets to provide an explanation. A nd according to the 
principle of his own logic, it must be possible to give one, i.e., to reduce the 
connection to a partial overlap of the form A , versus A B, or A B  versus A C .
Now suppose that Frege, having received Russell’s imaginary letter dated 
October 1905, had remarked the above-sketched similarity. How would 
he have reacted to it? A s far as I can see, he would have been in a serious 
predicament, probably in a predicament even more serious than that of 1902. 
For now, it is not just an appendix of his logic that is jeopardized, but one of 
its essential distinctions, viz., that between proof-value and truth-value. But 
never would he have been prepared to give up his anti-psychologism. The laws 
of logic are not man-made. They are “anchored in an eternal ground, capable 
of being washed over, but not transferable”.160
From this principle Frege could have concluded that his predicament 
is human. That is the counterpart of radical anti-psychologism. The 
realm studied by logicians is not problematic. Therefore logical problems 
are psychological or even existential. To be honest, I do not know at all 
whether Frege would have been prepared to draw this conclusion. Anyhow,
I am prepared to do so. A nd I am convinced that it makes a great internal 
difference. For it amounts to the same as accepting that the real principles 
of logic need not perforce be evident to us and that what seems to be 
contradictory need not perforce be contradictory. This involves a radical
159 Frege (1882), p.92.
160 Frege (1893), p.XVI.
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change in attitude towards Russell’s paradox. For it means that, maybe, the so- 
called contradiction is not a real contradiction at all. In that case the problem 
is not to avoid it, but rather to see it in a different light: not as an enemy or 
wicked intruder, but as a gentle invitation to change our minds.
25.3 The spectre of solipsism
W hen Russell discovered the paradox on the occasion of his attempt to 
criticize Cantor’s proof that there is no greatest cardinal number, he actually 
changed his mind. He concluded that in his revolt against his own former 
idealism, he had made a mistake. But he never questioned his view of the 
nature of that mistake. Russell assumed that in any event he had gone too far. 
He had been too tolerant in accepting all kinds of beings in his ontological 
universe. He supposed himself to have reached the absolute maximum of 
openness. In some way or other his universe had to become “less luxuriant”. 
A nd eventually the ToD helped him to effectuate it with a minimum of 
violence.
In my opinion, Russell’s initial realism was not open enough. One 
important “entity”, namely being-in, was excluded. Consequently anything 
was welcome, save intimate contact between entities. His universe consisted 
of untouchables. The theory of denoting concepts was an attempt to introduce 
something like extra-mental intentionality. But Russell eventually turned his 
back on it and its problem. In saying this, I do not want to vindicate idealism. 
Quite the contrary. According to me, Russell identified being-in in general 
with being-in as it is conceived in idealism: as a one-sided suppressive relation 
of inferior or un-genuine beings to their superiors. In this respect his criticism 
of idealism was too soft. He shared with his opponent the tenet that the unio 
mystica of reciprocal being-in is to be kept outside logic and metaphysics.161
However, I cannot understand how universals can actually be universal, 
unless they are universal in something that is the same as that in which an 
individual instance is individual. It does not make sense to speak about an 
individual alone. For individual and universal are opposite sides of one and the 
same. Bucephalus may be called an individual, i.e., an individual horse. And 
a universal cannot be universal, unless its universality consists in something 
particular, for example: horse. Both Russell and Frege are prepared to admit the 
entities called “universals”, but not their actually being universal. The spectre 
of solipsism haunts the logic of their metaphysics.
161 See 0.3.
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In my opinion, this spectre of solipsism is nothing else but the axiom of 
external difference. It excludes reflexivity. For reflexivity is not possible unless 
one and the same acts differently, say, as subject and as object. W hoever writes 
an autobiography must act as both the writer and the one whose life is being 
described. If this difference is supposed to be outside the sameness, then the 
word “auto” does not mean anything at all. From an externalist perspective, 
reflexivity is suspicious or even impossible. It is supposed to be essentially 
vicious. If it happens to creep into a system of logic, this must be due to lack of 
rigor. That seems to be the message of the contradiction discovered by Russell. 
But if the axiom of external difference is abandoned, the situation appears 
in a completely different light. Then there is no reason at all for supposing 
reflexivity as such to be vicious.
25.4 A  dialectical analysis of the paradox
Let us look at the most simple and classical version of the paradox. Epimenides 
the Cretan says that wherever and whenever something is said or will be 
said by Cretans, it is false. My very first reaction may be: “That sounds rather 
implausible. A  community cannot use language and initiate their children in it 
unless its members allow themselves to say something true from time to time.” 
But Epimenides is disappointed. He has supposed me to be more intelligent.
He has expected me to understand that his statement is not only implausible, 
but that it cannot be true. For if it were true, then its very truth would be a 
refutation of what he claims to be true. After some time, I understand this 
self-contradiction. But then he makes his second move. The moment I have 
conceded that what he says cannot be true, he wants me to believe that 
therefore he is right. But I protest. The fact that he is a Cretan saying something 
false does not prove that he does so because he is a Cretan. Moreover, the 
claim that you are right because you are wrong seems to be vicious.
Suppose I meet a friend who looks very depressed. He is a kind of champion 
in self-pity. He complains: “W hatever I say and whatever I do, it is always 
wrong.” Then I say: “Please do not exaggerate!” His reaction is “I told you,
I am always wrong. For you, too, criticize me. In this very case I have been 
wrong again. That corroborates how terrible I am.” This then is the most 
elementary psychological version of the paradox. It seems to exemplify the 
very pinnacle of self-denial. But in fact it shows something else: the pinnacle 
of self-defence and self-righteousness. In philosophy it corresponds to the 
imaginary sceptic who supposes himself to be immune to criticism of others,
191
because he already has criticized himself.
According to Russell’s Vicious Circle Principle, Epimenides is to be 
criticized for making a statement that is nonsensical as long as it purports to be 
reflexive. He can only say something about a totality of propositions provided 
his own statement is of a higher type. The same applies to excessive self-pity or 
to the imaginary sceptic.162 Russell’s approach is based on the assumption that 
in all varieties of the paradox, reflexivity provides two equally contradictory 
alternatives. The assumption of truth leads to a contradiction and is therefore 
to be rejected. But the rejection of truth leads equally to a real contradiction 
and is therefore to be rejected as well. According to me, however, the latter 
assumption is not warranted at all. The inference from truth to falsity is valid; 
the inference from falsity or non-truth to truth is invalid.
Consider the following, extremely sophisticated version of Epimenides, 
namely the sentence:
Whatever the nature of this sentence may be, it does not express something 
true.
According to me, the assumption that this sentence actually does express 
something true, leads to a contradiction. Therefore it is to be rejected. But the 
assumption that it does not express something true is not to be rejected. It only 
implies the truth of what is expressed by the sentence “The above-mentioned 
sentence does not express something true”. It does not imply the truth of the 
above-mentioned sentence itself. Truth cannot consist in its own denial. In 
other words, the crucial question is not whether there is reflexivity, but in what 
it consists.
This perspective may be generalized. Let us look at Grelling’s paradox. 
Suppose all impeccably reflexive or “autological” words to be united in a 
very distinguished high society. Words like “word”, “noun” or “polysyllabic” 
will certainly belong to its members. Suppose all impeccably unreflexive or 
“heterological” words such as “verb”, “article” or “monosyllabic” to be united 
in an equally high society. Evidently a lot of words are excluded from both 
societies. For example, it is rather problematic to observe how interesting the 
word “interesting” is. Now suppose that the word “non-autological” wants to 
become a member of the autological society. Its selection committee does not 
like difficulties, let alone contradictions. Therefore “non-autological” is not 
accepted. The argument is as follows. If it were supposed to be acceptable, as 
truly applicable to itself, then its very being autological would consist in its
162 See Russell and W hitehead (1910), p.38.
192
non being truly applicable to itself.
But the word “non-autological” happens to be disappointed by this 
decision. It raises the objection that its very being refused, i.e., its being 
supposed to be non-autological, is an excellent reason for being accepted as 
autological. So it claims to be qualified because it is rejected. In my opinion this 
is essentially the same strategy as the one displayed by Epimenides. Therefore, 
the selection committee is right. “Non-autological” is not autological, but that 
only seems to be a reason for accepting it as autological.
Russell never discussed Grelling’s paradox. If he had done so, he would 
have been in a predicament. For it is far from easy to explain why the possible 
reflexivity of words is vicious. A s far as sets or “collections” are concerned, the 
Vicious Circle Principle may seem to be more convincing. Actually it is as 
far as sets are extensionally defined, i.e., by means of enumeration. Evidently 
a vicious circle is involved if I define a set S in saying: it has three members, 
namely the number 3, the number 17 and the set S. But the set of words 
deserving to be called nouns is defined by intension. Therefore the question 
may be legitimately raised as to whether the word “noun” itself belongs to 
that class. The answer is: yes. A s soon as collections are defined intensionally, 
i.e., by means of a concept, the question can be raised of whether its defining 
concept can truly be applied to it. If so, the collection may be called reflexive. 
Then it is reflexive in something. Thus, just as the reflexivity of the word 
“noun” consists in its itself being a noun, so in my opinion the reflexivity of 
the collection of all collections consists in itself being a collection.
But from this tolerant approach it by no means follows that all possible 
defining concepts are such that a collection can be reflexive or unreflexive 
in it. For although a collection may be defined by the class concept “non­
reflexive collection”, that in itself is not sufficient for qualifying that concept 
as something in which a collection may be reflexive. Therefore, the approach 
I advocate in case of the original version of Russell’s paradox is essentially the 
same as the one I have argued for in view of other, more elementary versions. 
The collection of all non-reflexive collections is not reflexive, but that is no 
reason at all for supposing that therefore it must be reflexive. For being non­
reflexive simply does not belong to the things in which a collection can be 
reflexive.
In natural language, words like “re”, “auto”, or “s e l f  mark reflexivity. These 
words mean a repetition of the same in different positions without showing it.
In symbolism, however, reflexivity can only be expressed by means of an actual 
repetition of the same symbol in different positions. If the use of symbolism is 
allied with the belief in the axiom of external differences, then the difference 
in position cannot be supposed to touch what is the same. In this way both
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the advantage of symbolism and the meaning of natural language are obscured. 
A  formula of the form “aRa” is supposed to be equivalent to something like 
F(a). Reflexivity and that in which a collection may be reflexive are lumped 
together.
If these sketchy remarks are right, then Russell’s paradox is not to be 
construed as an enemy of Platonic realism, but as an invitation to abandon 
externalism. Viewed in this way, Russell’s original attempt to criticize Cantor 
by proving that there must be a greatest cardinal number is far less ridiculous 
or unscientific than he afterwards made himself believe. Cantor’s proof only 
works as long as an external procedure is available, which determines in what 
the elements of a set are reflexive or unreflexive. But as soon as the proof is 
applied to Russell’s collection of all entities which themselves are collections, 
then the need of an external procedure has disappeared. Russell cannot make 
use of any other procedure than attributing any collection to itself. Then the 
answer to the question of whether a certain collection is, or is not, a member 
of the collection attributed to it, is independent of the procedure. The answer 
is up to the collection itself. Is it reflexive or not? According to Cantor, at least 
one collection must be forgotten, namely the infamous collection of all non­
reflexive collections. But Russell did not forget this case. However, Cantor asks 
whether it is reflexive. According to me, Russell could have answered that it is 
not, because in absence of an external procedure, the possible reason for being 
reflexive is relegated to the defining concept. But the defining concept “non­
reflexive collection” is incapable of acting as something in which a collection 
may be reflexive or unreflexive.
25.5 Conclusion: the problem of denoting as Russell’s second paradox
In isolation, this view on the nature of the paradox is, maybe, somewhat 
too sketchy and too unorthodox to be convincing. But it is supported by 
the analysis of the G EA  explained in the previous chapter. The main aim 
of my approach has been: making the text intelligible in paying attention 
to its historical context. The result of the proposed analysis has been: that 
the GEA’s importance cannot be understood unless the axiom of external 
difference is taken into account. In the G EA  Russell more consistently 
accepts its consequences than he ever had done before. He proves that the 
reflexivity required by denoting, or “determining”, as Frege would prefer to 
say, is incompatible with externalism. For it involves the subtle difference 
between C  and “C ” or between a sense and the indirect sense derived from 
it. But according to externalism, there cannot be opposed versions or forms
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of one and the same. Something cannot differ from itself. It can only differ 
from something else. A s seen from an externalist point of view, the reflexivity 
involved by the all-embracing character of being-denoted or being referred to 
is to be eliminated. In this way the later Vicious Circle Principle is heralded.
But the analysis provided in this study is based on challenging the validity 
of the axiom of external difference. Seen from that perspective the real 
problem discussed in the G EA  differs from what it seems to be. The whole 
argument is to be turned inside out. The real problem is not denoting or 
reflexivity, but externalism. The very same approach can also be applied to the 
paradox. The real problem is not collections or concepts and their extensions, 
nor reflexivity, but the principle incompatible with them, namely externalism. 
Therefore, the problem discussed in the G EA  deserves to be called Russell’s 
second paradox.
Russell’s full adoption of the ToD is allied with the rise of his official story. 
A nd the latter is the outcome of his attempt to forget his second paradox in 
order to solve his first one. In this way he wronged both the nature of the 
two problems and their kinship. W hat is more, he also wronged the power of 
his criticism of Frege and his own exceptional power to detect unsuspected 
logical difficulties. The rise of the official story marks the point of no return 
in Russell’s philosophical development: no return to the deep metaphysical 
issues he once was involved in and equally no return to the Platonic love of 
mathematics he once lived through. A t the age of eighty-seven, he wrote:
Mathematics has ceased to seem to me non-human in its subject-matter.
I have come to believe, though very reluctantly, that it consists of 
tautologies. I fear that, to a mind of sufficient intellectual power, the whole 
of mathematics would appear trivial, as trivial as the statement that a four­
footed animal is an animal. I think that the timelessness of mathematics 
has none of the sublimity that it once seemed to me to have, but consists 
merely in the fact that the pure mathematician is not talking about time.
I cannot any longer find any mystical satisfaction in the contemplation of 
mathematical truth.
The aesthetic pleasure to be derived from an elegant piece of mathematical 
reasoning remains. But here, too, there were disappointments. The solution 
of the contradictions mentioned in an earlier chapter seemed to be only 
possible by adopting theories which might be true but were not beautiful. I 
felt about the contradictions much as an earnest Catholic must feel about 
wicked Popes.163
163 Russell (1959), chapter 17 entitled “T he Retreat from Pythagoras” , p. 155.
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I admire the heroic courage of Russell’s honesty, I admire his reluctance, but I 
am unable to admire what he reluctantly did. For in my opinion “feeling about 
the contradictions much as an earnest Catholic must feel about wicked Popes” 
cannot and need not be justified. The whole drama is just as tautological as 
Russell eventually supposed mathematics to be. Its unhappy ending is the 
outcome of a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is the fulfilment of the belief with 
which the story started: the belief that the paradox is an enemy of a Platonic 
love of mathematics.
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During the last decades, a growing number of analytical philosophers have 
started to study the genesis of the school to which they belong. This thesis is 
an attempt to contribute to this salutary development, but from a different 
point of view, namely from the point of view of someone who once moved 
from continental (Hegelian) towards analytical philosophy, but eventually 
refused to become its adherent. The critical distance that distinguishes 
the approach of this study is marked by the predicate “dialectical” added 
to “analysis” . It indicates a minimal residue of Hegelianism: Hegelianism 
without hierarchy, without idealism and without the belief in “inevitable 
contradictions”. W hat remains of it is only the conviction that oppositions are 
of universal, i.e., of existential, historical and logical importance, in spite of 
the fact that for us, human beings, it is difficult both to understand them and 
to acknowledge this very difficulty.
This point of view purports to lie beyond the schism between the analytical 
and continental traditions. For it opposes a presupposition unconsciously 
shared by the two movements, namely that oppositions, if they are real at 
all, are outside the scope of logic. Contemporary continental philosophers 
are prepared to accept the importance of oppositions and of irreducible two- 
sidedness, as in the much-discussed case of “intentionality”. But they are 
prone to believing that what really matters in human life, cannot fall within 
the scope of logic. Analytical philosophers, being prepared to accept logic’s 
universality, are prone to ignoring the very possibility of oppositions.
In this study no elaborate theory of oppositions is provided, but only the 
elementary maxim that, as such, oppositions must have something in common. 
They are to be construed as contrasting forms of one and the same: not as 
A  versus B or A C  versus BC, but rather as A B  versus BA. The difference 
cannot be outside of what is the same. The above-mentioned analytical 
ignorance of the very possibility of oppositions consists in assuming that, 
on pain of contradiction, identity must be construed as absolute. Difference 
cannot intrude into what is the same. In other words: nothing can differ from 
itself or be outside itself. W hen something differs from something, it must be 
something else.
Being the principle of un-dialectical analysis, this Axiom of External 
Difference constitutes the main target of my criticism. I reject it as an illusion, 
but I fully acknowledge its importance as an existentially deep-rooted illusion.
I admire philosophers like Frege and Russell, who have seriously tried to 
elaborate this axiom consistently. This thesis is an attempt to prove the logical 
and historical fertility of a “dialectical analysis” in applying it to a little, but
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vexed and much-discussed piece of the history of early analytical philosophy: 
the most obscure passage occurring in Bertrand Russell’s famous article On 
Denoting (OD), the passage containing the so-called G ray’s Elegy Argument 
(G EA ).
OD is famous because it is the very first public appearance of the theory that 
was later named the Theory of Descriptions (ToD). In OD the then nameless 
theory is put forward as a new theory of denoting. Russell’s own former theory 
of denoting concepts (mainly explained in the Principles of Mathematics, 
Chapter V) and Frege’s theory of Sinn and Bedeutung, are treated as variants 
of essentially one and the same old theory. It is subjected to criticism in two 
different arguments. Most famous and most conspicuous is the argument 
concerning propositions in whose verbal expression a vacuous denoting phrase, 
like “the present King of France”, occurs. In the King o f France Argument 
(KFA), the views of Meinong and Frege are jointly discussed. The other 
argument, the GEA , is concerned with an issue in which Meinong does not 
play any role. The question at stake is: how can the supposed meaning of an 
unambiguously denoting phrase occur as the subject of a proposition?
In his autobiographical accounts, Russell stressed the importance of the 
ToD. Its rise marks the second great salutary turning point in his philosophical 
development. It enabled him to mitigate the excessive realism that resulted 
from his revolt against his own former idealism. A s such, it also helped him 
to cope with the paradox or “contradiction”, discovered shortly after that 
revolt. In this connection, Russell mentions OD, but not the GEA . Quite the 
contrary, he declared: ” ...the desire to avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm 
of being led me to the theory of descriptions.” .
From this statement it has generally be inferred that the G EA  does not 
have anything to do with the ToD’s genesis. It seemed to be an additional 
argument, conceived afterwards in order to defend the new theory against the 
old one. Construed in this way, it has been extensively discussed by a lot of 
analytic philosophers, among them distinguished proponents such as Church, 
Carnap, Searle, Geach, Dummett, Ayer and Hochberg. Their rather heated 
controversies belong to the first main phase of the GEA’s reception, the period 
from 1943 to 1980. These discussions were dominated by a crucial cluster of 
questions. For the sake of brevity, I shall call it the Russell-Frege question: Can 
the G EA  be construed as a sound criticism of Frege? Or can it only be applied 
to Russell’s own theory? How fundamental are the differences between these 
two theories? Did Russell misunderstand these differences and did his possible 
misunderstanding impair the validity of the G EA  as criticism of Frege?
From 1980 onwards, both the issue itself and the atmosphere of the
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discussion considerably changed. It became less heated and more historical.
In that year Coffa discovered the manuscript O n Fundamentals (OF), written 
shortly before OD. In it a passage occurs which, at least partly, strikingly 
resembles the GEA . Immediately after that passage, the ToD is first introduced. 
A nd importantly, in OF, neither Meinong nor the un-Meinongian Frege 
are discussed. In short: the G EA  now began to appear to have been of 
unsuspected importance to the true genesis of the ToD, and Russell’s official 
autobiographical story proved to be unreliable.
Because of this finding, commentators have concluded that the official 
account is to be replaced by a new, unofficial story. According to it, Russell 
was not led to the ToD by the supposed “desire to avoid Meinong’s unduly 
populous realm of being”, but, instead, by the desire to avoid the purely 
Russellian problem of denoting discovered in OF and later discussed in the 
GEA . W hoever wants to understand OD and the enigmatic G EA  occurring in 
it, must, according to this unofficial story, forget the later Russell and focus on 
what has preceded OD. Evidently, neither Meinong nor Frege have thus played 
any role in the ToD’s genesis. Indeed, OD contains criticism of both, but that 
merely belongs to the defence of a previously conceived and adopted theory.
In the present dissertation, the aim  of the unofficial story, which is to 
criticize Russell’s official account by means of evidence derived from OF, is 
fully embraced. But the unofficial story itself is rejected. The most elementary 
opposition, which is ignored by its adherents, is the opposition in which they 
themselves are involved. Impressed by the implacable outer appearance of 
their own criticism (the official story is deemed to be completely false), they 
have failed to see its inner weakness. In fact, their view has much more in 
common with the official story than they realize, because two essential and 
contestable assumptions are uncritically adopted: A ) that there is no need 
to distinguish the ToD’s conception from its acceptance and B) that there is no 
need to mention Frege.
The commentators have counterbalanced their lack of criticism by 
attributing a kind of magical and almost exclusive importance to OF. In doing 
so, they have prevented themselves from acknowledging its real importance 
and from comparing it with OD and with later expositions of the ToD. They 
supposed OD to be written after the ToD’s full adoption, whereas, at least 
according to the present thesis, it has been written before it.
In Part One of this thesis, OF and other evidence is used in order to refute 
dogma A . The problem of denoting discovered in OF occasioned Russell to 
conceive the ToD, but it appears to have prevented him from accepting it. In 
Part Two, OF and other evidence is used in order to refute dogma B. In this
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way, the old Russell-Frege question is approached from a new perspective. 
Along the road towards the ToD’s conception, Frege did play a role of crucial 
importance. Along the road towards its adoption, he has in fact played a 
remarkable, but rather problematic role. It is not by accident that in the 
official story, both the problem discussed in the G EA  and Frege are forgotten.
In Chapter I, two oppositions, both ignored by the proponents of the 
unofficial story, are discussed. The first opposition is constituted by the 
formal difference between the KFA and the GEA . The former argument 
purports to be of “ imperative” importance in favour of the ToD, whereas the 
problem discussed in the latter is introduced as “curious”, i.e., as more or less 
inexplicable. This contrast has disturbed the straightforwardness of O D ’s 
composition. In OD much more actually happens than what is announced in 
its paragraph 3.
The second opposition discussed in Chapter I consists in the conflict 
between the official story and the true genesis of the ToD. Although, of course, 
the adherents of the unofficial story did not fail to see the existence of this 
conflict, they failed to understand its nature. They wrongly supposed it to lie 
outside the true history. They simply treated Russell as an unreliable Russell 
scholar, whereas in fact, he is the history’s very protagonist.
In Chapter II, an attempt is made to lay bare the kernel of truth contained 
in Russell’s official account. Indeed, Meinong did not play any role in the 
ToD’s conception, but Russell’s discovery, made after the completion of OF and 
before the final composition of OD, that the new theory throws a new light 
on the Meinongian problem of non-being, greatly contributed to the ToD’s 
adoption. The crux of the KFA may be summarized as follows: The opposition 
between Meinong (or rather the quasi-Meinongian Russell) and Frege (or 
rather the Russell who by means of a quasi-Fregean move turned away from 
his former quasi-Meinongianism) is based on an apparently unavoidable 
presupposition they share. It may be stated thus: If  a sentence in which, say, 
“Zeus” occurs does express something true or false, then “Zeus” (irrespective 
of whether the word is construed as a proper name or as a denoting phrase 
in disguise) must stand for something that the proposition expressed by 
that sentence is about. This presupposition, which may be called “crypto- 
Meinongianism”, is actually avoided by the ToD.
In Chapter III, the opening chapter of Part Two, an attempt is made to 
reconstruct the role played by Frege in the genesis of the GEA. A s to the 
question discussed in it, namely the question of how the meaning of a denoting
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phrase may occur as subject of a proposition, Russell started with the innocent 
view expressed in Principles §56: if we wish to speak about the denoting 
concept itself, “we have to indicate the fact by italics or inverted commas”. In 
Principles §476 this outlook is clearly distinguished from the Fregean principle 
that a Sinn can only become the subject of a proposition, if it is indicated by 
another Sinn. In OF, p.363, a passage preceding the one that corresponds to the 
GEA , Russell appears to have integrated this “ important” Fregean principle 
into his own theory of denoting concepts. In the crucial passage OF §35 the 
insufficiency of this quasi-Fregean view is discovered.
This, then, is one of the clues without which, according to the present 
thesis, the G EA  cannot be understood. Another, equally essential, clue 
consists in asking and answering the question why the discovery made in 
OF §35 is surprising and important. The answer provided in Chapter III is, 
that in fact Russell discovered the incompatibility of the Axiom  of External 
Difference with denoting.
In Chapter IV  these two clues are used in order to analyse the G EA  itself, 
taking into due account similarities and dissimilarities between the text 
and the passage in OF corresponding to it. In this connection, a third clue 
is laid bare, namely that the structure of the G EA  (which is much more 
straightforward than the puzzling structure of OD as a whole) is marked by 
the sentence “This happens as follows”. It indicates the division between 
two opposed forms of one and the same problem: its general description and 
its actual illustration. Any sound exegesis must be such that the supposed 
description and the supposed happening correspond with one another.
The outcome of this approach is rather unorthodox. The G EA  culminates 
in a criticism of what is left of the quasi-Fregean view, once its Russellian 
embodiment has been abandoned. N ot the G EA  as a whole can be applied to 
Frege, but only its last part. However, that part is more cogent than the part 
that can be applied to Russell. For an appeal to special kinds of occurrences is 
more alien to the nature of Frege’s logic than to the nature of Russell’s logic.
The concluding Chapter V  deals with the role played, and not played, in 
the process terminating in the ToD’s adoption by the “fundamental Frege”,
i.e., the Frege who holds ideas presupposed in his theory of Sinn and Bedeutung. 
In OF §§56-57, this Frege actually appears on the scene. In order to prepare 
the exegesis of this rather puzzling passage, three elements, constituting its 
environment, are discussed. The first element consists in what happens in 
the preceding passage: Russell’s conception of the ToD and his discovery 
that it is not viable unless a fresh view of the variable is developed, namely
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a view in which the variable is not any longer assumed to presuppose the 
denoting concept “any entity”. The second element consists in the limitation 
of Russell’s perception, which is due to his misconception of this own 
fundamental difference with Frege. O f course, the nature and seriousness of 
that misconception cannot be fathomed unless an attempt is made to explore a 
third element as well, namely this fundamental difference itself.
These investigations lead to the conclusion that Frege’s assistance in 
reshaping Russell’s view of the variable is just as problematic as the resulting 
view itself. Furthermore, the part Russell actually allowed Frege to play in 
OD is much more limited than it could have been. Frege could have been 
honoured as the precursor of the new theory of indefinite descriptions. Finally, 
neither the difference between Russell and Frege, nor Russell’s having partially 
misconstrued it, does impair the validity of the G EA  as applied to Frege.
However, Russell was not prepared to fully acknowledge what, according 
to the present thesis, constitutes the importance of the GEA , namely its 
disproving of the logical validity of the Axiom  of External Difference. In 
his opinion, the G EA  disproves the logical possibility of denoting. A nd the 
variable seems to presuppose denoting. Therefore, if the ToD is to be adopted, 
the best way of doing so is, by forgetting both denoting and Frege altogether. 
This is exactly what happened in the final acceptance of the ToD and in the 
official story about its genesis.
According to the present analysis, Russell actually decided to fully 
embrace the ToD as soon as he realized its possible assistance in coping with 
the paradox. But if the “problem of denoting” is construed in the way just 
sketched, as basically a problem of externalism, then the same procedure 
may be applied to the paradox. W hat seems to be a “problem of reflexivity” 
essentially is another variant of the problem of externalism. In this way an 
unsuspected kinship between the two problems can be laid bare. That is 
why the problem discussed in the G EA  deserves to be called Russell’s second 
paradox.
Samenvatting
Hoewel analytische filosofen van huis uit niet zo historisch ingesteld plachten 
te zijn, valt er in de laatste decennia onder hen een groeiende belangstelling 
te constateren voor de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de stroming waartoe ze zelf 
behoren. Aan deze reflexieve wending, die onvermijdelijk kritische distantie 
vereist, hoopt deze dissertatie iets bij te dragen, maar vanuit de andere kant: 
vanuit het perspectief van iemand die met kritische distantie begonnen is, 
iemand die zich ooit vanuit zijn continentale (Hegeliaanse) achtergrond in 
de richting van de analytische filosofie heeft bewogen, die daar weerstand en 
inspiratie gezocht en gevonden heeft, maar die uiteindelijk geweigerd heeft 
een aanhanger van die stroming te worden. De kritische distantie waardoor de 
in dit proefschrift gevolgde benaderingswijze zich onderscheidt van de onder 
analytische filosofen gangbare, is gemarkeerd door het woord “dialectisch” 
aan het woord “analyse” toe te voegen. Ik heb het gebruikt om een minimale 
rest van Hegelianisme aan te duiden: Hegelianisme zonder hiërarchie, zonder 
idealisme en zonder het geloof in “onvermijdelijke tegenspraken”. Wat er van 
overblijft, is alleen maar de overtuiging dat tegenstellingen van universeel, 
d.w.z. existentieel, historisch en logisch belang zijn, ondanks het feit dat het 
ons, mensen, moeilijk valt ze te begrijpen en die moeite te erkennen.
Dit gezichtspunt pretendeert aan gene zijde te staan van de kloof die de 
continentale van de analytische filosofie scheidt. Want ik keer mij tegen 
een vooronderstelling die onbewust gedeeld wordt door beide stromingen 
en die volgens mij aan hun tegenstelling ten grondslag ligt, te weten dat 
tegenstellingen, als ze reëel zijn, buiten het bestek vallen van de logica.
Hedendaagse continentale filosofen zijn bereid het belang van tegenstellingen 
en van onherleidbare tweezijdigheid (denk aan het geval van de veelbesproken 
“intentionaliteit” ) te erkennen. Maar ze zijn geneigd te geloven dat wat écht 
van belang is in het menselijk leven, buiten het bereik van de logica moet 
liggen. Analytische filosofen redeneren andersom: omdat ze bereid zijn de 
universaliteit van de logica te erkennen, voelen ze zich gedwongen de logische 
mogelijkheid van tegenstellingen te ontkennen.
Deze dissertatie verschaft geen uitgewerkte theorie over tegenstellingen, 
maar slechts de elementaire richtlijn dat tegenpolen als zodanig iets met elkaar 
gemeen moeten hebben. Ze moeten als contrasterende vormen van één en 
hetzelfde worden opgevat: niet als A  versus B, of A C  versus BC, maar eerder als 
A B versus BA. Het verschil kan niet gelegen zijn buiten datgene wat hetzelfde 
is. De hierboven genoemde, onder analytische filosofen gangbare miskenning 
van de mogelijkheid van tegenstellingen, bestaat in de aanname, dat, op straffe 
van tegenspraak, identiteit absoluut moet worden opgevat: Niets kan van
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zichzelf verschillen of buiten zichzelf zijn. A ls iets van iets verschilt, moet het 
iets anders zijn.
Omdat dit axioma van uitwendig verschil het principe is waarop een 
ondialectische analyse is gebaseerd, ligt daar het voornaamste doelwit van 
mijn kritiek. Ik verwerp het als een illusie, maar ik erken en bewonder de 
anti-psychologistische en anti-idealistische motieven van waaruit grondleggers 
van de analytische filosofie, zoals Frege en Russell, ertoe gekomen zijn dit 
axioma te omarmen. Deze dissertatie is een poging de vruchtbaarheid van een 
“dialectische analyse” aan te tonen door die toe te passen op een geducht en 
veelbesproken stukje uit de geschiedenis van de vroege analytische filosofie: de 
meest duistere passage die voorkomt in Bertrand Russell’s beroemde, in 1905 
verschenen artikel On Denoting (OD), de passage waarin het zogenaamde Gray’s 
Elegy Argument (G EA ) wordt uiteengezet.
OD is beroemd omdat het de allereerste openbare verschijning is van de 
theorie die later als Theory of Descriptions (ToD) bekend is geworden. In OD 
wordt de dan nog naamloze theorie naar voren gebracht als een nieuwe theorie 
over denoting (verwijzing). Russells eigen voormalige theorie over denoting 
concepts (verwijzende begrippen), hoofdzakelijk uiteengezet in The Principles of 
Mathematics, hoofdstuk V  en Frege’s theorie over Sinn en Bedeutung worden in 
OD behandeld als varianten van één en dezelfde oude theorie. Die wordt aan 
kritiek onderworpen in twee verschillende argumenten. Het meest beroemd 
en opvallend is de argumentatie die betrekking heeft op proposities uitgedrukt 
door volzinnen waarin een loze verwijzende frase, zoals “de huidige koning 
van Frankrijk” voorkomt. In dit King of France Argument (KFA), worden de 
opvattingen van Meinong en Frege samen besproken. Het tweede argument, het 
GEA, heeft te doen met een kwestie waarin Meinong geen enkele rol speelt. 
Het punt waar het om gaat is: Hoe kan de vooronderstelde betekenis (meaning) 
van een eenduidig verwijzende frase, zoals “de eerste regel van Gray’s Elegie”, 
als thema van een propositie voorkomen?
In zijn autobiografische uiteenzettingen heeft Russell het belang van 
de ToD voor zijn ontwikkeling als volgt geschetst: Het ontstaan van die 
theorie markeert de tweede grote heilzame ommekeer in zijn filosofische 
ontwikkelingsgang. Die theorie stelde hem in staat het overmatige realisme 
af te zwakken dat uit zijn eerste heilzame ommekeer, de in 1898 begonnen 
revolte tegen zijn eigen vroegere idealisme, was voortgekomen. In die 
hoedanigheid hielp de ToD hem ook om in het reine te komen met de paradox 
of “contradictie” die Russell kort na die revolte, in 1901, ontdekt had. In die 
autobiografische uiteenzettingen wordt OD soms genoemd (bij voorbeeld 
in My Philosophical Development (1959), hoofdstuk 7), maar het G EA  nooit.
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Integendeel, in My Mental Development (1944) heeft Russell gezegd: “ ....het 
verlangen Meinongs overbevolkte rijk van zijnden te vermijden, bracht me tot 
de theory of descriptions.” .
U it deze woorden is de algemeen verbreide opvatting voortgekomen, dat 
het G EA  niets te maken heeft met de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de ToD. Het 
leek een extra argument te zijn dat later bedacht is om de nieuwe theorie tegen 
de aanspraken van de gevestigde zienswijze te verdedigen. Een aanzienlijk 
aantal analytische filosofen, onder wie beroemdheden zoals Church, Carnap, 
Searle, Geach, Dummett, Ayer en Hochberg, heeft het aldus opgevatte G EA  
uitgebreid besproken. Hun nogal verhitte onenigheden behoren tot de eerste 
hoofdperiode van de receptie van het GEA, de periode van 1943, het jaar 
waarin Church met zijn commentaar de discussie op gang bracht, tot 1980, het 
jaar waarin het gezag van Russells officiële verhaal voor het eerst ter discussie 
werd gesteld. De controverses in dit tijdvak worden beheerst door één cruciaal 
cluster van vragen. Voor het gemak noem ik het de Russell-Frege kwestie: Kan 
het G EA  worden gelezen als een steekhoudende kritiek op Frege? O f is het 
alleen maar van toepassing op Russells eigen theorie? Hoe fundamenteel zijn 
hun verschillen? Heeft Russell die verkeerd begrepen? En heeft zijn eventuele 
misverstand afbreuk gedaan aan de geldigheid van het G EA  opgevat als kritiek 
op Frege?
Vanaf 1980 zijn zowel het thema als de stemming van de discussie aanzienlijk 
veranderd. De stemming werd minder verhit en het thema meer historisch.
In dat jaar ontdekte Coffa het manuscript On Fundamentals (OF), geschreven 
kort voor OD. In dat manuscript komt een passage voor die minstens ten dele 
opvallend met het G EA  overeenstemt. Direct na die passage wordt de ToD 
geconcipieerd. In OF wordt noch over Meinong gerept, noch over Frege als 
zijn tegenpool. Kortom: het G EA  bleek opeens van onverwacht belang te 
zijn voor de ware ontstaansgeschiedenis van de ToD. Bovendien bleek Russells 
autobiografische schets onbetrouwbaar te zijn.
U it deze vondst hebben de commentatoren de conclusie getrokken dat het 
officiële verhaal vervangen moet worden door een nieuw, onofficieel verhaal. 
Niet “het verlangen Meinongs overbevolkte rijk van zijnden te vermijden” 
bracht Russell tot de ToD, maar in plaats daarvan het verlangen iets anders te 
vermijden, namelijk het puur Russelliaanse probleem van denoting dat hij in OF 
had ontdekt en in het G EA  opnieuw had besproken. Wie OD wil begrijpen, 
en vooral het raadselachtige G EA  dat daarin voorkomt, moet, volgens het 
onofficiële verhaal, de latere Russell vergeten en zich concentreren op wat aan 
OD voorafging. Kennelijk heeft noch Meinong noch Frege een rol gespeeld 
in de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de ToD. Natuurlijk valt, ook volgens de 
aanhangers van deze zienswijze, niet te ontkennen dat Meinong en Frege beiden
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in OD worden bekritiseerd. Maar die kritiek hoort volgens hen thuis in de 
verdediging van een al eerder geconcipieerde en aangenomen theorie.
In dit proefschrift wordt het doel van het onofficiële verhaal volledig erkend, 
namelijk Russells officiële verhaal bekritiseren met behulp van bewijsmateriaal 
dat aan OF ontleend is. Maar het onofficiële verhaal zelf wordt in dit 
proefschrift verworpen. De meest elementaire tegenstelling die door de 
aanhangers van deze opvatting wordt veronachtzaamd, is de tegenstelling 
waarin ze zelf betrokken zijn. Onder de indruk van de onverbiddelijke uiterlijke 
verschijning van hun eigen kritiek (het officiële verhaal zou totaal verkeerd 
zijn) vergeten ze oog te hebben voor de toegeeflijkheid die daar achter 
schuilgaat. In feite heeft hun visie veel meer gemeen met het officiële verhaal 
dan ze beseffen. Twee essentiële en aanvechtbare vooronderstellingen worden 
kritiekloos overgenomen: A ) dat het niet nodig is de conceptie van de ToD te 
onderscheiden van haar acceptatie en B) dat het niet nodig is Frege te noemen.
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift wordt OF samen met ander 
bewijsmateriaal gebruikt om dogma A  te weerleggen. Naar aanleiding van het 
probleem dat Russell in OF ontdekt heeft, is de ToD geconcipieerd. Maar uit 
OF blijkt ondubbelzinnig dat datzelfde probleem hem ervan weerhield de ToD 
zonder meer te accepteren. Het probleem bleek sterker en universeler te zijn dan 
de oplossing die de ToD te bieden had. In het tweede deel wordt OF samen met 
andere bronnen gebruikt om dogma B te ontkrachten, zodat aldus een nieuw 
licht geworpen kan worden op de aloude Russell-Frege kwestie: Frege heeft wel 
degelijk een cruciale rol gespeeld in het proces dat tot de conceptie van de ToD 
geleid heeft. En in het proces naar de uiteindelijke acceptatie van de ToD heeft 
hij een opmerkelijk, maar nogal problematisch aandeel gehad. Het is bepaald 
niet toevallig dat in het officiële verhaal Frege samen met het G EA  vergeten 
wordt.
In hoofdstuk I worden twee tegenstellingen besproken die beide door 
de aanhangers van het onofficiële verhaal verwaarloosd zijn. De eerste 
tegenstelling is gelegen in het formele verschil tussen het KFA en het GEA. 
Afgezien van hun evidente inhoudelijke verschil valt er in OD een verschil te 
bespeuren in wat deze argumenten pretenderen te bewijzen. Het eerstgenoemde 
argument pretendeert “dwingend” te zijn ten gunste van de ToD, terwijl het 
probleem besproken in het laatstgenoemde argument wordt ingeleid als zijnde 
“nogal vreemd” , d.w.z. min of meer onverklaarbaar. Dit contrast heeft de 
rechtlijnigheid en doorzichtigheid van de structuur van OD verstoord. In de 
tekst gebeurt heel wat meer dan in de derde alinea op onschuldige toon wordt 
aangekondigd. Dat het KFA, oftewel de kritische discussie behorende bij puzzel
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(3), in een apart deel naar voren is geschoven, is geheel te danken aan de 
door Russell ongenoemde extra legitimerende kracht die hij aan dat argument 
toekent.
De tweede in hoofdstuk I besproken tegenstelling betreft het conflict tussen 
het officiële verhaal en de ware ontstaansgeschiedenis van de ToD. Hoewel de 
aanhangers van het onofficiële verhaal het bestaan van dit conflict uiteraard 
niet over het hoofd hebben gezien, hebben ze wel de aard ervan verkeerd 
begrepen. Ze hebben ten onrechte aangenomen dat die tegenstelling buiten de 
echte geschiedenis gelegen is. Ze hebben Russell gewoonweg behandeld als een 
onbetrouwbare Russell deskundige, terwijl hij in feite de hoofdpersoon is van 
het drama!
In hoofdstuk II wordt een poging gedaan de kern van waarheid bloot te 
leggen die vervat is in Russells officiële verhaal. Inderdaad, Meinong heeft, 
zoals de aanhangers van het onofficiële verhaal maar al te graag benadrukken, 
geen enkele rol gespeeld in de conceptie van de ToD, maar wel degelijk in 
haar acceptatie. Want Russells ontdekking, gedaan na de voltooiing van OF 
en voor de definitieve compositie van OD, dat de ToD een nieuw licht werpt 
op het Meinongiaanse probleem van het niet-zijnde, heeft daaraan flink wat 
bijgedragen. De clou van het KFA kan als volgt worden samengevat: De 
tegenstelling tussen Meinong (of eigenlijk de quasi-Meinongiaanse Russell) 
en Frege (of eigenlijk de Russell die zich met behulp van een quasi-Fregeaanse 
manoeuvre van zijn voormalige quasi-Meinongianisme had afgekeerd) is 
gebaseerd op een ogenschijnlijk onvermijdelijke vooronderstelling die ze 
met elkaar gemeen hebben. Die vooronderstelling kan als volgt worden 
weergegeven. Als een volzin waarin, zeg, “Zeus” voorkomt, iets waars of onwaars 
uitdrukt, dan moet “Zeus” (ongeacht of die uitdrukking nu als eigennaam 
wordt opgevat dan wel als verkapte descriptie) staan voor iets waarover de 
door die volzin uitgedrukte propositie handelt. De extra legitimerende kracht 
van het KFA berust op Russells ontdekking dat deze aanname, die als “crypto- 
Meinongianisme” te betitelen is, door de ToD vermeden kan worden.
In hoofdstuk III wordt het tweede deel van deze dissertatie geopend met 
een poging de rol te reconstrueren die Frege in de ontstaansgeschiedenis van 
het G EA  gespeeld heeft. Ten aanzien van de vraag die in het G EA  centraal 
staat, de vraag hoe de betekenis van een eenduidig verwijzende frase als thema 
van een propositie kan voorkomen, heeft Russell aanvankelijk de onschuldige 
opvatting gehuldigd die in Principles §56 naar voren komt: “A ls we willen 
spreken over het verwijzende begrip zelf, “dan moet dat worden aangegeven 
door van cursivering of aanhalingstekens gebruik te maken.” In Principles §476
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wordt deze zienswijze duidelijk onderscheiden van het Fregeaanse beginsel dat 
een Sinn alleen maar tot thema van een propositie kan worden, wanneer daarnaar 
middels een andere Sinn verwezen wordt. In OF, p.363, een stuk van de tekst dat 
voorafgaat aan de cruciale, met het GEA corresponderende passage, blijkt Russell 
dit aldaar door hem als “belangrijk” betitelde Fregeaanse beginsel in zijn eigen 
theorie van denoting concepts ingelijfd te hebben. In de cruciale passage (OF §35) 
wordt dan vervolgens het fiasco van deze semi-Fregeaanse zienswijze ontdekt.
Dat is dan één van de sleutels zonder welke volgens dit proefschrift het GEA 
niet ontcijferd kan worden: het eerste standpunt dat daar in alinea D aan kritiek 
wordt onderworpen, is noch puur Russelliaans, noch puur Fregeaans, maar quasi- 
Fregeaans.
Maar waarom meende Russell Freges hulp nodig te hebben? Wat was er mis 
met de onschuldige, in Principles §56 gehuldigde opvatting? Daar wordt in feite 
een beroep gedaan op een verandering van rol zonder een verandering van positie, 
terwijl dat volgens het in §49 gehuldigde externalisme onmogelijk zou moeten 
zijn. Dat is dan de tweede sleutel zonder welke volgens dit proefschrift het GEA 
niet ontcijferd kan worden: de rol van het axioma van uitwendige verschillen dient 
als zodanig onderkend te worden.
Wat Russell in OF §35 ontdekte en in een iets gewijzigde vorm in het G EA  heeft 
uiteengezet, is, zo wordt in Hoofdstuk IV  uiteengezet, simpelweg, dat niet alleen 
zijn onschuldige uitgangspunt, maar ook de quasi-Fregeaanse remedie, ja zelfs alle 
beschikbare alternatieven, in strijd zijn met het genoemde axioma. Externalisme 
sluit denoting uit. Dat is volgens mijn exegese de uiterst belangwekkende en 
verrassende stelling die in het G EA wordt bewezen.
Het laatste hoofdstuk V  handelt over de “fundamentele Frege”, d.w.z. Frege als 
vertegenwoordiger van opvattingen die voorondersteld zijn in zijn theorie over 
Sinn en Bedeutung. Welke rol heeft hij gespeeld in het proces dat uitloopt op de 
volledige acceptatie van de ToD? In OF §§56-57 verschijnt hij daadwerkelijk 
op het toneel. Teneinde de exegese van die nogal moeilijke passage voor te 
bereiden, worden drie factoren die samen de context bepalen, aan een nader 
onderzoek onderworpen. Het eerste element bestaat in wat is gebeurd in de 
voorafgaande passage: Russells conceptie van de ToD en zijn ontdekking dat die 
niet levensvatbaar is tenzij er een nieuwe visie op de variabele wordt uitgewerkt, 
een visie waarin de variabele niet langer geacht wordt het verwijzende begrip 
“willekeurig welke entiteit” ( “any entity” ) te vooronderstellen. De tweede factor 
bestaat in de beperking van Russells waarneming, een beperking die te wijten is 
aan zijn misverstanden over het fundamentele verschil tussen Frege en hemzelf. 
Uiteraard kan de aard en de ernst van die misverstanden niet worden vastgesteld,
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tenzij ook nog een derde factor onderzocht wordt: het fundamentele verschil zelf.
Deze onderzoekingen leiden tot de conclusie dat de door Frege geboden 
hulp bij het ontwerp van een nieuwe kijk op de variabele even problematisch 
is als het resultaat van die hulp. Verder wordt ook geconcludeerd dat de rol die 
Russell Frege heeft toegestaan te spelen in OD veel beperkter is dan die geweest 
had kunnen zijn. Frege had geëerd kunnen worden als voorloper van de nieuwe 
theorie van indefinite descriptions (onbepaalde beschrijvingen). Ten slotte komt 
uit dit onderzoek ook naar voren, dat noch de fundamentele verschillen tussen 
Russell en Frege, noch Russells misverstanden daarover, afbreuk doen aan de 
geldigheid van het GEA als uitmondend in een kritiek op Frege. In tegendeel: 
aldus opgevat is het G EA op z’n sterkst. Want een eventueel beroep op bijzondere 
occurrences is nog moeilijker te rijmen met de logica van Frege dan met die van 
Russell.
Echter, Russell was niet bereid het belang dat volgens dit proefschrift aan het 
GEA toekomt, namelijk dat daardoor het axioma van uitwendig verschil ontkracht 
wordt, volledig te erkennen. Volgens hem wordt door het G EA de logische 
onmogelijkheid van denoting bewezen. Desondanks lijkt de variabele zoiets als 
denoting toch te vooronderstellen. Dus, als de ToD volledig geaccepteerd moet 
worden, dan kan dat het beste gebeuren door denoting samen met Frege helemaal 
te vergeten. En dat is precies wat er in de uiteindelijke acceptatie van de ToD en 
het daarbij behorende officiële verhaal over haar ontstaansgeschiedenis gebeurd 
is!
Volgens de onderhavige analyse wilde Russell de ToD volledig accepteren 
toen hij in de gaten kreeg hoe die van dienst zou kunnen zijn om met de in 1901 
ontdekte paradox in het reine te komen. Maar als het “probleem van denoting” 
op de hierboven geschetste manier wordt uitgelegd, namelijk als in wezen een 
probleem van externalisme, dan kan diezelfde procedure ook op de beroemde 
paradox worden toegepast. Wat op het eerste gezicht een “probleem van 
reflexiviteit” lijkt, blijkt dan in wezen een andere variant te zijn van het probleem 
van externalisme. Inderdaad, het axioma van uitwendig verschil loopt uit op de 
ontkenning van reflexiviteit. Want het subtiele verschil van zichzelf dat daarin 
voorondersteld is, wordt door dat axioma uitgesloten. Maar zodra dat axioma 
wordt losgelaten, is elk verschil van meaning terug te vinden op het vlak van de 
denotation. Dan is er wel degelijk een weg terug van denotation naar meaning, 
van de morgenster naar “de morgenster” bij voorbeeld. En dan wordt tevens 
duidelijk onder welke specifieke voorwaarde reflexiviteit vicieus wordt, namelijk 
wanneer die niet langer bestaat in iets dat van reflexiviteit en niet-reflexiviteit 
onderscheiden is. Op die manier blijkt er een onvermoede verwantschap tussen 
beide problemen te bestaan. Daarom verdient het in het G EA besproken 
probleem betiteld te worden als Russells tweede paradox.
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resulted.

Stellingen
bij het proefschrift R u sse ll’s Second P arad ox  van H arm  Boukem a
1. Het gaat niet vanzelf goed, maar als het goed gaat, gaat het vanzelf.
2. De scherpste kritiek is ontwapenend.
3. Vanwege hun universele betekenis zijn tegenstellingen intiemer met de 
filosofie verbonden dan woorden.
4. Anti-psychologisme op het gebied van de Logica heeft als logische 
consequentie, dat logische problemen psychologisch en existentieel van 
aard moeten zijn.
5. Wat zijn visie op wetenschap en mystiek betreft is Russell 
wetenschappelijker en mystieker ingesteld dan Wittgenstein.
6. De manier waarop Russell zich tegen Leibniz heeft afgezet, is voor de 
aard van zijn verdere filosofische ontwikkeling van veel groter belang 
dan gewoonlijk, ook door hemzelf, is aangenomen.
7. Naast het door Landini (1998), p.73 genoemde en door Makin (2000) 
gerespecteerde uitgangspunt dat volgens Russell elk concept, en dus ook 
elk denoting concept, als entiteit moet kunnen voorkomen (zie subsectie 
9.2 van dit proefschrift), zijn voor een goed begrip van het Gray’s Elegy 
Argument nog drie andere punten van even groot belang, namelijk:
a) dat de zin This happens as follows de scheidslijn markeert tussen twee 
tegengestelde versies van één en hetzelfde, tweezijdige probleem
b) dat in alinea D vertrokken wordt vanuit een zienswijze die als zodanig 
niet in Principles is terug te vinden
c) dat de vermeende afwezigheid van een weg terug van denotation naar 
meaning berust op het axioma van extern verschil.
8. Gezien het feit dat de auteur van dit proefschrift het axioma van extern 
verschil verwerpt, huldigt hij hoogstwaarschijnlijk de opvatting dat het 
oordeel “De Morgenster is niet iets anders dan de Avondster” alleen 
dan een zakelijke, astronomische kenniswaarde kan hebben, wanneer 
daarin is voorondersteld dat er tussen de Morgenster en de Avondster
een zakelijk, astronomisch verschil bestaat, een anders-zijn dat numerieke 
identiteit niet uitsluit.
9. Wittgensteins vaak geroemde beschouwing over “familiegelijkenissen” 
leidt aan het euvel van tegenstellingblindheid. Terecht wijst hij er op 
dat bij voorbeeld competitie slechts voor sommige spelen van essentieel 
belang is, maar hij vergeet het omgekeerde, namelijk dat slechts 
sommige vormen van competitie een speels karakter hebben.
10. Austins stelregel dat in de filosofie de gewone taal niet misbruikt 
kan worden zonder daarvoor een prijs te betalen, is ook op zijn eigen 
taaldaadtheorie van toepassing. Alle technische grondbegrippen daarvan 
ontlenen hun kracht aan de tegenstelling tussen “zeggen” en “doen”.
Die tegenstelling wordt door hem echter stelselmatig vervormd tot een 
territoriumverdeling.
11. Machtsverheffen is voor het wezen van de getallen van veel groter 
belang dan gewoonlijk, ook door wiskundigen, wordt aangenomen. Bij 
voorbeeld: restklassen modulo m zijn slechts quasigetallen omdat ze niet 
als exponent kunnen fungeren.
12. Op een eenvoudige wijze kan een meetkundige stelling worden bewezen 
die buiten het bestek valt van de gangbare meetkunde en waardoor de 
gulden snede in een ruimer perspectief wordt geplaatst, namelijk dat
er vier en slechts vier typen gelijkbenige driehoeken zijn die door één 
deellijn in twee eveneens gelijkbenige driehoeken kunnen worden 
verdeeld. Slechts twee van deze typen vertonen de verhouding van de 
gulden snede.
13. Het verdient aanbeveling de vraag of God bestaat, te vervangen door de 
vraag wat voor god wel of niet bestaat.
14. Rechtvaardiging van geloof of ongeloof berust op bijgeloof.
15. Omdat het niet zeker is of er in het hiernamaals gepromoveerd kan 
worden, is het aan te raden, als je wilt promoveren, dat te doen voor de 
dood is ingetreden.
Copy of the original version of Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting”, Mind n.s. 14, 
pp. 479-93, attached to Harm Boukema, “Russell’s Second Paradox, A 
Dialectical Analysis of ‘On Denoting’”.
II.—ON DENOTING.
B y B e r t r a n d  B u s s e l l .
1 B y  a “ d en o tin g  p h ra se  ” I  m ean  a p h ra se  su ch  as an y  one 
of th e  fo llow ing  : a m an , som e m an , a n y  m an , every  m an , 
all m en , th e  p re se n t K in g  of E n g la n d , th e  p re se n t K in g  of 
F ra n c e , th e  c e n tre  of m ass  of th e  S o lar S y s tem  a t  th e  first 
in s ta n t  of th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry , th e  rev o lu tio n  of th e  e a r th  
ro u n d  th e  su n , th e  rev o lu tio n  of th e  sun  ro u n d  th e  e a r th . 
T h u s  a p h ra se  is d en o tin g  solely in  v ir tu e  of i ts  form. W e  
m ay  d is tin g u ish  th re e  cases : (1) A p h rase  m ay  be d en o tin g , 
and  y e t n o t d en o te  a n y th in g ;  e.g., “ th e  p re se n t K in g  of 
F ra n c e  ” . (2) A p h rase  m ay  deno te  one defin ite  ob ject ; e.g., 
“ th e  p re se n t K in g  of E n g la n d  ” den o tes  a ce rta in  m an . (3) 
A  p h ra se  m ay  d en o te  a m b ig u o u sly  ; e.g., “ a m a n ” deno tes 
n o t m an y  m en , b u t an am b ig u o u s m an . T h e  in te rp re ta tio n  
of such  p h rase s  is a m a tte r  of considerab le  difficulty  ; indeed , 
i t  is very  h a rd  to  fram e  an y  th eo ry  n o t su scep tib le  of fo rm al 
re fu ta tio n . All th e  d ifficulties w ith  w h ic h  I  am  a c q u a in ted  
a re  m et, so fa r  as I  can  d iscover, by  th e  th eo ry  w h ich  I  am  
a b o u t to  explain .
2 T h e  sub jec t of d en o tin g  is of very  g re a t im p o rta n c e , n o t 
only  in  logic and m a th e m a tic s , b u t  also in th e o ry  of k n o w ­
ledge. F o r  exam ple, w e know  th a t  th e  c e n tre  of m ass  of th e  
S o lar S y s tem  a t a defin ite  in s ta n t  is som e defin ite  p o in t, and 
w e can  affirm  a n u m b e r  of p ro p o sitio n s  ab o u t it  ; b u t we 
h a v e  no  im m ed ia te  acquaintance w ith  th is  p o in t, w h ich  is 
on ly  k n o w n  to  us by  descrip tion . T h e  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  
acquaintance an d  knowledge about is th e  d is tin c tio n  betw een  
th e  th in g s  w e h av e  p re se n ta tio n s  of, an d  th e  th in g s  we only  
reach  by  m ea n s  of d e n o tin g  phrases. I t  o ften  h ap p en s  th a t  
w e k now  th a t  a c e rta in  p h rase  d en o tes  u n am b ig u o u sly , a l­
th o u g h  w e have  no a c q u a in ta n c e  w ith  w h a t it  d eno tes ; th is  
o ccu rs  in  th e  above case of th e  c e n tre  of m ass. I n  p ercep ­
tio n  w e hav e  a c q u a in ta n c e  w ith  th e  ob jects of percep tion , 
a n d  in  th o u g h t w e hav e  a c q u a in ta n c e  w ith  ob jects of a m ore  
a b s tra c t  log ical c h a ra c te r  ; b u t  w e do n o t necessarily  have  
a c q u a in ta n c e  w ith  th e  ob jects d eno ted  by p h rase s  com posed
480 BERTRAND R U SSE L L  :
of w ords w ith  w hose m eanings we are acquain ted . To take  
a very im p o rtan t in stance  : T here  seem s no reason  to  believe 
th a t  we are ever acquain ted  w ith  o ther people’s m inds, seeing 
th a t  these  are no t directly  perceived ; hence w h a t we know  
about th em  is obtained th ro u g h  denoting. All th ink ing  has 
to  s ta r t  from  acquain tance  ; b u t it  succeeds in  th in k in g  about 
m any  th in g s w ith  w hich  we have no acquain tance.
3 T he  course  of m y argum en t w ill be as follows. I shall 
begin by s ta tin g  th e  theo ry  I  in tend  to advocate ; 1 I  shall 
th e n  discuss th e  theories of F rege  and  M einong, show ing 
w hy n e ith e r of th em  satisfies m e ; th en  I shall give th e  
grounds in  favour of m y theory  ; and finally I  shall briefly 
ind icate  th e  philosophical consequences of m y  theory .
4 M y theory , briefly, is as follows. I  tak e  th e  no tion  of the  
variable as fu n d am en ta l; I  use “ C (x) ” to  m ean  a proposi­
tion  2 in  w hich æ is a constituen t, w here  x, th e  variable, is 
essentially  and w holly undeterm ined . T h en  we can  consider 
th e  tw o notions “ C  {x) is alw ays tru e  ” and  “ C  (x ) is som e­
tim es tru e  ” .3 T hen  everything and nothing and something 
(w hich are th e  m ost prim itive of deno ting  phrases) are to 
be in te rp re ted  as follows :—
C (everything) m eans “ C (x) is alw ays tru e  ” ;
C  (nothing) m eans “  ‘ C  ( * )  is false ’ is alw ays tru e  ”  ;
C (som ething) m eans “ I t  is false th a t  ‘ C (æ) is false ’ is 
alw ays tru e  ” .4
H ere  the  notion  “ C  (x) is alw ays tru e  ” is taken  as u ltim a te  
and  indefinable, and  th e  o thers are  defined by m eans of it. 
Everything, nothing, and something, a re  no t assum ed to have any 
m ean ing  in  isolation, b u t a m ean ing  is assigned to  every p ro ­
position  in  w hich  th ey  occur. T h is is th e  princip le of the  
theo ry  of deno ting  I  w ish  to  advocate : th a t  deno ting  ph rases 
never have any  m ean ing  in  them selves, b u t th a t  every p ro ­
position  in  w hose verbal expression th ey  occur has a m ean ­
ing. T he difficulties concerning deno ting  are, I  believe, all 
th e  resu lt of a w rong analysis of propositions w hose verbal 
expressions con ta in  deno ting  phrases. T he proper analysis, 
if I  am  no t m istaken , m ay  be fu rth e r  set fo rth  as follows.
11 have discussed this subject in Principles o f Mathematics, chapter 
v., and § 476. The theory there advocated is very nearly the same as 
Frege's, and is quite different from the theory to be advocated in what 
follows.
2 More exactly, a propositional function.
■ 3 The second of these can be defined by means of the first, if we take 
it to mean, “ It is not true that ‘ C (x) is false ’ is always true ”.
41 shall sometimes use, instead of this complicated phrase, the phrase 
“ C (cs) is not always false,” or “ C (x) is sometimes true,” supposed defined 
to mean the same as the complicated phrase.
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5 Suppose now  w e w ish  to interpret the proposition, “ I  m et  
a  m an I f  th is  is true,. I  m et som e definite m an but that 
is not w h at I  affirm. W h a t I  affirm is, according to th e  theory  
I  advocate :—
“ ‘ I  inet x,  and x  is hum an ’ is not a lw ays fa lse ” . 
■Generally, defining the class of m en as the c lass of objects 
h av in g  the predicate human, w e say that :—- 
C (a m an) ” m eans “ ‘ C (x) and x is hum an ’ is not a lw ays  
_ fa ls e ”.
T h is  leaves “ a m a n ,” by itself, w h olly  destitu te  of m ean ing , 
but gives a m ean in g  to every proposition in w h ose verbal 
expression “ a m an ” occurs.
6 Consider n ext the proposition “ all m en are m o r ta l” . 
T h is p rop osition 1 is really hypothetical and states that i f  an y­
th in g  is a m an, it is mortal. T hat is, it sta tes that if x  is 
•a m an, x is m ortal, w hatever x  m ay be. H en ce, su b stitu tin g  
‘ x  is hum an ’ for ‘ x  is a m a n ,’ w e find :—
“ All m en  are m ortal ” m eans “ ‘ I f  x is hum an, x  is m ortal ’ 
is a lw ays true ”.
T h is  is w hat is expressed in sym bolic logic by saying that 
“ all m en are m o r ta l” m eans “ ‘ x is h u m a n ’ im plies ‘ x is 
m ortal ’ for all values of x  ” . M ore generally, w e say :—
•“ C (all m en) ” m eans “ ‘ If x  is hum an, th en  C (x) is true ’ is 
alw ays true ”.
S im ilarly
“ C (no m en) ” m eans “ ‘ I f  x is hum an, then  C (x) is false ’ 
is alw ays true ”.
“  C (som e m en) ” will m ean the sam e as “ C (a m a n ),” 2 and 
“ C (a m an) ” m eans “ It is false that ‘ C (x) and x is hum an ’ 
is alw ays false ” .
“ C (every m an) ” w ill m ean the sam e as “ C (all m en) ”.
7 I t  rem ains to interpret phrases conta in ing  the. T h ese are 
by far the m ost in terestin g  and difficult of d enotin g  phrases. 
T a k e  as an instance “ the father of Charles II . w as execu ted  ”. 
T h is asserts that there w as an x  w ho w as the father of 
Charles II. and w as executed. N o w  the, w h en  it is strictly  
used, involves uniqueness ; w e do, it is true, speak of “ the son  
of So-and-so ” even w h en  So-and-so has several sons, but it 
w ould be m ore correct to say “ a son of So-and-so ” . T hus  
for our purposes we take the as in vo lv in g  uniqueness. T hus  
w hen w e say “ x  w as the father of Charles I I .” w e not only  
assert that x  had a certain relation to Charles II ., but also
1 As has been ably argued in Mr. Bradley’s Logic, book i., chap. ii.
2 Psychologically “ C (a man) ” ha^ a suggestion of only one, and “ C 
(som e men) ” has a suggestion of more than  one ; but we may neglect 
these suggestions in a preliminary sketch.
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that nothing else had this relation. The relation in ques­
tion, without the assumption of uniqueness, and without any 
denoting phrases, is expressed by “ x begat Charles II.”. To 
get an equivalent of “ x was the father of Charles II.,” we 
must add, “ If y  is other than x, y  did not beget Charles II.,” 
or, what is equivalent, “ If y  begat Charles II., y  is identical 
with x ' \  Hence u x is the father of Charles II.” becomes 
“ x  begat Charles II. ; and * if y  begat Charles II., y  is identical 
with x * is always true of y  ”.
Thus “ the father of Charles II. was executed ” becomes :—
It is not always false of x that x begat Charles II. and that 
x  was executed and that ‘ if y  begat Charles II., y  is 
identical with x ’ is always true of y  ”.
This may seem a somewhat incredible interpretation ; but 
I am not at present giving reasons, I am merely stating the 
theory.
8 To interpret “  C (the father of Charles II.),” where C 
stands for any statement about him, we have only to sub­
stitute C (x) for “ x was executed” in the above. Observe 
that, according to the above interpretation, whatever state­
ment C may be, “ C (the father of Charles II.) ” implies :—
“ It is not always false of x  that ‘ if y  begat Charles II., y  is
identical with x ’ is always true of y ” 
which is what is expressed in common language by “ Charles 
II. had one father and no more ”. Consequently if this con­
dition fails, every proposition of the form *' C (the father of 
Charles II.) ” is false. Thus e.g. every proposition of the 
form “ C (the present King of France) ” is false. This is a 
great advantage in the present theory. I shall show later 
that it is not contrary to the law of contradiction, as might 
be at first supposed.
9 The above gives a reduction of all propositions in which 
denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases 
occur. W hy it is imperative to effect such a reduction, the 
subsequent discussion will endeavour to show.
10 The evidence for the above theory is derived from the 
difficulties which seem unavoidable if we regard denoting 
phrases as standing for genuine constituents of the proposi­
tions in whose verbal expressions they occur. Of the pos­
sible theories which admit such constituents the simplest is 
that of Meinong,1 This theory regards any grammatically 
correct denoting phrase as standing for an object Thus 
“ the present King of France," “ the round square,” etc., are
1 See Untersuchungen zur Gegenatandstheorie und Psychologie, Leip­
zig, 1904, the first three articles (by Meinong, Ameseder and Mally re­
spectively).
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supposed to  be genu ine objects. I t  is ad m itted  th a t  such  
objects do n o t subsist, b u t nevertheless th ey  are  supposed to  
be objects. T his is in  itself a difficult view  ; b u t th e  chief 
objection is th a t  such  objects, adm itted ly , a re  ap t to  in fringe  
th e  law  of con trad iction . I t  is contended , for exam ple, th a t  
th e  ex isten t p resen t K ing  of P ra n c e  exists, and  also does n o t 
exist ; th a t  th e  round  square  is round , and  also n o t ro und  ; 
etc. B u t th is  is in to lerab le  ; and  if any  theo ry  can  be found  
to  avoid th is  resu lt, it  is surely  to  be preferred.
11 T he  above breach  of th e  law  of con trad iction  is avoided by  
F re g e ’s theory . H e  d istinguishes, in  a deno ting  ph rase , tw o
. e lem ents, w hich  w e m ay  call th e  meaning and  th e  denotation.1 
T h u s  “ th e  cen tre  of m ass of th e  Solar System  a t th e  beg in ­
n in g  of th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  ” is h igh ly  com plex in  meaning, 
b u t its  denotation is a certa in  poin t, w hich  is sim ple. T he  
"Solar System , th e  tw e n tie th  cen tury , etc., are co n stitu en ts  of 
th e  meaning ; b u t th e  denotation h a s  no constituen ts  a t all.2 
One advan tage  of th is  d istinction  is th a t  i t  show s w hy  it is 
o ften  w orth  w hile to  assert iden tity . I f  we say “ S co tt is 
th e  a u th o r  of Waverley,” we a s s e r t .a n  iden tity  of deno ta tion  
w ith  a difference of m ean ing . I  shall, how ever, n o t rep ea t
- th e  g rounds in  favour of th is  theory , as I  have urged  its
■ claim s elsew here (loo. cit.), and am  now  concerned to  d ispute  
those claim s.
12 - O ne of the  first difficulties th a t  confron t us, w hen  we adopt 
th e  view  th a t  deno ting  phrases express a m ean ing  and  denote 
a d en o ta tio n ,3 concerns the  cases in  w hich  th e  deno ta tion  
appears to  be absent. I f  we say “ th e  K ing  of E n g lan d  is 
b a ld ,” th a t  is, it  w ould seem , n o t a s ta te m e n t abou t th e  
com plex meaning “ th e  K ing  of E n g la n d ,” b u t .a b o u t  th e  
ac tu a l m an  denoted by the  m ean ing . B u t now  consider 
“ th e  K in g  of F ra n ce  is bald ” . B y  p a rity  of form , th is  also 
o ugh t to  be abou t th e  deno tation  of th e  ph rase  “  th e  K ing  of 
F ra n c e  ” . B u t th is  phrase , th o u g h  it h as  a meaning provided
1 See his “ Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschrift fü r  Phil, und  Phil. 
K ritik , vol. 100. .
2 Frege distinguishes the two elements of meaning and denotation 
everywhere, and not only in complex denoting phrases. Thus it is the 
meanings of the constituents of a denoting complex that enter into its 
m eaning, not their denotation. In the proposition “ Mont Blanc is over 
1,000 metres high,” it is, according to him, the m eaning  of “ Mont Blanc,” 
not the actual mountain, that is a constituent of the m eaning  of the pro­
position.
3 In this theory, we shall say that the denoting phrase expresses a  
meaning ; and we shall say both of the phrase and of the meaning that 
they denote a denotation. In the other theory, which I advocate, there 
is no meaning, and only sometimes-a denotation.
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“ the K ing of England ” has a m eaning, has certainly no de­
notation, at least in any obvious sense. H ence one would 
suppose that “ the K ing of France is bald ” ought to be 
nonsense; but it is not nonsense, since it is plainly false. 
Or again consider such a proposition as the following : “ If u 
is a class which has only one member, then that one member 
is  a member of u,” or, as we m ay state it, “ If «  is a unit 
class, the u is a w ”. This proposition ought to be always 
true, since the conclusion is true whenever the hypothesis is 
true. B ut “ the u ” is a denoting phrase, and it is the de­
notation, not the m eaning, that is said to be a u. N ow  if u 
is not a unit class, “ the u ” seem s to denote nothing ; hence 
our proposition would seem  to become nonsense as soon as 
•w. is not a unit class.
N ow  it is plain that such propositions do not become 
nonsense m erely because their hypotheses are false. The  
K ing in “ The T em p est” m ight say, “ If Ferdinand is not 
drowned, Ferdinand is m y only son N ow  “ m y only son ” 
is a denoting phrase, which, on the face of it, has a denota­
tion when, and only w hen, I  have exactly one son. B ut the 
above statem ent would nevertheless have remained true if 
Ferdinand had been in fact drowned. Thus w e m ust either 
provide a denotation in cases in which it is at first sight 
absent, or we m ust abandon the view  that the denotation is 
what is concerned in propositions w hich contain denoting  
phrases. The latter is the course that I  advocate. The 
former course m ay be taken, as by M einong, by adm itting  
objects which do not subsist, and denying that they obey 
the law of contradiction ; this, however, is to be avoided if 
possible. Another way of taking the same course (so far as 
our present alternative is concerned) is adopted by Frege, 
who provides by definition som e purely conventional denota­
tion for the cases in which otherwise there would be none. 
.Thus “ the K ing of France,” is to denote the null-class; 
“ the only son of Mr. So-and-so” (who has a fine family of 
ten), is to.denote the class of all his sons ; and so on. B ut 
th is procedure, though it m ay not lead to actual logical error, 
is plainly artificial, and does not give an exact analysis of 
the matter. Thus if we allow that denoting phrases, in 
general, have the two sides of m eaning and denotation, the 
cases where there seem s to be no denotation cause difficulties 
both on the assumption that there really is a denotation and 
on the assumption that there really is none.
A logical theory m ay be tested by its capacity for dealing 
w ith puzzles, and it is a wholesom e plan, in thinking about 
logic, to stock the mind w ith  as m any puzzles as possible,
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since these  serve m uch  th e  sam e purpose as is served by 
experim en ts  in  physical science. I  shall therefo re  s ta te  th ree  
puzzles w h ich  a th eo ry  as to  deno ting  o ugh t to  be able to  
solve ; and  I  shall show  la te r  th a t  m y  theo ry  solves them .
15 (1) If  a is identical w ith  b, w h a tev er is tru e  of th e  one is 
tru e  of th e  o ther, and e ith e r m ay be su b s titu ted  for th e  o th er 
in  any  proposition  w ithou t a lte ring  th e  t ru th  or falsehood of 
th a t  proposition. N ow  G eorge IY . w ished to  know  w h e th e r 
S co tt w as th e  au th o r of Waverley; and  in  fac t S co tt was 
th e  au th o r of Waverley. H ence  we m ay  su b s titu te  Scott for 
the author of “ Waverley,” and  th ereb y  prove th a t  G eorge IV.. 
w ished to  know  w h e th e r S co tt w as Scott. Y et an  in te res t 
in  th e  law  of id en tity  can  hard ly  be a ttr ib u ted  to  th e  first, 
gen tlem an  of E urope.
16 . (2) B y  th e  law  of excluded m iddle, e ith e r  “ A is B ” or
“ A is no t B ” m u st be true . H ence  e ith e r “ th e  present. 
K ing  of F ra n c e  is bald ” or “ th e  p resen t K ing  of F ra n c e  is 
n o t b a ld ” m u s t be true . Y et if wè enum erated  th e  th in g s  
th a t  are  bald, and th e n  th e  th in g s  th a t  are  n o t bald, we 
shou ld  n o t find th e  p resen t K ing  of F ra n ce  in  e ith e r l is t. 
H egelians, w ho love a syn thesis, will p robab ly  conclude th a t  
h e  w ears a wig.
17 (3) C onsider th e  proposition  “ A  differs from  B  ” . I f  th is  
. is tru e , th e re  is a difference betw een  A and  B , w hich  fac t 
’ m ay  be expressed in  th e  fo rm  “ th e  difference betw een  A and
B  subsists ” . B u t if i t  is false th a t  A  differs from  B , th e n  
th e re  is no difference betw een  A and B , w hich fact m ay  be 
expressed  in  th e  form  “ th e  difference betw een A and  B  does- 
no t subsist ” . B u t how  can  a n o n -en tity  be th e  sub ject of 
a p roposition  ? “ I  th in k , therefo re  I  am  ” is no m ore  evident 
th a n  “ I  am  th e  subject of a p roposition , therefo re  I  a m ,” 
provided “ I  a m ” is tak en  to  assert subsistence o r be ing ,1 
n o t existence. H ence , it w ould appear, it  m u st alw ays be 
self-contrad ictory  to  deny  th e  being of an y th in g  ; b u t  we- 
have  seen, *in connexion  w ith  M einong, th a t  to  adm it being  
also som etim es leads to  con trad ic tions. T h u s if A and B- 
do n o t differ, to  suppose e ith e r th a t  th e re  is, or th a t  th ere  is. 
n o t, such  an  object as “ th e  difference betw een  A and  B  ” 
seem s equally  im possible.
(A) 18 T h e  re la tion  of tb s  m ean ing  to  th e  deno ta tion  involves.
ce rta in  ra th e r  curious difficulties, w h ich  seem  in  them selves 
sufficient to  prove th a t  th e  theo ry  w h ich  leads to  such  diffi­
cu lties m u st be w rong. '
(B) 19 W h e n  we w ish  to  speak ab o u t th e  meaning of a denoting;
11 use these as synonyms.
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phrase, as opposed to its denotation, the natural mode of 
doing so is by inverted commas. Thus we say :—■
The centre of mass of the Solar System is a point, not a 
denoting complex ; .
“  The centre of mass of the Solar System ” is a denoting 
complex, not a point.
Or again,
The first line of Gray’s Elegy states a proposition.
“  The first line of Gray’s Elegy ” does not state a proposi­
tion. Thus taking any denoting phrase, say C, we wish to 
consider the relation between C and “ C,” where the differ­
ence of the two is of the kind exemplified in the above two 
instances.
(C) 20 We say, to begin with, that when C occurs it is the
denotation that we are speaking about ; but when “  C ” occurs, 
it is the meaning. Now the relation of meaning and denota­
tion is not merely linguistic through the phrase : there must 
be a logical relation involved, which we express by saying 
that the meaning denotes the denotation. But the difficulty 
which confronts us is that we cannot succeed in both preserv­
ing the connexion of meaning and denotation and preventing 
them from being one and the same ; also that the meaning 
cannot be got at except by means of denoting phrases. This 
happens as follows.
(D) 21 _ The one phrase C was to have both meaning and denota-
’ tion. But if we speak of “ the meaning of C,” that gives us 
the meaning (if any) of the denotation. “ The meaning of 
the first line of Gray’s Elegy ” is the same as “ The meaning 
of ‘ The curfew tolls the knell of parting day,’ ” and is not the 
same as “ The meaning of ‘ the first line of Gray’s Elegy ’ 
Thus in order to get the meaning we want, we must speak 
not of “ the meaning of C,” but of “ the meaning of ‘ C,’ ” 
which is the same as “ C ” by itself. Similarly “ the denota­
tion of C ” does not mean the denotation we want, but means 
something which, if it denotes at all, denotes what is denoted 
by the denotation we want. Eor example, let “  C ” be “  the 
denoting complex occurring in the second of the above in­
stances ” . Then
C =  “ the first line of Gray’s Elegy,” and 
the denotation of C =  The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. 
But what we meant ta  have as the denotation was “  the first 
line of Gray’s Elegy ” . Thus we have failed to get what 
we wanted.
(E) 22 The difficulty in speaking of the meaning of a denoting
complex may be stated thus ; The moment we put ehe com­
plex in a proposition, the proposition is about the denotation ;
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and if we make a proposition in which the subject is “ the 
meaning of C,” then the subject is the meaning (if any) of 
the denotation, which was not intended.' This leads us to 
say that, when we distinguish meaning and denotation, we 
must be dealing with the meaning : the meaning has denota­
tion and is a complex, and there is not something other than 
the meaning, which can be called the complex, and be said 
to have both meaning and denotation. The right phrase, 
on the view in question, is that some meanings have de­
notations.
(F) 23 But this only makes our difficulty in speaking of meanings
more evident. For suppose C is our complex ; then we are 
to say that C is the meaning of the complex. Nevertheless, 
whenever C occurs without inverted commas, what is said 
is not true of the meaning, but only of the denotation, as 
' when we say : The centre of m ass of the Solar System is a 
point. Thus to speak of C itself, i.e., to make a proposition 
about the meaning, our subject must not be C, but something 
which denotes C. Thus “  C,” which is what we use when 
we want to speak of the meaning, must be not the meaning, 
but something which denotes the meaning. And C must not 
be a constituent of this complex (as it is of “  the meaning of 
C ” ) ; for if C occurs in the complex, it will be its denotation, 
not its meaning, that will occur, and there is no backward 
-- road from denotations to meanings, because every object can 
be denoted by an infinite number of different denoting phrases.
(G) 24 Thus it would seem that “  C ” and C are different entities,
such that “  C ” denotes C ; but this cannot be an explanation, 
because the relation of “  C ” to C remains wholly mysterious ; 
and where are we to find the denoting complex “ C ” which 
is to denote C ? Moreover, when C occurs in â proposition,- 
it is not only the denotation that occurs (as we shall see in 
the next paragraph) ; yet, on the view in question, C is-only 
the denotation, the meaning being wholly relegated to “  C ” , 
This is an  ^inextricable tangle, and seems to prove that the 
whole distinction of meaning and denotation has been wrongly 
conceived.
(H) 25 That the meaning is relevant when a denoting phrase
occurs in a proposition is formally proved by the puzzle 
about the author of Waverley. The proposition “  Scott was 
the author of W'averley”  has a property not possessed by 
“ Scott was Scott,” namely the property that George IY. 
wished to know whether it was true. Thus the two are not 
identical propositions ; hence the meaning of “ the author of 
Waverley ” must be relevant as well as the denotation, if we 
adhere to the point of view to which this distinction belongs.
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Yet, as we have just seen, so long as we adhere to this point 
of view, we are compelled to hold that only the denotation 
can be relevant. Thus the point of view in question must 
be abandoned.
26 It remains to show how all the puzzles we have been con­
sidering are solved by the theory explained at the beginning 
of this article.
27 According to the view which I  advocate, a denoting phrase 
is essentially part of a sentence, and does not, like most 
single words, have any significance on its own account. I f 
I  say “ Scott was a m an,” that is a statement of the form 
“ x  was a man,” and it has “  Scott ” for its subject. But 
if I  say “ the author of Waverley was a man,” that is not a 
statement of the form “ x  was a man,” and does not have “ the 
author of Waverley ” for its subject. Abbreviating the state­
" ment made at the beginning of this article, we may put, in
place of “ the author of Waverley was a man,” the follow­
ing : “ One and only one entity wrote Waverley, and that 
one was a man ” . (This is not so strictly what is meant as 
what was said earlier ; but it is easier to follow.) And speak­
ing generally, suppose we wish to say that the author of 
Waverley had the property <p, what we wish to say is equiva­
lent to “ One and only one entity wrote Waverley, and that 
one had the property (f> ” .
28 The explanation of denotation is now. as follows. Every 
proposition in which “  the author of Waverley ” occurs 
being explained as above, the proposition “ Scott was the 
author of Waverley” (i.e. “ Scott was identical with the 
author of Waverley”) becomes “  One and only one entity 
wrote Waverley, and Scott was identical with that one ” ; or, 
reverting to the wholly explicit form : “ It is not always 
false of x  that x  wrote Waverley, that it is always true of y 
that -if y wrote Waverley y  is identical with x, and that Scott 
is identical with x ” . Thus if “ C ” is a denoting phrase, it 
may happen that there is one entity x  (there cannot be more 
than one) for which the proposition “  x  is identical with C ” 
is true, this proposition being interpreted as above. We 
may then say that the entity x  is the denotation of the 
phrase “ C ” . Thus Scott is the denotation of “ the author 
of Waverley The “ -C ” in inverted commas will be merely 
the phrase, not anything that can be called the meaning. The 
phrase per se has no meaning, because in any proposition in 
which it occurs the proposition, fully expressed, does not 
contain the phrase, which has been broken up.
29 The puzzle about George IY .’s curiosity is now seen to 
have a very simple solution.' The proposition “ Scott was
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the author of Waverley,” which was written out in its un­
abbreviated form in the preceding paragraph, does not con­
tain any constituent “  the author of Waverley ”  for which 
we could substitute “ Scott” . This does not interfere with 
the truth of inferences resulting from making what is verbally 
the substitution of “  Scott ” for “ the author of Waverley,” so 
long as “  the author of Waverley ” has what I  call a primary 
occurrence in the proposition considered. The difference of 
primary and secondary occurrences of denoting phrases is 
as follows :—
30 When we say : “ G-eorge IV. wished to know whether so- 
and-so,” or when we say “ So-and-so is surprising” or “  So­
- and-so is true,” etc., the “  so-and-so ” must be a proposition. 
Suppose now that “  so-and-so ” contains a denoting phrase. 
We may either eliminate this denoting phrase from the 
subordinate proposition “ so-and-so,” or from the whole pro­
position in which “ so-and-so ” is a mere constituent. Differ­
ent propositions result according to which we do. I  have 
heard of a touchy owner of a yacht to whom a guest, on first 
seeing it, remarked, ‘ ‘ I  thought your yacht was larger than 
it i s ” ; and the owner replied, “  No, my yacht is not larger 
than it is ” . What the guest meant was, “ The size that I 
thought your yacht was is greater than the size your yacht 
is ” ; the meaning attributed to him is, “ I  thought the size 
' of your yacht was greater than the size of your yacht ” . To 
, return to George IV. and Waverley, when we say, “ George 
IV. wished to know whether Scott was the author of 
Waverley,” we normally mean “ George IV. wished to know 
whether one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott 
was that man ” ; but we may also mean : “ One and only 
one man wrote Waverley, and George IV. wished to know 
whether Scott was that m an ”. In the latter, “ the author 
of Waverley ” has a primary occurrence ; in the former, a 
secondary. The latter might be expressed by “ George IV. 
wished to* know, concerning the man who in fact wrote 
Waverley, whether he was Scott This would be true, for 
example, if George IV. had seen Scott at a distance, and 
had asked “ Is that Sco tt?” A secondary occurrence of a 
denoting phrase may be defined as one in which the phrase 
occurs in a proposition p  which is a mere constituent of the 
proposition we are considering, and the substitution for the 
denoting phrase is to be effected in p, not in the whole pro­
position concerned. The ambiguity as between primary and 
secondary occurrences is hard to avoid in language ; but it 
does no harm if we are on our guard against it. In symbolic 
logic it is of course easily avoided.
33 .
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31 The distinction of primary and secondary occurrences also 
enables us to deal with the question whether the present 
King of France is bald or not bald, and generally with the 
logical status of denoting phrases that denote nothing. If 
“ C ” is a denoting phrase, say “ the term having the pro­
perty F ,” then
“ C has the property (f> ” means “ one and only one term 
has the property F , and that one has the property ” .1 
If now the property F  belongs to no terms, or to several, it 
follows that “ C has the property ” is false for all values 
of <[>. Thus “ the present King of France is bald ” is certainly 
false ; and “ the present King of France is not bald ” is false 
if it means
“ There is an entity which is now King of France and is not 
bald,”
■ but is true if it means
“ It is false that there is an entity which is now King of 
France and is bald ” .
That is, “ the King of France is not bald ” is false if the 
occurrence of “ the King of Fran ce” is primary, and true if 
it is secondary. Thus all propositions in which “ the King of 
France ” has a primary occurrence are false ; the denials of 
such propositions are true, but in them “ the King of France ” 
has a secondary occurrence. Thus we escape the conclusion 
■•that the King of France has a wig.
32 We can now see also how to deny that there is such an 
object as the difference between A and B  in the case when A 
and B  do not differ. If A and B  do differ, there is one and 
only one entity x such that “ x is the difference between A and 
B  ” is a true proposition ; if A and B  do not differ, there is 
no such entity x. Thus according to the meaning of denota­
tion lately explained, “ the difference between A and B  ” has 
a denotation when A and B  differ, but not otherwise. This 
difference applies to true and false propositions generally. If 
“ a K  b ” stands for “ a has the relation E  to b,” then when 
æ E  & is true, there is such an entity as the relation E  between 
a and b ; when a E  b is false, there is no such entity. Thus 
out of any proposition we can make a denoting phrase, which 
denotes an entity if the proposition is true, but does not de­
note an entity if the proposition is false. E.g., it is true (at 
least we will suppose so) that the earth revolves round the 
sun, and false that the sun revolves round the earth ; hence 
“ the revolution of the earth round the sun ” denotes an
1 This is the abbreviated, not the stricter, interpretation.
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entity, while “ the revolution of the sun round the'earth” 
does not denote an entity.1
33 The whole realm of non-entities, such as “ the round 
square,” “ the even prime other than 2,” “ Apollo,” “ Ham ­
let,” etc., can now be satisfactorily dealt with. All these are 
denoting phrases which do not denote anything. A pro­
position about Apollo means what we get by substituting 
what the classical dictionary tells us is meant by Apollo, 
say “ the sun-god ”. All propositions in which Apollo occurs 
are to be interpreted by the above rules for denoting phrases. 
If “ Apollo ” has a primary occurrence, the proposition con­
taining the occurrence is false ; if the occurrence is secondary, 
the proposition may be true. So again “ the round square is 
round ” means “ there is one and only one entity x which is 
round and square, and that entity is round,” which is a 
false proposition, not, as Meinong maintains, a true one. 
“ The most perfect Being has all perfections ; existence is 
a perfection ; therefore the most perfect Being exists ” be­
comes :—
“ There is one and only one entity x which is most perfect ; 
that one has all perfections ; existence is a perfection ; there­
fore that one exists As a proof, this fails for want of a 
proof of the premiss “ there is one and only one entity x 
which is most perfect ”.2
34 Mr. MacColl (M ind , N.S., No. 54, and again No. 55, p. 401) 
regards individuals as of two sorts, real and unreal ; hence 
he defines the null-class as the class consisting of all unreal 
individuals. This assumes that such phrases as “  the 
present King of Prance,” which do not denote a real in­
dividual, do, nevertheless, denote an individual, but an un­
real one. This is essentially Meinong’s theory, which we 
have seen reason to reject because it conflicts with the law 
of contradiction. With our theory of denoting, we are able 
to hold that there are no unreal individuals ; so that the 
null-class, is the class containing no members, not the class 
sontaining as members all unreal individuals.
35 It is important to observe the effect of our theory on the 
interpretation of definitions which proceed by means of de­
1 The propositions from which such entities are derived are not iden­
tical either with these entities or with the propositions that these entities 
la v e  being.
2 The argument can be made to prove validly that all members of the 
jlass of most perfect Beings exist ; it can also be proved formally that 
this class cannot have more than one member ; but, taking the definition 
oi perfection as possession of all positive predicates, it can be proved 
almost equally formally that the' class does not have even one member.
492 BERTRAND R U SSE L L  :
noting phrases. Most mathematical definitions are of this 
sort : for example, “ m — n means the number which, added to 
n, gives m ” . Thus m — n is defined as meaning the same as 
a certain ' denoting phrase ; but wè agreed that denoting 
phrases have no meaning in isolation. Thus what the defini­
tion really ought to be is : “  Any proposition containing m — n 
is to mean the proposition which results from substituting 
for ‘ m —n ’ ‘ the number which, added to n, gives m ’ The 
resulting proposition is interpreted according to the rules 
already given for interpreting propositions whose verbal ex;- 
pression contains a denoting phrase. In the case where m 
and n are such that there is one and only one number x 
which, added to n, gives m, there is a number x which can 
be substituted for m — n in any proposition containing m — n 
without altering the truth or falsehood of the proposition.
. But in other cases, all propositions in which “ m — n "  has a 
primary occurrence are false.
36 The usefulness of identity is explained by the above theory. 
No one outside a logic-book ever wishes to say “  x is x,'' and 
yet assertions of identity are often made in such forms as 
“  Scott was the author of Waverley ” or “ thou art the man ”. 
The meaning of such propositions cannot be stated without 
the notion of identity, although they are not simply state­
ments that Scott is identical with another term, the author
. of Waverley, or that thou art identical with another term, 
the man. The shortest statement of “  Scott is the author 
of Waverley”  seems to be: “  Scott wrote Waverley; and it 
is always true of y that if y wrote Waverley, y is identical with 
Scott It is in this way that identity enters into “ Scott is 
the author of Waverley ” ; and it is owing to such uses that 
identity is worth affirming.
37 One interesting result of the above theory of denoting is 
this : when there is anything with which we do not have 
immediate acquaintance, but only definition by denoting 
phrases, then the propositions in which this thing is intro­
duced by means of a denoting phrase do not really contain 
this thing as a constituent, but contain instead the constitu­
ents expressed by the several words of the denoting phrase. 
Thus in every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e. not 
only in those whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but 
in all that we can think about), all the constituents are really 
entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. Now 
such things as matter (in the sense in which matter occurs 
in physics) and the minds of other people are known to us 
only by denoting phrases, i.e., we are not acquainted with 
them, but we know them as what has such and such proper­
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ties. Hence, although we can form propositional functions 
C (x) which must hold of such and such a material particle, 
or of So-and-so’s mind, yet we are not acquainted with the 
propositions which affirm these things that we know must 
be true, because we cannot apprehend the actual entities 
concerned. What we know is “  So-and-so has a mind which 
has such and such properties ” but we do not know “ A has 
such and such properties,” where A is the mind in question. 
In such a case, we know the properties of a thing without 
having acquaintance with the thing itself, and without, con­
sequently, knowing any single proposition of which the thing 
itself is a constituent.
38 Of the many other consequences of the view I  have been 
advocating, I  will say nothing. I  will only beg the reader 
not to make up his mind against the view—as he might be 
tempted to do, on account of its apparently excessive com­
plication—until he has attempted to construct a theory of 
his own on the subject of denotation. This attempt, I  be­
lieve, will convince him that, whatever the true theory may 
be, it cannot have such a simplicity as one might have ex­
pected beforehand.

